Bonaventure

DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Latin (`La.`) is verbatim from the Quaracchi apparatus; English (`En.`) is a literal rendering. Variant readings preserve the apparatus's manuscript-sigla style (e.g., Cod. X, Vat., ed. 1).

DUB. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo de hoc quod dicit Augustinus: Sciunt se Pater et Filius invicem, sed iste nascendo, ille gignendo. Videtur enim male dicere, quia scire est essentiale in divinis: ergo si scit nascendo, cum nasci dicat proprietatem personalem, proprietas personalis est ratio rei essentialis¹, quod non est sane neque vere dictum.

Respondeo: Aliqui voluerunt dicere, quod scire Dei, relatum ad creaturas, vel ita quod una persona sciat se ipsam, est dictum essentialiter; sed secundum quod una persona scit aliam, dicit respectum personae ad personam et est dictum notionaliter. — Sed hoc non est convenienter dictum, quia, sicut in praecedentibus habitum est², sapientia et sapere essentialiter tantum dicitur.

Et propterea dicendum, quod ablativus ille non tantum dicit causam sive rationem dicendi, sed rationem concomitantiae. Gerundia enim, sicut dicit Priscianus³, habent exponi per si, vel per dum, vel per quia; et primo modo dicunt convenientiam, secundo concomitantiam, et tertio causam.

DUB. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Et omnia quae sunt in eorum sapientia et in eorum essentia, unusquisque eorum simul videt. Sed supra, distinctione trigesima sexta⁴, dictum est, quod creaturae sunt in Dei notitia, sed non in Dei essentia: ergo est contradictio.

Respondeo: Dicendum est, quod in divina scientia sunt scibilia, in divina vero essentia sunt attributa, sicut potentia, sapientia et bonitas. Et Augustinus vult dicere, quod Pater et Filius simul vident omnia cognoscibilia, creata et creanda, et omnia essentiae attributa. Unde littera legenda est divisim: omnia quae sunt in eorum scientia, ut puta creata, simul scit quilibet; similiter omnia quae sunt in eorum essentia, ut puta attributa, simul sciunt sive scit quilibet. Et ideo non vult dicere, quod creaturae sint in divina essentia⁵.

DUB. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod scientia Dei non est nisi de his quae sunt vel fuerunt vel erunt. Videtur enim hoc esse falsum, quia Deus scit omne quod potest facere; sed potest facere quod nunquam fuit nec est nec erit: ergo scientia Dei est de aliquo, quod nunquam fuit vel est vel erit. Et praeterea, est infinitorum, sicut vult Augustinus undecimo de Civitate Dei⁶, non tantum quae sunt vel fuerunt vel erunt.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod Magister loquitur de scientia visionis, quae est illorum tantum, quorum ab aeterno fuit praevisio; sed ipse obiicit de scientia intelligentiae, quae nullius connotat existentiam; quod patet. Intelligit enim Deus omne quod potest, et ita non recte currit obiectio⁷.

DUB. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod non potest incipere scire vel praescire etc. Videtur enim male dicere, quia nihil scitur nisi verum⁸: ergo antequam sit verum, non scitur: ergo si aliquid incipit esse verum, aliquid incipit a Deo sciri: ergo Deus potest incipere aliquid scire. — Item, creatio est divina essentia, et tamen ratione connotati Deus potest aliquid incipere creare: ergo similiter et aliquid scire.

Respondeo: Scire dupliciter dicitur. Uno modo scire hoc est quod habere cognitionem de aliquo; et sic non connotat actualem existentiam cogniti, et sic non potest Deus incipere aliquid scire, id est alicuius cognitionem incipere habere. Alio modo scire hoc est quod nosse aliquid esse verum, et hoc tunc primo scitur esse verum, quando incipit esse; et sic⁹ incipit Deus scire, sic et desinit praescire, non ratione principalis significati, quod est scientia, sed ratione connotati, quod quidem est veritas rei scitae.

DUB. V.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Nec potest noviter vel ex tempore velle aliquid, et tamen potest velle quod nunquam voluit. Videtur enim hic¹⁰ dicere duo contradictorie opposita, quoniam illud est novum quod prius non fuit et modo est: ergo si posset velle quod prius non voluit, videtur quod incipiat velle.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod cum dico, Deum velle hoc¹¹, duo dico: et actum divinae voluntatis, et ulterius ordinationem¹² ipsius effectus ad illum actum. Et primum quidem est necessarium et semper, nec potest incipere nec desinere. Voluntas enim divina est semper in actu suo, ita quod nec potest illo carere nec alium habere; sed ordinatio alicuius effectus ad illum actum est ordinatio rei futurae, quae nondum est, et ideo potest esse et non esse, et ordinari et non ordinari. Quando ergo dicitur: Deus potest velle quod nunquam voluit, et tamen non ex tempore; intellectus est, quod effectus ille potuit ordinari ad divinum velle; et quoniam ordinatio effectus est ordinatio rei futurae, et quod semel est futurum semper fuit futurum, et quod semel est¹³ ordinatum semper fuit ordinatum ad illam. Quando ergo dicitur, quod Deus potest velle aliquid, idem est dicere, quod aliquid potuit esse futurum sive habere ordinem ad divinam voluntatem, quod tamen non habet ordinem; sed si haberet, ab aeterno habuisset, et ideo non incipit ex tempore. Et ideo exemplum Magistri bonum est, si velle Dei importat ordinem ad volitum in ratione futuri; sed secundum quod importat concomitantiam in ratione praesentis, potest Deus ex tempore velle hoc esse, sive hoc approbare hodie, non quia¹⁴ incipiat actus, sed quia incipiat connotatum.

