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Dist. 44, Art. 1, Q. 1

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 44

Textus Latinus
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Articulus I. De possibilitate mundi melioris.

Quaestio I. Utrum Deus potuerit mundum facere meliorem quoad substantiam partium integrantium.

Quod autem potuerit facere mundum meliorem quoad substantiam partium integrantium, ostenditur sic.

1. Partes integrantes mundum sunt finitae bonitatis et intensive et extensive; sed omni finito potest aliquid maius et melius cogitari; sed Deus plus potest facere, quam homo possit intelligere1: ergo etc. Si tu dicas, quod mundus non potuit amplius capere; hoc non solvit, quia Deus facit capacitatem: ergo maiorem potuit capacitatem dare, cum eius potentia sit infinita.

2. Item, suprema creatura in universo est finita, ergo distat a Deo in infinitum; sed in distantia infinita est ponere gradus infinitos: ergo ultra bonitatem creaturarum est intelligere creaturas gradus bonitatis habentes, et ex his potuit integrari mundus: ergo etc.

3. Item, constat, quod Deus potuit facere mundum ex partibus maioribus mole, ut caelum amplius sive latius et terram latiorem: ergo si potuit facere maius mole, eadem ratione et maius virtute: et si hoc, ergo simpliciter melius.

4. Item, materia secundum se totam capax est formae nobilissimae, ut patet: si ergo Deus dare potuit quod natura materiae potuit capere, ergo potuit dare toti materiae et omnibus partibus perfectionem formae nobilissimae, ut puta rationalis naturae: ergo potuit facere mundum, qui constaret ex solis substantiis rationalibus. Et si hoc, tunc mundus haberet omnes partes secundum substantiam meliores: ergo etc.

Contra:

1. Augustinus in tertio libro de Libero Arbitrio2: « Quidquid in vera ratione melius tibi occurrerit, scias fecisse Deum tanquam bonorum omnium conditorem; non esse autem, quod vera ratione cogitas, non potest. Neque enim tu potes aliquid melius in creatura cogitare, quod creaturae artificem fugerit ». Ergo non potest aliqua creatura nobilis cogitari, quae non sit de constitutione mundi.

2. Item, Augustinus duodecimo Confessionum3: « Duo fecisti, Domine, unum prope te, aliud prope nihil », scilicet angelicam creaturam et materiam primam; sed non potest maior ambitus cogitari quam a propinquitate Dei ad nihil: ergo non potuit fieri mundus, qui natus esset amplecti plures naturas rerum: ergo non potuit mundus fieri melior quantum ad capacitatem. Sed constat, capacitatem illam non esse vacuam quantum ad aliquem gradum, alioquin nec mundus perfectus esset, nec universum perfectum dici posset: ergo nec iste plus capere, nec alius capacior potuit fieri.

3. Item, materia prima est creata in omnimoda possibilitate et in perfecta obedientia respectu Creatoris4: ergo si capacitas ipsius materiae attenditur secundum suam possibilitatem et obedientiam, quam habuit ad Deum, et in summa possibilitate et in summa obedientia est creata, ergo mundus quantum ad capacitatem non potuit fieri melior. Si ergo dedit Deus unicuique, quantum capax erat, ergo nullo modo potuit fieri melior.

4. Item, quantumcumque creatura fiat bona, necesse est esse finitam: ergo necesse est aliquando ponere statum, ita quod creatura nullo modo possit fieri melior, in nullo derogando divinae potentiae; sed qua ratione statur in aliqua specie creaturae, statur in suprema specie creaturae spiritualis: nulla igitur creatura vel species potest illa fieri nobilior. Et « si optimum in genere est melius optimo in alio, et simpliciter hoc illo melius5 », ergo, si optimum in universo est optimum omnis creaturae,

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quae possit esse creatura, et simpliciter iste est ita bonus, quod eo non potest fieri melior.

Conclusio.

