Dist. 20, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 1
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 20
Articulus Unicus. De satisfactionis commutatione.
Quaestio I. Utrum unus pro alio possit satisfacere.
Quaeritur igitur primo, utrum possit fieri satisfactionis commutatio1, et hoc est quaestionis fundamentum, scilicet, utrum unus pro alio satisfaciat2. Et quod sic, videtur.
1. Ad Galatas sexto3: Alter alterius onera portate; sed onera, quae maxime sunt portanda, sunt onera spiritualia: ergo si alicui imposita est poenitentia gravis, videtur, quod aliquis partem vel totum possit pro eo portare.
2. Item, in littera4 dicitur: «Amicorum orationibus et eleemosynarum largitionibus pondus poenitentiae sublevandum est»; loquitur de eo qui graviter infirmatur.
3. Item, hoc videtur per rationem, primo per simile in rebus naturalibus. Videmus enim in aliquo corpore animalis, quod unum membrum se exponit, ut sustineat laesionem et gravamen alterius, sicut patet, quod brachium se exponit pro capite5: si ergo in corpore mystico est connexio per assimilationem ad corpus naturale, videtur similiter, quod unum membrum onus alterius possit et debeat supportare.
4. Item, hoc videtur per simile in humanis actibus6. Videmus enim, quod sic est in actibus, quod si aliquis est alicui debitor, non refert apud creditorem, utrum ipse, vel alius solvat, immo pro eodem utrumque acceptat: si ergo multo benignior est Deus et avidior ad percipiendam solutionem quam homo terrenus videtur, quod ipse sit contentus, et sibi sufficiat, si alius satisfaciat pro eo.
5. Item, hoc videtur per locum a minori7: quia plus est impetrare remissionem culpae quam remissionem poenae; sed sanctus vir impetrat alicui, qui est extra gratiam, per suas orationes remissionem culpae: ergo et remissionem poenae per suas afflictiones.
6. Item, Christus punitus est et poena sua satisfecit; non pro peccato suo, hoc constat: ergo pro alieno: ergo Christus satisfecit pro nobis. Si ergo omnes nos unum sumus in Christo et membra eius sumus et imitatores eius esse debemus8; videtur, quod unus pro alio possit et debeat satisfacere.
Contra: 1. Secundae ad Corinthios quinto9: Omnes stabimus ante tribunal Christi, ut recipiat unusquisque propria corporis, prout gessit, sive bonum, sive malum: ergo unicuique retribuetur iuxta opera sua: ergo non videtur, quod unus pro alio satisfaciat, quia tunc Deus alicui retribueret secundum opera aliena.
2. Item, in Psalmo10: Tu reddes unicuique iuxta opera sua: ergo idem quod prius.
3. Item, ratione videtur: quoniam non exigit Deus satisfactionem ab aliquo, quia delectetur in poena11, sed quia satisfactio est remedium contra culpam, ut anima reordinetur; sed antidotum sive remedium circa membrum infirmans debet apponi: ergo videtur, quod non possit in alium hominem commutari.
4. Item, non potest conteri nec confiteri unus pro alio, immo oportet, quod ipse qui peccat, conteratur et confiteatur: ergo videtur similiter, quod oporteat, ipsum satisfacere et poenam pati.
5. Item, si sani possunt supra se suscipere satisfactionem infirmi, ponatur igitur, quod aliquis debeat poenitentiam septennem, et consanguinei recipiant super se; et infirmus moritur: quaero ergo a te: aut evolat, aut non evolat. Si non evolat, sed punitur in purgatorio, et illi puniunt se pro eo: ergo Deus punit bis in id ipsum12. Si vero evolat, ponatur, quod illi nihil faciant de satisfactione suscepta: tunc ergo salvabitur quis, et culpa remanebit impunita; quod est contra divinam iustitiam.
6. Item, nullus potest mereri alteri, quin mereatur sibi, secundum quod dicit illa auctoritas13: «Qui pro alio orat pro se ipso laborat»: ergo pari ratione nullus potest satisfacere pro alio, quin satisfaciat pro se: ergo si potest unus pro alio satisfacere, potest unus simul et una poena satisfacere pro se et pro alio, et ita pari ratione pro tertio et quarto et sic deinceps, ergo pro omnibus: ergo videtur, si hoc verum est, quod uno satisfaciente, satisfaciant et omnes.
