← Back to Distinction 46

Dist. 46, Art. 1, Q. 4

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 46

Textus Latinus
p. 827

Quaestio IV. Utrum mala fieri sit verum.

Quarto quaeritur, utrum mala fieri sit verum. Et videtur, quod sic:

1. « Quia de quolibet affirmatio vel negatio vera »1; sed haec est falsa, nulla mala fiunt: ergo oppositum est simpliciter verum, scilicet mala fieri.

2. Item, « veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus »2: ergo quoties homo intelligit, sicut est in re, veritatem habet et intellectus et intellectum. Sed qui intelligit mala fieri, vere intelligit: ergo si vere intelligit, intellectum est verum: ergo mala fieri est verum.

3. Item, veritas propositionis asserit veritatem in dicto — unde si Socrates currit, Socratem currere est verum — ergo si malum fit, malum fieri est verum; sed malum fit, constat: ergo etc.

4. Item, veritas dicentis ponit veritatem in dicto; sed Deus, qui non est mendax, dicit mala fieri, Matthaei nono3: Quid cogitatis mala in cordibus vestris? ergo verum est, mala cogitari; pari ratione verum est fieri.

Contra:

1. Verum et bonum convertuntur; sed mala fieri non est bonum, ut supra4 probatum est: ergo mala fieri non est verum. Si forte dicas, quod verum est de veritate incomplexi; ostenditur

p. 828

de omni veritate, quia omnis veritas entitas quaedam est; et omne quod participat rationem entis, participat rationem boni: ergo etc.

2. Item, omnis veritas est a veritate prima: ergo et omne verum a primo vero: si ergo malum fieri est verum, malum fieri est a Deo; sed hoc est supra5 improbatum: ergo etc. Si tu dicas, quod illud est verum de veritate rei, non signi; hoc nihil est, quia, sicut a Deo sunt res, ita et signa; et Ambrosius dicit, quod « omne verum est a Spiritu sancto, a quocumque dicatur »; loquitur ergo de veritate in sermone, et ita de veritate complexionis sive signi.

3. Item, omnis veritas signi sive complexionis causam et ortum habet a veritate incomplexionis6, ergo veritas huius: istum furari, ortum habet a veritate furti; sed furtum non dicit actionem veram, immo defectivam: ergo pari ratione, istum furari non est simpliciter verum. Si tu dicas, quod veritas complexionis triplex est, scilicet positionis, privationis et negationis7, et prima causatur a veritate rei, secunda vero et tertia non causatur; contra: Philosophus8 generaliter dicit, « quod ab eo, quod res est vel non est, oratio dicitur vera vel falsa »: ergo hoc ubique verum est.

4. Item, omne quod modo verum est de praesenti, ab aeterno verum fuit de futuro9: ergo si malum hoc est modo verum, ab aeterno fuit verum. Sed nihil aeternaliter fuit verum, nisi esset Deus vel in Deo ut in causa: ergo si malum fore fuit verum et non fuit Deus, fuit in Deo tanquam in causa, ergo a Deo; sed hoc falsum: ergo etc.

Conclusio.

Conclusio. Mala fieri est simpliciter verum.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod sine distinctione concedendum est, quod mala fieri est verum: vere enim enuntiatur et vere intelligitur. Verum enim dictum de complexo respicit compositionem, sicut dicit Philosophus10, quia veritas et falsitas circa compositionem consistit; et ideo dicit veritatem signi. Signum autem est verum, quando significat rem se habere sicut se habet; tunc enim dicitur adaequari. Et ideo, cum ita se habeat in re sicut signum exprimit, simpliciter loquendo verum est mala fieri.

