Bonaventure

I. Deum omnia cognoscere praesenter, ab omnibus theologis catholicis docetur; sed multum disputatum est de duabus quaestionibus connexis, quarum prima est, quomodo ista praesentia sit intelligenda; secunda vero, utrum eadem sit Deo ratio cognoscendi res creatas.

Quoad primam quaestionem S. Thom. (S. I. q. 14. a. 13, q. 57. a. 3; S. c. Gent. I. c. 66. 67; de Verit. q. 2. a. 13; I. Sent. d. 38. q. unica, c. S.) docet: «Omnia quae sunt in tempore, sunt Deo ab aeterno praesentia non solum ea ratione, qua habet rationes rerum apud se praesentes, ut quidam dicunt, sed quia eius intuitus fertur ab aeterno super omnia, prout sunt in sua praesentialitate» (Sum. I. q. 14. a. 13.). Haec secunda ratio multis displicuit, inter quos Petrus Ioan. Olivi Ord. Min. eo progressus est, ut illam sententiam tanquam haereticam censuraverit. At econtra censores ipsius Petri Ioannis hanc censuram reprobarunt ut erroneam (D'Argentré, Collectio iudiciorum tom. I. pag. 229, ed. Paris. 1728). Etiam Scotus (hic. q. unica, n. 9.) non nisi primam illam rationem praesentialitatis admittit et docet, quod infinita aeternitatis duratio, quae omne tempus supergreditur, non nisi potentia, minime autem actu relationem coexistentiae ad res futuras habeat; quippe quia, quod non existit, nullatenus coexistere, vel fundamentum relationis coexistentiae esse possit. Scoto favet etiam Alex. Hal. (S. I. q. 23. m. 4. a. 3.), eumque sequuntur non tantum Durandus et Nominales, sed etiam plurimi posteriores theologi ex omnibus fere scholis.

Nihilominus sententiam S. Thomae, recte intellectam, verissimam Deoque dignissimam reputamus et omnino conforp. 697mem doctrinae S. Augustini, S. Gregorii, S. Anselmi et S. Bonaventurae. Tota difficultas versatur circa rectam intelligentiam huius profundae positionis. Unde haec pauca praenotamus.

1. Aliud est nunc (sive instans praesens) temporis, aliud nunc aevi, aliud nunc aeternitatis, ut bene explicat Alex. Hal. (S. p. 1. q. 13. m. 9. a. 1. § 3.). Sufficit hic dicere, quod nunc temporis est instans indivisibile, raptim fugiens, quod copulat tempus prius cum posteriore; nunc aeternitatis est ipsa aeternitas, quae ratione infinitae simplicitatis est tota simul et indivisibilis, et hac ratione similis instanti indivisibili temporis, ratione vero immensitatis illimitatae omnes durationes temporis et aevi eminentissime in se complectitur et superexcedit.

2. Intellectio divina, cum sit substantia, eandem mensuram habet, quam ipsa divina substantia, unde etiam «praesentialitas divinae cognitionis, quae quidem aeternitas est, est simplex et infinita» (hic in corp.). Intellectio autem humana, quae est accidens, mensuratur tempore, substantia autem animae mensuratur aevo.

3. Alia est praesentia, qua res corporales, vel in genere res, quae tempore mensurantur, sibi coexistunt, alia, qua Deus rebus coexistit, alia, qua res temporales et differentiae temporis Deo coexistunt. Ut res corporales sibi sint praesentes, praeter indistantiam loci requiritur, ut simul sint in eodem instanti temporis, cuius mensura dilabitur per partes sibi succedentes sive per differentias praeteritorum et futurorum, et non est nisi in instanti. Unde in hac coexistentia pars durationis succedentis est extra aliam eius partem, et nullum instans potest coexistere nisi uni soli instanti durationis rei coexistentis. Si mensura utriusque durationis est aequalis et in eodem fluxu temporis, tunc tota duratio unius coexistit toti durationi alterius, sed ita, ut pars unius durationis tantum parti alterius coexistat. Si autem mensura utriusque est diversa, tunc non tantum secundum partes, sed etiam ex parte sibi coexistunt, vel nullatenus coexistunt. V. g. mensura horae coexistit quidem mensurae anni, cuius est pars, sed tamen nec toti anno, nec parti eius proportionatae indivisim, sed per successionem partium.

