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Dist. 30, Dubia

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 30

Textus Latinus
p. 527

DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

DUB. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram et primo de his nominibus creator, dominus huiusmodi, quae dicit Magister: dici de Deo ex tempore. Videtur enim falsum, quia «dominium, ut dicit Boethius1, est potestas coercendi subditos» sed haec est in Deo ab aeterno: ergo etc. — Item, «Dominus, ut dicit Ambrosius, est nomen naturae»: ergo si natura est aeterna, ergo et dominium. — Item, de hoc nomine creator obiicitur, quia non dicitur lector, quia actu legit, sed quia habilis est ad legendum; sed Deus ab aeterno habilis est ad creandum: ergo etc.

Iuxta hoc quaeritur de horum nominum significatione et connotatione, et unde habent rationem connotandi, cum divina essentia sit principale significatum.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod quamvis divina essentia non habeat vere2 respectum ad creaturam, tamen contingit eam intelligere et significare per modum respectus; nec tamen intellectus est vanus, propter hoc quod totam rationem respectus realis ponit in creatura3. Quoniam igitur huiusmodi nomina dicunt respectum, a quo imponuntur — quamvis imponantur essentiae secundum — ideo dicuntur4 exigentiam illius respectus. Ideo intelligendum, quod quaedam dicunt respectum solum, ut dominus; quaedam5 effectum, ut creator et iustus, et utraque sunt sub duplici differentia, quia aut important respectum ad rem praesentem, aut ad rem futuram sive ad rem in actu vel in habitu. Primo modo, quia ponunt creaturam in actu, dicunt solum respectum6, cum creatura incipit; secundo modo ab aeterno.

Secundum hoc ergo, si dominus et creator important respectum in actu, ab aeterno non possunt dici; si autem in habitu, possunt. Tamen usus communis accipit huiusmodi nomina, ut connotant in actu; et ideo dicit Augustinus7, ea dici cum tempore. — Quod ergo intelligendum dicit Boethius, quod8 «coercendi subditos est potestas sed habitos, et non habendos». — Quod Ambrosius quod dicit, patet non cogit, quia quamvis imponatur naturae, tamen imponitur a proprietate9 naturae, ut dicit respectum ad creaturas, et ideo connotat quid creatum. — Et sic patent omnia, quia ratio connotandi est modus significandi10.

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DUB. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit11, quod tempus non coepit ex tempore. Videtur enim falsum, quia omne quod incipit, est temporale, et omne temporale mensuratur tempore, et omne tale coepit in tempore: ergo etc. Si tu das instantiam in imperitis, obiicitur, quod nihil magis est variabile quam tempus; sed omne tale est temporale: ergo etc. — Item, tempus non coepit in tempore, ergo si coepit extra tempus, ergo fuit tempus extra omne tempus.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod quantum ad praesens pertinet — quia de initio temporis debet dici in secundo12 — differt incipere ex tempore et in tempore et cum tempore, quia ex dicit ordinem, et ita praesupponit tempus tanquam anterius; et ideo nihil coepit ex tempore nisi quod sequitur tempus. In tempore dicit temporis existentiam13; sed tempus non fuit in sui initio, cum sit successivum. Ideo quae sunt aequalis durationis cum tempore non coeperunt nec ex tempore, nec in tempore, sed cum tempore, id est, cum tempus coepit.

Si quaeras, quomodo tempus coepit; breviter dicendum, quod nullo praedictorum modorum, sed coepit in sui principio, et ideo non coepit extra tempus.

Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod tempore mensuratur temporale; dicendum, quod temporale, quod

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exceditur14 a tempore, mensuratur et incipit in tempore, sed illud quod non exceditur, incipit cum tempore; et ratio praedicta est15.

