Bonaventure

Articulus II.

De modo divinae cognitionis.

Consequenter est quaestio de secundo articulo, scilicet de modo divinae cognitionis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria.

Primo quaeritur, utrum Deus cognoscat se et alia uniformiter.

Secundo, utrum cognoscat mutabilia immutabiliter.

Tertio, utrum cognoscat omnia praesenter.

Quaestio I.

Utrum Deus eodem modo cognoscat se et alia a se.

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (La.), then the English rendering (En.).

Quod autem cognoscat se et alia eodem modo sive uniformiter, ostenditur sic.

1. Scientia Dei est sua essentia, et suum scire est suum esse, ergo et modus cognoscendi est modus essendi; sed unus est modus essendi in Deo essentialis: ergo et unus modus cognoscendi.

2. Item, Deus se ipso et non alio cognoscit se, et se ipso et non alio cognoscit alia¹, ergo una et eadem ratione cognoscit se et alia; sed modus cognoscendi attenditur penes rationem cognoscendi: ergo si est eadem ratio cognoscendi se et alia, et idem modus, et sic etc.

3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur per impossibile, quia si alio modo cognoscit se, alio modo creaturas: ergo cum cognoscit se et creaturas, variatur in cognoscendo; ergo apud Deum est transmutatio et vicissitudinis obumbratio².

4. Item, si alio modo, tunc ego quaero: aut modus ille est Creator, aut creatura. Non creatura, quia cognitio et modus cognoscendi est aeternus; si Creator, aut dicit quid personale, aut quid essentiale. Non personale, quia omnis cognitio est communis tribus, ergo dicit quid essentiale: ergo si alius et alius modus, ergo alia et alia essentia; sed hoc est impossibile: ergo et primum.

Contra:

1. Deus cognoscendo alia a se, cognoscit per ideam, se autem non cognoscit per ideam³: ergo si cognoscere per ideam dicit modum cognitionis, et se non cognoscit per ideam, patet quod alio modo cognoscendi; et sic etc.

2. Item, in cognitione, qua Deus cognoscit se, idem est cognoscens et cognitum et ratio cognoscendi; sed in cognitione, qua cognoscit creaturam, non est idem ratio cognoscendi cum cognito: ergo non idem modus⁴.

3. Item, nihil commune est Creatori et creaturae secundum rationem essendi, ergo neque secundum rationem cognoscendi: cum ergo aliud sit esse creaturae quam Creatoris, et alius modus essendi: ergo alia cognitione et alio modo cognoscitur⁵ quam Creator. Si ergo alio modo cognoscitur a Deo, et idem est creaturam cognosci et Deum cognoscere, ergo Deus alio modo cognoscit se et alia.

4. Item, omnis cognitio, in qua cognitum est nobilius, praesentius et intelligibilius, est cognitio nobilior, scilicet quantum ad rem et modum. Quantum ad rem, quia de re magis nobili; quantum ad modum, quia de re praesentiori. Sed in cognitione, qua Deus cognoscit se, cognitum est nobilius, praesentius et intelligibilius quam in cognitione creaturae: ergo nobilior cognitio quantum ad rem et modum.

Conclusio.

Una cognitione et eodem modo cognoscit Deus se et alia a se.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod est quaedam cognitio, quae causatur et ortum habet a cognoscibili: et haec, quoniam a cognoscibili causatur et dependet, variatur secundum exigentiam cognoscibilis quantum ad rem et modum. Est et alia cognitio, quae secundum rem idem est quod cognoscens et a cognoscibili non causatur nec dependet: et haec accipit identitatem quantum ad rem et modum a parte cognoscentis, non a parte cogniti.

Quoniam igitur divina cognitio a rebus non dependet nec causatur, sed est idem quod Deus, et Deus eadem essentia et eodem modo se habens: ideo una cognitione et eodem modo cognoscit Deus se et alia a se, quia per se ipsum nullo modo variatum nec diversificatum.

Ad intelligentiam autem obiectorum notandum, quod per respectum ad cognoscentem cognitio eodem modo comparatur et eodem modo est, quia secundum illam comparationem habet esse⁶; et sic procedunt primae rationes ostendentes, quod eodem modo cognoscit se et alia. Per respectum ad cognitum, licet sit eodem modo, tamen alio modo comparatur: nam ad Deum secundum rationem identitatis, ad creaturam secundum rationem diversitatis et causalitatis, et ideo ad creaturam secundum rationem ideandi, ad Deum vero minime; et hoc probant rationes inductae ad secundam partem, quod alio modo comparatur, et hoc modo concedendum est. Si ergo inferat quod alio modo sit, ratio non valet, quia cognitio Dei non recipit modum essendi nec nobilitatem a cognito.

