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Dist. 46, Art. 1, Q. 1

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 46

Textus Latinus
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Articulus Unicus. De voluntate Dei respectu salutis omnium, et respectu mali.

Quaestio I. Utrum Deus velit omnes homines salvos fieri voluntate beneplaciti.

Quod autem Deus velit omnes homines salvos fieri voluntate beneplaciti, ostenditur sic:

1. Primae ad Timotheum secundo1: Vult omnes homines salvos fieri; sed constat, quod hoc non est dictum de voluntate signi, quia nec praecepti nec impletionis nec alicuius alterius — hoc enim non cadit sub praecepto — ergo constat esse dictum de voluntate beneplaciti.

2. Item, Damascenus2: « Oportet scire, quoniam Deus vult antecedenter omnes homines salvos fieri, et regni sui potiri fortuna; non enim ad puniendum plasmavit nos Deus »: ergo cum voluntas antecedens sit voluntas beneplaciti, quae est bonorum, quae sunt bona irrefragabiliter, voluntate beneplaciti vult omnes homines salvos fieri sive salvari.

3. Item, omnis habens caritatem vult omnes homines salvos fieri, quantumcumque modicam habeat dilectionem3. Cum ergo Deus summam habeat dilectionem et caritatem, videtur, quod ipse velit omnes homines salvos fieri.

4. Item, sicut vult Philosophus4, primum uno modo se habet ad omnia sive ad omnes, ergo, quantum est de se, omnes uniformiter diligit; ergo si vult aliquos salvari, et omnes; vel si de aliquibus non vult, pari ratione de nullis.

Ad oppositum:

1. Contra hoc primo est instantia, quam adducit Magister in littera5: si vult omnes homines salvos fieri, et de omnibus plures damnantur, quam salvantur, ergo voluntas eius frustratur et cassatur; quod est contra veritatem aperte.

2. Item, omnes quos vult Deus salvari, eligit ad salutem — electio enim Dei non dicit aliud quam dilectionem ad salvandum — ergo si omnes vult salvos fieri, omnes sunt electi. Contra, Matthaei vigesimo secundo6: Multi sunt vocati, pauci vero electi.

3. Item, in praedestinatione non sunt nisi haec duo, scilicet praecognitio et voluntas salvandi, ratione cuius Deus dicitur praedestinare. Dum enim proponit dare gratiam et gloriam praeparare, praedestinare dicitur7: ergo cum praecognitio Dei omni-

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bus sit communis, si voluntas salutis est respectu omnium, ergo omnes sunt praedestinati. Sed omnes praedestinati salvabuntur: ergo omnes salvabuntur; quod est contra fidem. Si tu dicas mihi, quod duplex est voluntas, absoluta et conditionalis, et Deus absoluta voluntate solum vult salvare quos praescivit conformes fieri imagini Filii sui8, et istos praedestinavit, voluntate vero conditionali vult omnes, si ipsi velint; tunc obiicitur, quod voluntas conditionalis non videtur convenire Deo, quia haec est voluntas semiplena, Deus autem quidquid vult, plene vult. Et iterum, quidquid facit, plene facit. Et iterum, haec conditionata voluntas aut est voluntas beneplaciti, aut voluntas signi. Si signi, tunc nihil ad propositum, quia voluntate signi non vult omnes homines salvos fieri. Si voluntas beneplaciti; sed haec uno modo tantum est et dicitur et semper impletur: ergo omnes homines salvantur. Et praeterea, haec voluntas conditionata, qua dicitur, quod vult, si ipsi velint, locum non potest habere in parvulis, qui moriuntur: ergo adhuc non solvit ista distinctio.

4. Item, cum sic dicitur: vult hunc salvari, aliquo demonstrato, aut hoc quod est velle aliquid connotat, aut nihil. Si nihil: ergo pari ratione potest dici de lapide, quod Deus vult hunc salvari. Si aliquid, non nisi salutem: ergo sequitur, si vult hunc salvari, quod iste salvabitur, qualitercumque accipiatur velle. Si dicas, quod connotat possibilitatem et ordinabilitatem ad salutem; obiicitur tunc, quod de quolibet ordinabili ad aliquid potest dici Deum velle; sed quilibet clericus est ordinabilis ad episcopatum, et quilibet miles ad dignitatem regiam: ergo Deus vult, omnes clericos esse episcopos, et omnes milites esse reges; quod non conceditur.

Conclusio.

Conclusio. Deus vult, omnes voluntate beneplaciti salvos fieri, quod intelligi potest sive cum Augustino de voluntate consequenti, sive cum Damasceno de voluntate antecedenti.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod cum Apostolus dicat, quod Deus hoc vult, scilicet omnes homines salvos fieri, quod necesse habemus concedere, quod Deus velit. Et cum non possit exponi de voluntate signi, necesse habemus exponere de voluntate beneplaciti. Sed cum non omnes salventur, et voluntas Dei numquam frustretur, ideo necesse est, quod fiat vis in modo distribuendi, vel in modo volendi9.

