Dist. 44, Art. 1, Q. 2
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 44
Quaestio II. Utrum mundus potuerit fieri melior quantum ad proprietates partium integrantium.
Secundo quaeritur, utrum mundus potuit fieri melior quantum ad partium integrantium proprietates. Et quod sic, videtur.
1. Isaiae trigesimo1: Erit lux lunae sicut lux solis, et lux solis sicut lux septem dierum; hoc et Magister adducit hanc auctoritatem2: « Potuit,
inquit, Deus talem facere hominem qui nec peccare vellet nec posset; et si talem fecisset, quis dubitat, eum meliorem fuisse »: ergo etc.
2. Item, Augustinus super Genesim ad litteram, et Magister adducit hanc auctoritatem: erit; ergo potest esse, ergo Deus potuit condere, et ita de aliis corporibus: et si hoc, essent utique res meliores: ergo etc.
3. Item, melior est proprietas incorruptibilitatis et quietis quam corruptionis et motus3; sed omnia quae fecit Deus, aut fecit corruptibilia, aut aliquo modo mobilia: ergo omnia potuit facere meliora.
4. Item, si non potuerunt creaturae fieri meliores, hoc fuit, aut quia Deus non potuit dare plus, aut quia creaturae non potuerunt plus capere. Si quia Deus non potuit amplius dare, ergo divina potentia est limitata; si quia creaturae non potuerunt amplius capere; contra: videmus tota die creaturas meliorari et deteriorari, salva substantia et capacitate: ergo etc.
Contra:
1. « Optimi est optima adducere », sicut dicit Dionysius4; sed optimo non potest esse melius: ergo si Deus, cum sit optimus, adduxit res optime, patet etc.
2. Item, Plato5 addit rationem: « Porro quia optimus est, ab optimo vero omnis invidia relegata erat »; et ideo dedit unicuique creaturae tantum de bonitate, quantum potuit capere. Si tu dicas, quod Platonis verbum non valet, quia invidia non est respectu inferioris; contra: Augustinus super Genesim ad litteram6: « Si bona facere non posset, nulla esset potentia; si posset, sed nollet, magna esset invidentia »: ergo pari ratione, si posset facere meliora et nollet, esset invidus.
3. Item, ratione videtur: quia omne agens ex tota sua substantia7 facit rem optimo modo, quo potest fieri, si potentiam eius nihil omnino impedit; sed Deus est agens ex tota sua potentia in omni sua actione, et potentia eius nullam habet indigentiam nec resistentiam: ergo quidquid facit, ita bonum facit, quod nullo modo potest fieri melius.
4. Item, haec est vera per se: « bonum est diffusivum sui8 », ergo magis bonum magis diffusivum, et maxime bonum maxime diffusivum; sed Deus est agens maximae bonitatis, ergo maxime se diffundit: ergo videtur, quod unumquodque optime facit et quantum ad substantiam et quantum ad proprietates.
Conclusio.
Conclusio. Partes huius mundi transeuntes quoad proprietates fieri meliores possent; item partes permanentes, si absolute considerantur, non autem in relatione ad finem.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod cum quaeritur de melioritate partium universi, potest quaeri quantum ad duplex genus partium: aut quantum ad partes permanentes, sicut natura intellectualis, rationalis, caelestis et elementaris: aut quantum ad partes transeuntes, sicut hic homo et hic equus.
Si quantum ad partes transeuntes, sic sine distinctione concedo, quod possunt ut in pluribus quantum ad proprietates fieri meliores, quia non sunt de substantia universi, nec sunt a solo Deo, sed a Deo simul operante cum agente particulari, quod impeditur et deficit. Si autem intelligamus de partibus quae sunt de constitutione et integritate mundi, et immediate sunt a Deo, cum quaeritur, utrum potuerint fieri meliores quantum ad proprietates, distinguendum est: quia aut loqueris de ipsis absolute, aut de ipsis in relatione ad finem. Si de ipsis absolute, patet, quod meliores conditiones potuerunt habere; si de ipsis in relatione adinvicem vel ad finem, optimas habuerunt proprietates: quod patet, quia, sicut dicit Augustinus9: « Meliores iudicavit Deus homines, si ei liberaliter deservirent ». Similiter melius fuit, quod omnes homines essent ex uno, et ita quod haberent corpus animale; et secundum exigentiam eius necesse fuit, alias creaturas corporales disponi in motu et corruptibilitate.