Ad argumenta in oppositum:

Ad 1. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod verum et bonum convertuntur; dicendum, quod circa idem verum est. Unde si res est vera, est bona, et si signum est verum, est bonum; sed tamen non sequitur, quod si signum sit verum, quod signatum sive res sit bona. Et ideo hic est fallacia accidentis: omne verum est bonum; sed istum furari est verum: ergo istum furari est bonum, ex variatione minoris extremitatis. Verum enim praedicatur de illo dicto ratione compositionis, cum sit dictio modalis, bonum vero ratione attributionis; et hanc instantiam facit Magister in littera11. Similis modus arguendi est hic: Audio Angelos cantare; sed cantare Angelos est verum: ergo audio verum. Consimilis modus arguendi est in illa ratione12: omne verum est a Deo; istum furari est verum: ergo etc.; et ideo similiter solvendum.

p. 829

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod veritas signi est a veritate rei; dicendum, quod falsum est. Tunc enim signum verum est, quando significat rem non esse, quae non est; et non habere veritatem, cum illa non habet. Nam sicut aliquid imperfectum perfecte aequatur alii imperfecto, ita res defectiva plene potest significari. Unde Philosophus non dixit: « Ab eo, quod res est tantum », sed est, vel non est. Et est sensus: ab eo quod res est, est oratio vera, quae significat ipsam esse, et ab eo quod non est, est falsa, quae significat esse; e contrario intelligendum in re, quae non est13. Unde quamvis furtum sit ens secundum quid, tamen oratio, quae significat aliquem furari, est vera simpliciter. Verum est tamen, quod omnis veritas complexa super aliquid fundatur; sed non oportet, quod super rem intellectam, sed super intelligentem14, in quo oratio habet esse. Et sic patet illud.

Posset tamen dici, quod fundatur super ens secundum quid ratione deformitatis; et tamen verum15 est simpliciter propter adaequationem, quae est simpliciter.

Nota tamen, quod de fundamento veritatis propositionis diversimode sentiunt diversi.

Aliqui enim distinguunt, sicut tactum est16, tripliciter veritatem orationis, scilicet positionis, ut cum dicitur: Caesar est homo; privationis, ut cum dicitur: Caesar est homo mortuus; negationis, ut cum dicitur: Caesar non est. Primam dicunt fundari supra ens simpliciter, secundam supra ens secundum quid, et tertiam non dicunt fundari super aliquid, quia talis oratio nihil ponit. — Sed tamen illud non videtur sufficere, quia, cum dicitur: haec oratio est vera, verum praedicat aliquam conditionem entis: ergo necesse est super aliquid fundari, quod sit.

Et ideo dicunt alii, quod fundatur super principia Caesaris. — Sed hoc non sufficit, quia, esto, quod Caesar omnino sit corruptus et secundum materiam et secundum formam, adhuc tamen vera est ista: Caesar fuit sive Caesar non est.

Et ideo dicunt alii, quod fundatur super intelligentem. — Sed adhuc illud non videtur sufficiens, quia, esto quod nullus intelligat actu, adhuc oratio ista est vera, scripta in pariete: Caesar fuit.

Ideo dicendum, quod cum veritas orationis sit veritas signi, et veritas signi non dicat qualitatem absolutam — sicut nec necessitas consequentiae — sed respectivam, sicut signum17; cum omne quod contingit significare, contingat vere significare, et etiam falso; sicut ad rationem significandi non oportet rem esse entem, sed cognoscibilem, sic nec ad rationem verae significationis. Et quoniam omne quod intellectus capit, vel est ens, vel capit sive imaginatur per comparationem ad ens18; ideo omnis significatio et veritas orationis significantis vel fundatur simpliciter super ens, ut si dicatur: Petrus est, vel in ordine ad ens. Unde propositio de praeterito fundatur super ordinem eius ad praesens; similiter propositio de futuro, sicut propositio negativa, ut si dicatur: Caesar non est; aliquod enim ens est, quod non est Caesar, et sic de aliis; similiter si dicatur: chimaera non est hircocervus.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur ultimo, quod malitiam fore sit verum ab aeterno; dicendum, quod ad hoc, quod aliquid sit verum, non oportet, quod sit in Deo tanquam in causa, sed sufficit, quod sit in Dei praescientia, quae non est nisi veri. Ad hoc autem quod aliquid sit in Dei praescientia sufficit, quod ipsum, vel eius causa, vel eius oppositum sit in Deo tanquam in causa, sicut supra dictum est de cognitione Dei.