Et egregius doctor Augustinus duplicem facit vim in modo distribuendi in Enchiridio10: uno modo, quod distributio sit accommoda, sicut et haec: omnis homo timet in mari, secundum communem modum loquendi intelligitur: qui est in mari. Similiter Augustinus11 exemplificat, si dicatur: « Magister iste docet omnes pueros de ista civitate, quia scilicet docet omnes qui addiscunt. Nullus enim docetur nisi per ipsum ». Similiter, « Deus vult omnes homines salvos fieri, quia nullus salvatur, nisi velit Deus, et ideo orandus est, ut velit »12. — Facit etiam alio modo vim in distributione secundum communem modum distinguendi, quod potest fieri pro singulis generum, et sic est falsa, et non intelligit Apostolus sic; vel pro generibus singulorum, et sic vera, quia Deus de omni gente voluit et vult aliquos salvari, et de Graecis et Latinis, et de praelatis et subditis, et de omni gente; et ideo dicit Apostolus13, pro omnibus esse orandum. Haec est responsio Augustini, cui Magister innititur; et

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necesse est sic vel sic solvere, supposito quod velle dicat ibi velle Dei, secundum quod dicitur velle placito quietato sive voluntate absoluta, de qua verum est dicere: Omnia quaecumque voluit, fecit14.

Sed Damascenus15 facit vim in modo volendi. Distinguit enim in Deo voluntatem antecedentem et voluntatem consequentem. Et voluntas antecedens est voluntas respectu eius, propter quod Deus hominem facit, et est irrefragabiliter bonorum. Voluntas autem consequens est voluntas, non quae sequitur merita, sed quae vult aliqua secundum praescientiam meritorum. Prima, scilicet antecedens, dicitur a magistris voluntas conditionalis sive voluntas, qua Deus vult, quantum in se est. Secunda autem, scilicet consequens, dicitur absoluta. Differentia autem inter hanc voluntatem et illam non est secundum diversitatem affectionis sive modi volendi, qui sit in Deo, sed secundum rationem connotandi et intelligendi. — Prout enim Deus dicitur velle omnium salutem, quantum in se est et antecedenter, connotatur in omnibus hominibus ordinabilitas16 ad salutem, tum ex parte naturae datae, tum ex parte gratiae oblatae. Dedit enim Deus naturam, secundum quam possent ipsum cognoscere et cognitum quaerere et quaesitum invenire et invento inhaerere, ac per hoc salutem obtinere. Gratiam similiter obtulit, dum Filium misit et obtulit, cuius pretium omnium saluti suffecit. Leges etiam et mandata tribuit salutis et ostendit. Ipse etiam praesto est omnibus inquirentibus et prope est omnibus invocantibus eum17. Velle ergo hominem antecedenter salvare est ordinatum ad salutem facere et volenti pervenire non deesse. Unde velle antecedenter salvare non connotat salutem, sed ordinabilitatem ad salutem. Velle autem consequenter sive absolute salvare est velle dare salutem ei, quem praescit ad salutem perventurum per suum auxilium et gratiam, et connotat salutis eventum. Et sic non est dicere, quod Deus velit omnes homines salvos fieri.

Huic responsioni magis consonant magistri, quamvis utraque bona sit. Secundum hanc igitur respondendum, quod Deus vult omnes homines salvos fieri, quantum in se est sive voluntate antecedente, non autem voluntate absoluta sive consequente.

Ad argumenta:

Ad 1, 2, 3, 4. Et quia illa non connotat effectus solum, ideo non impeditur in hoc, quod non omnes salvantur. — Patet etiam responsio ad illud quod obicit de praedestinatione sive electione, quia in illis clauditur voluntas absoluta, non solum antecedens. — Patet etiam responsio ad ultimum de connotato.

Ad illud tamen quod obiicitur, quod voluntas conditionata non cadit in Deum; dicendum, quod non ponitur in Deo velleitas quantum ad defectum18 plenitudinis voluntatis nec propter diversos modos volendi, sed propter aliam comparationem in connotando, et sic patet illud.

Ad 1, 2. Ad rationes vero ad oppositum, quod Deus vult omnes homines salvos fieri; responderi potest ad duas primas, quod verum concludunt et vere.

Ad 3. Ad illud autem quod obiicitur de caritate hominum, dicendum, quod non est simile, quia nos nescimus merita hominum futura finaliter; et si quis sciret, aliquos esse praescitos, quamvis, quantum in se est, deberet eos velle salvari, non tamen voluntate absoluta. Sed haec melius infra patebunt19.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus uno modo se habet ad omnes; dicendum, quod illud verbum Philosophi habet locum quantum ad rerum gubernationem, non quantum ad earum productionem; vel quantum ad naturalia, non quantum ad gratuita.

