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Dist. 46, Art. 1, Q. 6

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 46

Textus Latinus
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Quaestio VI. Utrum malum sit de complemento universi.

Sexto et ultimo quaeritur, utrum malum sit de complemento universi. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Ecclesiastici trigesimo tertio1: Contra malum bonum est, et contra mortem vita; et sic intuere in omnia opera Altissimi. Si ergo huiusmodi oppositio spectat ad decorem et complementum universi: ergo et malum.

2. Item, Augustinus de Civitate Dei2, loquens de malis, quare sinantur a Deo, dicit, quod Deus universum quasi quibusdam antithetis honestavit; et exemplificat in sermone et in picturis: in sermone, sicut Apostolus utitur, secundae ad Corinthios sexto3: Per gloriam et ignobilitatem. Et in picturis similiter: sicut enim « pictura alba cum colore nigro suo loco posito pulcra est; sic universum cum malis »: ergo malum secundum hoc decorat universum. Sed omne tale est de complemento universi: ergo etc.

3. Item, ratione videtur, quia sicut malum est privatio boni, ita silentium est privatio vocis, et somnus vigiliae; sed ad perfectionem et decorem sermonis necesse est, interponi silentium, et ad perfectionem et decorem animalis necesse est, aliquando vigiliis interponi somnum: ergo ad perfectum decorem universi necesse est, bonis interponi mala4.

4. Item, universum est conditum ad Dei manifestationem; sed in operibus Dei maxime manifestantur misericordia et veritas5; sed si malum non fuisset, nec misericordia nec veritas ita perfecte manifestaretur, sicut manifestatur in aeterna punitione et peccatorum remissione et redemptione: ergo non esset universum completum.

Contra:

1. Genesis primo6: Vidit Deus cuncta quae fecerat, et erant valde bona; et non fecerat mala, constat: ergo absque malis erant omnia valde bona in universo. Sed universum non esset valde bonum, si deesset ei perfectio: cum ergo deesset ei malum, videtur, quod malum non sit de eius perfectione.

2. Item, Augustinus in tertio de Libero Arbitrio7, loquens de perfectione universi, dicit: « Quidquid tibi vera ratione melius occurrerit, scias opificem omnium fecisse ». Si ergo non fecit mundum cum malis, sed sine malis, ergo mundus sine malis erat perfectior quam cum malis: ergo malum non est de perfectione universi.

3. Item, ratione videtur, quia « albius est

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quod est nigro impermixtius »8, ergo pulcrius et melius quod est malo impermixtius; sed si in mundo nullum esset malum, tunc universum esset malis impermixtius, ergo melius, ergo perfectius: ergo ordinatio mali non est de complemento universi.

4. Item, « bonum et pulcrum idem », sicut dicit Dionysius9; ergo quod est privatio boni est privatio pulcri; sed malum est privatio boni: ergo est privatio pulcri, ergo malum deturpat. Sed quod deturpat et foedat non spectat ad pulcritudinem sive decorem: ergo nec malum sive mali ordinatio.

Conclusio.

Conclusio. Malum nec per se nec per accidens facit ad substantialem decorem vel complementum universi; ad accidentalem autem facit per accidens, et quidem triplici modo.

Respondeo: Ad hoc notandum, quod circa hoc diversi diversa senserunt.

Dixerunt enim aliqui, quod est loqui de malo, ut est in potentia facientis, et ut est in opere sive in facto. Si loquamur, ut est in potentia facientis, sic voluerunt dicere, quod posse malum facere erat de perfectione universitatis, quia creatura debebat fieri, quae posset peccare et posset abstinere, ad hoc quod universum perfectum esset, sicut in tertio de Libero Arbitrio10 dicitur. Si loquamur de malo ut est in facto esse, sic dicunt, quod nullo modo spectat ad complementum universi, nec per se nec per accidens. — Sed cum auctoritates dicant contrarium, quod ex ordinatione mali ad bonum quidam decor resultat, sicut dicit Augustinus11 expresse, oportet aliter dicere.