p. 830
Scholion

I. Haec quaestio iam a Magistro (hic c. 7. circa finem) tacta est ad eludendum quoddam sophisticum argumentum. In responsione supponuntur plura circa definitionem et distinctionem veritatis, de quibus vide supra d. 8. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. et Scholion. S. Bonav. ad quaestionem respondet affirmative et sine distinctione, dum Richard. a Med. (hic q. 5.) malum distinguit secundum formale et materiale, et tantum quoad materiale responsionem affirmativam concedit; quae distinctio hic parum ad propositum esse videtur, ut ex solutione ad 3. apparet. — In solutione ad 3. resolvitur etiam quaestio de fundamento veritatis. Recensitis quatuor opinionibus, S. Doctor adhaeret ultimae. — In solutione ad 4. agitur de quaestione, aetate illa valde agitata, quomodo aliqua veritas, praesertim respectu mali, possit esse ab aeterno. Omnes probati doctores docent, quod nulla veritas sit aeterna, nisi quatenus est in Deo. Contraria sententia est articulus septimus condemnatus ab « Universitate magistrorum Parisiensium tempore Episcopi Gulielmi et Odonis Cancellarii » (vide II. Sent. d. 23. a. 2. q. 3. in fine). Diffuse illud probat Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 15. m. 6. 7. (cfr. S. Thom., S. I. q. 16. a. 7; B. Albert., S. p. I. tr. 6. q. 25. m. 2. a. 3.)

II. De quaestione principali tractant: Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 4. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 5. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.

---

English Translation
p. 827

Question IV. Whether that evils come about is true.

Fourthly it is asked whether evils come about is true. And that it is, is shown:

1. « Because of anything, affirmation or negation [is] true »1; but this [proposition] is false, no evils come about: therefore the opposite is simply true, namely evils come about.

2. Likewise, « truth is the adequation of thing and intellect »2: therefore whenever a man understands [the matter] as it is in the thing, both intellect and intellected have truth. But he who understands evils come about truly understands: therefore if he truly understands, the intellected [object] is true: therefore evils come about is true.

3. Likewise, the truth of a proposition asserts truth in what is said — whence if Socrates runs, that Socrates is running is true — therefore if evil comes about, that evil comes about is true; but it is established that evil does come about: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, the truthfulness of the speaker posits truth in what is said; but God, who is not a liar, says that evils come about, Matthew 93: Why do you think evils in your hearts? — therefore it is true that evils are thought; by the same reasoning it is true that they come about.

On the contrary:

1. The true and the good are convertible; but evils come about is not a good, as has been proved above4: therefore evils come about is not true. Should you perhaps say that true is [predicated] of the truth of the incomplex [object], it is shown

p. 828

[that this holds] of every truth, since every truth is a kind of entity; and everything that shares in the account of being, shares in the account of the good: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, every truth is from the first truth: therefore every true [thing] also is from the first true [being]; if therefore evils come about is true, evils come about is from God; but this has been refuted above5: therefore, etc. Should you say that this is true of the truth of the thing, not of the sign, this is nothing, since just as things are from God, so also are signs; and Ambrose says that « every truth is from the Holy Spirit, by whomever it be spoken »; he therefore speaks of truth in discourse, and so of the truth of complexion or of the sign.

3. Likewise, every truth of sign or of complexion has its cause and origin from the truth of incomplexion6; therefore the truth of this — that this man steals — has its origin from the truth of the theft; but theft does not name a true action, but rather a defective one: therefore by the same reasoning that this man steals is not simply true. Should you say that the truth of complexion is threefold, namely of position, of privation, and of negation7, and the first is caused by the truth of the thing, but the second and the third are not caused; on the contrary: the Philosopher8 says generally that « from the [fact] that the thing is or is not, speech is called true or false »: therefore this is true everywhere.

4. Likewise, everything which is now true in the present, was true from eternity in the future9: therefore if this evil is now true, it was true from eternity. But nothing was eternally true unless [it] were God or [were] in God as in [its] cause: therefore if that evil will be was true and was not God, it was in God as in [its] cause, therefore from God; but this is false: therefore, etc.

Conclusion.

Conclusion. Evils come about is simply true.