Conclusio.
Poena satisfactionis, non quatenus est medicinalis, sed quatenus solvit poenam, potest commutari in aliam personam.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod poena satisfactoria habet in se duplicem rationem sive virtutem14. Poena enim talis propter duo est maxime: et propter medicamentum contra sequelas peccati et in pretium ad solvendum reatum peccati. Si igitur loquamur de ista poena, secundum quod est purgatoria sive medicinalis; cum morbus non recipiat medicinam ex poena aliena, sed propria — unde non extinguitur concupiscentia in me, si tu ieiunas pro me — quantum ad hanc rationem poena satisfactoria nec potest nec debet commutari in aliam personam.
Posset tamen commutari in poenam internam, quia gemitus cordis plus frequenter medetur et reparat1a animam quam diuturnitas poenae exterioris. — Si autem loquamur de poena, secundum quod habet rationem pretii; hoc modo concedendum, quod potest commutari, quia potest unus pro alio solvere poenam. — Sed haec commutatio debet fieri auctoritate sacerdotis, cuius est hic duo considerare, scilicet debitam in subditis dispositionem et debitam proportionem in poena. Debitam dispositionem voco, quod in uno sit sufficientia et in alio indigentia2a, et in utroque sit caritas, quae faciat bona communia; si vero alterum horum desit, non fit commutatio recte. Debitam vero proportionem voco, ut minor poena in maiorem commutetur, quia plus satisfacit Deo poena propria quam aliena, sicut efficacius homo meretur sibi quam alii3a. Unde sicut poena assumta commutatur in maiorem poenam purgatoriam, eo quod multo minus est illa accepta, pro eo quod ista est voluntaria simpliciter, illa minime voluntaria; similiter propria poena debet commutari in maiorem alienam ad hoc, ut fiat commutatio recta.
Sic igitur concedendum, sicut probant primae rationes, quod poena satisfactoria commutari potest ratione unitatis caritatis, quantum ad id quod habet in se pretii solvendi, sed non quantum ad id quod habet in se medicamenti.
Ad 1. 2. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod unicuique reddetur secundum opera sua; dicendum, quod caritas opera aliena facit sua, maxime quando caritas alterius voluntarie quod suum est alteri donat.
Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de remedio, iam patet responsio: quoniam quantumcumque aliquis supra se poenam recipiat alterius, tamen ille non est omnino liberatus a poena, quousque consumatur peccati scoria, quam contraxit ex culpa; quae etiam non potest deleri nisi per poenam exteriorem, vel per contritionem internam.
Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non potest conteri nec confiteri; dicendum, quod non est simile: quia prima, scilicet confessio et contritio, sunt ordinata, ut ingrediatur unitatem ecclesiasticam, per quam fit, ut bona unius sint alterius; satisfactio vero utramque consequitur; et quia fundamentum istius communicationis est in caritate: ideo non est simile. — Alia ratio est, quia in potestate cuiuslibet est confiteri, in nullius potestate est conteri, nisi eius qui novit occulta cordis, scilicet spiritus hominis4a; sed poenam pati est in potestate cuiuslibet tam pro se quam pro alio. Attamen non est inutile nec a satisfactione alienum, si vir iustus peccata defleat minus iusti.
Ad 5. Ad illud quod quaeritur, utrum statim evolet ille cuius satisfactio commutatur; dicendum, quod non: tum quia oportet, quod scoria peccati purgetur, tum etiam quia nullus ingreditur paradisum, quousque sit extra debitum omne5a, ita quod nec ipse sit debitor, nec alius pro eo. Si ergo obiicias, quod tunc bis punit Deus in id ipsum; dicendum, quod falsum est, quia, secundum quod illi celerius faciunt, ipse liberatur, et computat Dominus in sortem poenam, quam ille sustinet pro se, et quam alii sustinent pro eo; unde si debuit poenam duorum mensium, taliter poterit iuvari, quod liberabitur infra mensem. Nunquam tamen inde extrahitur, quousque debitum sit plene solutum; quo soluto, iam illud quod solvitur, deinceps est ipsius qui satisfacit; oratio enim in sinu suo convertitur6a, vel si ipse non indiget, convertitur in sinu Ecclesiae.