Ideo dicunt alii, quod decor universitatis quidam est substantialis sive quantum ad esse, quidam accidentalis sive quantum ad bene esse. Quantum ad primum decorem mala non sunt facientia12 nec per se nec per accidens; sed quantum ad aliquem decorem accidentalem mala bene ordinata faciunt, non quia mala, sed quia ordinata, et ita per accidens, sicut per accidens ordinantur. Et illo decore circumscripto, adhuc esset universum decorum et perfectum, quamvis hunc decorem non haberet.

Ad hunc decorem faciunt mala, non ratione sui, sed ratione subiecti, quod ordinatur in poena ad divinae iustitiae manifestationem; vel ratione oppositi13, cuius decor magis clarescit ex praesentia mali, sicut « opposita iuxta se posita magis elucescunt », sicut communiter dicitur; vel ratione boni eliciti. Multa enim bona Deus fecit14 et facta sunt, quae non essent facta, nisi peccatum praestitisset occasionem, sicut illa quae gesta sunt in nostra reparatione. Tamen sine his omnibus esset universum completum.

Si vero quaeritur, utrum tunc esset pulcrius, quam nunc sit, responderi potest, quod se habent sicut excedentia et excessa15: sicut duae facies, in quarum una nulla est macula, in altera est cicatrix aliqua bene sita, quae videtur faciem venustare. — Et si ultra procedas: quis decor magis excedit? potest dici sine praeiudicio, quod decor qui nunc est. Et ratio huius est, quia vis divina, eliciens bonum ex malo, praepotens est malo; et ideo bonum, quod inde elicit, praevalet bono, quod malum corrumpit. Et ideo plus valet universum nunc, quam valuisset tunc; in quo nunc modo commendatur sapientia Creatoris. Unde Gregorius in benedictione caerei Paschalis16: « O felix culpa, quae talem meruit habere Redemptorem ». Et exemplum est de scypho sano, qui frangitur et religatur filo argenteo vel aureo, quia melior est post quam ante, non ratione fractionis, sed ratione religationis.

Et si tu quaeras a me: Nonne melius valeret17, si omnes essent beati, quam si quidam beati, et quidam miseri? Dicendum, quod, sicut credo, si homo stetisset, non pervenissent plures ad Ierusalem supernam, quam sic perventuri sunt. Unde mali quasi ex abundanti sunt nec sunt in computatione.

Et sic concedendum, quod ordinatio mali facit ad complementum accidentale; sicut probant rationes ad primam partem inductae; sed ad complementum sive ad decorem substantialem nec per se nec per accidens; per se vero ad nullum, sicut illae rationes ostendunt.

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Ad argumenta pro parte negativa:

Ad 3. Verumtamen quod obiicitur ad primam partem per simile in privationibus18; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia illae privationes non sunt aliquid adimentes nec auferentes aliquid de bono vel pulcro; malum tamen aufert. Ideo patet illud.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non manifestarentur misericordia et iustitia; dicendum19, quod quamvis non manifestarentur in actu, manifestarentur tamen in sua origine. Qui enim Deum in se cognoscit videt in illo aeterno exemplari, quid Deum deceat20 facere et possit — licet non omnino — et ita misericordiam et iustitiam pariter. Nihilominus tamen misericordia ostenderetur in supererogatione, et iustitia in retributione, licet non ita clare, ut nunc in opere.

Scholion

I. Cum pluries dictum sit, quod malum a Deo ordinabile sit in bonum, nunc quaeritur, utrum inter bona a Deo ex malo elicita poni possit etiam decor et complementum universi. Haec quaestio resolvitur in generali, et tunc enumerantur in speciali tria bona, ad quae malum a Deo in universo ordinatur. Quaedam autem magis explicantur infra d. 47. q. 3. — Per modum corollariorum duae quaestiones annexae proponuntur et solvuntur, ut patet in textu.

Differt quaestio respectu possibilitatis mali, quatenus haec fundata est in creato arbitrio libero, et quaestio de malo, ut actu fit vel factum est. Creaturas cum potentia ad malum creatas esse de perfectione universi, est aperta doctrina S. Augustini (vide d. 47. q. 3. in corp.) et communiter admissa. Aliter res est quoad malum actu factum. Tamen opinio, quod illud nullo modo, ne per accidens quidem, spectet ad complementum universi, cum communi sententia improbatur. — De quaestione, utrum Verbum incarnatum esset, si Adam non peccasset, cfr. III. Sent. d. 1. a. 2. q. 2.

