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Dist. 39, Art. 1, Q. 2

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 39

Textus Latinus
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Quaestio II.

Utrum Deus cognoscat omnia alia a se.

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (La.), then the English rendering (En.).

Secundo, dato quod Deus cognoscat alia a se, quaeritur, utrum cognoscat omnia alia a se. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Auctoritate Ieremiae decimo septimo1: Pravum est cor hominis etc., et post: Ego Dominus scrutans corda et renes; sed nihil incertius, nihil occultius nostris cogitationibus: ergo si has cognoscit, et omnia alia.

2. Item, ad Hebraeos quarto2: Omnia sunt nuda et aperta oculis eius ad quem nobis sermo. Et iterum: Vivus est sermo Dei et efficax, usque ibi, et non est aliqua creatura invisibilis in conspectu eius.

3. Item, Ioannes ultimo3: Domine, tu omnia nosti.

4. Item, Augustinus tertio de Trinitate4: «Nihil fit visibile nec intelligibile, quod non de aula interiori atque invisibili summi Imperatoris aut iubeatur, aut permittatur secundum ineffabilem iustitiam poenarum et praemiorum et gratiarum et meritorum». Et si hoc: ergo omnia cognoscit.

5. Item, ratione videtur: quia quanto substantia est spiritualior atque simplicior, tanto plurium est cognitiva5; sed Deus est substantia simplicissima et spiritualissima: ergo est omnium cognitiva.

6. Item, Deus est creator et remunerator; sed in quantum creator est artifex, in quantum remunerator iudex; sed perfectus artifex cognoscit omnia producta, perfectus iudex omnia remuneranda: si ergo omnis creatura spectat ad artificium, et omne bonum et malum ad iudicium, ergo Deus omnem creaturam cognoscit, et omnem bonitatem et malitiam.

7. Item, impossibile est, aliquid esse, in quo non sit Deus per praesentiam essentiae, ut supra probatum est6; sed7 cuicumque praesens est per essentiam, et cognitionem: ergo impossibile est, aliquid Deo esse incognitum.

8. Item, si esset in una re ita, quod non in alia, esset eius essentia limitata: ergo si ita cognosceret, quod aliqua essent incognita, esset eius cognitio limitata et arctata, et ita imperfecta.

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Sed contra:

1. Omne nobilius Deo est attribuendum; sed «quaedam melius est nescire quam scire», sicut dicit Augustinus in Enchiridio8: ergo necesse est ponere, quod Deus illa non sciat.

2. Item, intellectus noster propter sui immaterialitatem non intelligit singularia — unde, ut Philosophus9 dicit, «intellectus est universalium, et sensus singularium» — sed divinus intellectus multo magis est immaterialis quam noster; ergo si noster non intelligit singularia, nec divinus.

3. Item, noster habitus scientialis propter sui certitudinem non est nisi necessariorum, et non contingentium, quia dicit Boethius10 quod «scientia est eorum quae sui immutabilem existentiam sortiuntur». Si ergo divina cognitio est multo certior quam nostra scientia, patet etc.

4. Item, quae necessitas est Deum ponere cognoscere omnia? Et videtur quod nulla, quia cognitio nostra non minus dicitur perfecta, si non cognoscit unam muscam; si ergo divina cognitio multo minus perficitur a scibili, non erit imperfecta, si non cognoscit ista vilia.

5. Item, sicut Deus est11 omnisciens, ita est omnipotens; sed potentia mali non est de omnipotentia nec de perfectione potentiae; ergo et similiter cognitio mali non est de perfectione scientiae, ergo etc.

6. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur auctoritatibus12, et primo auctoritate Habacuc13: Mundi sunt oculi tui, Domine, ne videant malum etc. Item de malis dicitur Matthaei vigesimo quinto14: Nescio vos.

Conclusio.

Deus cognitione simplicis notitiae omnia cognoscit, bona et mala, approbationis vero tantum bona.