Ad 6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod qui meretur alii, et sibi; dicendum, quod non est simile de opere meritorio et satisfactorio. Opus enim meritorium est ea ratione, qua est ex radice caritatis — quae semper placet Deo et ille in quo est, illa radix — quae omnes communiter respicit et omnia communia facit; ideo7a non potest aliquis mereri alii, quin ipse placeat apud Deum, quia hoc ipsum Deo placet maxime. — Opus vero satisfactorium est ratione poenae, et tanta poena solvit tantum debitum, et maior maius debitum; ideo per eandem poenam non potest quis in integrum duo debita solvere; et ideo, si satisfacit pro alio, quantum ad totum non satisfacit pro se; et si pro se, non pro alio; sibi quidem meretur aeternam gloriam, quia opus illud placitum est Deo, et faciens illud Deo placet in faciendo, ac per hoc dignus retributione a Deo iudicatur.
I. Doctrinam catholicam de indulgentiis impugnarunt primo Waldenses aliique illius aetatis haeretici, quos egregie confutat Guliel. Parisiensis (de Sacram. Ordinis c. 13.); posterius Wikleff et Huss (cfr. decreta Martini V. et Concilii Constant. prop. 42, et inter articulos 39 prop. 26.); Petrus Oxomensis (prop. 6. a Sixto IV. confixa); Lutherus (vide prop. 18-22. et Concil. Tridént. Sess. XXV. decretum de indulgentiis). Item erravit Synod. Pistor. (cfr. prop. 40-43.).
II. Quaestio 1. quoddam fundamentum ponit doctrinae seqq. quaestionum. S. Thom. (hic q. I. a. 2. quaestiunc. 3; Suppl. q. 13. a. 2.) eandem distinctionem et doctrinam profert, eo excepto, quod nec approbat, minorem poenam in maiorem mutandam esse suscipienti satisfactionem pro alio, nec rationem allatam, quod poena propria magis satisfaciat quam aliena; immo asserit, quod «minor poena requiritur in eo qui pro alio satisfacit, quam in principali requireretur». Loquitur autem S. Bonaventura hic specialiter de satisfactione seu poenitentia sacramentali, quae in casu, quo poenitens est inhabilis, ut per se satisfaciat, auctoritate confessarii etiam ab alio impleri potest, ut cum nostro auctore putant Alex. Hal., Richard. a Med., Durand. aliique. — Notanda autem est hic prop. 15. ab Alexandro VII. damnata (24. Sept. 1665): «Poenitens propria auctoritate substituere sibi alium potest, qui loco ipsius poenitentiam adimpleat». De hac 1. quaestione praeter S. Thomam: Alex. Hal., S. p. IV. q. 23. m. 1. a. 2. et q. 24. m. 4. a. 4. — B. Albert., supra d. 18. a. 12. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 3. — Durand., hic q. 9. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1.
III. Quoad 2. quaestionem constat, tum indulgentias etiam in foro Dei valere, tum in Ecclesia thesaurum meritorum esse vi communionis Sanctorum, quam profitetur Symbolum; quod confirmatum est a Clemente VI. Extrav. Unigenitus, et in damnatis Lutheri prop. 17. Synodique Pistoriensis prop. 41. De hac 2. quaestione: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. q. 23. m. 1. a. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3. quaestiunc. 1; Suppl. q. 25. a. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 16. 17. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 1. — Durand., hic q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3.
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Article (Sole). On the commutation of satisfaction.
Question I. Whether one person can make satisfaction for another.
It is asked, therefore, first, whether a commutation of satisfaction can take place1, and this is the foundation of the question, namely, whether one person makes satisfaction for another2. And that it can, seems [to be the case].
1. To the Galatians, chapter six3: Bear one another's burdens; but the burdens which most need to be borne are the spiritual burdens: therefore, if a grave penance has been imposed on someone, it seems that another person can bear part or the whole of it for him.