Quoad primam quaestionem annexam cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 18. m. 10. a. 2. 3; S. Thom., I. Sent. d. 44. a. 2. ad 5; B. Albert., S. p. I. tr. 6. q. 27. m. 5. q. incident. 2. — Quoad secundam quaestionem notamus, quod S. Bonav. videtur supponere, quod non fuissent reprobi, supposito quod Adam non peccasset (cfr. supra d. 40. a. 3. q. 1. ad 3.); et tantum problematice (« ut credo ») respondet ad dubium, utrum in ista hypothesi plures fuissent praedestinati.

II. Alex. Hal., loc. cit. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3; S. I. q. 48. a. 2; S. c. Gent. III. c. 71. — B. Albert., hic a. 6. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 8.

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English Translation
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Question VI. Whether evil is of the complement of the universe.

Sixthly and lastly it is asked whether evil is of the complement of the universe. And that it is, appears thus:

1. Ecclesiasticus 331: Against evil is the good, and against death is life; and so look upon all the works of the Most High. If therefore such opposition pertains to the beauty and complement of the universe: therefore so also [does] evil.

2. Likewise, Augustine in the City of God2, speaking of evils, why they are permitted by God, says that God adorned the universe as it were by certain antitheses; and he exemplifies [this] in speech and in pictures: in speech, as the Apostle uses [it] in the second [letter] to the Corinthians 63: Through glory and ignobility. And likewise in pictures: for « just as a white picture is beautiful with a black color placed in its own location, so [is] the universe with evils »: therefore evil in this respect adorns the universe. But everything such is of the complement of the universe: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, by reason [it appears so], because just as evil is the privation of good, so silence is the privation of voice, and sleep [the privation] of waking; but for the perfection and beauty of speech it is necessary that silence be interposed, and for the perfection and beauty of an animal it is necessary that sleep sometimes be interposed in waking: therefore for the perfect beauty of the universe it is necessary that evils be interposed among goods4.

4. Likewise, the universe was founded for the manifestation of God; but in the works of God mercy and truth are most of all made manifest5; but if evil had not been, neither mercy nor truth would be so perfectly manifested as is manifested in eternal punishment and in the remission of sins and redemption: therefore the universe would not be complete.

On the contrary:

1. Genesis 16: God saw all things that he had made, and they were very good; and he had not made evils — it is established: therefore without evils all things were very good in the universe. But the universe would not be very good if perfection were lacking to it: since therefore evil was lacking to it, it appears that evil is not of its perfection.

2. Likewise, Augustine in book III On Free Choice7, speaking of the perfection of the universe, says: « Whatever better thing occurs to you by true reason, know that the Maker of all has made it ». If therefore he did not make the world with evils, but without evils, then the world without evils was more perfect than with evils: therefore evil is not of the perfection of the universe.

3. Likewise, by reason [it appears so], because « that is whiter which is more unmixed with black »8, therefore [that is] more beautiful and better which is more unmixed with evil; but if in the world there were no evil, then the universe would be more unmixed with evils, therefore better, therefore more perfect: therefore the ordering of evil is not of the complement of the universe.

4. Likewise, « the good and the beautiful are the same », as Dionysius says9; therefore what is the privation of good is the privation of the beautiful; but evil is the privation of good: therefore [it] is the privation of the beautiful, therefore evil disfigures. But what disfigures and defiles does not pertain to beauty or to ornament: therefore neither [does] evil or the ordering of evil.

Conclusion.

Conclusion. Evil neither per se nor per accidens contributes to the substantial beauty or complement of the universe; but to the accidental [complement] it contributes per accidens, and indeed in a threefold manner.

I respond: For this it must be noted that on this matter different [authors] have thought differently.

For some have said that there is to speak of evil [in two ways]: as it is in the power of the agent, and as it is in [the] work or in fact. If we speak [of evil] as it is in the power of the agent, in this way they wished to say that the ability to do evil was of the perfection of the universe — because the creature had to be made who could sin and could abstain, in order that the universe might be perfect, as is said in book III On Free Choice10. If we speak of evil as it is in the [state of] having-been-done, thus they say that in no way does it pertain to the complement of the universe, neither per se nor per accidens. — But since authorities say the contrary, namely that from the ordering of evil to good a certain beauty results, as Augustine11 expressly says, it is necessary to speak otherwise.

