Dist. 46, Art. 1, Q. 5
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 46
Quaestio V. Utrum malum sit ordinabile a voluntate Dei.
Quinto quaeritur, utrum malum sit ordinabile a Dei voluntate. Et quod sic, videtur:
1. Quia super illud Psalmi1: Domine Deus meus, in te speravi, Glossa: « Qui videt, merita animarum sic ordinari a Deo, ut pulcritudo universitatis ex nulla parte violetur, in omnibus laudat Deum », distinguens, Deum aliud fecisse et ordinasse, ut universum bonum, aliud non fecisse, sed ordinasse, ut malum.
2. Item, Augustinus in Enchiridio2: « Malum, bene ordinatum et loco suo positum, eminentius commendat bonum ».
3. Item, ratione videtur, quia omne meritum3 ordinatur ad praemium sive retributionem; sed malum meretur poenam, sicut bonum gloriam: ergo, cum bonum gratiae sit ordinabile, pari ratione malum culpae.
4. Item, peccantes in suppliciis ordinantur; sed « propter quod unumquodque, et illud magis »4; sed mali non ordinantur in poenis nisi propter mala: ergo malum multo magis est ordinabile.
5. Item, omne quod auget decorem in re ordinata, est ordinatum; sed malum auget decorem in universo, quod est ordinatum: ergo etc. Probatio minoris: Augustinus in undecimo de Civitate Dei5: « Sicut pictura cum colore nigro suo loco posito pulcrior est, ita universitas rerum ex peccatoribus est pulcra ».
Contra:
1. Augustinus: « Malum est privatio modi, speciei et ordinis »6; sed nulla privatio participat id cuius est privatio: ergo si malum, eo quod malum, privat ordinem, malum non contingit ordinari.
2. Item, quod non est non est ordinabile, nam ordo praesupponit esse; sed « malum, in eo quod malum, nihil est »7: ergo non est ordinabile.
3. Item, omne ordinabile est ordinanti possibile; sed malum non est possibile Deo, quia Deus non potest facere malum: ergo non est a Deo ordinabile.
4. Item, si malum est ordinabile, aut ordine partium in totum, aut in finem. Non primo modo,
quia malum nullius est pars; si secundo modo: ergo cum bonum sit aliquid ex ordine in finem, tunc malum fieret bonum8.
Conclusio.
Conclusio. Malum est ordinabile a Deo secundum ordinem iustitiae, non sicut ordinis susceptivum in se, sed sicut huius ordinis dispositivum et ostensivum.
Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod9 quemadmodum aliquid dicitur esse sanum tripliciter: aut subiective, ut animal dicitur sanum; aut dispositive, ut potio dicitur sana; aut ostensive, ut urina sana — sic aliquid ordinatum10 dicitur tripliciter: aut sicut ordinis susceptivum, aut sicut dispositivum, aut sicut ostensivum.
Sicut susceptivum, non est aliquid ordinabile, nisi quod est ens et natura aliqua; et ita malum non est ordinabile nisi per accidens, scilicet per bonum substratum.
Sicut dispositivum, malum est ordinabile, sed non sicut dispositio ponens, sed privans. Duplex enim est ordo, scilicet naturae et iustitiae. Ordo naturae est institutus, ordo iustitiae est acquisitus11. Malum autem privat ordinem specialis naturae et illum privando incurrit in ordinem iustitiae, quia offendit; unde ratio ordinandi sicut dispositio in ordine iustitiae est meritum, vel demeritum.
Sicut ostensivum, malum est ordinabile et ordinatum, quia manifestat ordinem bonorum per oppositum; « opposita enim iuxta se posita magis elucescunt ».
Rationes igitur probantes, quod malum sit ordinatum, procedunt secundum ordinem iustitiae et secundum dispositionem et ostensionem.
Ad 1. Ad illud autem quod obiicitur, quod malum est privatio ordinis; dicendum, quod verum est12 particularis naturae, sed non est verum, prout ordo dicit dispositionem universalis providentiae, de quo dicit Boethius13: « Ordo cuncta complectitur, quo fit, ut si quis ab assignata sibi ordinis ratione discesserit, necesse sit, ut in alteram differentiam relabatur ». Exemplum ponitur in circumferentia circumplectente centrum.
Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur: esse ordinatum praesupponit esse; dicendum, quod verum est in eo quod per se et in se ordinatur; malum autem non ordinatur per se nec in se, et ideo non oportet, quod ipsum sit, sed sufficit, quod aliud sit, in quo substantificatur malum: et hoc est bonum, ut dicit Dionysius14.
Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ordinabile est possibile ordinanti; dicendum, quod esse possibile sive subesse potentiae divinae est dupliciter: aut potentiae producenti, aut providenti; et quamvis malum non subsit divinae productioni, subest tamen provisioni.
Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, qua ordinatione sit ordinabile; dicendum, quod ordinatione ad finem; sed hoc solum est ex post facto15. Et ideo non sequitur, quod malum sit bonum, sed quod ex ipso sequitur bonum. — Posset tamen dici, quod, quamvis malum non sit pars, tamen illud in quo est, pars est et locum et ordinem partis tenet.
I. Alex. Hal. (S. p. I. q. 38. m. 3. a. 1.) recte docet, bonum esse ordinabile secundum suas quatuor causas, scil. finalem, materialem, formalem et efficientem, sive ratione eius ad quod est, in quo est, secundum quod est, et ratione eius quod ex eo est; malum autem non esse ordinabile nisi ratione eius in quo est, scil. in bono, et ad quod est, scil. bonum contrarium a Deo elicitum. — Hoc a Seraphico subtiliter et multis adhibitis distinctionibus probatur. — Notanda est solut. ad 4, quod scil. malum non ordinetur ad finem ut medium, quod per se et ante factum a Deo sit volitum et ordinatum. Contraria opinio falsa est, ut explicatur supra q. 3.
II. Alex. Hal., loc. cit. — S. Thom., I. Sent. d. 39. q. 2. a. 2. ad 5; S. I. q. 22. a. 2. ad 2. — B. Albert., I. Sent. d. 47. a. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 4. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 7. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 3.
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Question V. Whether evil is orderable by the will of God.
Fifthly it is asked whether evil is orderable by the will of God. And that it is, appears thus:
1. Because on that [verse] of the Psalm1: Lord my God, in thee have I hoped, the Gloss [says]: « He who sees the merits of souls so ordered by God, that the beauty of the universe is in no part violated, praises God in all things » — distinguishing that God made one thing and ordered [it], namely the universe-good, and another he did not make but ordered, namely evil.
2. Likewise, Augustine in the Enchiridion2: « Evil, well ordered and placed in its own location, more eminently commends the good ».
3. Likewise, by reason it appears [so], because every merit3 is ordered to a reward or recompense; but evil deserves punishment, just as good [deserves] glory: therefore, since the good of grace is orderable, by parallel reasoning [so is] the evil of fault.
4. Likewise, sinners are ordered in [their] punishments; but « on account of which each thing [is such], that [is so] more so »4; but the evil are not ordered to punishments except on account of evils: therefore evil all the more is orderable.
5. Likewise, everything which augments the beauty in an ordered thing is itself ordered; but evil augments the beauty in the universe, which is ordered: therefore etc. Proof of the minor: Augustine in the eleventh [book] On the City of God5: « Just as a picture is more beautiful with a black color placed in its own location, so the universe of things is beautiful [together] with sinners ».
On the contrary:
1. Augustine: « Evil is the privation of mode, species, and order »6; but no privation participates [in] that of which it is the privation: therefore if evil, by the very fact that it is evil, deprives [of] order, evil cannot happen to be ordered.
2. Likewise, what is not, is not orderable, for order presupposes being; but « evil, by the fact that it is evil, is nothing »7: therefore [it] is not orderable.
3. Likewise, everything orderable is possible to the one ordering; but evil is not possible to God, since God cannot do evil: therefore [it] is not orderable by God.
4. Likewise, if evil is orderable, [it is so] either by an order of parts toward a whole, or toward an end. Not in the first way,
since evil is the part of nothing; if in the second way: then since the good is something from an order toward an end, then evil would become good8.
Conclusion.
Conclusion. Evil is orderable by God according to the order of justice, not as something receptive of order in itself, but as dispositive and ostensive of this order.