2. Likewise, in the text4 it is said: «By the prayers of friends and by the bestowal of alms the weight of penance is to be lightened»; this is said of one who is gravely ill.
3. Likewise, this seems [to follow] by reason, first by a likeness drawn from natural things. For we see in the body of an animal that one member exposes itself in order to sustain the injury and burden of another, as is clear in that the arm exposes itself for the head5: if, therefore, in the mystical body there is a connection by assimilation to the natural body, it seems likewise that one member can and ought to bear the burden of another.
4. Likewise, this seems [to follow] by a likeness drawn from human acts6. For we see that it is so in [human] acts, that if someone is a debtor to another, it does not matter to the creditor whether he himself or another pays, but rather he accepts either for the same [debt]: if, therefore, God is much more kindly and more eager to receive payment than an earthly man appears to be, it seems that He is content, and that it suffices for Him, if another makes satisfaction for him.
5. Likewise, this seems [to follow] by an argument from the lesser7: for it is more to obtain the remission of guilt than the remission of penalty; but a holy man obtains for someone who is outside grace, by his prayers, the remission of guilt: therefore [he obtains] also the remission of penalty by his afflictions.
6. Likewise, Christ was punished and by His penalty made satisfaction; not for His own sin, this is established: therefore for another's: therefore Christ made satisfaction for us. If, then, we all are one in Christ and are His members and ought to be His imitators8; it seems that one person can and ought to make satisfaction for another.
On the contrary: 1. Second to the Corinthians, chapter five9: We shall all stand before the tribunal of Christ, that each one may receive the proper things of the body, according as he has done, whether good or evil: therefore to each one it will be rendered according to his works: therefore it does not seem that one makes satisfaction for another, since then God would render to someone according to another's works.
2. Likewise, in the Psalm10: Thou wilt render to each one according to his works: therefore the same as before.
3. Likewise, it seems [so] by reason: for God does not exact satisfaction from anyone because He delights in penalty11, but because satisfaction is a remedy against guilt, that the soul may be set in order again; but an antidote or remedy must be applied to the member that is ailing: therefore it seems that it cannot be commuted to another man.
4. Likewise, one cannot be contrite nor confess for another, but rather it is necessary that the very one who sins be contrite and confess: therefore it seems likewise that it is necessary that he himself make satisfaction and undergo the penalty.
5. Likewise, if the healthy can take upon themselves the satisfaction of the sick, let it be supposed, then, that someone owes a seven-year penance, and his kinsmen take it upon themselves; and the sick man dies: I ask you therefore: either he flies up [to heaven], or he does not fly up. If he does not fly up, but is punished in purgatory, and they punish themselves for him: therefore God punishes twice for the same thing12. But if he does fly up, let it be supposed that they do nothing about the satisfaction undertaken: then, therefore, someone will be saved, and the guilt will remain unpunished; which is against divine justice.
6. Likewise, no one can merit for another without meriting for himself, according to what that authority says13: «He who prays for another labors for himself»: therefore by parity of reasoning no one can make satisfaction for another without making satisfaction for himself: therefore if one can make satisfaction for another, one person can by a single penalty make satisfaction at once both for himself and for another, and so by parity of reasoning for a third and a fourth and so on, therefore for all: therefore it seems, if this is true, that when one makes satisfaction, all also make satisfaction.
Conclusion.
The penalty of satisfaction, not insofar as it is medicinal, but insofar as it pays the penalty, can be commuted to another person.
I respond: It must be said that satisfactory penalty has in itself a twofold account or power14. For such a penalty exists chiefly for two things: both as a medicine against the consequences of sin and as a price for paying the debt of sin. If, therefore, we speak of this penalty insofar as it is purgative or medicinal; since the disease does not receive its medicine from another's penalty, but from its own — whence concupiscence is not extinguished in me if you fast for me — as regards this account satisfactory penalty neither can nor ought to be commuted to another person.