Therefore others say that the beauty of the universe is in part substantial or insofar as [its] being, [and] in part accidental or insofar as [its] well-being. As regards the first beauty, evils are not contributors12, neither per se nor per accidens; but as regards a certain accidental beauty, evils well ordered do contribute, not because [they are] evils, but because [they are] ordered, and so per accidens, just as they are ordered per accidens. And with that beauty set aside, the universe would still be beautiful and perfect, although it would not have this [particular] beauty.

To this beauty evils contribute, not by reason of themselves, but by reason of the subject, which is ordered in [its] punishment to the manifestation of divine justice; or by reason of the opposite13, whose beauty the more shines forth from the presence of evil, just as « opposites placed next to each other shine forth the more », as is commonly said; or by reason of the good elicited. For God made many goods14, and many things were made, which would not have been made unless sin had supplied the occasion — as those things which were done in our reparation. Yet without all these the universe would be complete.

But if it is asked whether [the universe] would then be more beautiful than it now is, it can be answered that they stand as exceeding and exceeded15: just as two faces, in one of which there is no mark, [while] in the other there is some scar well placed, which appears to grace the face. — And if you proceed further: which beauty exceeds more? it can be said without prejudice that [it is] the beauty which now is. And the reason of this is that the divine power, eliciting good from evil, is more powerful than evil; and therefore the good which it elicits thence prevails over the good which evil corrupts. And therefore the universe is worth more now than it would have been worth then; in which now the wisdom of the Creator is commended. Whence Gregory in the blessing of the Paschal candle16: « O happy fault, which deserved to have such a Redeemer ». And the example is of a sound cup, which is broken and bound back together with a silver or gold thread, because it is better afterward than before — not by reason of the breaking, but by reason of the binding-back.

And if you ask me: Would it not be better17 if all were blessed, than if some [were] blessed and some wretched? It must be said that, as I believe, if man had stood firm, no more would have come to the supernal Jerusalem than thus [in fact] are going to come. Whence the evil are as it were of abundance and are not in the count.

And thus it must be conceded that the ordering of evil contributes to the accidental complement, as the arguments adduced for the first part prove; but to the complement or to the substantial beauty [it does] not [contribute] per se nor per accidens; per se indeed [it contributes] to none, as those arguments [for the contrary] show.

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To the arguments for the negative side:

Ad 3. Yet to what is objected against the first part by a simile drawn from privations18; it must be said that the simile does not hold, because those privations are not something taking away, nor removing anything of the good or of the beautiful; evil, however, does take away. Therefore that is clear.

Ad 4. To what is objected — that mercy and justice would not be manifested: it must be said19 that although they would not be manifested in act, they would yet be manifested in their origin. For he who knows God in himself sees in that eternal exemplar what is befitting20 for God to do and what is possible [to him] — although not entirely — and so [he sees] mercy and justice equally. Nevertheless mercy would be shown in [his] over-bestowing, and justice in [his] retribution, although not so clearly as now in the work.

Scholion

I. Since it has been said several times that evil is orderable by God toward good, now it is asked whether among the goods elicited by God from evil there can also be placed beauty and the complement of the universe. This question is resolved in general, and then there are enumerated in particular three goods toward which evil is ordered by God in the universe. Some [of these] are further explained below at d. 47 q. 3. — By way of corollaries two annexed questions are proposed and solved, as appears in the text.

The question is distinct in respect of the possibility of evil — insofar as this is founded in the created free choice — and the question of evil as it actually comes about or has come about. That creatures created with a potency to evil are of the perfection of the universe is the clear teaching of St. Augustine (see d. 47 q. 3 in corp.) and is commonly admitted. The case is otherwise as regards evil actually done. Yet the opinion that this in no way, not even per accidens, pertains to the complement of the universe is, with the common sentence, disapproved. — On the question whether the Word would have been incarnate if Adam had not sinned, cf. III Sent. d. 1 a. 2 q. 2.