Respondeo: Dicendum ad intelligentiam obiectorum, quod in Deo est notitia approbationis, et simplicis notitiae. Et notitia approbationis connotat complacentiam voluntatis. Hac non cognoscit Deus omnia, quia nec mala nec malos, sed tantum bona et bonos; et de hac intelliguntur duae ultimae auctoritates15. Est alia cognitio simplicis notitiae; et haec quia habet rationem cognoscendi a Veritate, quae est lux summa, cui nihil potest occultari, nec etiam tenebrae obscurantur ab ipsa16; ideo de necessitate cognoscit omnia, magna et parva, bona et mala, sicut ostendunt rationes ad primam partem.

Ad 1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur, quod omne nobilius Deo est attribuendum; dicendum, quod est melius simpliciter, et est melius huic et secundum statum. Dico ergo, quod omnia scire simpliciter melius et nobilius est; sed homini corrupto, qui accipit occasionem peccandi ex cognitione, melius est quaedam nescire. Ideo non sequitur, quod sit Deo attribuendum.

Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de immaterialitate intellectus, dicendum, quod hoc, quod non cognoscat singularia, non tantum venit ex immaterialitate, immo ex materialitate coniuncti et immaterialitate sua. Quoniam enim coniungitur corpori, ideo habet potentias, secundum quas dependet a corpore quantum ad operationem, et per quas intellectus, quamdiu est in corpore, exit ad exteriora, quia illae sunt mediae, scilicet sensus particularis et imaginatio. Quoniam ergo singulare non pervenit ad intellectum nisi per istas potentias, et ascensus per has est secundum abstractionem et depurationem, et abstractio facit de singulari universale17; ideo non potest singularia cognoscere ut intellectus, nisi intellectus sit separatus vel divinus.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de certitudine scientiae, dicendum, quod hoc non est propter certitudinem simpliciter, sed propter certitudinem causatam a re. Et quoniam causatur certitudo in nostra cognitione vel18 pendet ex re, ideo non potest nostra cognitio esse certa, nisi res sit necessaria. Divina autem cognitio, quoniam a re non causatur nec dependet, ideo potest esse certa de re contingenti.

Ad 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod potentia mali non est de omnipotentia; ergo etc; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia rectitudo, manens rectitudo, est ratio cognoscendi malum; sed rectitudo non est causa mali, nisi declinando a rectitudine et defip. 690ciendo. Ideo scire malum est de perfectione scientiae, sed posse malum non est de perfectione potentiae.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod quaeritur, quae necessitas est cognoscendi Deum omnia: dicendum, quod infinitas et immensitas veritatis, quae non patitur, aliquid latere Deum, sicut immensitas divinae praesentiae non patitur, aliquid absentari a Deo.

Scholion

I. In hac generali quaestione Seraphicus solvit etiam problemata specialia, quae ab aliis magistris (ut Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 23. m. 3. a. 1–7.) distinctis quaestionibus tractantur. In specie solvitur (ad 2.) quaestio, utrum Deus singularia cognoscat, ubi tangitur etiam quaestio, utrum intellectus noster pro statu viatoris directe cognoscat singularia; quod S. Doctor negat cum Alex. Hal. (loc. cit. a. 6. ad 1.) et S. Thoma (S. I. q. 86. a. 1.). Aliter sentit Scotus (II. Sent. d. 3. q. 2. et passim) cum Durando aliisque. Cohaeret haec opinionum differentia cum controversia de adaequato intellectus humani obiecto, utrum sit quidditas rei materialis, ut docet schola S. Thomae, an ens communissime sumtum, ut est ens reale in communi, non tantum quidditas rei sensibilis, ut Scotus censet; de quo diffuse disputatur in utriusque scholae libris philosophicis.

