Bonaventure

DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation that follows. Each note is given first in Latin (`La.`), then in literal English (`En.`). Quaracchi numbers its footnotes per printed page; this chunk renumbers them sequentially ¹–²⁴ across the three printed pages bearing apparatus (834, 835, 836).

DUB. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram et primo de illo verbo Augustini¹: Nisi usque adeo esset omnipotens et bonus, ut bene faceret etiam de malo. Videtur enim indebito modo loqui, quia malitia est privatio; ergo non est materia boni². Si dicas, quod accipitur ratione substrati, scilicet de malo, id est, de illo qui est malus, facit bonum; contra: hoc nihil est aliud quam malum destruere: ex hoc ergo non habetur, quod Deus debeat³ mala sinere, cum eius sit facta destruere.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod de non est ibi causale nec materiale, sed occasionale, quasi dicat: de malo facit bonum, quia post malum facit bonum⁴, occasione sumta a malo. Ipse autem obiicit, ac si hoc quod est de teneretur causaliter sive materialiter.

DUB. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Quod malum bene ordinatum et suo loco positum. Videtur enim male loqui, quia quod non est non est locari⁵. Si tu dicas, quod habet locum ratione substrati; contra: locus debitus et conveniens na-

turae rationali est gloria: ergo malum locatur in gloria.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod cum dico infernum sive locum poenalem, duo dico: et partem universi, et vilitatem. In quantum locus est, debetur naturae substratae; sed in quantum vilis est, debetur deformitati culpae: et ita malum locum habet et vilem, sed locum ratione substrati, vilem vero ratione deformitatis.

DUB. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit⁶: Si qui horum deviant et exorbitant, etiam hoc ipsum faciet eis proficere in bonum: ergo videtur, quod mala proficiant sive cooperentur⁷. Contra: mali est bonum corrumpere: ergo nullo modo est in bonum cooperari sive proficere.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod proficere sive cooperari in bonum aliquid alicui potest tripliciter, scilicet adiuvando, ut gratia cooperatur libero arbitrio vel e converso; vel excitando, ut paupertas et miseria, quae excitant ad amorem Dei sive pungunt et impellunt, sicut dicit Gregorius⁸; vel etiam obsistendo, sicut aqua calida fortius congelatur, quia, dum resistit, vigoratur actio contrarii. Et sic malum dicitur cooperari, vel quia facit hominem ad bonum magis excitari, vel magis quia, dum obsistit, et homo praevalet, vigoratur virtus gratiae et fervescit⁹.

DUB. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod Augustinus astruit a minori¹⁰. Videtur enim falsum dicere, quia locus a minori non est destructivus, sed positivus; sed illud argumentum est destructivum: sapiens non potest facere hominem deteriorem, ergo nec Deus: ergo non est a minori.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod revera locus iste non est a minori, proprie loquendo, sed a maiori; quia non dicitur ibi minus res¹¹ minor, sed illud quod minus videtur inesse. Magis autem videtur, quod homo possit facere malum quam Deus; sed sapiens homo non potest: ergo nec Deus; et ita est a maiori locus. — Nihilominus autem potest dici, quod est a minori; sed reducitur ad rationem affirmativam sic: minus videtur, quod impossibilitas faciendi malum insit homini quam Deo; sed sapiens, manens sapiens, est impotens¹² in minus a faciendo aliquem deteriorem: ergo multo fortius Deus.

DUB. V.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod culpa in sapientem cadere nequit. Videtur enim hoc falsum, quia sicut se habet sapientia ad ignorantiam, ita virtus ad culpam: ergo permutatim, sicut virtus ad ignorantiam, ita sapientia ad culpam. Sed virtus simul stat cum ignorantia: ergo sapientia simul stat cum culpa.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod sapientia uno modo dicit cognitionem veram; alio modo dicit cognitionem veram et nobilissimam, quia per causas altissimas; tertio modo dicit cognitionem veram, nobilem et sapidam; quarto modo sapientia non dicit aliam cognitionem quam religionem divinam sive cultum, secundum quod dicitur, quod pietas ipsa est sapientia sive theosebia; et haec consistit, ut dicit Augustinus¹³, in fide, spe et caritate, et hoc modo claudit in se virtutem, et ita opponitur culpae. Et sic patet responsio.

DUB. VI.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod Deus non est causa tendendi ad non-esse. Videtur enim falsum dicere, quia in Cantico Deuteronomii¹⁴ dici-

tur: Ego occidam, et ego vivere faciam; percutiam, et ego sanabo: ergo videtur, cum mors sit corruptio tendendi ad non-esse, quod Deus sit huius causa.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod non-esse non appellatur hic per privationem qualiscumque esse, sed illius quod definit Boethius¹⁵ dicens: «Esse est quod ordinem retinet servatque naturam». Et ad illud Deus non deducit; ipse autem obiicit de esse naturali.