Ex his patent rationes inductae ad primam partem; procedunt enim de proprietatibus rerum secundum se consideratarum.
Ad argumenta in contrarium:
Ad 1. Ad illud quod obiicitur in contrarium de Dionysio, dicendum, quod illud intelligitur secundum ordinem, sicut iam patebit10.
Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Platone, dicendum, quod non habet veritatem, nisi intelligatur salvo ordine universi, et hoc quantum ad bonitatem essentialem, considerata dispositione in materia. Nec ratio sua est necessaria, sed solum persuasio in simili: sicut in homine, qui potest alii benefacere et
non facit, quod hoc iudicatur invidia, et frequenter dimittit propter invidiam, et qui caret invidia e converso facit; sic Deus carens invidia fecit; et sic intelligitur verbum Augustini.
Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod agens ex tota potentia producit optime: dicendum, quod agens ex tota potentia quidam agit secundum impetum, quidam secundum artem et sapientiam. Et qui secundum impetum agit facit quanto melius potest; qui agit secundum artem et sapientiam agit quantum vult et quantum congruit, salvo ordine, quia « sapientis est ordinare ». Ideo quaedam facit bona, quaedam meliora, quaedam optima. Et sic patet, quod illud non sequitur.
Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod bonum summum summe se diffundit; dicendum, quod hoc verum est de diffusione naturali, de voluntaria sive a proposito non est verum. Primo modo est diffusio in productione personarum, secundo modo in productione creaturarum.
I. Quaestio haec intelligitur de proprietatibus accidentalibus partium mundi et quidem huius mundi, non alicuius mundi possibilis. — Pro explicatione sententiae Dionysii in solut. ad 1. dicit Alex. Hal. (S. p. I. q. 21. m. 3. a. 1. ad 3.): « Dicendum, quod optimum dicitur simpliciter, et optimum secundum genus et secundum statum, et secundum ordinem. Optimum simpliciter est Deus; optimum secundum genus et statum, ut in genere creaturae et conditionis statu Christus, optimum in ordine et non simpliciter, rerum universitas. Optimi ergo est optima adducere, hoc potest intelligi et quantum ad optimum simpliciter, ut in processione personali, et quantum ad optimum in genere et statu conditionis, ut in productione Christi; et quantum ad optimum in ordine, ut in productione universi ».
II. Auctores vide in Scholio hic ad 1. quaestionem, et praeterea: Petr. a Tar., de hac et seq. q. hic q. unica, a. 2. — Aegid. R., de hac et seq. q. hic 1. princ. q. 2. — Durand., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 3.
---
Question II. Whether the world could have been made better as to the properties of its integral parts.
Secondly, it is asked whether the world could have been made better as to the properties of its integral parts. And that it could, is shown as follows.
1. Isaiah 301: The light of the moon shall be as the light of the sun, and the light of the sun shall be as the light of seven days; this also the Master adduces along with this authority2: « God could,
he says, have made such a man who would neither will nor be able to sin; and if he had made such a one, who doubts that he would have been better »: therefore, etc.
2. Likewise, Augustine On Genesis according to the Letter, and the Master adduces this authority: it will be; therefore it can be; therefore God could establish [it], and so of other bodies: and if this is so, things would surely be better: therefore, etc.
3. Likewise, the property of incorruptibility and rest is better than that of corruption and motion3; but everything that God made, he made either corruptible or in some way mobile: therefore he could have made all things better.
4. Likewise, if creatures could not have been made better, this was either because God could not give more, or because creatures could not receive more. If because God could not give more, then the divine power is limited; if because creatures could not receive more — on the contrary: we see all day long creatures being made better and worse, while their substance and capacity remain: therefore, etc.