II. In respons. et in solut. ad 5. agitur breviter de cognitione mali. Quae hic tanguntur magis explicantur supra d. 36. a. 3. q. 1. 2, et infra d. 46. q. 1. 5. Antiqui Scholastici in hoc conveniunt, quod malum a Deo non cognoscitur nisi per aliud, «quia de ratione mali est, quod sit privatio boni, et sic nec definiri nec cognosci potest nisi per bonum» (S. Thom., S. I. q. 14. a. 10. ad 4.). Fundamentum huius doctrinae est, quod «malum substantificatur in bono, et non solum in bono, sed etiam in bono quodam modo sibi opposito» (S. Bonav., II. Sent. d. 34. a. 2. q. 2.), et quod purum malum non est possibile, dicente eodem (loc. cit. q. 1.): «Ponere malum aliquod esse, quod nihil habeat de bono, non solum est perversitatis haereticae, sed etiam manifestae caecitatis et stultitiae». Hinc est, quod «quamvis malum non subsit divinae productioni, subest tamen provisioni» (infra d. 46. q. 5. ad 3.); et quamvis ut privatio non habeat nisi causam deficientem et nullatenus in Deo aliquam causam, tamen potest «esse in Dei praescientia, quae non est nisi veri. Ad hoc autem, quod aliquid sit in Dei praescientia, sufficit, quod ipsum, vel eius causa, vel eius oppositum sit in Deo tanquam in causa» (ibid. q. 4. ad 4.). Quod posse facere malum non sit de ratione potentiae, explicatur infra d. 42. q. 2.

III. Petr. a Tar., I. Sent. d. 36. q. 1. a. 1. 2, d. 38. q. 2. a. 2, d. 39. q. 2. a. 1. 2. — Richard. a Med., I. Sent. d. 35. q. 6, d. 36. a. 1. q. 1. 2, d. 38. q. 5. — Durand., I. Sent. d. 33. q. 1. 2. 3, d. 38. q. 3.

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English Translation
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Question II.

Whether God knows all things other than himself.

Secondly, granting that God knows things other than himself, it is asked whether he knows all things other than himself. And that he does, [it] seems:

1. By the authority of Jeremiah seventeen1: The heart of man is perverse etc., and after: I am the Lord searching hearts and reins; but nothing is more uncertain, nothing more hidden than our thoughts: therefore if he knows these, [he knows] all other things too.

2. Likewise, to the Hebrews four2: All things are bare and open to the eyes of him to whom is our discourse. And again: The word of God is living and effective, up to: and there is no creature invisible in his sight.

3. Likewise, John final [chapter]3: Lord, thou knowest all things.

4. Likewise, Augustine in the third [book] On the Trinity4: «Nothing becomes visible nor intelligible which is not, from the inner and invisible court of the supreme Emperor, either commanded or permitted according to [his] ineffable justice of punishments and rewards and graces and merits». And if this [is so]: therefore he knows all things.

5. Likewise, by reason it seems [so]: because the more spiritual and simpler a substance is, the more it is cognoscitive of5; but God is a most simple and most spiritual substance: therefore he is cognoscitive of all things.

6. Likewise, God is creator and rewarder; but inasmuch as he is creator he is artisan, inasmuch as rewarder he is judge; but a perfect artisan knows all things produced, a perfect judge all things to be rewarded: if therefore every creature pertains to [his] handiwork, and every good and evil to [his] judgment, therefore God knows every creature, and every goodness and malice.

7. Likewise, it is impossible that anything be in which God is not by the presence of essence, as was proved above6; but7 to whatever he is present by essence, [also by] cognition: therefore it is impossible that anything be unknown to God.

8. Likewise, if he were in one thing in such a way that not in another, his essence would be limited: therefore if he so knew, that some things were unknown, his cognition would be limited and constricted, and so imperfect.

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On the contrary:

1. Everything more noble is to be attributed to God; but «some things it is better not to know than to know», as Augustine says in the Enchiridion8: therefore it is necessary to posit that God does not know those things.

2. Likewise, our intellect, on account of its immateriality, does not understand singulars — whence, as the Philosopher9 says, «the intellect is of universals, and sense of singulars» — but the divine intellect is far more immaterial than ours; therefore if ours does not understand singulars, neither does the divine.