I respond: It must be said that, without distinction, it must be conceded that evils come about is true: for it is truly enunciated and is truly understood. For true said of the complex [object] regards composition, as the Philosopher says10, because truth and falsity consist in [a] composition; and so it speaks of the truth of the sign. The sign is true when it signifies the thing to be as it is; for then it is said to be adequated. And so, since the thing is in [reality] just as the sign expresses [it], simply speaking it is true that evils come about.

Replies to the arguments on the contrary:

Ad 1. To that which is objected — that true and good are convertible: it must be said that they are true [as said] of the same [subject]. Hence if a thing is true, it is good, and if a sign is true, it is good; but it does not follow that if a sign is true, the signified or the thing is good. And so there is here the fallacy of accident: every true [thing] is good; but that this man steals is true: therefore that this man steals is good — by [an illicit] variation of the minor extreme. For true is predicated of that said [object] by reason of composition, since it is a modal expression, but good by reason of attribution; and this objection the Master makes in his text11. A similar mode of arguing is this: I hear angels singing; but that angels sing is true: therefore I hear true. The same mode of arguing is in this reasoning12: every true [thing] is from God; that this man steals is true: therefore, etc.; and so it must be solved similarly.

p. 829

Ad 3. To that which is objected — that the truth of the sign is from the truth of the thing: it must be said that this is false. For then a sign is true when it signifies a thing not to be, which is not [the case]; and that it does not have truth, when that [thing] does not have [truth]. For just as something imperfect is perfectly equated to another imperfect [thing], so a defective thing can be fully signified. Whence the Philosopher did not say: « From the [fact] that the thing only is », but: is or is not. And the sense is: from the [fact] that the thing is, the discourse is true which signifies it to be, and from the [fact] that [the thing] is not, the [discourse] is false which signifies [it] to be; conversely it is to be understood in the thing which is not13. Hence although theft is a being according-to-something, yet the discourse which signifies that someone steals is simply true. Yet it is true that every complex truth is founded on something; but it is not necessary [that it be founded] on the thing understood, but on the one understanding14, in whom the discourse has [its] being. And so that is plain.

It could however be said that [the complex truth] is founded on a being according-to-something by reason of its deformity; and yet true15 is simply [predicated] on account of an adequation which is simple.

Note however that concerning the foundation of the truth of a proposition diverse [authors] hold diverse views.

Some, then, distinguish — as has been touched on16 — three kinds of truth of speech, namely of position, as when it is said: Caesar is a man; of privation, as when it is said: Caesar is a dead man; of negation, as when it is said: Caesar is not. The first they say is founded on being simply, the second on being according-to-something, and the third they say is not founded on anything, because such a discourse posits nothing. — But this does not seem to suffice, because, when it is said: this discourse is true, true predicates some condition of being: therefore [the discourse] must necessarily be founded on something which is.

And so others say that [the discourse] is founded on the principles of Caesar. — But this does not suffice, because, granted that Caesar is altogether corrupted both as to matter and as to form, yet that [discourse] is still true: Caesar was or Caesar is not.

And so others say that [the discourse] is founded on the one understanding. — But this still does not seem sufficient, because, granted that no one is understanding [it] in act, still that discourse is true, [if] written on a wall: Caesar was.

Therefore it must be said that, since the truth of speech is the truth of a sign, and the truth of a sign does not say an absolute quality — just as neither does the necessity of consequence — but a relative [quality], as does sign17; since everything which it happens [we] signify, it can happen [we] signify truly, and also falsely; just as for the account of signifying it is not necessary that the thing be in being [entem], but [only] knowable, so neither [is it necessary] for the account of true signification. And since everything which the intellect grasps is either a being, or [it] grasps or imagines [it] by comparison to a being18; therefore every signification and truth of significative speech either is founded simply on being, as if one says: Peter is, or in [an] ordering to being. Whence a proposition concerning the past is founded on its ordering to the present; likewise a proposition concerning the future, as a negative proposition, e.g. if one says: Caesar is not; for there is some being which is not Caesar, and so of the others; likewise if one says: the chimera is not a goat-stag.