It could, however, be commuted into an interior penalty, since the groaning of the heart more frequently heals and restores1a the soul than the long duration of an exterior penalty. — But if we speak of the penalty insofar as it has the account of a price; in this way it must be granted that it can be commuted, since one person can pay the penalty for another. — But this commutation must be made by the authority of the priest, whose office it is to consider two things here, namely the due disposition in the subjects and the due proportion in the penalty. By due disposition I mean that in the one there be sufficiency and in the other need2a, and that in both there be charity, which makes goods common; but if either of these is lacking, the commutation is not rightly made. By due proportion I mean that a lesser penalty be commuted into a greater, since one's own penalty makes satisfaction to God more than another's, just as a man more effectively merits for himself than for another3a. Whence just as an assumed penalty is commuted into a greater purgatorial penalty, because that one is far less acceptable, in that this is voluntary simply, that one least voluntary; likewise one's own penalty ought to be commuted into a greater foreign one, that the commutation may be made rightly.
Thus, therefore, it must be granted, as the first reasons prove, that satisfactory penalty can be commuted by reason of the unity of charity, as regards that which it has in itself of the price to be paid, but not as regards that which it has in itself of the medicine.
To 1 and 2. To that, then, which is objected, that to each one it will be rendered according to his works; it must be said that charity makes another's works its own, especially when the charity of the other voluntarily gives what is its own to another.
To 3. To that which is objected concerning the remedy, the reply is already clear: for however much someone may take another's penalty upon himself, nevertheless that other is not entirely freed from penalty until the dross of sin is consumed which he contracted from guilt; and this dross also cannot be blotted out except by an exterior penalty, or by interior contrition.
To 4. To that which is objected, that one cannot be contrite nor confess; it must be said that it is not the same: because the first things, namely confession and contrition, are ordained that one may enter ecclesiastical unity, through which it comes about that the goods of one are another's; but satisfaction follows upon both; and because the foundation of this communication is in charity: therefore it is not the same. — Another reason is that it is in the power of anyone to confess, [but] it is in the power of no one to be contrite, except of Him who knows the hidden things of the heart, namely the spirit of man4a; but to undergo penalty is in the power of anyone, both for himself and for another. Nevertheless it is not useless nor foreign to satisfaction if a just man should bewail the sins of a less just man.
To 5. To that which is asked, whether he whose satisfaction is commuted flies up at once; it must be said that he does not: both because it is necessary that the dross of sin be purged, and also because no one enters paradise until he is free of every debt5a, so that neither he himself be a debtor, nor another for him. If, then, you object that God then punishes twice for the same thing; it must be said that this is false, because, in proportion as they do it more quickly, he is freed, and the Lord reckons into the lot [of his debt] the penalty which that one bears for himself, and which others bear for him; whence if he owed a penalty of two months, he can be helped in such a way that he will be freed within a month. Nevertheless he is never drawn out from there until the debt is fully paid; and when it is paid, then that which is paid thereafter belongs to him who makes satisfaction; for the prayer is turned back into his own bosom6a, or if he himself does not need it, it is turned into the bosom of the Church.
To 6. To that which is objected, that he who merits for another [merits] also for himself; it must be said that it is not the same with the meritorious and the satisfactory work. For a work is meritorious by that account, by which it is from the root of charity — which always pleases God, and [pleases] him in whom it is, that root — which regards all in common and makes all things common; therefore7a no one can merit for another without himself being pleasing before God, since this very thing pleases God most. — But a satisfactory work [is satisfactory] by reason of the penalty, and so much penalty pays so much debt, and a greater [penalty] a greater debt; therefore by one and the same penalty one cannot pay two debts in full; and therefore, if he makes satisfaction for another, as regards the whole he does not make satisfaction for himself; and if for himself, not for another; for himself indeed he merits eternal glory, because that work is pleasing to God, and the one doing it is pleasing to God in the doing, and through this he is judged worthy of recompense from God.
I. The catholic doctrine concerning indulgences was first impugned by the Waldenses and other heretics of that age, whom William of Paris excellently refutes (On the Sacrament of Orders, c. 13.); afterwards by Wycliffe and Hus (cf. the decrees of Martin V. and of the Council of Constance, prop. 42, and among the articles, 39 prop. 26.); [by] Peter of Osma (prop. 6, condemned by Sixtus IV.); [by] Luther (see prop. 18-22. and the decree of the Council of Trent, Sess. XXV., on indulgences). The Synod of Pistoia likewise erred (cf. prop. 40-43.).