3. Likewise, our scientific habit, on account of its certitude, is only of necessary things, and not of contingents, since Boethius10 says that «science is of those things which obtain unchangeable existence of themselves». If therefore divine cognition is far more certain than our science, it is plain etc.

4. Likewise, what necessity is there to posit that God knows all things? And it seems [there is] none, because our cognition is no less called perfect, if it does not know one fly; if therefore divine cognition is far less perfected by the knowable, it will not be imperfect, if it does not know these vile [things].

5. Likewise, just as God is11 omniscient, so he is omnipotent; but the power of evil is not part of omnipotence nor of the perfection of power; therefore likewise neither is the cognition of evil part of the perfection of knowledge, therefore etc.

6. Likewise, the same is shown by authorities12, and first by the authority of Habakkuk13: Thy eyes are clean, Lord, lest they see evil etc. Likewise of evils it is said in Matthew twenty-five14: I know you not.

Conclusion.

God by the cognition of simple cognizance knows all things, good and evil, but [by the cognition] of approbation only the good.

I respond: It must be said, for the understanding of the objections, that in God there is the cognizance of approbation, and of simple cognizance. And the cognizance of approbation connotes the complacency of the will. By this God does not know all things, since neither evils nor evil-doers, but only the good and the good-doers; and of this are understood the last two authorities15. There is another cognition of simple cognizance; and this, since it has the ratio of knowing from Truth, which is the supreme light, to which nothing can be hidden, nor are even darknesses obscured before it16; therefore of necessity it knows all things, great and small, good and evil, as the reasons for the first part show.

To 1. To that which is first objected, that everything more noble is to be attributed to God; it must be said that there is what is better simply, and what is better for this [creature] and according to [its] state. I say therefore that to know all things simply is better and more noble; but for corrupt man, who takes occasion of sinning from cognition, it is better to be ignorant of certain things. Therefore it does not follow, that it [must] be attributed to God.

To 2. To that which is objected concerning the immateriality of the intellect, it must be said that this — that it does not know singulars — comes not only from immateriality, rather from the materiality of the conjoined [body] and its own immateriality. For since it is conjoined to a body, it has powers according to which it depends on the body as regards [its] operation, and through which the intellect, while it is in the body, goes out to exterior things, since these [powers] are the means, namely the particular sense and imagination. Since therefore the singular does not arrive at the intellect except through these powers, and the ascent through these is according to abstraction and purification, and abstraction makes a universal of the singular17; therefore [the intellect] cannot know singulars as intellect, unless the intellect be separated or divine.

To 3. To that which is objected concerning the certitude of science, it must be said that this is not on account of certitude simply, but on account of certitude caused by the thing. And since certitude in our cognition is caused [by] or18 depends on the thing, therefore our cognition cannot be certain unless the thing be necessary. But divine cognition, since it is neither caused nor depends from the thing, can be certain about a contingent thing.

To 5. To that which is objected, that the power of evil is not part of omnipotence; therefore etc; it must be said, that it is not similar, since rectitude, remaining rectitude, is the ratio of knowing evil; but rectitude is not the cause of evil, except by deviating from rectitude and falling awayp. 690. Therefore to know evil is part of the perfection of knowledge, but to be able [to do] evil is not part of the perfection of power.

To 4. To that which is asked, what necessity there is for God to know all things: it must be said that the infinity and immensity of truth, which does not allow anything to be hidden from God, just as the immensity of divine presence does not allow anything to be absent from God.

Scholion

I. In this general question the Seraphic resolves also particular problems, which are treated in distinct questions by other masters (e.g. by Alex. Hal., S. p. I, q. 23, m. 3, a. 1–7). In particular, the question is solved (ad 2) whether God knows singulars, where also the question is touched whether our intellect, for the state of [its] wayfaring, directly knows singulars; which the Holy Doctor denies with Alex. Hal. (loc. cit. a. 6, ad 1) and St. Thomas (S. I, q. 86, a. 1). Otherwise thinks Scotus (II Sent. d. 3, q. 2, and passim) with Durandus and others. This difference of opinions hangs together with the controversy concerning the adequate object of the human intellect, whether it be the quiddity of a material thing, as the school of St. Thomas teaches, or being most commonly taken, as it is real being in common, not only the quiddity of a sensible thing, as Scotus thinks; concerning which there is diffuse disputation in the philosophical books of both schools.