On the contrary:
1. « It belongs to the best to bring forth the best things », as Dionysius says4; but nothing can be better than the best: therefore if God, since he is the best, brought forth things in the best way, the matter is clear, etc.
2. Likewise, Plato5 adds the reason: « Moreover, because he is best, and from the best all envy was banished »; and therefore he gave to each creature as much goodness as it was able to receive. If you say that Plato's word is not valid, because envy is not with respect to one's inferior; on the contrary: Augustine On Genesis according to the Letter6: « If he could not have made good things, there would be no power; if he could, but would not, there would be great envy »: therefore by parallel reasoning, if he could have made better things and would not, he would be envious.
3. Likewise, it appears from reason: because every agent acting from its whole substance7 makes a thing in the best mode in which it can be made, if nothing impedes its power; but God is an agent [acting] from his whole power in every action, and his power has no deficiency or resistance: therefore whatever he makes, he makes so good that it can in no way be made better.
4. Likewise, this is true per se: « good is diffusive of itself8 »; therefore the more good, the more diffusive, and the supremely good, supremely diffusive; but God is an agent of supreme goodness, therefore he diffuses himself supremely: therefore it seems that he makes each thing in the best way both as to substance and as to properties.
Conclusion.
Conclusion. The transient parts of this world could have been made better as to their properties; likewise the permanent parts, if considered absolutely, but not in relation to the end.
I respond: It must be said that when one asks about the betterment of the parts of the universe, one can ask about two kinds of parts: either as to the permanent parts, such as intellectual, rational, celestial, and elemental nature; or as to the transient parts, such as this man and this horse.
If as to the transient parts, then without distinction I concede that they can in most cases be made better as to their properties, since they do not belong to the substance of the universe, nor are they from God alone, but from God acting together with a particular agent, which is impeded and defective. But if we understand it of those parts which are of the constitution and integrity of the world and are immediately from God — when it is asked whether they could have been made better as to their properties, a distinction must be drawn: because either you speak of them absolutely, or of them in relation to the end. If of them absolutely, it is clear that they could have had better conditions; if of them in relation to one another or to the end, they had the best properties: which is clear because, as Augustine says9: « God judged men to be better, if they should serve him freely ». Likewise it was better that all men should be from one, and so that they should have an animal body; and according to its exigency it was necessary that other corporeal creatures be disposed in motion and corruptibility.
From these things the reasons brought forward to the first part are clear; for they proceed from the properties of things considered in themselves.
Replies to the contrary arguments:
Ad 1. To that which is objected on the contrary side concerning Dionysius, it must be said that this is to be understood according to order, as will soon appear10.
Ad 2. To that which is objected concerning Plato, it must be said that it does not have truth unless it is understood with the order of the universe preserved, and this as to essential goodness, the disposition in matter being considered. Nor is his reasoning necessary, but only a persuasion by likeness: just as in the case of a man, who can do good to another and
does not, [in which case] this is judged envy, and he often refrains on account of envy, and one who lacks envy does the opposite; so God, lacking envy, made [things]; and so is Augustine's word to be understood.
Ad 3. To that which is objected, that an agent [acting] from its whole power produces in the best way: it must be said that an agent [acting] from its whole power acts in one of two ways: some act according to impulse, some according to art and wisdom. And he who acts according to impulse makes [a thing] as good as he can; he who acts according to art and wisdom acts as much as he wills and as much as is fitting, with order preserved, since « it belongs to the wise man to set things in order ». Therefore he makes some things good, some better, some best. And thus it is clear that this does not follow.
Ad 4. To that which is objected, that the supreme good supremely diffuses itself: it must be said that this is true of natural diffusion; of voluntary or purposeful [diffusion] it is not true. In the first mode the diffusion is in the production of [the divine] persons; in the second mode, in the production of creatures.