II. Question 1 lays a certain foundation for the doctrine of the following questions. St. Thomas (here q. 1, a. 2, quaestiuncula 3; Suppl. q. 13, a. 2.) sets forth the same distinction and doctrine, with this exception, that he neither approves that a lesser penalty is to be changed into a greater for one who undertakes satisfaction for another, nor the reason adduced, that one's own penalty makes satisfaction more than another's; rather he asserts that «a lesser penalty is required in him who makes satisfaction for another than would be required in the principal [debtor]». But St. Bonaventure here speaks specifically of sacramental satisfaction or penance, which, in the case where the penitent is incapable of making satisfaction by himself, can be fulfilled even by another by the authority of the confessor, as, with our author, Alexander of Hales, Richard of Mediavilla, Durandus, and others hold. — But here is to be noted prop. 15, condemned by Alexander VII. (24 Sept. 1665): «The penitent by his own authority can substitute another for himself, who may fulfill the penance in his place». On this 1st question, besides St. Thomas: Alex. of Hales, Summa p. IV. q. 23. m. 1. a. 2. and q. 24. m. 4. a. 4. — B. Albert, above, d. 18. a. 12. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1. a. 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1. q. 3. — Durandus, here q. 9. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 1.
III. As regards the 2nd question, it is established both that indulgences are valid also in the forum of God, and that in the Church there is a treasury of merits by virtue of the communion of Saints, which the Creed professes; which was confirmed by Clement VI. in the Extravagant Unigenitus, and in the condemned propositions of Luther, prop. 17, and of the Synod of Pistoia, prop. 41. On this 2nd question: Alex. of Hales, loc. cit. q. 23. m. 1. a. 1. — St. Thomas, here q. 1. a. 3. quaestiuncula 1; Suppl. q. 25. a. 1. — B. Albert, here a. 16. 17. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3. a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 3. q. 1. — Durandus, here q. 3. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 3.
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- 1Vide supra d. 17. p. II. dub. 7; B. Albert., hic a. 10; Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.See above, d. 17, p. II, dub. 7; B. Albert, here a. 10; Peter of Tarentaise and Richard of Mediavilla, here on the text.
- 2Partis II. a. I. q. 1. Cfr. d. 50. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. — Idem dub. solvitur a B. Albert., hic a. 11; S. Thom., hic circa lit.Of Part II, a. I, q. 1. Cf. d. 50, p. I, a. 1, q. 1. — The same doubt is resolved by B. Albert, here a. 11; St. Thomas, here on the text.
- 3Vers. 2.Verse 2.
- 4Hic c. 1. [In edd. additur in necessitate. Inferius pro gravibus cod. U gravioribus.]Here c. 1. [In the editions is added in necessitate (in necessity). Below, for gravibus (grave), codex U reads gravioribus (graver).]
- 5Codd. R S hic et paulo inferius contractibus.Codices R, S here and a little below [read] contractibus (contracts).
- 6Vide tom. I. pag. 835, nota 5. — Cod. H a maiori.See tom. I, p. 835, note 5. — Codex H [reads] a maiori (from the greater).
- 7Cfr. I. Cor. 12, 23. [Cod. aa propter. Codd. FGK scilicet.]Cf. 1 Cor. 12, 23. [Codex aa (reads) propter. Codices FGK (read) scilicet.]
- 8Respicitur Gal. 3, 28; Eph. 3, 30. et 1. Cfr. Rom. 12, 5; 1. Cor. 11, 1. et 12, 27.Reference is made to Gal. 3, 28; Eph. 3, 30 and 1. Cf. Rom. 12, 5; 1 Cor. 11, 1 and 12, 27.
- 9Vers. 10: Omnes enim nos manifestari oportet ante tribunal Christi, ut referat unusquisque etc.Verse 10: For we must all be made manifest before the tribunal of Christ, that each one may bring back etc.
- 10Psalm. 61, 13. — Conclusioni cod. Z praemittit non ergo iuxta opera aliena.Psalm 61, 13. — To the Conclusion codex Z prefixes non ergo iuxta opera aliena (not, therefore, according to another's works).