Vel potest dici, quod loquitur hic secundum naturae institutionem, secundum quam dicitur: Deus mortem non fecit¹⁶. Quod autem dicitur, quod ipse occidit, hoc est secundum punitionem iustitiae; hoc tamen in secundo melius dicetur¹⁷.

DUB. VII.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod malum est tendere ad non-esse. Videtur enim male dicere, quia si tendit ad non-esse, aut hoc dicitur quantum ad esse naturae, aut gratiae. Si naturae: ergo malum corrumpit naturam, quod est contra Dionysium¹⁸, qui dicit, quod «malum nihil corrumpit existentium, in eo quod essentia vel natura». Si autem intelligatur quantum ad esse gratiae, hoc similiter falsum videtur, quia post primam culpam non remanet esse gratuitum secundum aliquid sui, quia totaliter per mortale expellitur culpa¹⁹; ergo non tendit ad non-esse, sed iam est in termino.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod in homine iusto et bono est tria considerare. Cum enim habeat naturam per gratiam ordinatam²⁰, est considerare esse naturae, et ordinabilitatem ad gratiam, quae communi nomine dicitur habilitas, et ordinem gratiae sive gratiae ordinationem. Malum igitur, per se loquendo, corrumpit ipsam ordinabilitatem, et ex hoc elongat a gratia et facit tendere ad non-esse. Et quia habilitas nunquam omnino tollitur, salva natura, et natura non corrumpitur: semper malum facit tendere ad non-esse, ita quod nunquam est in termino²¹.

DUB. VIII.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit Ambrosius: Verum, a quocumque dicatur, a Spiritu sancto est. Videtur enim male dicere, quia si hoc est verum, ergo cum detractor detrahendo frequenter²² dicat verum, videtur quod dicat a Spiritu sancto. Similiter, diabolus multa vera dicit. Similiter, de verbo illo obiicitur: Nemo dicit: Dominus Iesus, nisi in Spiritu Sancto²³. Multi enim peccatores hoc dicunt tota die. — Item, veritas appropriatur Filio: ergo magis deberet dicere Ambrosius, quod omne verum est a Filio.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod aliquid dicitur a Spiritu sancto illustrante intellectum et movente affectum; et illud est verum et bonum, quia dicitur verum aliquid ex caritate²⁴. Item, est aliquid a Spiritu sancto movente affectum, sed non illustrante intellectum; sicut dixit Apostolus, se iturum ad Hispanos. Falsum dixit, sed tamen in dicendo meruit, quia caritas movebat eum hoc dicere. Aliquid est dictum a Spiritu sancto illustrante intellectum, sed non rectificante affectum; et illud potest esse malum, et tamen verum est dicere. Ergo perfectum utrumque includit; et sic dicitur a Spiritu sancto et in Spiritu sancto, et ita intelligit Apostolus; Ambrosius autem largius dicit.

Et sic patet illud quod obiicitur, quod veritas appropriatur Filio: respondetur enim, quod Spiritui sancto appropriatur interpretatio. — Vel dicendum, quod hoc non dicitur tanquam appropriatum, vel si appropriatum, hoc est ratione doni.

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DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first concerning that saying of Augustine¹: Unless he were so far omnipotent and good that he should do well even with evil. For this seems to speak in an undue manner, since malice is a privation; therefore it is not the matter of a good². If you say that it is taken by reason of the substrate — namely, from evil, that is, from the one who is evil, he makes good — on the contrary: this is nothing other than to destroy evil; from this therefore it is not had that God ought³ to permit evils, since it is his to destroy what has been done.

I respond: It must be said that from is not there causal nor material, but occasional, as if he should say: from evil he makes good, because after evil he makes good⁴, the occasion being taken from evil. He himself however objects as if this from were held causally or materially.

Doubt II.

Likewise, it is asked concerning what he says: That evil is well ordered and placed in its own location. For this seems to speak ill, because what is not is not [capable of] being placed⁵. If you say that it has a place by reason of the substrate — on the contrary: a due and suitable place for ra-

tional nature is glory: therefore evil is placed in glory.

I respond: It must be said that when I say hell, or the place of punishment, I say two things: both a part of the universe, and baseness. In so far as it is a place, it is owed to the underlying nature; but in so far as it is base, it is owed to the deformity of fault: and so evil has both a place and baseness — but place by reason of the substrate, baseness however by reason of deformity.

Doubt III.

Likewise, it is asked concerning what he says⁶: If any of these deviate and go astray, this very thing also he will make to profit them unto good: therefore it seems that evils profit or cooperate⁷. On the contrary: it is of evil to corrupt the good: therefore in no way is [evil] able to cooperate or profit toward the good.

I respond: It must be said that to profit or to cooperate toward good with someone can occur in three ways, namely: by helping, as grace cooperates with free choice or the other way round; or by exciting, as poverty and misery, which excite to the love of God or sting and impel, as Gregory says⁸; or also by resisting, as hot water freezes more strongly, because, while it resists, the action of the contrary is invigorated. And so evil is said to cooperate, either because it makes a man be more excited to good, or rather because, while it resists and the man prevails, the power of grace is invigorated and grows fervent⁹.