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DUB. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod nummus mutatus non est, cum coeperit esse pretium. Videtur enim falsum, quia esse pretium est accidens nummi, et modo inest, et prius non inerat, ergo nummus mutatus est.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod relatio non praedicat quid absolutum, sed praedicat ordinem ad alterum; ordo autem respicit dispositionem ordinatorum. Quaedam igitur sunt ordinabilia quod utrumque est in potentia; et tunc relatio introducitur per mutationem factam in utroque. Quaedam sunt ordinabilia, ita quod alterum quantum est de se, in actu est, sed alterum in potentia; sicut patet de duobus, quorum unus, qui est actu albus, actu habet proprietatem, secundum quam attenditur similitudo, et ideo, altero de non albo facto albo, fit perfecta similitudo. — Non ergo oportet, quod relatio semper inducat mutationem in utroque extremorum propter sui corruptionem vel inceptionem16; sed sufficit, quod in altero. Et ratio visa est, quia respicit duplex extremum, et quia potest unum esse de se in actu, altero existente in potentia: sicut in nummo, qui est in potestate possidentis, quod sit pignus vel pretium vel arrha secundum mutationem factam in ipso; nec advenit nummo aliquid absolutum, sed ordo, qui ex parte nummi erat in actu, ex parte illius quod erat in potentia, fit in actu; et ideo mutatur illud, non mutato nummo.

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DUB. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod accidens est in creatura, cum relatio est creaturae ad Creatorem. Videtur enim falsum, quia contingit rem intelligi, accidente remoto: ergo si relatio ad Creatorem accidit creaturae, ergo illo remoto17, contingit rem creatam esse intelligi, etiam circumscripto respectu ad Creatorem. — Item, si relatio, qua creatura refertur ad Creatorem, est accidens, cum illud sit creatum, refertur, et ita per accidens: et sic de alio, et ita est18 abire in infinitum.

Dicendum, quod creatura quantum ad esse primum essentialiter dependet; et talis relatio, quae exprimit illam dependentiam, non est creaturae accidentalis, sed magis essentialis. Quantum autem ad esse secundum sive ad bene esse non dependet essentialiter, quia illud bene esse accidentale est; ideo talis relatio secundum accidens dicitur, ut filiatio, secundum quod dicit adoptionem; et de tali intelligit Augustinus.

Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod relatio relatione alia refertur; aliqui volunt dicere, quod creatura19 se ipsa refertur. — Tamen illud non videtur esse dicendum, quia nulla creatura est sua relatio, cum non sit summe simplex, immo hoc ipsum, quod refertur, aufert simplicitatem. — Ideo dicendum, quod sicut relativa referuntur proprie, quae dicunt rem substratam cum respectu, ipsae autem relationes sive respectus non referuntur, immo magis illa alia referunt, quia non sunt entia, sed entium20: sic in proposito dicendum, quod ipsae relationes per se non referuntur, sed cum subiectis, ita quod unum cum alio et per aliud. Ideo non est ultra quaerere aliud, quo referuntur.

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DUB. V.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Nec tamen dicimus, Spiritum sanctum referri ad se. Videtur enim posse referri21, quia Spiritus sanctus est donum, et donum refertur ad donantem: et ipse est donans: ergo necessario concluditur, quod refertur ad se.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod hoc nomen spiritus dicit relationem secundum esse; et ideo, quia relatione secundum esse nihil refertur ad se ipsum secundum idem, nullo modo Spiritus sanctus, in quantum spiritus, ad se refertur. Sed donum non tantum importat relationem secundum esse, ut puta cum dicit auctoritatem in dante, sed etiam secundum modum dicendi, ut quando dicit largitatem et potestatem in communicante22; et quia taliter potest secundum modum intelligendi comparari ad se ut datum, in quantum datum, dicitur ad se, in quantum dans, non. Ideo concedit23, quod appellatio dati vel donati refertur ad Spiritum sanctum, non autem spiritus sanctus.

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English Translation
p. 527

DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

Doubt I.