- 11Edd. hic addunt: sed ut velut per remedium sanetur offensa, inferius omittunt ut anima reordinetur, et substituunt et antidotum et pro sed antidotum sive.The editions here add: sed ut velut per remedium sanetur offensa (but that the offense may be healed as if by a remedy); below they omit ut anima reordinetur (that the soul may be set in order again), and substitute et antidotum and, for sed antidotum sive (but the antidote or).
- 12Nahum 1, 9. Vide supra lit. Magistri, d. XV. c. 1. — Superius pro possunt codd. G V W possint, et post recipiant cod. aa addit eam.Nahum 1, 9. See above, the text of the Master, d. XV, c. 1. — Above, for possunt (can), codices G V W [read] possint; and after recipiant (take), codex aa adds eam (it).
- 13Gregor., XXXV. Moral. c. 10. n. 20: Quisquis pro aliis intercedere nititur, sibi potius ex ipsa caritate suffragatur.Gregory, Morals, book XXXV, c. 10, n. 20: «Whoever strives to intercede for others is rather profited himself out of that very charity».
- 14Plurimi codd. et ed. veritatem.Very many codices and the edition [read] veritatem (truth) [for virtutem].
- 1aCodd. R S meretur, ut reparet (plures alii codd. et ed. 1 etiam habent ut reparet).Codices R, S [read] meretur, ut reparet (he merits, that he may restore) — many other codices and edition 1 likewise have ut reparet.
- 2aLev. 25, 25: Sin attenuatus frater tuus vendiderit possessiunculam suam, et voluerit propinquus eius, potest redimere quod ille vendiderat. — De caritate cfr. Act. 4, 32. et I. Cor. 13, 5. — Codd. R S insufficientia sive indigentia. Iidem codd. cum codd. T bb et ed. 1 inferius poenae pro recte.Lev. 25, 25: But if thy brother, being impoverished, sell his little possession, and his kinsman be willing, he may redeem what the other had sold. — On charity cf. Acts 4, 32 and 1 Cor. 13, 5. — Codices R S [read] insufficientia sive indigentia (insufficiency or need). The same codices, with codices T bb and edition 1, below [read] poenae (of penalty) for recte (rightly).
- 3aVide tom. II. pag. 661, nota 6. Glossam Bedae. — Superius post ut cod. E legit quando minor... commutatur. Mox pro commutatur edd. perperam commutat. Subinde Vat. omittit simpliciter, illa minime voluntaria (cfr. supra p. I. q. 3.).See tom. II, p. 661, note 6, the Gloss of Bede. — Above, after ut, codex E reads quando minor... commutatur (when a lesser... is commuted). Soon, for commutatur the editions wrongly [read] commutat. Thereupon the Vatican edition omits simpliciter, illa minime voluntaria (cf. above, p. I, q. 3).
- 4aEpist. I. Cor. 2, 11: Quis enim hominum scit quae sunt hominis, nisi spiritus hominis, qui in ipso est? — Locus est obscurus, immo, ut videtur, corruptus. Videtur excidisse non post quia. Secunda manus in cod. bb transponit verba confiteri et conteri. Ad utrumque supple pro alio. — Superius pro communicationis cod. N communionis, edd. commutationis.Epistle, 1 Cor. 2, 11: For what man knows the things of a man, except the spirit of man which is in him? — The passage is obscure, indeed, as it seems, corrupt. A non seems to have dropped out after quia. A second hand in codex bb transposes the words confiteri and conteri. To both supply pro alio (for another). — Above, for communicationis (of communication) codex N [reads] communionis (of communion); the editions [read] commutationis (of commutation).
- 5aCfr. Matth. 5, 26. et 18, 34.Cf. Matt. 5, 26 and 18, 34.
- 6aPsalm. 34, 13: Oratio mea in sinu meo convertetur. — Mox pro in sinu edd. et plures codd. in sinum.Psalm 34, 13: My prayer shall be turned back into my own bosom. — Soon, for in sinu the editions and several codices [read] in sinum.
- 7aVerba ille in quo est illa radix a Vat. transferuntur huc post ideo.The words ille in quo est illa radix (he in whom that root is) are transferred by the Vatican edition to here, after ideo. ---