Scholion

I. Magister in hac distinctione non parum laborat, ut sustineat, voluntatem divinam numquam fieri cassam, nec si vult bonum, nec si non vult malum. Imprimis nititur explicare verba Apostoli (I. Tim. 2, 4): Qui omnes homines vult salvos fieri etc. Unde incidit hic quaestio, utrum Deus vere velit salutem omnium hominum; cum qua intime connexae sunt duae aliae quaestiones; utrum Christus mortuus sit pro omnibus hominibus, et utrum Deus conferat vel saltem offerat omnibus hominibus media sufficientia ad salutem. — Notum est, Cornelium Iansenium, Calvini vestigia secutum, ad has tres quaestiones pro statu naturae lapsae respondere negative; item, ab Innocentio X. (Constit. « Cum occasione », 31 Maii 1653) damnatam esse propositionem Iansenii: « Semipelagianum est dicere, Christum pro omnibus omnino hominibus mortuum esse aut sanguinem fudisse ». Cfr. etiam inter propositiones Paschasii Quesnelli, a Clemente XI. (Constit. « Unigenitus », 8 Sept. 1713) damnatas, propos. 30. et

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32. — Contra istos errores S. Bonav. docuit, quod Christus mortuus sit pro omnibus, III. Sent. d. 20. q. 4. in corp. 1; IV. Sent. d. 4. p. I. a. 1. q. 3. ad 3; — item, quod sufficientia auxilia modis diversis offerat omnibus, II. Sent. d. 28. a. 1. q. 3. ad 4; q. 2. q. 1. ad 1. — Quoad parvulos sine baptismo morientes cfr. II. Sent. d. 32. a. 3. q. 2.

II. Quoad expositionem illius testimonii Apostoli: Qui omnes homines vult salvos fieri, notandum, quod cum Pelagiani et Semipelagiani hoc dicto abuterentur ad errores suos confirmandos, S. Augustinus plures interpretationes excogitavit, quibus intelligi terminum omnes cum restrictione, et terminus positus in sensu voluntatis consequentis (id est voluntatis absolutae et efficacis respectu salutis). Ita etiam Magister hunc locum interpretatur, atque S. Bonav. aliique antiqui magistri has conclusiones ut bonas et probabiles referunt; sed aliam planiorem iuxta Damasceni, hic propositam, praeferre videntur, ut explicite (hic q. unica, n. 3.) dicit: « Tamen multo melius posset exponi de voluntate antecedenti ». Ipse S. August. (de Spiritu et littera c. 33, et de Catechiz. Rudibus c. 26.) expositionem iuxta voluntatem antecedentem satis indicat. Nostra aetate uniter docetur, divinam voluntatem salvandi omnes spectare ad voluntatem antecedentem, sed praedestinationem et reprobationem ad voluntatem consequentem.

III. Circa hanc distinctionem antecedentis et consequentis voluntatis diversae propugnatae sunt sententiae. Apud Alexandrum Hal. (S. p. I. q. 36. m. 2.) primo loco ponitur, quod voluntas antecedens salvandi omnes non sit voluntas beneplaciti, sed voluntas signi; quae sententia etiam posterioribus theologis placuit, sed ab Alexandro, a Bonaventura, S. Thoma (de Verit. q. 23. a. 3, et I. Sent. d. 19. a. 2.) aliisque communiter reprobatur. — Omissis aliis huius distinctionis explicationibus, nunc communiter voluntatem antecedentem in Deo attingere obiectum in nudis circumstantiis, consequentem vero obiectum circumstantiis omnibus vestitum (vide explicationem S. Thomae, S. [I.] q. 19. a. 1. ad 1.). In ulteriore harum circumstantiarum determinatione theologi in diversas sententias abeunt. Qui praedestinationem post praevisa merita defendunt, putant, praevisionem consensus humanae voluntatis praecedere Dei voluntatem consequentem. Opposita autem sententia Thomistarum vult, quod utraque voluntas, et antecedens et consequens, antecedit praevisionem meritorum, et quod voluntas antecedens praeparat omnibus auxilia et media sufficientia, consequens vero tantum electis auxilia efficacia (Gotti, l. tr. 5. dub. 4. § 2.).

IV. Nobis sufficiat in conspectu ponere quae S. Bonav. hoc loco et infra d. 47. q. 1. docet de hac distinctione. Haec valde conveniunt cum iis, quae S. Thom. habet in suo Commentario in Sent. (hic q. unica, a. 1.). [In ulteriore harum circumstantiarum determinatione theologi in diversas sententias abeunt secundum applicationem S. Thomae (S. I. q. 19. a. 1. ad 1.).]

1. Haec distinctio attenditur non ex parte ipsius voluntatis divinae, sed ex parte volitorum. « Differentia autem inter hanc voluntatem et illam non est secundum diversitatem affectionis sive modi volendi... sed secundum rationem connotandi et intelligendi » (hic in corp.); S. Thom. (loc. cit. in corp.): « Hoc contingit non ex aliqua diversitate voluntatis divinae, sed propter diversas conditiones ipsius voliti ».