DUB. VI.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod specialem curam habet de rationalibus; quia videtur esse contra illud quod dicitur Sapientiae sexto¹⁵: Aequalis est illi cura de omnibus.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod aequaliter non privat ibi ordinem divinae distributionis, sed privat acceptionem personae. Et omnibus distribuit ibi tantum pro hominibus, tamen¹⁶ pro magnis et parvis, pauperibus et divitibus; et sic est ei aequaliter cura de omnibus, quia ita vult salutem pauperum, ut divitum.

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DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

DOUBT I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first concerning what Augustine says: The Father and the Son know each other, but this one by being born, that one by begetting. For he seems to speak ill, because to know is something essential in divine things: therefore if [the Son] knows by being born, since to be born states a personal property, a personal property would be the account of an essential reality¹, which is neither soundly nor truly said.

I respond: Some wished to say that the knowing of God, when referred to creatures, or [taken] thus that one person knows himself, is said essentially; but inasmuch as one person knows another, it states a respect of person to person and is said notionally. — But this is not fittingly said, because, as has been laid down in the preceding², wisdom and to be wise are said only essentially.

And therefore it must be said that that ablative does not only state cause or the account of saying [it], but the account of concomitance. For gerunds, as Priscian says³, have to be expounded by si (if), or by dum (while), or by quia (because); and in the first mode they state agreement, in the second concomitance, and in the third cause.

DOUBT II.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: And all things which are in their wisdom and in their essence, each of them sees at once. But above, in the thirty-sixth distinction⁴, it was said that creatures are in God's cognition, but not in God's essence: therefore there is a contradiction.

I respond: It must be said that in the divine knowledge there are knowables, but in the divine essence there are attributes, such as power, wisdom and goodness. And Augustine wishes to say that the Father and the Son together see all knowables, both created and to be created, and all the attributes of the essence. Hence the text must be read divisively: all things which are in their knowledge, namely created [things], each one knows at once; likewise all things which are in their essence, namely the attributes, they know at once or each one knows. And therefore he does not wish to say that creatures are in the divine essence⁵.

DOUBT III.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that the knowledge of God is only of those things which are or have been or will be. For this seems false, because God knows everything that he can do; but he can do what never was nor is nor will be: therefore the knowledge of God is of something which never was or is or will be. And furthermore, it is of infinites, as Augustine wills [in] On the City of God eleven⁶, not only of those things which are or have been or will be.

I respond: It must be said that the Master is speaking of the knowledge of vision (scientia visionis), which is only of those things of which there was foresight from eternity; but he objects from the knowledge of intelligence (scientia intelligentiae), which connotes the existence of nothing; which is plain. For God understands everything which he can [understand], and so the objection does not run rightly⁷.

DOUBT IV.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that he cannot begin to know or foreknow etc. For he seems to speak ill, because nothing is known except [what is] true⁸: therefore before it is true, it is not known: therefore if something begins to be true, something begins to be known by God: therefore God can begin to know something. — Likewise, creation is the divine essence, and yet by reason of the connoted [term] God can begin to create something: therefore likewise also to know something.

I respond: To know is said in two ways. In one way to know is the same as to have cognition of something; and thus it does not connote the actual existence of the known, and thus God cannot begin to know anything, that is, to begin to have cognition of something. In another way to know is the same as to be acquainted that something is true, and this is then first known to be true, when it begins to be; and thus⁹ God begins to know, and likewise ceases to foreknow, not by reason of the principal signified, which is knowledge, but by reason of the connoted [term], which is the truth of the thing known.

DOUBT V.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: Nor can he newly or in time will anything, and yet he can will what he never willed. For he seems here¹⁰ to say two contradictorily opposed things, since that is new which previously was not and now is: therefore if he could will what he previously did not will, it seems that he begins to will.

I respond: It must be said that when I say God wills this¹¹, I say two things: both the act of the divine will, and further the ordering¹² of the effect itself to that act. And the first is indeed necessary and ever-abiding, nor can it begin nor cease. For the divine will is always in its act, such that it can neither lack that act nor have another; but the ordering of some effect to that act is the ordering of a future thing, which is not yet, and therefore it can be and not be, can be ordered and not ordered. When therefore it is said: God can will what he never willed, and yet not in time; the sense is that that effect could be ordered to the divine willing; and since the ordering of the effect is the ordering of a future thing, and what is once future was always future, and what is once¹³ ordered was always ordered to it. When therefore it is said that God can will something, it is the same as to say that something could be future or have an order to the divine will, which yet does not have [such] order; but if it had, it would have had it from eternity, and therefore it does not begin from time. And so the Master's example is good, if God's willing imports an order to the willed in the character of future; but inasmuch as it imports concomitance in the character of present, God can in time will this to be, or to approve this today, not because¹⁴ the act begins, but because the connoted [term] begins.

DOUBT VI.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that he has special care for rational [creatures]; since this seems to be against what is said in Wisdom 6¹⁵: His care is equal for all.

I respond: It must be said that equally does not there exclude the order of the divine distribution, but excludes respect of persons. And he distributes [his care] to all there only as regards human beings, yet¹⁶ for great and small, poor and rich; and thus he has equally care for all, because he so wills the salvation of the poor as of the rich.

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