In this section there are doubts about the text, and first concerning those names — creator, dominus (lord), and names of this kind — which the Master says are said of God from time. For this seems false, because "lordship (dominium), as Boethius says1, is the power of coercing subjects," but this is in God from eternity: therefore, etc. — Likewise, "Lord (Dominus), as Ambrose says, is a name of nature": therefore, if nature is eternal, so also is lordship. — Likewise, concerning the name creator, the objection is raised that one is not called a reader because he actually reads, but because he is able to read; but God is from eternity able to create: therefore, etc.

In connection with this, inquiry is made concerning the signification and connotation of these names, and whence they have the ground of connoting, given that the divine essence is their principal significate.

I respond: It must be said that, although the divine essence does not truly2 have a respect toward the creature, yet it is possible to understand and signify it by the mode of respect; nor is the intellect therefore vain, on account of its placing the whole ground of real respect in the creature3. Since, therefore, names of this kind say a respect — by which they are imposed, even though they are imposed upon the essence — they are therefore said4 according to the exigency of that respect. Therefore it must be understood that certain names say respect alone, as "lord" (dominus); certain others5 say an effect, as "creator" and "just," and both kinds are under a twofold difference, because they either import a respect to a present thing, or to a future thing, whether to a thing in act or in habit. In the first mode, because they posit the creature in act, they say respect alone6 when the creature begins; in the second mode, from eternity.

According to this, therefore, if "lord" and "creator" import respect in act, they cannot be said from eternity; but if in habit, they can. Yet common usage takes names of this kind as connoting in act; and therefore Augustine says7 they are said with time. — Now, what Boethius is understood to say is that8 "it is the power of coercing subjects, but of those already subject, and not of those not yet so." — What Ambrose says, it is evident, does not compel, because, even though it is imposed upon nature, yet it is imposed from a property9 of nature, as it says a respect toward creatures, and therefore connotes something created. — And thus all things are clear, because the ground of connoting is the mode of signifying10.

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Doubt II.

Likewise, inquiry is made concerning what the Master says11, that time did not begin from time. For this seems false, because everything that begins is temporal, and every temporal thing is measured by time, and everything such began in time: therefore, etc. If you give an instance in things at their very beginning, the objection is raised that nothing is more variable than time; but everything such is temporal: therefore, etc. — Likewise, time did not begin in time, therefore if it began outside time, therefore there was time outside all time.

I respond: It must be said that, insofar as it pertains to the present — because concerning the beginning of time it must be discussed in the second [book]12 — there is a difference between beginning from time, in time, and with time, because from (ex) says order and so presupposes time as prior; and therefore nothing began from time except what follows upon time. In time says the existence of time13; but time was not in its own beginning, since it is successive. Therefore, things that are of equal duration with time began neither from time nor in time, but with time, that is, when time began.

If you ask how time began: briefly, it must be said that in none of the aforesaid modes, but it began at its own principle, and therefore did not begin outside time.

To the objection that the temporal is measured by time: it must be said that the temporal which

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is exceeded14 by time is measured and begins in time, but that which is not exceeded begins with time; and the reason given above holds15.

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Doubt III.

Likewise, inquiry is made concerning what the Master says, that the coin (nummus) has not been changed when it has come to be a price (pretium). For this seems false, because being a price is an accident of the coin, and it is present now and was not present before, therefore the coin has been changed.

I respond: It must be said that a relation does not predicate something absolute, but predicates order toward another; order, however, regards the disposition of the things ordered. Certain things, therefore, are orderable such that both are in potency; and then the relation is introduced by a change made in both. Certain things are orderable such that one, insofar as it is of itself, is in act, but the other is in potency; as is evident in the case of two things, one of which, being actually white, actually has the property in accordance with which similarity is observed, and therefore, when the other is made white from non-white, perfect similarity comes about. — Therefore it is not necessary that a relation should always bring about a change in both extremes by reason of its corruption or inception16; it suffices that it do so in one. And the reason is evident: because it regards a double extreme, and because one can be of itself in act while the other exists in potency — as in the case of the coin, which is in the power of the possessor, such that it is a pledge (pignus) or price (pretium) or earnest-money (arrha) by reason of a change made in him; nor does anything absolute come to the coin, but the order which, on the part of the coin, was in act, comes into act on the part of that which was in potency; and therefore that is changed, without the coin being changed.