I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that9 just as something is said to be healthy in three ways: either subjectively, as an animal is called healthy; or dispositively, as a draught is called healthy; or ostensively, as urine [is called] healthy — so something [is called] ordered10 in three ways: either as receptive of order, or as dispositive [of order], or as ostensive [of order].
As receptive, nothing is orderable except what is a being and some [kind of] nature; and so evil is not orderable except per accidens, namely through the underlying good.
As dispositive, evil is orderable, but not as a disposition positing [something], but [as one] privating. For order is twofold, namely of nature and of justice. The order of nature is instituted, the order of justice is acquired11. But evil deprives [of] the order of a particular nature, and by depriving [of] it falls into the order of justice, because it offends; whence the ground of ordering as a disposition in the order of justice is merit or demerit.
As ostensive, evil is orderable and ordered, because it manifests the order of goods through [its] opposite; « for opposites placed next to each other shine forth the more ».
The reasonings, therefore, which prove that evil is ordered proceed according to the order of justice and according to disposition and ostension.
Ad 1. To that, however, which is objected — that evil is the privation of order: it must be said that [this] is true12 of particular nature, but is not true insofar as order names the disposition of universal providence, of which Boethius13 says: « Order encompasses all things, by which it comes about that if anyone departs from the ordering-ground assigned to him, it is necessary that he fall back into another difference ». An example is given in [the case of] a circumference encompassing a center.
Ad 2. To that which is objected — being ordered presupposes being: it must be said that [this] is true of that which is ordered per se and in se; but evil is not ordered per se nor in itself, and therefore it is not necessary that it itself be, but it suffices that another be, in which evil is substantified: and this is the good, as Dionysius says14.
Ad 3. To that which is objected — that the orderable is possible to the one ordering: it must be said that to be possible or to lie under the divine power is twofold: either [under] the power producing, or [the power] providing; and although evil does not lie under the divine production, yet it does lie under [divine] provision.
Ad 4. To that which is objected, by what kind of ordering [evil] is orderable: it must be said, by an ordering toward an end; but this only after the fact15. And therefore it does not follow that evil is good, but that good follows from it. — Yet it can also be said that, although evil is not a part, nevertheless that in which it [exists] is a part and holds the place and order of a part.
I. Alexander of Hales (Summa p. I q. 38 m. 3 a. 1) rightly teaches that the good is orderable according to its four causes — namely final, material, formal, and efficient — that is, by reason of that toward which it is, in which it is, according to which it is, and by reason of that which is from it; but that evil is not orderable except by reason of that in which it is, namely in the good, and toward which it is, namely the contrary good elicited by God. — This is proved by the Seraphic [Doctor] subtly and with many distinctions employed. — Note the solution to objection 4, namely that evil is not ordered toward an end as a means — [a means] which per se and before the fact would be willed and ordered by God. The contrary opinion is false, as is explained above at q. 3.
II. Alex. of Hales, loc. cit. — St. Thomas, I Sent. d. 39 q. 2 a. 2 ad 5; Summa I q. 22 a. 2 ad 2. — Bl. Albert, I Sent. d. 47 a. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2 a. 4. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 7. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the following question here q. 3.
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- Psalm. 7, 2. — In Glossa, quae sumta est ex August., Enarrat. in hunc Psalm. v. 18, n. 19, post a Deo, ut desunt haec verba, quae in textu originali habentur: dum sua cuique tribuuntur. Verba, quae dein sequuntur, distinguens, Deum etc. summam exhibent eorum quae August. loc. cit. fusius docet, ubi inter alia haec dicit: Deus enim dixit: Fiat lux, et facta est lux. Non dixit: Fiant tenebrae, et factae sunt tenebrae; et tamen ipsas ordinavit. Et ideo dicitur: Divisit Deus inter lucem et tenebras, et vocavit Deus lucem diem et tenebras vocavit noctem. Ista distinctio: aliud fecit et ordinavit, aliud autem non fecit, sed tamen etiam hoc ordinavit. Iam vero tenebris significari peccata, et in Propheta invenitur etc.Psalm 7:2. — In the Gloss, which is taken from Augustine, Enarratio on this Psalm v. 18, n. 19, after a Deo ("by God") these words — which appear in the original text — are missing: dum sua cuique tribuuntur ("while to each their own things are assigned"). The words which follow, distinguens, Deum etc., give a summary of what Augustine in the cited place teaches more fully, where among other things he says: For God said: Let there be light, and light was made. He did not say: Let there be darkness, and darkness was made; and yet he ordered them. And therefore it is said: God divided between light and darkness, and God called the light day and the darkness he called night. This distinction: he made and ordered one thing, but the other he did not make, yet even this he ordered. That darkness signifies sins, is also found in the Prophet, etc.