2. In voluntate antecedenti « connotatur in omnibus ordinabilitas ad salutem, tum ex parte naturae datae, tum ex parte gratiae oblatae » etc. (S. Bonav. ibid.). S. Thom. (ibid.): « In illius voluntatis (antecedentis) effectus est ipse ordo naturae in finem salutis et promoventia in finem, omnibus communiter proposita, tum naturalia quam gratuita, sicut potentiae naturales et praecepta legis, et huiusmodi ».

3. Unde voluntas antecedens non est pura velleitas, sed quoad effectum suum proprium (scil. ordinabilitatem ad salutem et media sufficientia) est semper efficax. Explicite hoc declarat (infra d. 47. q. 1. in corp.): « Unde voluntas (antecedens) non cassatur, quia habet proprium effectum ».

4. Voluntas consequens connotat « salutis eventum » (hic in corp.), et sicut « connotat effectum, ita connotat existentiam causae particularis »; « connotat causam creatam concurrere » (d. 47. q. 1. ad 2.). S. Thom. (ibid.) notat in voluntate consequenti hanc circumstantiam, quod homo « est volens et praeparans se ad salutem suam, vel etiam repugnans et contrarie agens ».

5. In voluntate consequenti implicatur praescientia salutis, quia est « velle dare salutem ei, quem praescit ad salutem perventurum per suum auxilium et gratiam » (hic). « Numquam enim vellet (istum salvari), nisi pariter praesciret, eum esse salvandum » (d. 47. q. 1.).

6. Implicatur in eadem voluntate consequenti etiam praescientia bonorum operum. « Voluntas autem consequens est voluntas, non quae sequitur merita, sed quae vult aliqua secundum praescientiam meritorum ». « Voluntas Dei secundum convenientiam ad praescientiam vult illa quae vult » (d. 47. q. 1. ad 4.). Similiter S. Thom. (loc. cit. in hac corp.): « Dicitur voluntas consequens, eo quod praesupponit praescientiam operum, non tanquam causam voluntatis, sed quasi rationem voliti ». — De praescientia meritorum, quatenus esse possit ratio motiva voluntatis, S. Bonaventuram paulo aliter loqui ac S. Thom., iam supra d. 41. a. q. I. 2. observavimus.

V. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 36. m. 2. ad 1. — Scot., hic q. unica ad 1. — S. Thom., locc. citt. — B. Albert., hic a. 1, d. 40. a. 8; S. p. I. tr. 20. q. 79. m. 3. a. 2. q. incid. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. unica. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., ex parte q. 1.

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English Translation
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Sole Article. On the will of God with respect to the salvation of all, and with respect to evil.

Question I. Whether God wills all men to be saved by the will of good-pleasure.

That God wills all men to be saved by the will of good-pleasure is shown thus:

1. First Letter to Timothy, chapter 21: He wills all men to be saved; but it is established that this was not said of the will of sign, since [it is] neither of precept nor of fulfillment nor of any other [kind of sign] — for this does not fall under precept — therefore it is established to have been said of the will of good-pleasure.

2. Likewise, [John] Damascene2: « It must be known, that God antecedently wills all men to be saved, and to obtain the fortune of his kingdom; for God did not fashion us for punishment »: therefore, since the antecedent will is the will of good-pleasure, which is of good things — things which are irrefragably good — by the will of good-pleasure he wills all men to be saved or to attain salvation.

3. Likewise, everyone having charity wills all men to be saved, however small the love he has3. Since therefore God has supreme love and charity, it appears that he himself wills all men to be saved.

4. Likewise, as the Philosopher holds4, a first [principle] in one way relates to all things or to all [men]; therefore, so far as in itself, it loves all uniformly; therefore if [God] wills some to be saved, he wills all; or if of some he does not will [it], by the same reasoning of none.

On the contrary:

1. Against this, first, is the instance which the Master adduces in the text5: if he wills all men to be saved, and of all the greater number are damned than are saved, then his will is frustrated and rendered void; which is openly against the truth.

2. Likewise, all whom God wills to be saved he elects to salvation — for God's election says nothing other than love unto saving — therefore if he wills all to be saved, all are elect. On the contrary, Matthew 226: Many are called, but few are chosen.

3. Likewise, in predestination there are only these two, namely foreknowledge and the will of saving, by reason of which God is said to predestine. For when he proposes to give grace and to prepare glory, he is said to predestine7: therefore, since God's foreknowledge is com-

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mon to all, if the will of salvation is with respect to all, then all are predestined. But all the predestined will be saved: therefore all will be saved; which is against the faith. If you say to me that the will is twofold, absolute and conditional, and that God by absolute will wills to save only those whom he foreknew to be made conformed to the image of his Son8, and these he predestined, but by conditional will he wills all, if they themselves will [it]; then it is objected that the conditional will does not seem to befit God, since this is a half-full will, whereas God whatever he wills, wills fully. And again, whatever he does, he does fully. And again, this conditioned will is either the will of good-pleasure, or the will of sign. If of sign, then [it is] nothing to the purpose, since by the will of sign he does not will all men to be saved. If [it is] the will of good-pleasure; but this exists and is so called in one way only, and is always fulfilled: therefore all men are saved. And furthermore, this conditioned will, by which it is said that he wills [it] if they themselves will, can have no place in little ones who die [in infancy]: therefore even so this distinction does not solve [the difficulty].