Conclusio. Deus potuit facere alium mundum meliorem quoad substantiam partium, sed hunc mundum tantum secundum accidentalia meliorem et maiorem.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod excessus bonitatis substantialis in rebus potest attendi dupliciter: quantum ad essentiarum nobilitatem et gradus, et sic dicitur, quod species hominis melior est et nobilior specie asini; aut quantum ad esse, prout concernit additionem sive augmentum, sicut dicitur quod marca6 auri melior est uncia, non quia nobiliorem habet formam vel essentiam, sed quia plus habet de auri substantia ac per hoc de bonitate et valore.

Quando ergo quaeritur, utrum Deus potuerit mundum facere meliorem quantum ad substantiam partium; si tu intelligas de excessu quantum ad primum modum, quod mundus constaret ex melioribus et nobilioribus essentiis, dico, quod iste mundus, qui est nunc, non potuit fieri melior, quia non esset iste, sed alius; sicut, si iste qui factus est homo, fuisset factus asinus7, non esset ille qui est. Quia tamen posse eius non est arctatum nec limitatum, non video, quare non potuisset mundum facere meliorem hoc genere melioritatis.

Si autem intelligas quantum ad secundum modum, sic dico, quod non solum alium, verum etiam hunc potuit facere meliorem, sicut et maiorem. Et si fecisset, non esset alius; sicut posset facere, quod iste puer esset ita magnus ut gigas, et plus haberet de substantia et virtute, et tamen non esset alius, quam est.

Concedo ergo rationes probantes, quod Deus simpliciter potuit alium mundum quantum ad substantiam partium meliorem, etiam hunc fecisse quantum ad magnitudinem partium et virtutem, non tamen quantum ad essentiarum nobilitatem munclus maiorem. Et hoc vult Augustinus dicere in praemissa auctoritate de Libero Arbitrio8, quod nulla essentia nobilior potest cogitari esse in hoc mundo rationabiliter, quae non sit ibi. Nam si cogites, meliores esse partes, hoc est aut secundum totum, aut secundum partem: si secundum totum, iam non istum mundum cogitas, sed alium; si secundum partem, tunc ergo tollis ordinem et perfectionem de hoc mundo: ut si cogites, quod Deus fecisset lunam ita lucidam, ut est sol, vel terram sicut caelum, non rationabiliter cogitas, quia perimis universum. « Non enim essent omnia, si essent aequalia9 ». Et hoc est quod dicit Augustinus de Libero Arbitrio: « Non est vera ratio, sed invida infirmitas, cum aliquid melius faciendum fuisse cogitaveris, iam nihil aliud inferius fieri velle, tanquam si, perfecto caelo, nolles terram factam esse, utique omnino inique cogitares ».

Et sic patet, ultimo obiectum ad primam partem10 esse sophisticum, pro eo quod hoc non competebat universo, ut materia secundum se totam perfecta esset forma nobilissima.

Ad argumenta in contrarium:

Ad 1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium per auctoritatem Augustini de Libero Arbitrio, iam patet responsio, quia intelligit de hoc mundo, et de melioritate secundum essentiam, ut patet ex textu11.

Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod summa distantia est in universo; dicendum, quod prope Deum potest dupliciter intelligi, scilicet quantum