Ad 4. To that which is objected last — that malice will be was true from eternity: it must be said that, for something to be true, it is not necessary that it be in God as in [its] cause, but it suffices that it be in God's foreknowledge, which is only of the true. But for something to be in God's foreknowledge, it suffices that itself, or its cause, or its opposite, be in God as in [its] cause, as has been said above concerning God's cognition.

p. 830
Scholion

I. This question was already touched on by the Master (here c. 7, near the end) for the dispelling of a certain sophistical argument. In the reply, several points are presupposed concerning the definition and distinction of truth, on which see above d. 8 p. I a. 1 q. 1 and the Scholion. St. Bonaventure replies to the question affirmatively and without distinction, while Richard of Mediavilla (here q. 5) distinguishes evil according to formal and material [aspects], and concedes the affirmative reply only as to the material; which distinction seems here little to the purpose, as appears from the solution to objection 3. — In the solution to objection 3 is also resolved the question of the foundation of truth. Having reviewed four opinions, the Holy Doctor adheres to the last. — In the solution to objection 4 is treated the question, then much agitated, how any truth, especially with respect to evil, could be from eternity. All approved doctors teach that no truth is eternal except insofar as [it is] in God. The contrary view is the seventh article condemned by « the University of the Masters of Paris in the time of Bishop William and Chancellor Odo » (see II Sent. d. 23 a. 2 q. 3 at the end). Alexander of Hales proves this at length, Summa p. I q. 15 m. 6, 7 (cf. St. Thomas, Summa I q. 16 a. 7; Bl. Albert, Summa p. I tr. 6 q. 25 m. 2 a. 3).

II. On the principal question treat: Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1 a. 4. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 5. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 2.