- Cap. 11. n. 3. — In textu cit. Vat. cum aliquibus mss. evidentius pro eminentius.Chapter 11 n. 3. — In the cited text, the Vatican [edition] with some manuscripts [reads] evidentius ("more evidently") for eminentius ("more eminently").
- Meritum hic in sensu largiore sumitur, ita ut includat etiam demeritum. — Paulo inferius post ergo Vat. cum aliis edd. nec non pluribus codd. subiicit et.Meritum ("merit") is here taken in a wider sense, so as to include also demeritum ("demerit"). — A little below, after ergo the Vatican [edition] with other editions and many codices inserts et.
- Aristot., I. Poster. c. 2.Aristotle, Posterior [Analytics] I c. 2.
- Cap. 23. n. 1. Textus hic exhibitus non plane convenit cum textu ed. Oper. S. August., qui talis est: « Sicut pictura cum colore nigro, suo loco posita: ita universitas rerum, si quis possit intueri, etiam cum peccatoribus pulcra est ». Sicut ed. Oper. S. August., ita etiam maior pars codd. et edd. posita pro posito.Chapter 23 n. 1. The text exhibited here does not exactly agree with the text of the edition of Augustine's works, which is as follows: « Just as a picture with a black color placed in its own location: so the universe of things, if one could behold it, is beautiful even with sinners ». As [reads] the edition of Augustine's works, so likewise the greater part of the codices and editions [read] posita for posito.
- Libr. de Natura boni, c. 4: Nihil aliud est [malum], quam corruptio vel modi vel speciei vel ordinis naturalis.Book On the Nature of the Good, c. 4: Evil is nothing other than a corruption either of mode, or of species, or of natural order.
- Dionys., de Div. Nom. c. 4. § 20. August., Tract. 1. in Evang. Ioan. 1, 3. sub n. 13. ait: Peccatum quidem non per ipsum factum est, et manifestum est, quia peccatum nihil est, et nihil fiunt homines, cum peccant. Cfr. Anselm., de Casu diaboli, c. 10. seq.Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names c. 4 § 20. Augustine, Tractate 1 on the Gospel of John 1:3 under n. 13 says: Sin indeed was not made through him, and it is manifest, because sin is nothing, and men become nothing when they sin. Cf. Anselm, On the Fall of the Devil c. 10ff.
- Cfr. Dionys., de Div. Nom. c. 4. § 20. seqq., ubi probatur, malum, in quantum malum, ad nihilum utile esse neque in rebus existere neque ordinatum esse.Cf. Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names c. 4 § 20ff., where it is proved that evil, insofar as evil, is useful for nothing, neither exists in things, nor is ordered.
- Ex codd. V Z ff et ed. 1 adiecimus quod, pro quo alii codd. minus congrue quoniam.From codices V Z ff and ed. 1 we have added quod, for which other codices less congruously [read] quoniam.
- Vat. ordinabile.The Vatican [edition reads] ordinabile ("orderable").
- Cfr. August., I. de Ordine, c. 7. n. 17. seqq., et de Natura boni, c. 37. In libro VI. de Musica, c. 11. n. 30. August. hanc duplicem ordinis divisionem insinuat locutionibus legem agere et lege agi, atque in eod. libro, c. 14. n. 46. his verbis: Aliud enim est tenere ordinem, aliud ordine teneri. — Post pauca pro quia offendit plurimi codd. cum edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 quia ostendit, et dein pro in ordine iustitiae plures codd. in ordine tantum, omissa voce iustitiae.Cf. Augustine, On Order I c. 7 n. 17ff., and On the Nature of the Good c. 37. In book VI On Music c. 11 n. 30, Augustine hints at this twofold division of order in the expressions legem agere ("to enact a law") and lege agi ("to be acted on by law"), and in the same book c. 14 n. 46 in these words: For it is one thing to hold an order, another to be held by order. — A little after, for quia offendit ("because it offends") very many codices with editions 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 [read] quia ostendit ("because it shows"), and then for in ordine iustitiae ("in the order of justice") several codices [read] in ordine only, the word iustitiae being omitted.