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ad immediatam receptionem et conversionem in Deum, aut quantum ad summam imitationem et assimilationem. Primo modo est natura angelica prope Deum, simpliciter loquendo; sed secundo modo non nisi in comparatione, quia magis est dissimilis quam similis, et plus deficit quam exprimit, immo infinitis gradibus distat12; et ideo maior propinquitas est nobis cogitabilis et Deo possibilis, quamvis nunc non sit.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod materia est creata in omnimoda possibilitate; dicendum, quod possibilitatem obedientiae nulla creatura Deus in complet totaliter, quia hoc est secundum omnimodum imperium Creatoris, sed complet capacitatem et possibilitatem, ut disponitur per aliquas dispositiones. Et sic Deus complet materiam, quia eius capacitatem debitis dispositionibus limitavit et illis formas completivas et perfectivas adiunxit, ita quod nihil dimisit incompletum. Quis tamen audeat dicere, quin Deus nobilius disponere et nobilioribus formis perficere posset, secundum suae sapientiae et potentiae infinitatem? Quod ergo dicitur: dedit unicuique bonitatis quantum erat capax; hoc intelligitur de capacitate, non prout dicit longinquam possibilitatem et obedientiam respectu Creatoris, sed prout cum hoc dicit dispositionem et exigentiam; et hanc constans est Deum potuisse maiorem facere.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod in creaturis est stare; dicendum, quod sicut nummus semper habet statum in actu, tamen nunquam est dare statum aliquem, ultra quem divina potentia non possit se extendere; sic intelligendum est in magnitudine molis et bonitatis, quod quantumcumque sit in creatura, status est semper, quia finita; et bene agit Deus hucusque, ita quod non agit amplius, sed quin possit amplius, nunquam est dare, ut credo. Et ideo, si alium mundum meliorem hoc fecisset, adhuc erit ultra quaerere, quare non fecit meliorem, cum possit, et sic procedendo ulterius; et ideo talis quaestio est irrationalis, et solutio non potest dari nisi haec, quia voluit, et rationem ipse novit. Attamen si non fecit, nemo potest arguere, quia hoc totum, quod fecit, fuit gratia; nec erat aliqua exigentia, ratione cuius possit poni in eo fuisse invidia.

Scholion

I. Seraphicus de perfectione divinorum operum (sive mundi) sub distinctis quaestionibus prae ceteris antiquis Scholasticis accurate disputat. Cum autem universae creaturae quoddam totum, ex partibus integrantibus constitutum, sive, quendam, ut dicunt, organismum exhibeant, respici potest tum ad bonitatem partium in se sive absolutam, tum ad earum bonitatem quoad ordinem in finem sive respectivam; quae distinctio explicatur hic dub. 2. et q. 2. De bonitate absoluta (quam vocat S. Doctor « melius simpliciter ») praecipue agitur in qq. 1. 2; de bonitate in ordine ad finem in q. 3.

II. Mundum non posse fieri meliorem ex parte causae efficientis, exemplaris et finalis nec ex parte modi agendi manifestum est, et probatur ab Alexandro Hal., S. p. I. q. 21. m. 3. a. 2, et a S. Thom., S. I. q. 25. a. 6. ad 1. Sed dubitatur, utrum ipse mundus, in se spectatus, possit esse melior; et haec quaestio secundum S. Doctorem (hic in corp.) potest vel intelligi de eodem hoc mundo, vel de alio possibili et a Deo creabili. Et iterum intelligi potest vocabulum melius quoad perfectionem partium mundi vel essentialem, vel accidentalem. His factis distinctionibus, cum sententia communi eliditur systema Optimismi, quod defendit inter alios Leibnitius. — Argumentum autem 1. in fundam. ab ipso S. Bonaventura notatur ut sophisticum. — In solutione ad 4. negatur, aliquam creaturam habere posse ultimum gradum perfectionis, ita ut sit in ea status, ultra quem non possit esse maior perfectio. Consentiunt S. Thom. (loc. cit.) aliique. Aliter sentiunt Scotus (III. Sent. d. 13. q. 1.), Durand. (hic q. 2, et d. 43. q. 1.) et, ut videtur, Henr. Gand. (Quodlib. 5. q. 22.). Plura de hac re, speciatim de perfectione Christi et B. Virginis Mariae, vide hic dub. 3 et supra d. 17. p. II. q. 4.