---

Apparatus Criticus
  1. De hac propositione, quae est Aristotelis, cfr. supra pag. 97, nota 7. — Post vera Vat. cum cod. cc adiungit de nullo ambo simul.
    On this proposition, which is Aristotle's, cf. above p. 97, note 7. — After vera the Vatican edition with codex cc adds de nullo ambo simul ("of nothing [are] both [true] at once").
  2. Vide supra pag. 707, nota 5. — Paulo inferius pro intellectus et intellectum ed. 1 et cod. T a secunda manu intelligens et intellectum, Vat. intellectus intellectum.
    See above p. 707, note 5. — A little below, for intellectus et intellectum edition 1 and codex T (in a second hand) read intelligens et intellectum, and the Vatican edition reads intellectus intellectum.
  3. Vers. 4.
    Verse 4.
  4. Hic q. 3. — Propositio maior fundatur in eo, quod verum et bonum realiter idem sint cum ente; de quo cfr. supra pag. 32, nota 2, et pag. 150, nota 13. Mox post Si forte dicas quod simul audi illud dictum, scilicet verum et bonum convertuntur. — Dein pro incomplexi plurimi codd. cum sex primis edd. complexi, aliis codd. ut S T ac mente argumenti repugnantibus. Cfr. etiam supra d. 8. p. I. a. I. q. I. arg. 1. ad opposit., ubi similis obiectio infertur, nec non ibid. Scholion, in quo exponitur, quid sit veritas complexa, quid incomplexa.
    Here q. 3. — The major premise is founded on this: that true and good are really the same as being; on which cf. above p. 32 note 2, and p. 150 note 13. Shortly after Si forte dicas quod understand [in apposition] that saying — namely, the true and the good are convertible. — Then for incomplexi very many codices with the first six editions [read] complexi; other codices, such as S T, and the sense of the argument oppose [this]. Cf. also above d. 8 p. I a. I q. I arg. 1 ad opposit., where a similar objection is brought, and likewise ibid. the Scholion, in which it is set out what is the truth of the complex and what of the incomplex.
  5. Cfr. Anselm., Dialog. de Veritate, c. 2: Veri veritas in ipso vero est; res vero enuntiata non est in enuntiatione vera, unde non eius veritas, sed causa veritatis eius dicenda est. — Pro a veritate incomplexionis Vat. a veritate rei, et proxime post eadem Vat. omittit huius, quod ex codd. F K M V Z ee ff et ed. 1 restauravimus.
    Cf. Anselm, Dialogue on Truth c. 2: « The truth of the true is in the true [thing] itself; but the thing enunciated is not in the true enunciation, whence not its truth, but [its being] the cause of its truth is to be said. » — For a veritate incomplexionis the Vatican edition [reads] a veritate rei, and immediately afterwards the same Vatican edition omits huius, which we have restored from codices F K M V Z ee ff and edition 1.
  6. Secundum Aristot., II. Periherm. c. 1, et I. Prior. c. ult. quatuor species propositionum distinguuntur: affirmativa, negativa, privativa et infinita, quarum duae ultimae similiter se habent, v. g. est iniustus homo, et est non iustus homo, ut ait Boeth. in hunc loc. (ed. prima).
    According to Aristotle, On Interpretation II c. 1, and Prior Analytics I last chapter, four species of proposition are distinguished: affirmative, negative, privative, and infinite, of which the last two behave alike, e.g. is an unjust man and is a not-just man, as Boethius says on this passage (first edition).
  7. Libr. de Praedicam. c. de Substantia; cfr. supra pag. 707, nota 5.
    Book On the Categories, the chapter on Substance; cf. above p. 707 note 5.
  8. Vat., omissis verbis de futuro, sic prosequitur: ergo si malum esse modo est, est verum, contradicentibus codd., quorum alii minus clare sic: ergo si malum est hoc modo verum.
    The Vatican edition, having omitted the words de futuro, continues thus: ergo si malum esse modo est, est verum ("therefore if [for] evil to be now is, it is true"), against the codices, some of which less clearly [read] thus: ergo si malum est hoc modo verum ("therefore if evil is in this way true").
  9. Libr. I. Periherm. c. 1: Circa compositionem enim et divisionem est verum et falsum. Cfr. etiam III. de Anima, text. 21. seqq. (c. 6.).
    Book I On Interpretation c. 1: « For about composition and division is the true and the false. » Cf. also De Anima III, text 21 ff. (c. 6).
  10. Cap. 7. — Quid sit dictio sive propositio modalis, iam supra pag. 671, nota 2 exposuimus, et pag. 678, nota 1, etiam quatuor species propositionum modalium allegavimus. Ad has quatuor Aristot., II. Periherm. c. 3. (c. 12.) hanc quintam addit, scil. verum et non verum, qui modus, ut Boeth. ait in hunc loc. (ed. prima), « ad demonstrationem omnium modorum valet »; sed, ut S. Thomas dicit, Aristoteles hanc quintam speciem sive hunc quintum modum non in prima modorum enumeratione, sed hic affert ea ratione, ut modus iste intelligatur copulam propositionis non modificare. Sensus solutionis est: cum dicitur; malum fieri est verum, hoc intelligitur de veritate propositionis sive dicti, non de veritate attributionis sive rei; non enim malo, in quantum malum est, inest veritas sive entitas, sed huic dictioni: malum fieri; ideoque, cum infertur: ergo malum fieri est bonum, peccatur procedendo a veritate dicti ad veritatem rei.