As to the first annexed question, cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa p. I q. 18 m. 10 a. 2, 3; St. Thomas, I Sent. d. 44 a. 2 ad 5; Bl. Albert, Summa p. I tr. 6 q. 27 m. 5 q. incident. 2. — As to the second annexed question, we note that St. Bonaventure seems to suppose that there would have been no reprobates, supposing Adam had not sinned (cf. above d. 40 a. 3 q. 1 ad 3); and only problematically (« as I believe ») does he answer the doubt whether on that hypothesis more would have been predestined.

II. Alexander of Hales, loc. cit. — St. Thomas, here q. 1 a. 3; Summa I q. 48 a. 2; Summa contra Gentiles III c. 71. — Bl. Albert, here a. 6. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2 a. 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 8.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vers. 15. — In Vulgata hoc loco post vita additur contra virum iustum peccator.
    Verse 15. — In the Vulgate at this place, after vita ("life") there is added contra virum iustum peccator ("against the just man, [is] the sinner").
  2. Libr. XI. c. 18. Ipsa verba August. vide supra pag. 786, nota 7.
    Book XI c. 18. The very words of Augustine see above p. 786, note 7.
  3. Vers. 7. — Textus qui mox affertur, est August., XI. de Civ. Dei, c. 23. n. 1, de quo cfr. supra pag. 830, nota 8. Etiam hoc loco, sicut supra, pro posito plurimi codd. et primae edd. posita; pro pulcra cod. T pulcrior.
    Verse 7. — The text immediately adduced is from Augustine, City of God XI c. 23 n. 1, on which cf. above p. 830, note 8. At this place too, as above, for posito very many codices and the early editions [read] posita; for pulcra codex T [reads] pulcrior.
  4. August., de Natura boni, c. 16: Si enim nos continendo vocem decenter interponimus in loquendo silentium, quanto magis ille quarundam rerum privationes decenter facit sicut rerum omnium perfectus artifex? Cfr. de Gen. ad lit. imperf. c. 5. n. 25; de Natura boni, c. 8, et libr. contra Secundinum Manich. c. 15, nec non III. de Musica, c. 8. n. 17. seqq. De alia similitudine, scil. de somno, cfr. Aristot., de Somno et Vigilia, ubi etiam c. I. haec somni habetur definitio: Videtur somnus vigiliae quaedam privatio.
    Augustine, On the Nature of the Good c. 16: For if we, by restraining the voice, becomingly interpose silence in speaking, how much more does He becomingly bring about the privations of certain things, as the perfect Artificer of all things? Cf. On Genesis Against the Manichees, unfinished commentary c. 5 n. 25; On the Nature of the Good c. 8, and the book Against Secundinus the Manichee c. 15, and also III On Music c. 8 n. 17ff. On the other simile, namely of sleep, cf. Aristotle, On Sleep and Waking, where also at c. 1 this definition of sleep is given: Sleep appears to be a certain privation of waking.
  5. Psalm. 24, 10: Universae viae Domini misericordia et veritas.
    Psalm 24:10: All the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth.
  6. Vers. 31. — Mox post constat ergo Vat. inserit quod, et paulo inferius eadem Vat. cum cod. cc perfectum exhibet pro perfectio.
    Verse 31. — Immediately after constat ("it is established"), the Vatican [edition] inserts quod, and a little below, the same Vatican [edition] with codex cc exhibits perfectum for perfectio.
  7. Cap. 5. n. 13. Cfr. supra d. 44. a. 1. q. 1. arg. 1. ad opposit., et in corp. quaest.
    Chapter 5 n. 13. Cf. above d. 44 a. 1 q. 1 arg. 1 ad oppositum, and in the body of the question.
  8. Aristot., III. Topic. c. 4. (c. 5.). — Paulo inferius pro tunc universum esset malis impermixtius Vat. nec universum esset malis permixtum.
    Aristotle, Topics III c. 4 (c. 5). — A little below, for tunc universum esset malis impermixtius ("then the universe would be more unmixed with evils") the Vatican [edition] [reads] nec universum esset malis permixtum ("nor would the universe be mixed with evils").
  9. De Div. Nom. c. 4. § 7. In textu Dionysii post idem nonnulli codd. ut Y Z cc adiiciunt sunt, Vat. adiicit est. Dein post ergo malum deturpat cod. adiungit et foedat.