III. Alex. Hal., de hac et seqq. qq. S. p. I. q. 21. m. 3. a. 1-7. — Scot., de hac et seq. q. Report. hic q. 2. — S. Thom., de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. 1. a. 1. 2. 3; S. I. q. 25. a. 6. — B. Albert., de hac et seq. q. hic a. 2; S. p. I. tr. 19. q. 77. m. 3. a. 1. 2. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. unica, a. 1. — Richard. a Med., de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. 1. 4. 5. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 1. — Durand., hic q. 1. 2. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. 1. 2. — Biel, de hac et seq. q. hic q. unica.

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English Translation
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Article I. On the possibility of a better world.

Question I. Whether God could have made the world better as to the substance of its integral parts.

That he could have made the world better as to the substance of its integral parts is shown thus.

1. The parts that integrate the world are of finite goodness, both intensively and extensively; but for every finite thing something greater and better can be thought of; but God can do more than man can understand1: therefore, etc. If you say that the world could not have received more, this does not solve it, because God makes the capacity: therefore he could have given a greater capacity, since his power is infinite.

2. Likewise, the highest creature in the universe is finite, therefore it is distant from God to infinity; but within an infinite distance one must posit infinite degrees: therefore beyond the goodness of the [existing] creatures one can think of creatures possessing degrees of goodness, and from these the world could have been made whole: therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, it is plain that God could have made the world out of parts greater in mass — a wider or broader heaven and a wider earth: therefore if he could make it greater in mass, by the same reasoning [he could make it] greater also in power: and if so, then better, absolutely.

4. Likewise, matter taken as a whole is capable of the most noble form, as is evident: if therefore God could give what the nature of matter could receive, then he could have given to the whole of matter and to all its parts the perfection of the most noble form, namely of rational nature: therefore he could have made a world that would consist of rational substances alone. And if so, then the world would have all its parts better according to substance: therefore, etc.

On the contrary:

1. Augustine in the third book On Free Will2: « Whatever in true reason occurs to you as better, know that God has made it as the founder of all goods; but that what you think of in true reason should not exist, is impossible. For neither can you think anything better in a creature than has escaped the creator's notice ». Therefore no noble creature can be thought of which is not of the constitution of the world.

2. Likewise, Augustine in the twelfth book of the Confessions3: « Two things you made, Lord, one near to you, the other near to nothing », namely the angelic creature and primary matter; but no greater span can be thought of than from God's nearness to nothing: therefore there could not have come to be a world that was apt to embrace more natures of things: therefore the world could not have been made better as to capacity. But it is plain that this capacity is not empty as to any degree, otherwise neither would the world be perfect, nor could the universe be called perfect: therefore neither could this [world] hold more, nor could another be made more capacious.

3. Likewise, primary matter has been created in every kind of possibility and in perfect obedience with respect to the Creator4: therefore if the capacity of matter itself is considered according to its possibility and obedience, which it had toward God, and it is created in supreme possibility and in supreme obedience, then the world as to capacity could not have been made better. If therefore God gave to each thing as much as it was capable of, then in no way could it have been made better.

4. Likewise, however good a creature is made, it must of necessity be finite: therefore a stopping-point must at some time be set, such that a creature can in no way be made better, without derogating in any way from divine power; but on the same ground on which one stops at any species of creature, one stops at the supreme species of spiritual creature: no creature or species therefore can be made nobler than that. And « if the best in a genus is better than the best in another, then absolutely this is better than that5 »; therefore, if the best in the universe is the best of every creature

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that can be a creature, then absolutely this [world] is so good that nothing better can come to be than it.

Conclusion.

Conclusion. God could have made another world better as to the substance of its parts, but this [present] world only better and greater according to accidentals.

I respond: It must be said that an excess of substantial goodness in things can be considered in two ways: as to the nobility and grades of essences — and in this way it is said that the species of man is better and nobler than the species of an ass; or as to being, insofar as it concerns addition or augmentation, as it is said that a mark6 of gold is better than an ounce — not because it has a nobler form or essence, but because it has more of the substance of gold and thereby more of its goodness and value.