    Chapter 7. — What a modal expression or proposition is, we have already explained above at p. 671 note 2, and at p. 678 note 1 we also adduced the four species of modal proposition. To these four Aristotle, On Interpretation II c. 3 (c. 12) adds this fifth, namely true and not-true, which mode, as Boethius says on this passage (first edition), « avails for the demonstration of all modes »; but, as St. Thomas says, Aristotle adduces this fifth species or this fifth mode not in his first enumeration of the modes, but here for this reason: that this mode should be understood not to modify the copula of the proposition. The sense of the solution is: when it is said that evils come about is true, this is understood of the truth of the proposition or of what-is-said, not of the truth of attribution or of the thing; for in evil, insofar as it is evil, there is no truth or entity, but [it is] in this expression: evils come about; and so when it is inferred therefore that evils come about is good, one sins by proceeding from the truth of the said [object] to the truth of the thing.
  11. Sive argumentatione. — Pro ratione Vat. cum cod. cc oratione.
    Or [we may say] argumentation. — For ratione the Vatican edition with codex cc [reads] oratione.
  12. Cfr. Anselm., Dialog. de Veritate, c. 2. — Vat. pro e contrario intelligendum in re, quae non est sic: ipsam: et ab eo quod non est, est vera, quae significat non esse: et ab eo quod est, est falsa, quae significat eam non esse. Pro verbis quae significat esse, quae verba immediate praecedunt illis verbis e contrario etc., fere omnes codd. (excepto T) cum ed. 1 perperam quae significat non esse. Mox pro furtum sit ens cod. V furtum sit non-ens.
    Cf. Anselm, Dialogue on Truth c. 2. — The Vatican edition, for e contrario intelligendum in re, quae non est, [reads] thus: ipsam: et ab eo quod non est, est vera, quae significat non esse: et ab eo quod est, est falsa, quae significat eam non esse. For the words quae significat esse, which immediately precede the words e contrario etc., almost all the codices (except T) with edition 1 wrongly [read] quae significat non esse. Shortly afterwards for furtum sit ens codex V [reads] furtum sit non-ens.
  13. Ed. 1 vera, scil. oratio.
    Edition 1 [reads] vera, namely [as referring to] oratio ("the discourse").
  14. Hic in arg. 3. ad opposit.
    Here in argument 3 on the contrary.
  15. Sensus est: si nemo intelligeret hanc propositionem, tunc certe quoad hanc propositionem nulla formalis veritas foret, cum veritas formalis consistat in intellectu cognoscente; attamen, si haec propositio scriberetur, tunc in ipsa foret veritas signi, scil. rectitudo significationis, non quidem in actu, sed tantum in potentia.
    The sense is: if no one were to understand this proposition, then certainly as to this proposition there would be no formal truth, since formal truth consists in the cognizing intellect; yet, if this proposition were written, then in it there would be the truth of the sign, namely the rightness of signification — not indeed in act, but only in potency.
  16. Hoc sibi vult: Sicut necessitas consequentiae non dicit aliquid ipsi rei absolute, sed ex suppositione (respective) conveniens (cfr. supra d. 38. a. 2. q. 1.), sic veritas signi non dicit aliquam proprietatem, quae signo absolute et semper conveniat, sed quae ita ei convenit, ut possit etiam ei non convenire. Cfr. Anselm., Dialog. de Veritate, c. 2, ubi S. Doctor veritatem enuntiationis non ipsam orationem esse ostendit, aut eius significationem, aut aliquid eorum quae sunt in definitione enuntiationis (quia si hoc esset, semper esset vera), sed aliquid ei (enuntiationi) conveniens relate ad rem, quam significat; quod tunc habetur, cum propositio rem significat recte, sive ut debet. — In principio huius propos. post dicendum quod Vat. omittit cum, et paulo inferius post significare cum cod. cc adiicit quid; deinde eadem Vat., post falso posito puncto, voculae sicut praefigit Et, ac post pauca pro entem, substituit exsistentem.
    This is its sense: as the necessity of consequence does not say something of the thing itself absolutely, but [something] suiting [it] by supposition (relatively) — cf. above d. 38 a. 2 q. 1 — so the truth of a sign does not say any property which befits the sign absolutely and always, but which befits it in such a way that it can also not befit it. Cf. Anselm, Dialogue on Truth c. 2, where the Holy Doctor shows that the truth of an enunciation is not the discourse itself, nor its signification, nor any of those things which are in the definition of an enunciation (since, if it were [any of these], it would always be true), but something befitting it (the enunciation) in relation to the thing which it signifies; which is had then, when the proposition signifies the thing rightly, or as it ought. — At the beginning of this proposition, after dicendum quod, the Vatican edition omits cum, and a little below after significare together with codex cc adds quid; then the same Vatican edition, having placed a full stop after falso, prefixes Et to the particle sicut, and after a few [words], for entem substitutes exsistentem.
  17. Cfr. supra d. 25. dub. 3. — Mox pro significatio et veritas cod. T significatio, quae est veritas.
    Cf. above d. 25 dubium 3. — Shortly afterwards for significatio et veritas codex T [reads] significatio, quae est veritas.
  18. Dist. 36. a. 3. q. 1, et d. 38. a. 1. q. 1.
    Distinction 36 a. 3 q. 1, and d. 38 a. 1 q. 1. ---
← Dist. 46, Art. 1, Q. 3Dist. 46, Art. 1, Q. 5→