II. In the response and in the solution to [argument] 5 there is brief treatment of the cognition of evil. The matters here touched are more fully explained above at d. 36, a. 3, q. 1, 2, and below at d. 46, q. 1, 5. The ancient Schoolmen agree in this, that evil is not known by God except through another, «since it is of the ratio of evil that it be a privation of the good, and so it can neither be defined nor known except through the good» (St. Thomas, S. I, q. 14, a. 10, ad 4). The foundation of this doctrine is, that «evil is given subsistence in the good, and not only in the good, but even in the good [taken] in some way as opposed to itself» (St. Bonav., II Sent. d. 34, a. 2, q. 2), and that pure evil is not possible, the same one saying (loc. cit. q. 1): «To posit some evil to be, which would have nothing of the good, is not only of heretical perversity, but even of manifest blindness and folly». Hence it is, that «although evil does not lie under divine production, yet it lies under [his] provision» (below d. 46, q. 5, ad 3); and although as a privation it has only a deficient cause and in no way any cause in God, nevertheless it can «be in God's foreknowledge, which is only of the true. But for this — that something be in God's foreknowledge — it suffices, that itself, or its cause, or its opposite be in God as in [its] cause» (ibid. q. 4, ad 4). That to be able to do evil is not part of the ratio of power is explained below at d. 42, q. 2.