- Cfr. supra pag. 493, nota 1. — Paulo ante pro enim Vat. cum cod. cc autem.Cf. above p. 493, note 1. — A little before, for enim ("for") the Vatican [edition] with codex cc [reads] autem ("but").
- Libr. IV. de Consol. prosa 6, ubi in ed. Oper. Boeth. sic legitur: Ordo enim quidam cuncta complectitur, ut quod ab assignata ordinis ratione discesserit, hoc licet in alium, tamen in ordinem relabatur, ne quid in regno providentiae liceat temeritati. — Exemplum mox commemoratum bene adhibetur ad Boethii sententiam illustrandam. Nam sicut circumferentia ita circumplectitur centrum, ut nec centrum excedat circumferentiam, nec circumferentia relinquat centrum; sic ordo divinus tanquam circumferentia ita circumplectitur hominem, ut homo eum effugere minime possit, cum, si ab una parte circumferentiae (ab ordine misericordiae) fugit, statim appropinquet alteri (ordini iustitiae). Cfr. S. Anselm., I. Cur Deus homo, c. 15.Book IV On the Consolation [of Philosophy] prose 6, where in the edition of Boethius's works it reads thus: For a certain order encompasses all things, so that whatever has departed from its assigned ordering-ground — this, although it may [fall] into another [order], yet falls back into [some] order, lest anything in the realm of providence be left to chance. — The example just mentioned is well employed to illustrate Boethius's sentence. For just as a circumference encompasses a center in such a way that neither does the center exceed the circumference, nor does the circumference leave the center; so the divine order, as a circumference, encompasses man, so that man can in no way escape it, since, if he flees from one part of the circumference (from the order of mercy), he straightaway approaches another (the order of justice). Cf. St. Anselm, Cur Deus homo I c. 15.
- Fide codd. F M P Q Z ff etc. nec non ed. 1 substituimus Dionysius pro Boethius, cui Vat. sententiam allatam tribuit. Praeter citt. codd. etiam B. Albert. (S. p. I. tr. 6. q. 29. m. 2. in fine) et alii Scholastici istam sententiam nomini addicunt Dionysii, qui in libro de Div. Nom. c. 4. § 20. ait (iuxta versionem Scoti Erigenae): « Substantificat (οὐσιοῖ) et suimet privationem bonum tota sui participatione ». Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 94. m. 5. a. 1. hunc Dionysii textum his verbis reddit: Bonum sustentificat suam privationem. Cfr. de hac solutione II. Sent. d. 34. a. 2. q. 2. et q. 3, ubi multa huc spectantia tractantur et etiam eadem obiectio solvitur.On the testimony of codices F M P Q Z ff etc. and also ed. 1, we have substituted Dionysius for Boethius, to whom the Vatican [edition] attributes the saying adduced. Besides the cited codices, also Bl. Albert (Summa p. I tr. 6 q. 29 m. 2 at the end) and other Scholastics ascribe this saying to the name of Dionysius, who in the book On the Divine Names c. 4 § 20 says (according to the version of Scotus Eriugena): « The good substantifies (οὐσιοῖ), by the whole [act of] participation in itself, even its own privation ». Alexander of Hales (Summa p. II q. 94 m. 5 a. 1) renders this text of Dionysius in these words: The good sustentifies its own privation. Cf. on this solution II Sent. d. 34 a. 2 q. 2 and q. 3, where many things pertaining to this are treated, and the same objection is also solved.
- Pro ex post facto ed. 1 ex suppositione. Dein pro ex ipso sequitur codd. V cc ex ipso sequatur, et post pauca cod. Y verbis non sit pars adiicit universi.For ex post facto ed. 1 [reads] ex suppositione ("by supposition"). Then for ex ipso sequitur codices V cc [read] ex ipso sequatur, and a little after, codex Y to the words non sit pars adds universi ("of the universe"). ---