Aliter Deum coexistere omnibus rebus et mensuris temporum et locorum, manifestum est. Tota aeternitas existit per modum unius indivisibilis instantis, sine successione permanens et omnes successiones et mensuras temporis actu complectens et excedens. Sic est mensura divinae vitae et actionis ad intra; sic mensurat etiam omnes ad extra creatarum rerum mensuras; unde in eodem simplicissimo et immenso nunc aeternitatis coexistit omnibus rebus, non tantum iis quae in mensura temporis sunt praesentes temporali nunc vel cuidam parti aeternitatis quam nos imaginamur, sed etiam iis quae in mensura temporis et loci ab invicem distant secundum differentiam praeteritorum et futurorum. Immensa et indivisa aeternitas finitis rebus coexistit quidem tota propter indivisionem, sed non totaliter propter excessum, quia etiam aliis unquam existentibus rebus in actu coexistit, et aliis possibilibus in potentia.

Aliter denique ipsas res creatas et earum mensuram (tempus) aeternitati coexistere, tenendum est. Manifestum est, easdem pro mensura temporis, in qua sunt, et pro eo statu, in quo eorum duratio in omni instanti a differentia futuri fluit ad differentiam praeteriti, minime respondere toti aeternitati, nec eas virtute suae durationis posse coexistere eidem aeternitati. Sed quatenus haec finita mensura temporis circumplectitur et quasi includitur in altiore et supereminenti mensura aeternitatis, ad quam totum tempus non est nisi minimum instans, dici potest, quod etiam res temporales coexistant toti aeternitati, non autem totaliter. Sed τὸ non totaliter, dictum de coexistentia rerum temporalium, aliam rationem habet, ac dictum de coexistentia Dei. Deo enim convenit illa coexistentia per se, et τὸ non totaliter ratione excessus suae mensurae. Creaturae autem, cum non sint aeternae nec Deo coaeternae, illam coexistentiam non habent ex se et ratione suae durationis, sed ratione immensitatis et simplicitatis aeternitatis divinae, et τὸ non totaliter competit eis propter defectum, scil. propter finitam suae durationis mensuram.

II. Licet S. Bonav. a plurimis auctoribus ad sententiam Scoti trahatur, praesertim ob solutionem dubii 5. distinctionis 35. (quam partem etiam Barthol. de Barberiis, Curs. theol. tom. I. disp. 8. q. 7. mordicus tenet); tamen ipsa verba Seraphici (hic et infra d. 40. a. 2. q. 1. ad 4, et d. 41. a. 2. q. 1. ad 4; Itiner. mentis in Deum, c. 5. circa finem) satis demonstrant, plene eum convenire cum Angelici sententia, sane intellecta. In Itinerario ita dicit: «Quia aeternum et praesentissimum, ideo omnes durationes ambit et intrat, quasi simul existens earum centrum et circumferentia. Quia simplicissimum et maximum, ideo totum intra omnia et totum extra omnia, ac per hoc est sphaera intelligibilis, cuius centrum est ubique et circumferentia nusquam». Nihil autem dubii relinquit expositio huius doctrinae, quam S. Doctor facit in inedita quadam quaestione disputata, a nobis suo tempore publicanda, ex qua tantum unam propositionem transcribimus: «Sicut divina incircumscriptibilitas habet omnia loca sibi praesentia, et ipsa non distenditur per illa, licet illa vere sint distensa, sic divina aeternitas habet sibi omnia tempora praesentia, nec tamen ipsa succedit cum illis, licet illa vere succedant». — Plurimae obiectiones, quae contra hanc sententiam fieri solent, optime inter antiquos magistros solvit Richardus, hic a. 1. q. 1, et d. 41. a. 4. q. 2; qui tamen sententiam Scoti non omnino improbabilem censet. Circa utriusque positionis fundamenta possunt conferri Rada, contr. 30. a. 2, Macedo, coll. 9. diff. 4. et alii utriusque sententiae patroni.