When therefore it is asked whether God could have made the world better as to the substance of its parts, if you understand it of an excess in the first mode, [namely] that the world would consist of better and nobler essences, I say that this world which now is could not have been made better, because it would not be this [world] but another; just as, if this one who has been made a man had been made an ass7, he would not be the one who is. Yet since his power is not narrowed nor limited, I do not see why he could not have made the world better by this kind of betterment.

If however you understand it as to the second mode, then I say that not only another but also this very [world] he could have made better, just as also greater. And if he had done so, it would not be another; just as he could make this child to be as great as a giant, having more of substance and power, and yet not be other than he is.

I therefore concede the arguments proving that God could absolutely have made another world better as to the substance of its parts, and also have made this very [world] greater as to magnitude of parts and as to power, though not as to the nobility of essences. And this is what Augustine wishes to say in the aforementioned authority On Free Will8, that no nobler essence can rationally be thought of as in this world which is not there. For if you think the parts to be better, this is either according to the whole or according to a part: if according to the whole, then you no longer think of this world but of another; if according to a part, then you destroy the order and perfection of this world: as if you think that God had made the moon as bright as the sun, or earth like heaven, you do not think rationally, because you destroy the universe. « For all things would not be, if they were equal9 ». And this is what Augustine says On Free Will: « It is not true reason, but envious infirmity, when, having thought that something ought to have been made better, you then want nothing else more lowly to be made, just as if, the heaven being perfect, you should be unwilling for the earth to have been made — in which case you would altogether be thinking unjustly ».

And thus it is clear that the last objection to the first part10 is sophistical, on the ground that this did not belong to the universe, that matter taken as a whole should be perfected by the most noble form.

Replies to the contrary arguments:

Ad 1. To that which is objected on the contrary side from the authority of Augustine On Free Will, the response is already clear, because he understands it of this world, and of betterment according to essence, as is plain from the text11.

Ad 2. To that which is objected, that there is the greatest distance in the universe; it must be said that near to God can be understood in two ways, namely as to

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immediate reception and conversion into God, or as to supreme imitation and assimilation. In the first way the angelic nature is near to God, absolutely speaking; but in the second way only by comparison, because it is more unlike than like, and falls short more than it expresses — indeed it is distant by infinite grades12; and therefore a greater nearness is thinkable by us and possible for God, although it is not at present.

Ad 3. To that which is objected, that matter is created in every possibility; it must be said that no creature does God fully complete as to the possibility of obedience, because that belongs to the all-encompassing dominion of the Creator, but he completes its capacity and possibility, as it is disposed by certain dispositions. And thus God completes matter, because he has limited its capacity by due dispositions, and to those [dispositions] he has joined completive and perfective forms, so that he has left nothing incomplete. Yet who would dare to say that God could not dispose more nobly and perfect by nobler forms, according to the infinity of his wisdom and power? When therefore it is said: he gave to each as much goodness as it was capable of — this is understood of the capacity, not as it expresses remote possibility and obedience with respect to the Creator, but as together with this it expresses disposition and exigency; and this disposition God could certainly have made greater.

Ad 4. To that which is objected, that in creatures there must be a stopping-point; it must be said that, just as a coin always has a stopping-point in act, yet there is never given any stopping-point beyond which the divine power could not extend itself; so it must be understood in magnitude of mass and of goodness — that, however much it be in a creature, there is always a stopping-point, because it is finite; and God acts well thus far, so that he does not act further — but that he could not act further, this is never to be granted, as I believe. And therefore, if he had made another world better than this one, it would still remain further to ask why he did not make a still better one, since he can; and so on indefinitely; and therefore such a question is irrational, and no solution can be given except this: that he willed, and he himself knows the reason. Yet even if he did not make it, no one can argue [against him], because this whole that he made was grace; nor was there any exigency by reason of which envy could be supposed to have been in him.