4. Likewise, when it is said thus: he wills this one to be saved, with someone pointed out, either this — i.e. to will something — connotes [something], or nothing. If nothing: then by the same reasoning it can be said of a stone, that God wills this one to be saved. If [it connotes] something, [it connotes] nothing but salvation: therefore it follows that if he wills this one to be saved, then this one will be saved, however to-will be taken. If you say that it connotes possibility and orderability toward salvation, then it is objected that of anything orderable toward anything else it can be said that God wills it; but every cleric is orderable to the episcopate, and every soldier to royal dignity: therefore God wills all clerics to be bishops, and all soldiers to be kings; which is not granted.

Conclusion.

Conclusion. God wills all to be saved by the will of good-pleasure, which can be understood either with Augustine of the consequent will, or with Damascene of the antecedent will.

I respond: It must be said that since the Apostle says that God wills this, namely that all men be saved, we must necessarily concede that God wills [it]. And since it cannot be expounded of the will of sign, we must necessarily expound [it] of the will of good-pleasure. But since not all are saved, and God's will is never frustrated, therefore it is necessary that force be put on the mode of distribution, or on the mode of willing9.

And the eminent doctor Augustine in the Enchiridion10 applies force in two ways in the mode of distribution: in one way, [namely] that the distribution is accommodated, as also this [example]: "every man fears at sea" is understood according to the common manner of speaking [as referring to him] who is at sea. Similarly Augustine11 gives the example: « This master teaches all the boys of this city, namely because he teaches all who are learning. For no one is taught except through him ». Similarly, « God wills all men to be saved, because no one is saved unless God wills [it], and therefore he must be prayed to, that he may will it »12. — He also applies force in another way to the distribution according to the common manner of distinguishing — [namely] that [the distribution] can be made for individuals of [each] genus, and thus it is false, nor does the Apostle understand [it] thus; or for genera of individuals, and thus [it is] true, since God of every nation has willed and wills some to be saved — of Greeks and Latins, of prelates and subjects, and of every nation; and therefore the Apostle says13 that prayer is to be made for all. This is Augustine's reply, on which the Master leans; and

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it is necessary to resolve [it] in this way or that, supposing that to will there says the willing of God according as he is said to will by satisfied resolve or by absolute will, of which it is true to say: He has done all that he willed14.

But Damascene15 applies force in the mode of willing. For he distinguishes in God an antecedent will and a consequent will. And the antecedent will is the will with respect to that on account of which God makes man, and is irrefragably of good things. The consequent will, however, is the will, not which follows merits, but which wills certain things according to the foreknowledge of merits. The first, namely the antecedent, is called by the masters the conditional will, or the will by which God wills, so far as in himself. The second, namely the consequent, is called absolute. But the difference between this will and that is not according to diversity of affection or of mode of willing which may be in God, but according to a ground of connotation and understanding. — For inasmuch as God is said to will the salvation of all, so far as in himself and antecedently, there is connoted in all men orderability16 toward salvation, both on the side of given nature, and on the side of grace offered. For God gave a nature according to which they can know him, and seek him once known, and find him once sought, and cling to him once found, and through this obtain salvation. Likewise he offered grace, when he sent and offered the Son, whose price sufficed for the salvation of all. He also bestowed laws and commandments of salvation and showed them. He himself also is present to all who seek, and is near to all who call upon him17. Therefore to will antecedently to save a man is to be ordered toward making salvation and to not fail him who wills to attain [it]. Hence to will antecedently to save does not connote salvation, but orderability toward salvation. But to will consequently or absolutely to save is to will to give salvation to him whom [God] foreknows will reach salvation through his own help and grace, and it connotes the event of salvation. And thus it is not to be said that God wills all men to be saved.

To this reply the masters give greater consent, although both [replies] are good. According to this [reply], therefore, it must be said that God wills all men to be saved, so far as in himself, or by antecedent will, but not by absolute or consequent will.

Replies to the arguments:

Ad 1, 2, 3, 4. And because [the antecedent will] does not connote the effects alone, it is not therefore hindered by the fact that not all are saved. — The reply is also plain to that which is objected concerning predestination or election, because in these the absolute will is included, not only the antecedent. — The reply is also plain to the last [objection], concerning the connotation.

To that which is objected, that conditioned will does not fall in God, it must be said that velleity is not posited in God as regards a defect18 of the fullness of will, nor on account of diverse modes of willing, but on account of another relation in connoting; and thus this [objection] is clear.