III. Verba, quibus S. Doctor in principio responsionis duplicem sensum locutionis praesenter cognoscere distinguit, aliqua explicatione indigere videntur. Si praesenter ut adverbium determinat ipsum divinum actum sciendi, omnes concedunt eundem esse extra omnem mensuram temporis in simplicissimo nunc aeternitatis, ita ut nec praeteritum nec futurum nec praesens temporis ei convenire possint. Si autem praesenter trahitur ad omnia, tunc iterum duplex sensus distingui potest: vel ut notetur «praesentialitas cognitorum», ut est «dispositio rei cognitae in sua natura» (hic ad 1. 2.); quasi res futurae in mensura temporis non inter se realiter distent, sed sint simul et praesentes, quod manifeste est falsum — vel ipsa cognita comparari possunt non ad nunc temporale, sed ad praesentialitatem aeternitatis, quae simul est praesentialitas divinae cognitionis; et si in hoc sensu sumitur, subsistit duplex illa opinio scholarum. Ita fere Richard., d. 41. a. 4. q. 2.

IV. Quoad secundam quaestionem, utrum haec praesentialitas Deo sit ratio cognoscendi futura contingentia, non defuerunt, ut supra in Scholio (hic q. 1.) notavimus, qui nodum difficultatum, quae sunt circa praescientiam divinam, ita solvi posse putarent, inter quos numerantur etiam Salmanticenses. Ipse S. Thom. saepius istam rationem profert, quam Scotus (hic q. unica, n. 9.) nititur evertere. Communius autem S. Thomae sententia aliter explicatur, nempe quod ipse istam rationem non a priori tanquam unicum et proprium medium in quo statuere velit, sed quod potius a posteriori, supposita iam praescientia, inde sumat optima argumenta, ut manuducat ad intelligendum, praescientiam Dei esse intuitivam, infallibilem, immutabilem, nec ipsam contingentiae rerum derogare. Hoc inter alia insinuant ipsius verba (S. c. Gent. I. c. 67. in princ.) «Ex his autem iam aliqualiter patere potest, quod contingentium ab aeterno Deus infallibilem scientiam habuit, nec tamen contingentia esse desistunt». — Et revera, si scientia Dei non est, ut nostra, a rebus, sed potius ad res, ista praesentialitas rerum, saltem sola, non potest esse propria ratio divinae praescientiae.

V. Praeter iam citatos auctores: Alex. Hal., S. p. 1. q. 23. m. 4. a. 3. — B. Albert., S. p. 1. tr. 18. q. 60. m. 4. partic. 3. — Petr. a Tar., I. Sent. d. 41. q. 4. a. 2. — Durand., I. Sent. d. 38. q. 3. n. 11. seqq.

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I. That God knows all things presentially is taught by all Catholic theologians; but there has been much dispute over two connected questions, of which the first is how this presence is to be understood; the second, whether this is the same as God's reason for knowing created things.

As to the first question, St. Thomas (S. I. q. 14. a. 13, q. 57. a. 3; S. c. Gent. I. c. 66. 67; de Verit. q. 2. a. 13; I. Sent. d. 38. q. unica, c. S.) teaches: «All things which are in time are present to God from eternity, not only in that sense in which He has the rationes of things present with Himself, as some say, but because His gaze is borne from eternity over all things, as they are in their presentiality» (Sum. I. q. 14. a. 13.). This second reason has displeased many, among whom Peter John Olivi O.F.M. went so far as to censure that opinion as heretical. But on the contrary, the censors of Peter John himself reproved this censure as erroneous (D'Argentré, Collectio iudiciorum tom. I. p. 229, ed. Paris. 1728). Scotus too (here, q. unica, n. 9.) admits only that first reason of presentiality, and teaches that the infinite duration of eternity, which surpasses all time, has a relation of coexistence to future things only in potency, by no means in actuality; since indeed what does not exist can in no way coexist, nor can it be the foundation of a relation of coexistence. Alex. of Hales also favors Scotus (S. I. q. 23. m. 4. a. 3.), and not only Durandus and the Nominalists follow him, but also very many later theologians from nearly all schools.