    On the Divine Names c. 4 § 7. In the text of Dionysius, after idem ("the same") several codices, such as Y Z cc, add sunt ("are"); the Vatican [edition] adds est ("is"). Then after ergo malum deturpat ("therefore evil disfigures") a codex adjoins et foedat ("and defiles").
  10. Cap. 5. n. 12. seqq. et c. 9. n. 27. seqq.
    Chapter 5 n. 12ff. and c. 9 n. 27ff.
  11. Libr. III. de Lib. Arb. c. 9. n. 27. Cfr. etiam XI. de Civ. Dei, c. 18. et 23, ex quibus hic in arg. 2. pro parte negativa aliqua allata sunt.
    Book III On Free Choice c. 9 n. 27. Cf. also XI City of God c. 18 and 23, from which here in argument 2 for the negative side some things have been adduced.
  12. Vat. sic: mala non faciunt ad decorem. Pro facientia complures codd. et sex primae edd. facienda; perperam. Paulo inferius post sed quia Vat. cum cod. cc interiicit bene.
    The Vatican [edition reads] thus: mala non faciunt ad decorem ("evils do not contribute to beauty"). For facientia very many codices and the first six editions [read] facienda; wrongly. A little below, after sed quia ("but because"), the Vatican [edition] with codex cc inserts bene ("well").
  13. Scilicet boni. — Immediate post pro cuius sola Vat. quia, et paulo ante eadem Vat. in poenam pro in poena. De axiomate mox allato cfr. supra pag. 493, nota 1.
    Namely [of the] good. — Immediately after, for cuius ("of which"), the Vatican [edition] alone [reads] quia ("because"), and a little before, the same Vatican [edition] [reads] in poenam ("into punishment") for in poena ("in punishment"). On the axiom just adduced cf. above p. 493, note 1.
  14. Cod. T (a secunda manu) facit.
    Codex T (by a second hand) [reads] facit ("makes").
  15. Sensus est: universum sine malis excederet hoc universum ex una parte, sed excederetur ex alia parte sive in bonitate comparata, ut hic explicatur. — Paulo ante Vat. cum ceteris edd. et pluribus mss. mutata interpunctione, quam nunc, sic responderi potest.
    The sense is: the universe without evils would exceed this universe on one side, but would be exceeded on the other side, that is in the comparative goodness, as is explained here. — A little before, the Vatican [edition] with the other editions and many manuscripts, with altered punctuation [different] from the present, [reads] sic responderi potest ("thus it can be answered").
  16. In Missali, die Sabbati sancti, in praeconio paschali Exultet.
    In the Missal, on Holy Saturday, in the Paschal proclamation Exultet.
  17. Pro valeret Vat. cum aliquot codd. esset; plures codd. cum ed. 1 incongrue valerent. Paulo inferius pro quam sic cod. O quam nunc.
    For valeret ("would be worth") the Vatican [edition] with several codices [reads] esset ("would be"); many codices with edition 1 incongruously [read] valerent. A little below, for quam sic ("than thus") codex O [reads] quam nunc ("than now").
  18. Scilicet silentium et somnus. — In Vat. et cod. cc desideratur verbo nisi vel simile, quia.
    Namely silence and sleep. — In the Vatican [edition] and codex cc the word nisi ("unless") or a similar one, quia ("because"), is wanting.
  19. Quatenus scilicet Deus ultra condignum praemiat, et ipsa iustitia retribuens fundatur in misericordia, quippe cum Deus non coronet nisi sua dona et ultra condignum. — Vat. omittit in opere et paulo ante pro et possit, licet non omnino exhibet et quid possit, licet non ita clare ut nunc in opere. Plurimi codd. particulae licet praefigunt et.
    Inasmuch as God rewards beyond what is fitting, and the very justice that repays is founded in mercy, since indeed God crowns nothing except his own gifts and beyond what is fitting. — The Vatican [edition] omits in opere ("in the work"), and a little before, for et possit, licet non omnino ("and is able, although not entirely") exhibits et quid possit, licet non ita clare ut nunc in opere ("and what would be possible, although not so clearly as now in the work"). Very many codices prefix to the particle licet [the word] et.
  20. Pro debeat Vat. habeat.
    For debeat ("ought") the Vatican [edition reads] habeat ("has"). ---
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