Doubt IV.

Likewise, it is asked concerning what he says, that Augustine argues from the lesser¹⁰. For it seems false to say so, because a locus from the lesser is not destructive, but positive; but that argument is destructive: a wise man cannot make a man worse, therefore neither can God: therefore it is not from the lesser.

I respond: It must be said that in truth this locus is not from the lesser, properly speaking, but from the greater; since what is there said is not a lesser thing¹¹ less, but [rather] what seems less to be present. But it seems more that man can do evil than God; but the wise man cannot: therefore neither can God; and so the locus is from the greater. — Nevertheless it can be said that it is from the lesser; but it is reduced to the affirmative form thus: it seems less, that the impossibility of doing evil should be in man than in God; but the wise man, remaining wise, is unable¹² to a lesser degree to make anyone worse: therefore much more so God.

Doubt V.

Likewise, it is asked concerning what he says, that fault cannot fall upon the wise. For this seems false, because just as wisdom stands to ignorance, so does virtue to fault: therefore by exchange, just as virtue [stands] to ignorance, so wisdom [stands] to fault. But virtue stands together with ignorance: therefore wisdom stands together with fault.

I respond: It must be said that wisdom in one mode bespeaks true cognition; in another mode it bespeaks a true and most noble cognition, namely [obtained] through the highest causes; in a third mode it bespeaks a true, noble, and savory cognition; in a fourth mode wisdom does not bespeak another cognition than divine religion or worship — according to which it is said that piety itself is wisdom or theosebia; and this consists, as Augustine says¹³, in faith, hope, and charity, and in this mode it includes virtue in itself, and so is opposed to fault. And so the response is plain.

Doubt VI.

Likewise, it is asked concerning what he says, that God is not the cause of tending toward non-being. For this seems false to say, because in the Canticle of Deuteronomy¹⁴ it is

said: I will kill, and I will make to live; I will strike, and I will heal: therefore it seems, since death is the corruption of tending toward non-being, that God is the cause of this.

I respond: It must be said that non-being is not here named by the privation of being of any kind, but of that which Boethius¹⁵ defines saying: «Being is that which retains order and preserves nature». And to that God does not lead; but he himself objects from natural being.

Or it can be said that he speaks here according to the institution of nature, according to which it is said: God did not make death¹⁶. As for what is said, that he himself kills, this is according to the punishment of justice; this however will be better treated in [book] II¹⁷.

Doubt VII.

Likewise, it is asked concerning what he says, that evil is to tend toward non-being. For this seems ill said, because if it tends toward non-being, either this is said as to the being of nature, or as to [the being] of grace. If of nature: therefore evil corrupts nature — which is against Dionysius¹⁸, who says that «evil corrupts none of existing things, with respect to that which is essence or nature». But if it is understood as to the being of grace, this likewise seems false, because after the first fault gracious being does not remain according to anything of itself, since fault is wholly expelled by mortal [sin]¹⁹; therefore it does not tend toward non-being, but is already at its terminus.

I respond: It must be said that in a just and good man there are three things to consider. For since he has a nature ordered through grace²⁰, one is to consider the being of nature, and the orderability to grace, which by a common name is called aptitude, and the order of grace, or the ordering of grace. Evil therefore, properly speaking, corrupts the orderability itself, and from this it withdraws from grace and makes [the person] tend toward non-being. And since aptitude is never altogether removed, with nature preserved, and nature is not corrupted: evil always makes [him] tend toward non-being, so that he is never at the terminus²¹.

Doubt VIII.

Likewise, it is asked concerning what Ambrose says: The true, by whomever it is uttered, is from the Holy Spirit. For this seems ill said, because if this is true, then since the detractor in his detraction frequently²² speaks the true, it seems that he speaks [it] from the Holy Spirit. Similarly, the devil says many true things. Similarly, against that saying it is objected: No one says: Lord Jesus, except in the Holy Spirit²³. For many sinners say this all day long. — Likewise, truth is appropriated to the Son: therefore Ambrose ought rather to say that everything true is from the Son.

I respond: It must be said that something is said from the Holy Spirit who illuminates the intellect and moves the affect; and that is true and good, because something is said as true out of charity²⁴. Likewise, there is something from the Holy Spirit moving the affect, but not illuminating the intellect; as the Apostle said, that he was going to go to Spain. He said something false, yet in saying it he merited, because charity moved him to say it. Something is said from the Holy Spirit illuminating the intellect, but not rectifying the affect; and that can be evil, and yet it is true to say it. Therefore the perfect [case] includes both; and so it is said from the Holy Spirit and in the Holy Spirit, and so the Apostle understands [it]; Ambrose however speaks more broadly.

And so what is objected — that truth is appropriated to the Son — is plain: for the response is that interpretation is appropriated to the Holy Spirit. — Or it must be said that this is not said as appropriated, or, if as appropriated, this is by reason of the gift.

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