Scholion

I. The Seraphic Doctor disputes accurately concerning the perfection of the divine works (or of the world), under distinct questions, ahead of the other ancient Scholastics. Since, however, the totality of creatures presents a certain whole, constituted of integral parts — or, as they say, a certain organism — it can be considered both as to the goodness of the parts in themselves or absolute, and as to their goodness in respect of order toward the end or relative; which distinction is explained here in dub. 2 and q. 2. The absolute goodness (which the holy Doctor calls « better absolutely ») is treated chiefly in qq. 1 and 2; the goodness in order toward the end in q. 3.

II. That the world cannot be made better on the side of the efficient, exemplary, and final cause, nor on the side of the mode of acting, is manifest, and is proved by Alexander of Hales, Summa p. I q. 21 m. 3 a. 2, and by St. Thomas, Summa I q. 25 a. 6 ad 1. But it is disputed whether the world itself, considered in itself, can be better; and this question, according to the holy Doctor (here in the body), can be understood either of this same world, or of another that is possible and creatable by God. And again the term better can be understood as to the perfection of the parts of the world, either essential or accidental. With these distinctions drawn, the system of Optimism — which Leibniz among others defends — is dismissed in line with the common opinion. — And argument 1 in the fundamenta is noted by St. Bonaventure himself as sophistical. — In the reply to objection 4 it is denied that any creature can have an ultimate degree of perfection such that there is in it a stopping-point beyond which there cannot be a greater perfection. With this agree St. Thomas (loc. cit.) and others. Otherwise think Scotus (III Sent. d. 13 q. 1), Durand. (here q. 2, and d. 43 q. 1) and, as it seems, Henry of Ghent (Quodlib. 5 q. 22). For more on this matter, especially concerning the perfection of Christ and of the Blessed Virgin Mary, see here dub. 3 and above d. 17 p. II q. 4.