Replies to the arguments on the contrary:

Ad 1, 2. As to the reasonings on the contrary side — that God wills all men to be saved — it can be answered to the first two that they conclude both truly and rightly.

Ad 3. To that which is objected concerning the charity of men, it must be said that the case is not similar, since we do not know the future merits of men finally; and if anyone did know that some were foreknown [as reprobate], although, so far as in himself, he ought to will them to be saved, yet not by absolute will. But these matters will be made clearer below19.

Ad 4. To that which is objected, that God relates to all in one way; it must be said that this saying of the Philosopher has place as regards the governance of things, not as regards their production; or as regards natural things, not as regards things of grace.

Scholion

I. The Master in this distinction labors not a little to maintain that the divine will never becomes void, neither when it wills good, nor when it does not will evil. First of all, he strives to explain the words of the Apostle (1 Tim. 2:4): Who wills all men to be saved etc. Hence falls here the question, whether God truly wills the salvation of all men; with which two other questions are intimately connected: whether Christ died for all men, and whether God confers or at least offers to all men sufficient means for salvation. — It is known that Cornelius Jansen, following in Calvin's footsteps, answered these three questions in the negative for the state of fallen nature; likewise, that by Innocent X (Constitution « Cum occasione », 31 May 1653) the proposition of Jansen was condemned: « It is semipelagian to say that Christ died or shed his blood for all men absolutely ». Cf. also among the propositions of Paschasius Quesnel, condemned by Clement XI (Constitution « Unigenitus », 8 Sept. 1713), propositions 30 and

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32. — Against these errors St. Bonaventure taught that Christ died for all, III Sent. d. 20 q. 4 in corp. 1; IV Sent. d. 4 p. I a. 1 q. 3 ad 3; — likewise, that sufficient helps are offered to all in various ways, II Sent. d. 28 a. 1 q. 3 ad 4; q. 2 q. 1 ad 1. — As to little ones dying without baptism, cf. II Sent. d. 32 a. 3 q. 2.

II. As to the exposition of that testimony of the Apostle, Who wills all men to be saved, it must be noted that since the Pelagians and Semipelagians abused this saying to confirm their errors, St. Augustine thought out several interpretations by which the term all may be understood with a restriction, and the term [is to be] taken in the sense of the consequent will (that is, of the absolute and efficacious will with respect to salvation). The Master too interprets this place in this way, and St. Bonaventure and other ancient masters report these conclusions as good and probable; but they seem to prefer another plainer one according to Damascene, here proposed, as he says explicitly (here q. unica, n. 3): « Yet it could be far better expounded of the antecedent will ». St. Augustine himself (On the Spirit and the Letter c. 33, and On Catechizing the Uninstructed c. 26) sufficiently indicates the exposition according to the antecedent will. In our age it is uniformly taught that the divine will of saving all pertains to the antecedent will, but predestination and reprobation to the consequent will.

III. Concerning this distinction of antecedent and consequent will, diverse opinions have been advanced. In Alexander of Hales (Summa p. I q. 36 m. 2) it is first proposed that the antecedent will of saving all is not the will of good-pleasure, but the will of sign; which opinion also pleased later theologians, but is commonly rejected by Alexander, by Bonaventure, by St. Thomas (de Verit. q. 23 a. 3, and I Sent. d. 19 a. 2), and others. — Other explanations of this distinction being passed over, it is now commonly [held] that the antecedent will in God attains its object in bare circumstances, the consequent will, however, the object clothed with all [its] circumstances (see St. Thomas's explanation, Summa [I] q. 19 a. 1 ad 1). In the further determination of these circumstances theologians depart into different opinions. Those who defend predestination after foreseen merits hold that the foreseeing of the consent of the human will precedes God's consequent will. The opposite opinion, of the Thomists, holds that both wills — both antecedent and consequent — precede the foreseeing of merits, and that the antecedent will prepares for all sufficient helps and means, the consequent will only for the elect efficacious helps (Gotti, l. tr. 5 dub. 4 § 2).

IV. Let it suffice for us to set forth here what St. Bonaventure teaches in this place and below at d. 47 q. 1 concerning this distinction. These [points] agree very much with what St. Thomas has in his Commentary on the Sentences (here q. unica, a. 1). [In the further determination of these circumstances theologians depart into diverse opinions according to St. Thomas's application (Summa I q. 19 a. 1 ad 1).]

1. This distinction is considered not on the side of the divine will itself, but on the side of the willed things. « But the difference between this will and that is not according to a diversity of affection or of mode of willing... but according to a ground of connoting and understanding » (here in corp.); St. Thomas (loc. cit. in corp.): « This happens not from any diversity of God's will, but on account of diverse conditions of the willed thing itself ».