Ad argumenta in oppositum:

Ad 1. 2. Et sic patent duo obiecta de idea et diversitate.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur tertio, quod nihil est commune Creatori et creaturae; dicendum, quod verum est de communitate secundum eandem comparationem; sed secundum aliam et aliam nihil prohibet, quod aliquid sit veritas creaturae et similitudo Dei, similiter, quod aliquid sit veritas Dei et similitudo creaturae. Et quoniam ratio cognoscendi accipitur penes utrumque modum, ideo cognitio potest esse communis.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur ultimo, dicendum, quod tenet, cum cognitio causatur a cognito; non autem tenet cum non causatur, sicut in proposito.

Article II.

On the mode of divine cognition.

Consequently there is a question about the second article, namely, on the mode of divine cognition. And concerning this three things are asked.

First, it is asked whether God knows himself and other things uniformly.

Second, whether he knows mutable things immutably.

Third, whether he knows all things presentially.

Question I.

Whether God knows himself and other things in the same way.

That he knows himself and other things in the same way, that is, uniformly, is shown thus.

1. The knowledge of God is his essence, and his to-know is his to-be; therefore the mode of knowing also is the mode of being; but there is one essential mode of being in God: therefore there is also one mode of knowing.

2. Likewise, God knows himself by himself and not by another, and he knows other things by himself and not by another¹; therefore he knows himself and other things by one and the same ratio; but the mode of knowing is taken according to the ratio of knowing: therefore if there is the same ratio of knowing himself and other things, [there is] also the same mode, and so on.

3. Likewise, this same thing seems [to follow] per impossibile, because if he knows himself in another way [and] creatures in another way: therefore when he knows himself and creatures, he is varied in knowing; therefore in God there is transmutation and the shadow of vicissitude².

4. Likewise, if [he knows] in another way, then I ask: either that mode is the Creator, or a creature. Not a creature, since the cognition and the mode of knowing is eternal; if [it is] the Creator, [it expresses] either something personal, or something essential. Not something personal, since every cognition is common to the three; therefore it expresses something essential: therefore if [there is] one mode and another, then [there is] one essence and another; but this is impossible: therefore also the first [is impossible].

On the contrary:

1. God, by knowing things other than himself, knows through an idea, but he does not know himself through an idea³: therefore if to know through an idea expresses the mode of cognition, and he does not know himself through an idea, it is plain that [he knows himself] in another mode of knowing; and so on.

2. Likewise, in the cognition by which God knows himself, the knower and the known and the ratio of knowing are the same; but in the cognition by which he knows the creature, the ratio of knowing is not the same as the known: therefore not the same mode⁴.

3. Likewise, nothing is common to the Creator and the creature according to the ratio of being, therefore neither according to the ratio of knowing: since therefore the being of the creature is other than that of the Creator, and another mode of being [obtains]: therefore [the creature] is known by another cognition and in another mode⁵ than the Creator. If therefore [the creature] is known by God in another mode, and to know the creature and to know God are the same [act], then God knows himself and other things in another mode.

4. Likewise, every cognition in which the known is more noble, more present, and more intelligible is a more noble cognition, namely as regards the thing and the mode. As regards the thing, since [it is] of a more noble thing; as regards the mode, since [it is] of a more present thing. But in the cognition by which God knows himself, the known is more noble, more present, and more intelligible than in the cognition of the creature: therefore [it is] a more noble cognition as regards the thing and the mode.

Conclusion.

By one cognition and in the same way God knows himself and the things other than himself.

I respond: It must be said that there is a certain cognition which is caused and takes its origin from the knowable: and this one, since it is caused by and depends on the knowable, is varied according to the requirement of the knowable as regards thing and mode. There is also another cognition which according to the thing is the same as the knower and is neither caused nor depends on the knowable: and this one receives identity as regards thing and mode from the side of the knower, not from the side of the known.

Since therefore divine cognition does not depend on things and is not caused [by them], but is the same as God, and God is keeping himself in the same essence and in the same mode: therefore by one cognition and in the same way God knows himself and the things other than himself, since [he is] in no way varied or diversified through himself.

For the understanding of the objections, however, it must be noted that with respect to the knower the cognition is compared in the same way and is in the same way, since according to that comparison it has being⁶; and so the first arguments proceed, showing that he knows himself and other things in the same way. With respect to the known, although it is in the same way, yet it is compared in another way: for to God [it is compared] according to the ratio of identity, to the creature according to the ratio of diversity and of causality, and therefore to the creature according to the ratio of being-an-idea-[for], but to God by no means; and this the arguments adduced for the second part prove, that it is compared in another way, and in this way it must be conceded. If therefore one infers that it is in another way, the argument is not valid, since the cognition of God does not receive its mode of being or nobility from the known.

To the arguments on the opposite side:

To 1. 2. And so the two objects [of the cognition] — concerning idea and diversity — are made plain.

To 3. To that which is objected in the third [argument], that nothing is common to the Creator and the creature; it must be said that [this] is true of community according to the same comparison; but according to one and another [comparison] nothing prohibits that something be a truth of the creature and a likeness of God, and likewise that something be a truth of God and a likeness of the creature. And since the ratio of knowing is taken according to either mode, the cognition can be common.

To 4. To that which is objected last, it must be said that [it] holds when the cognition is caused by the known; but it does not hold when it is not caused, as in [the present] case.