III. Alex. Hal., on this and the following qq., Summa p. I q. 21 m. 3 a. 1–7. — Scot., on this and the following q., Report. here q. 2. — S. Thom., on this and the following qq., here q. 1 aa. 1, 2, 3; Summa I q. 25 a. 6. — B. Albert, on this and the following q., here a. 2; Summa p. I tr. 19 q. 77 m. 3 aa. 1, 2, 3. — Petr. a Tar., here q. unica, a. 1. — Richard. a Med., on this and the following qq., here q. 1, 4, 5. — Aegid. R., here 1. princ. q. 1. — Durand., here qq. 1, 2. — Dionys. Carth., on this and the following qq., here qq. 1, 2. — Biel, on this and the following q., here q. unica.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Cfr. supra d. 42. q. 3. arg. 1. pro parte affirmativa.
    Cf. above, d. 42, q. 3, arg. 1, on the affirmative side.
  2. Cap. 5. n. 13. In textu Augustini hic plures propositiones omissae sunt; ipse bene illustratur infra in corp. quaest. his verbis: quod nulla essentia nobilior potest cogitari esse in hoc mundo rationabiliter [sive, ut in ipso textu habetur, vera ratione], quae non sit ibi.
    Chapter 5, n. 13. In Augustine's text several propositions have here been omitted; he is well illustrated below in the body of the question by these words: that no nobler essence can rationally be thought of as existing in this world [or, as the very text has it, by true reason], which is not there.
  3. Cap. 7. n. 7. — Paulo inferius post ambitus in cod. Q (in marg.) additur vel distantia.
    Chapter 7, n. 7. — A little below, after ambitus ("span"), codex Q adds in the margin or distance.
  4. Sive in perfecta potentia tum passiva tum obedientiali relate ad Creatorem. — Paulo inferius pro non potuit ed. 1. nec potuit.
    Or: in perfect potency, both passive and obediential, with regard to the Creator. — A little below, for non potuit edition 1 has nec potuit.
  5. Aristot., III. Topic. c. 2, de eligibilioribus agens ait: « Amplius si hoc simpliciter illo melius, etiam omnino optimum eorum quae in hoc melius eo quod in altero optimum; ut si melior est homo quam equus, etiam optimus homo optimo equo melior. Et si optimum optimo melius, etiam simpliciter hoc illo melius: ut si optimus homo optimo equo melior, et simpliciter homo simpliciter equo melior ». Quae verba Averroes ita exponit: quia quod simpliciter praestantius est alia re, quod in hoc illo genere est primum nobilitate, nobilius est primo secundum nobilitatem in altero genere, v. g. si homo sit simpliciter nobilior equo, id quod est primum secundum hominum nobilitatem, praestantius est secundum nobilitatem ipso equo. Et econtra, si primum nobilitate in hoc genere fuerit nobilius primo alterius generis, hoc itaque genus est nobilius illo altero genere. — Pro in genere Vat. in uno genere.
    Aristotle, Topics III c. 2, treating of preferable things, says: « Further, if this is absolutely better than that, then also the best of those that are in the former is better than the best of those that are in the latter; as if man is better than horse, then also the best man is better than the best horse. And if the best is better than the best, then absolutely this is better than that: as if the best man is better than the best horse, then absolutely man is better than horse ». Averroes expounds these words thus: because that which is absolutely more excellent than another thing, [namely] that which in its genus is first in nobility, is nobler than what is first by nobility in another genus — for example, if man is absolutely nobler than horse, that which is first by the nobility of men is more excellent in nobility than the horse itself. And on the contrary, if what is first by nobility in this genus is nobler than what is first in another genus, then this genus is nobler than that other genus. — For in genere the Vatican [edition has] in uno genere.
  6. Marca, ut explanat Du Cange in Gloss. mediae et infimae latinitatis, est pondus, quod appendit bessem librae regiae, qua negotiatores et pigmentarii et alii utuntur, omnesque omnino, qui appensas merces venditant... Apud nos igitur Marca duplicata libram efficit, quae dividitur in 16 uncias; uncia vero subdividitur in 8 drachmas vel 24 scrupulos seu denarios etc. — Paulo ante pro sicut cod. M ut cum, Vat. sic.
    Marca (a mark), as Du Cange explains in his Glossary of Middle and Low Latin, is a weight equal to two-thirds of the royal pound, used by traders, perfumers, and others — by all, in short, who sell wares by weight... Among us, then, a doubled Marca makes up a pound, which is divided into 16 ounces; an ounce in turn is subdivided into 8 drachms or 24 scruples or pence, etc. — A little above, for sicut codex M reads ut cum, the Vatican [reads] sic.
  7. Pro asinus Vat. et ed. 1 Angelus, omnibus codd. contradicentibus. Paulo superius Vat. cum cod. cc omittit melioribus et, et paulo inferius verbo mundum praemittit alium, nonnullis codd. suffragantibus.
    For asinus (ass) the Vatican edition and ed. 1 have Angelus (Angel), against all the manuscripts. A little above, the Vatican edition together with codex cc omits melioribus et, and a little below it prefixes alium to the word mundum, with several codices in support.
  8. Vide hic 1. arg. ad opposit.
    See here argument 1 on the opposite side.
  9. August., libr. 83 Qq. q. 41. — Textus sequens habetur loc. cit. c. 8. n. 13, ubi tamen in originali ultimum verbum cogitares desideratur.
    Augustine, Eighty-three Questions, q. 41. — The following text is found at the same place, c. 8, n. 13, where however in the original the final word cogitares is missing.
  10. Scilicet in fundam.
    Namely, [the last argument] in the fundamenta.
  11. Paulo ante in fine corp. quaest. allato. — Pro textu ed. 1 contextu.
    A little above, [in the text] cited at the end of the body of the question. — For textu edition 1 has contextu.
  12. Cfr. supra d. 38. q. 1. ad 2.
    Cf. above, d. 38, q. 1, ad 2.
← Dist. 44, Divisio TextusDist. 44, Art. 1, Q. 2→