III. Petr. a Tar., I Sent. d. 36, q. 1, a. 1–2, d. 38, q. 2, a. 2, d. 39, q. 2, a. 1–2. — Richard. a Med., I Sent. d. 35, q. 6, d. 36, a. 1, q. 1–2, d. 38, q. 5. — Durand., I Sent. d. 33, q. 1, 2, 3, d. 38, q. 3.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vers. 9. et 1, ubi Vulgata pro hominis exhibet et voci renes praemittit probans. — Mox pro incertius codd. interius.
    Verses 9 and 1, where the Vulgate, in place of hominis, has [a different reading], and prefixes probans to the word renes. — Soon, in place of incertius codices [read] interius.
  2. Vers. 13. Textus sequens ibid., ubi pro aliqua creatura Vulg. ulla creatura.
    Verse 13. The following text [is from] the same place, where in place of aliqua creatura the Vulgate [has] ulla creatura.
  3. Vers. 17.
    Verse 17.
  4. Cap. 4. n. 9. In textu originali pro visibile nec intelligibile legitur visibiliter et sensibiliter, et in fine retributionum pro meritorum.
    Chapter 4, n. 9. In the original text, in place of visibile nec intelligibile there is read visibiliter et sensibiliter, and at the end retributionum in place of meritorum.
  5. Cfr. liber de Causis, prop. 10, et Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 3. seqq. (c. 4.).
    Cf. the book On Causes, prop. 10, and Aristotle, III On the Soul, text 3 ff. (c. 4).
  6. Dist. 37. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. seqq. — In propositione minori, quae sequitur, inter verba et cognitionem supple ; praesens est per. Ratio sententiae in hac propositione minori enuntiatae est, quia in Deo essentia idem est ac cognitio. Pro cuicumque multi codd. cum ed. minus concinne cuique.
    Distinction 37, p. I, a. 1, q. 1 ff. — In the minor proposition which follows, between the words et cognitionem supply ; praesens est per ["is present by"]. The reason of the sentence enunciated in this minor proposition is, that in God essence is the same as cognition. In place of cuicumque many codices with the [printed] edition, less elegantly, [read] cuique.
  7. Cum codd. D PQ (T a secunda manu) et ed. 1 posuimus si ergo pro sed, quod exstat in Vat.
    With codices D, P, Q (T from a second hand) and ed. 1 we have placed si ergo ["if therefore"] in place of sed ["but"], which stands in the Vatican [edition].
  8. Cap. 17. n. 3. Et Aristot., XII. Metaph. text. 31. (c. 9.): «Etenim quaedam melius est non videre quam videre».
    Chapter 17, n. 3. And Aristotle, XII Metaphysics text 31 (c. 9): «For there are some things [of which] it is better not to see than to see».
  9. Multis locis. Cfr. I. Poster. c. 14. 20. 24. (18, 21. 31.); II. de Anima, text. 60. (c. 3.); I. Metaph. c. 1.
    In many places. Cf. I Posterior [Analytics] c. 14, 20, 24 (18, 21, 31); II On the Soul, text 60 (c. 3); I Metaphysics c. 1.
  10. Libr. I. de Arithmetica, c. 1: «Est enim sapientia rerum, quae sunt suique immutabilem substantiam sortiuntur, comprehensio veritatis». Idem docet Aristot., I. Poster. c. ult., et VI. Ethic. c. 3. 6.
    Book I On Arithmetic, c. 1: «For wisdom is the comprehension of [the] truth of [those] things which are and which obtain their unchangeable substance». The same is taught by Aristotle, I Posterior [Analytics] c. ult., and VI Ethics c. 3, 6.
  11. Vat. cum cod. cc dicitur. Mox post potentiae Vat. adiungit naturaliter.
    The Vatican [edition] with codex cc [reads] dicitur ["is said"]. Soon, after potentiae the Vatican adds naturaliter ["naturally"].
  12. Quae allegantur in 6. arg. ad opposit.
    Those [authorities] which are alleged in the 6th argument ad oppositum.
  13. Cap. 1, 13, ubi Vulgata, omissa voce Domine, prosequitur: ne videas malum. Nostra lectio, ut testatur editio Hieronymi, alias erat in usu.
    Chapter 1, [v.] 13, where the Vulgate, with the word Domine omitted, continues: ne videas malum. Our reading, as the edition of Jerome attests, was elsewhere in use.
  14. Vers. 12.
    Verse 12.
  15. Quae litterantur in 6. arg. ad opposit.
    Those [authorities] cited in the 6th argument ad oppositum.
  16. Psalm. 138, 12: Quia tenebrae non obscurabuntur a te.
    Psalm 138 [Vulg.], 12: For darknesses are not obscured by thee.
  17. Sicut intellectus in eliciendo cognitione[m] exteriorum, per medias i. e. sensibiles potentias quasi exit et descendit ad exteriora, sic singulare sive species, quam singulare generat in medio et organo, intrat et ascendit a sensu particulari ad sensum communem indeque per phantasiam usque ad intellectum. Sic ascendens species abstrahitur et depuratur a conditionibus singularibus sive individuantibus. Cfr. Itiner. mentis in Deum, c. 2, et Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 39. (c. 8.). — Mox pro ut intellectus cod. noster intellectus, et subinde multi codd. ut CGHKLORSUVY prosequuntur: non sic intellectus et divinus.
    Just as the intellect, in eliciting cognition of exterior things, through middle (i.e. sensible) powers as it were goes out and descends to exterior things, so the singular — or the species which the singular generates in the middle [body] and the organ — enters and ascends from the particular sense to the common sense, and thence through phantasy up to the intellect. Thus the ascending species is abstracted and purified from singular or individuating conditions. Cf. Itinerary of the Mind into God, c. 2, and Aristotle, III On the Soul, text 39 (c. 8). — Soon, in place of ut intellectus a codex [reads] noster intellectus, and thereupon many codices such as CGHKLORSUVY continue: non sic intellectus et divinus.
  18. Pro vel cod. necessario.
    In place of vel a codex [reads] necessario.
← Dist. 39, Art. 1, Q. 1Dist. 39, Art. 1, Q. 3→