Nonetheless, we reckon St. Thomas's opinion, rightly understood, most true and most worthy of God, and altogether conformed p. 697to the doctrine of St. Augustine, St. Gregory, St. Anselm, and St. Bonaventure. The whole difficulty turns on the right understanding of this profound position. Hence we set down these few notes.

1. The now (or present instant) of time is one thing, the now of aeviternity another, the now of eternity another, as Alex. of Hales well explains (S. p. 1. q. 13. m. 9. a. 1. § 3.). It suffices here to say that the now of time is an indivisible instant, fleeing swiftly, which couples earlier time with later; the now of eternity is eternity itself, which by reason of its infinite simplicity is wholly simultaneous and indivisible, and on this account similar to the indivisible instant of time, but by reason of its unlimited immensity it most eminently embraces in itself and surpasses all the durations of time and of aeviternity.

2. The divine intellection, since it is substance, has the same measure as the divine substance itself; whence also «the presentiality of the divine cognition, which indeed is eternity, is simple and infinite» (here in corp.). But human intellection, which is an accident, is measured by time, while the substance of the soul is measured by aeviternity.

3. There is one presence by which corporeal things, or things in general which are measured by time, coexist with one another; another, by which God coexists with things; another, by which temporal things and the differences of time coexist with God. For corporeal things to be present to one another, besides closeness of place it is required that they be simultaneously in the same instant of time, whose measure slips away through parts succeeding one another, that is, through the differences of past and future, and is only in an instant. Hence in this coexistence the part of the succeeding duration is outside another part of itself, and no instant can coexist with anything but the one single instant of the duration of the coexisting thing. If the measure of both durations is equal and in the same flow of time, then the whole duration of the one coexists with the whole duration of the other, but in such a way that a part of the one duration coexists only with a part of the other. If however the measure of each is different, then they coexist not only according to parts, but partially also, or not at all. For example, the measure of an hour does coexist with the measure of a year, of which it is a part, but not with the whole year, nor with a proportionate part of it indivisibly, but by succession of parts.

That God coexists otherwise with all things and with the measures of times and places is manifest. The whole eternity exists in the manner of one indivisible instant, abiding without succession and actually embracing and exceeding all successions and measures of time. Such is the measure of the divine life and of the action ad intra; thus too it measures all the measures of created things ad extra; whence in the same most simple and immense now of eternity He coexists with all things, not only with those which in the measure of time are present in the temporal now, or in some part of eternity which we imagine, but also with those which in the measure of time and place are distant from one another according to the difference of past and future. The immense and undivided eternity coexists with finite things wholly (tota) by reason of its indivision, but not totally (totaliter) by reason of its excess, since it also coexists in act with other things that ever exist, and in potency with other things possible.

Finally, that the created things themselves and their measure (time) coexist with eternity in another way must be held. It is manifest that those things, with respect to the measure of time in which they are, and with respect to that state in which their duration in every instant flows from the difference of future to the difference of past, by no means correspond to the whole of eternity, nor can they by virtue of their duration coexist with that eternity. But insofar as this finite measure of time is encompassed and as it were included in the higher and supereminent measure of eternity, to which all time is no more than a least instant, it can be said that even temporal things coexist with all eternity, but not totally. But the τὸ not totally, said of the coexistence of temporal things, has another character than what is said of the coexistence of God. For to God that coexistence belongs per se, and the τὸ not totally by reason of the excess of His measure. But to creatures, since they are not eternal nor coeternal with God, that coexistence does not belong from themselves and by reason of their duration, but by reason of the immensity and simplicity of the divine eternity, and the τὸ not totally befits them on account of defect, that is, on account of the finite measure of their duration.