2. In the antecedent will « there is connoted in all [men] an orderability toward salvation, both on the side of given nature, and on the side of grace offered » etc. (St. Bonav., ibid.). St. Thomas (ibid.): « The effect of this (antecedent) will is the very ordering of nature toward the end of salvation and [the things] promoting toward the end, commonly proposed to all — both natural and gratuitous — such as the natural powers and the precepts of the law, and the like ».

3. Hence the antecedent will is not pure velleity, but as to its proper effect (namely, orderability toward salvation and sufficient means) is always efficacious. He declares this explicitly (below d. 47 q. 1 in corp.): « Hence the (antecedent) will is not rendered void, since it has its proper effect ».

4. The consequent will connotes « the event of salvation » (here in corp.), and just as « it connotes the effect, so also it connotes the existence of the particular cause »; « it connotes that the created cause concurs » (d. 47 q. 1 ad 2). St. Thomas (ibid.) notes in the consequent will this circumstance, that man « is willing and preparing himself for his salvation, or also resisting and acting contrarily ».

5. In the consequent will foreknowledge of salvation is implied, since it is « to will to give salvation to him whom he foreknows will reach salvation through his own help and grace » (here). « For he would never will (this one to be saved), unless he equally foreknew him to be one who would be saved » (d. 47 q. 1).

6. There is also implied in the same consequent will the foreknowledge of good works. « The consequent will is, however, the will, not which follows merits, but which wills certain things according to the foreknowledge of merits ». « God's will according to its congruity with foreknowledge wills those things which it wills » (d. 47 q. 1 ad 4). Similarly St. Thomas (loc. cit. in this corp.): « It is called the consequent will, in that it presupposes the foreknowledge of works, not as a cause of the will, but as a kind of ground of the willed thing ». — Concerning foreknowledge of merits, inasmuch as it can be a motive ground of the will, we have already observed above (d. 41 a. q. 1. 2) that St. Bonaventure speaks somewhat differently from St. Thomas.