I. This question is to be understood concerning the accidental properties of the parts of the world — and indeed of this world, not of some [other] possible world. — For the explanation of the opinion of Dionysius in the reply to objection 1, Alexander of Hales says (Summa p. I q. 21 m. 3 a. 1 ad 3): « It must be said that 'best' is spoken of [in three ways]: best absolutely, and best according to genus and according to state, and according to order. Best absolutely is God; best according to genus and state — namely in the genus of creature and in the state of [its] condition — is Christ; best in order and not absolutely is the totality of things. Therefore 'it belongs to the best to bring forth the best things' can be understood both as to the best absolutely, as in the personal procession, and as to the best in genus and in the state of condition, as in the production of Christ; and as to the best in order, as in the production of the universe ».
II. For [other] authors see in the Scholion here on question 1, and moreover: Peter of Tarentaise on this and the following question, here q. unica, a. 2. — Aegidius Romanus, on this and the following question, here 1. princ. q. 2. — Durandus, on this and the following question, here q. 3.
---
- Vers. 26. — Mox pro potuit Vat. potest.Verse 26. — Soon afterward, for potuit the Vatican edition reads potest.
- Hic c. 1.Here c. 1.
- Cfr. Aristot., VIII. Phys. text. 73 (c. 9), et supra pag. 654, nota 1.Cf. Aristotle, Physics VIII, text 73 (c. 9), and above p. 654, note 1.
- Libr. de Div. Nom. c. 4. § 19.[Pseudo-Dionysius], On the Divine Names, c. 4 § 19.
- In Timaeo (ed. Serrani, 1578 pag. 29): « ἀγαθὸς ἦν, ἀγαθῷ δὲ οὐδεὶς περὶ οὐδενὸς οὐδέποτε ἐγγίγνεται φθόνος », Latine: Bonitate videlicet praestabat; in bonum autem nulla de ulla unquam re cadit invidia.In the Timaeus (ed. Serranus, 1578, p. 29): « ἀγαθὸς ἦν, ἀγαθῷ δὲ οὐδεὶς περὶ οὐδενὸς οὐδέποτε ἐγγίγνεται φθόνος » — in Latin: Namely, he excelled in goodness; but upon the good no envy ever falls concerning anything whatsoever.
- Libr. IV. c. 16. n. 27, ubi ed. oper. August. si autem posset nec faceret pro si posset, sed nollet, et plures codd. cum ed. 1 et nollet pro sed nollet. Paulo superius codd. K P Q V X Y quia invidia est respectu superioris, non inferioris; aliqui codd. cum ed. 1 quia invidia est respectu inferioris. Cfr. d. 20. dub. 1.Book IV, c. 16, n. 27, where the edition of Augustine's works has si autem posset nec faceret for si posset, sed nollet, and several codices with edition 1 have et nollet for sed nollet. A little above, codices K P Q V X Y read because envy is with respect to one's superior, not to one's inferior; some codices with edition 1 read because envy is with respect to one's inferior. Cf. d. 20, dub. 1.
- Pro substantia cod. M cum ed. 1 potentia, et e converso paulo inferius pro sua potentia cod. A sua substantia, cod. K sua substantia et potentia.For substantia codex M with edition 1 reads potentia, and conversely a little below, for sua potentia codex A has sua substantia, codex K has sua substantia et potentia.
- De hac Dionysii propositione cfr. supra pag. 746, nota 5. — Paulo inferius pro optime facit Vat. cum cod. cc optimum facit.On this proposition of Dionysius see above, p. 746, note 5. — A little below, for optime facit the Vatican edition with codex cc reads optimum facit.
- Libr. de Vera Relig. c. 14. n. 27: Tales enim servos meliores esse Deus iudicavit, si ei servirent liberaliter. Cfr. de Agone christ. c. 10. n. 11. — Paulo superius multi codd. omittunt vel ante ad finem. Pro hoc vel cod. T substituit sive, cod. F cum ed. 1 et; codd. R X omittunt tum vel tum vocem antecedentem ad invicem.Book On True Religion c. 14, n. 27: For God judged such servants to be better, if they served him freely. Cf. On the Christian Combat, c. 10, n. 11. — A little above, many codices omit vel before ad finem. For hoc vel codex T substitutes sive, codex F with edition 1 has et; codices R and X omit both vel and the preceding word ad invicem.
- Quaest. seq.The following question.