II. Although St. Bonaventure is drawn by very many authors to the opinion of Scotus, especially on account of the solution of dubium 5 of distinction 35 (which part Barthol. de Barberiis, Curs. theol. tom. I. disp. 8. q. 7. tenaciously holds); nevertheless the very words of the Seraphic Doctor (here, and below d. 40. a. 2. q. 1. ad 4, and d. 41. a. 2. q. 1. ad 4; Itinerarium mentis in Deum, c. 5, near the end) sufficiently demonstrate that he fully agrees with the Angelic Doctor's view, sanely understood. In the Itinerarium he says: «Because [God] is eternal and most present, therefore He encompasses and enters all durations, as if simultaneously existing as their center and circumference. Because [He is] most simple and greatest, therefore He is wholly within all things and wholly outside all things, and through this is an intelligible sphere, whose center is everywhere and circumference nowhere». Nor does the exposition of this doctrine which the Holy Doctor makes in a certain unedited disputed question — to be published by us in due time — leave any doubt; from which we transcribe but one proposition: «Just as divine uncircumscribability has all places present to itself, and itself is not extended through them, although they are truly extended, so divine eternity has all times present to itself, nor does it itself succeed with them, although they truly succeed». — Most of the objections that are wont to be brought against this opinion are best resolved among the ancient masters by Richard [of Mediavilla], here a. 1. q. 1, and d. 41. a. 4. q. 2; who however judges Scotus's opinion not entirely improbable. Concerning the foundations of each position, one may consult Rada, contr. 30. a. 2; Macedo, coll. 9. diff. 4; and other patrons of either opinion.

III. The words by which the Holy Doctor at the beginning of his response distinguishes a twofold sense of the expression to know presentially seem to need some explanation. If presentially as an adverb determines the divine act of knowing itself, all concede that this same act is outside every measure of time, in the most simple now of eternity, in such a way that neither past nor future nor present of time can apply to it. If however presentially is drawn to all things, then again a twofold sense can be distinguished: either it notes the «presentiality of the things known», as that is «the disposition of the thing known in its own nature» (here, ad 1, 2); as if future things in the measure of time did not really stand apart from one another, but were simultaneous and present, which is manifestly false — or the things known themselves can be compared not to the temporal now, but to the presentiality of eternity, which is at the same time the presentiality of the divine cognition; and if it is taken in this sense, that twofold opinion of the schools stands. Thus, more or less, Richard, d. 41. a. 4. q. 2.

IV. As to the second question, whether this presentiality is for God the reason of knowing future contingents, there have not been wanting (as we noted above in the Scholion, here q. 1) those who thought that the knot of difficulties surrounding the divine foreknowledge could thus be loosed; among whom even the Salmanticenses are reckoned. St. Thomas himself often advances this reason, which Scotus (here, q. unica, n. 9.) labors to overturn. But more commonly St. Thomas's view is otherwise explained: namely, that he does not wish to set up this reason a priori as the unique and proper medium in quo, but rather a posteriori, foreknowledge being already supposed, draws from it the best arguments to lead the mind to understand that God's foreknowledge is intuitive, infallible, immutable, and not derogating from the contingency of things. Among other things, his words intimate this (S. c. Gent. I. c. 67. in princ.): «From these things it can now in some way be made clear that God has had infallible knowledge of contingents from eternity, and yet contingents do not cease to be». — And indeed, if God's knowledge is not, like ours, from things, but rather toward things, that presentiality of things, at least taken alone, cannot be the proper reason of the divine foreknowledge.

V. Besides the authors already cited: Alex. Hal., S. p. 1. q. 23. m. 4. a. 3. — B. Albert., S. p. 1. tr. 18. q. 60. m. 4. partic. 3. — Petr. a Tar., I. Sent. d. 41. q. 4. a. 2. — Durand., I. Sent. d. 38. q. 3. n. 11. seqq.

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