V. Alex. Hal., Summa p. I q. 36 m. 2 ad 1. — Scot., here q. unica ad 1. — S. Thom., locc. citt. — B. Albert, here a. 1, d. 40 a. 8; Summa p. I tr. 20 q. 79 m. 3 a. 2 q. incid. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 1 a. 1. — Richard. a Med., here q. 1. — Aegid. R., here 1 princ. q. unica. — Durand., here q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., ex parte q. 1.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vers. 4.
    Verse 4.
  2. Libr. II. de Fide orthod. c. 29. Textum originalem vide supra pag. 728, nota 2. — Circa finem argumenti Vat. sic: irrefragibiliter, vult voluntate beneplaciti, vult ergo omnes etc.
    Book II On the Orthodox Faith c. 29. See the original text above, p. 728, note 2. — Near the end of the argument the Vatican [edition reads] thus: irrefragibiliter, vult voluntate beneplaciti, vult ergo omnes etc.
  3. Vat. et cod. cc adiiciunt et caritatem.
    The Vatican edition and codex cc add et caritatem ("and charity").
  4. Intellige auctorem libri de Causis, cuius verba iam supra pag. 646, nota 1. allata sunt. Cfr. etiam propos. 20, in qua docetur, causam primam stando in sua unitate regere omnia. — Vat. post primum adiungit ens, scilicet Deus.
    Understand [him to mean] the author of the book On Causes, whose words have already been adduced above p. 646, note 1. Cf. also proposition 20, in which it is taught that the first cause, standing in its unity, governs all things. — The Vatican [edition] after primum adds ens, namely God.
  5. Hic c. 1. — Mox pro salvos fieri Vat. cum cod. cc salvari.
    Here c. 1. — Shortly afterward, for salvos fieri the Vatican edition with codex cc [reads] salvari ("to be saved").
  6. Vers. 14. — De propos. minori, quae praecedit, cfr. supra d. 40. a. 3. q. I. seq.
    Verse 14. — On the preceding minor proposition, cf. above d. 40 a. 3 q. 1 and following.
  7. Vide supra d. 40. a. 1. q. I. ad 5, et ibid. q. 2.
    See above d. 40 a. 1 q. 1 ad 5, and the same q. 2.
  8. Rom. 8, 29. — Mox post omnes in cod. V additur salvos fieri, in cod. W homines.
    Rom. 8:29. — Shortly afterward, after omnes codex V adds salvos fieri, and codex W [adds] homines.
  9. Vel aliis verbis: ideo necesse est, quod vel signum distributivum omnes distinguendo accipiamus in sensu congruo vel verbum vult distinguamus, prout scil. significare potest aut voluntatem antecedentem, aut consequentem.
    Or in other words: therefore it is necessary that either we take the distributive sign omnes ("all"), in distinguishing, in a congruent sense, or we distinguish the verb vult ("wills"), inasmuch as it can signify either antecedent or consequent will.
  10. Cap. 103. n. 27. Vide hic in lit. Magistri, c. 2. — Paulo post pro accommoda Vat. accommodata. De distributione accommoda cfr. supra pag. 817, nota 3.
    Chapter 103, n. 27. See here in the text of the Master, c. 2. — A little afterward, for accommoda the Vatican [reads] accommodata. On accommodated distribution, cf. above p. 817, note 3.
  11. Libr. de Natura et gratia contra Pelagium, c. 41. n. 48: « Itaque omnes dictum est, ne aliquo modo alio praeter ipsum quisquam salvus fieri posse credatur. Sicut enim, uno litterarum magistro in civitate constituto, rectissime dicimus: omnes iste hic litteras docet; non quia omnes cives litteras discunt, sed quia nemo discit, nisi quem ille docuerit: sic nemo iustificatur, nisi quem iustificaverit Christus ». Idem exemplum habetur in libro II. Oper. imperf. contra Iulian., sent. 134, his verbis: Sicut dicimus de litterarum magistro, si in civitate solus est: omnes iste hic litteras docet; non quia omnes discunt, sed quia nemo nisi ab ipso.
    Book On Nature and Grace against Pelagius, c. 41 n. 48: « And so all was said, lest it should be believed that anyone in any other way besides him himself could be saved. For just as, with one master of letters appointed in a city, we most rightly say: this one teaches all here their letters; not because all the citizens learn letters, but because no one learns except him whom he has taught: so no one is justified except him whom Christ has justified ». The same example is found in book II Opus imperfectum against Julian, sent. 134, in these words: As we say of a master of letters, if he is the only one in the city: this one teaches all here their letters; not because all learn, but because [none does] except by him.
  12. August., Enchir., c. 103. n. 27, ubi etiam quae hic sequuntur quoad sensum inveniuntur. Eandem distinctionem, ac hic, August. facit in libro IV. Oper. imperf. contra Iulian., sent. 124: Quomodo miseretur omnium Deus, cum alia Scriptura dicat: Non miserearis omnium qui operantur iniquitatem (Ps. 58, 6.), nisi quia et illis in quorum non miseretur, omnes homines ita sunt, ut omnia genera hominum intelligantur, sicut dictum est: Decimatis omne olus (Luc. 11, 42.) i. e. omne oleris genus? — Paulo inferius post potest fieri supple cum codd. M Z ff et ed. 1 distributio; pro potest fieri cod. H potest distribuere; Vat. sic: secundum omnem modum distribuendi, quae potest fieri pro etc.
    Augustine, Enchiridion c. 103 n. 27, where also what follows here is found as to the sense. The same distinction as here, Augustine makes in book IV Opus imperfectum against Julian, sent. 124: How does God have mercy on all, when another Scripture says: Have no mercy on all who work iniquity (Ps. 58:6), unless because also of those on whom he does not have mercy, all men are so [described] that all kinds of men should be understood — as it has been said: You tithe every herb (Luke 11:42), i.e. every kind of herb? — A little below, after potest fieri supply with codices M Z ff and edition 1 distributio; for potest fieri codex H [reads] potest distribuere; the Vatican [reads] thus: secundum omnem modum distribuendi, quae potest fieri pro etc.
  13. Epist. 1. Tim. 2, 1. seq. — Sententiam Magistri vide hic in lit. c. 2.
    Epistle 1 Tim. 2:1ff. — See the opinion of the Master here in the text, c. 2.
  14. Psalm. 113, 11.
    Psalm 113:11 [Vulg.].
  15. Libr. II. de Fide orthod. c. 29. Verba ipsa Damasceni vide supra pag. 728, nota 2.
    Book II On the Orthodox Faith c. 29. See the words of Damascene themselves above, p. 728, note 2.
  16. Pro ordinabilitas, quam lectionem codd. P Q T (H in marg.) exhibent, Vat. ordinatis, omissa voce hominibus, quae in omnibus codd. exstat. Mox post Dedit enim eadem Vat. inserit eis, et dein pro ipsum, quod a plurimis codd. et ed. 1 incongrue omittitur, substituit eum, pro quo cod. T (in secunda manu) Deum; primitus in cod. T legebatur ipsum.
    For ordinabilitas — which reading codices P Q T (H in margin) exhibit — the Vatican [reads] ordinatis, with the word hominibus omitted, which is present in all the codices. Shortly after Dedit enim the same Vatican [edition] inserts eis, and then for ipsum — which is incongruously omitted by very many codices and edition 1 — substitutes eum, for which codex T (in a second hand) [reads] Deum; originally in codex T was read ipsum.
  17. Psalm. 144, 18.
    Psalm 144:18 [Vulg.].
  18. Pro defectum multi codd. cum sex primis edd. effectum; pro defectum militat cod. T. Proxime ante pro velleitas codd. A I W voluntas.
    For defectum many codices with the first six editions [read] effectum; for defectum codex T contends. Just before, for velleitas codices A I W [read] voluntas.
  19. Dist. 48. a. 2. q. 1. et 2. ac dub. 1.
    Distinction 48 a. 2 q. 1 and 2, and dubium 1.
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