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Doubt IV.

Likewise, inquiry is made concerning what the Master says, that it is an accident in the creature when a relation is the creature's relation to the Creator. For this seems false, because it is possible to understand a thing with its accident removed: therefore, if the relation to the Creator is accidental to the creature, then with it removed17, it is possible to understand the created thing to exist, even with the respect to the Creator abstracted away. — Likewise, if the relation by which the creature is referred to the Creator is an accident, since that is a created thing, it is referred, and thus by accident: and so it is with another, and thus it18 is to proceed to infinity.

It must be said that the creature depends essentially upon the Creator as regards its first being (esse primum); and such a relation, which expresses that dependence, is not accidental to the creature but rather essential. But as regards the second being (esse secundum) or well-being (bene esse), it does not depend essentially, because that well-being is accidental; therefore such a relation is said to be according to accident, as filiation insofar as it says adoption; and of such Augustine speaks.

To the objection that a relation is referred by another relation: some wish to say that the creature19 is referred by itself. — Yet that does not seem to be what should be said, because no creature is its own relation, since it is not supremely simple; indeed, the very fact that it is referred takes away simplicity. — Therefore it must be said that, just as relatives are properly referred — which say a thing underlying with its respect — whereas the relations themselves or respects are not referred, but rather they refer those other things, because they are not beings but of beings20: so in the present case it must be said that the relations themselves are not referred per se, but together with their subjects, such that one is with another and through another. Therefore one need not seek further for something else by which they are referred.

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Doubt V.

Likewise, inquiry is made concerning what the Master says: "And yet we do not say that the Holy Spirit is referred to itself." For it seems it can be referred21, because the Holy Spirit is a gift (donum), and a gift is referred to the giver; and the Holy Spirit itself is the giver: therefore it is necessarily concluded that it is referred to itself.

I respond: It must be said that the name "spirit" (spiritus) says a relation according to being (relatio secundum esse); and therefore, since by a relation according to being nothing is referred to itself in the same respect, in no way is the Holy Spirit, insofar as it is spirit, referred to itself. But "gift" (donum) does not import only a relation according to being — as when it says authority in the giver — but also according to a mode of speaking, as when it says largeness and power in the communicator22; and because in this way it can, according to the mode of understanding, be compared to itself as given (datum), it is said toward itself insofar as it is given, but not insofar as it is giving. Therefore the Master concedes23 that the appellation of "that given" or "the gift" (dati vel donati) is referred to the Holy Spirit, but not "Holy Spirit" (spiritus sanctus) as such.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Textum integrum Boethii habes supra pag. 822, nota 2. et textum integrum Ambrosii mox citati invenies supra pag. 47.
    The full text of Boethius you have above, p. 822, n. 2. And the full text of Ambrose cited below you will find above, p. 47.
  2. Cod. S qvod [= quod].
    Codex S reads qvod [= quod].
  3. Ed. 1 verum.
    Edition 1 reads verum [for vere].
  4. Plura de hoc vide hic q. 3. — Paulo post pro ideo dicuntur multi codd. cum ed. 1 ideo dicunt; evidenter corrupte.
    For more on this see here, q. 3. — A little further on, for ideo dicuntur, many codices with edition 1 read ideo dicunt; evidently corrupt.
  5. Sola Vat. addit etiam.
    The Vatican edition alone adds etiam.
  6. Aliqui codd. ut H cc ff, omissa voce respectum, pro dicunt substituunt dicuntur; lectio minus congrua. Paulo inferius codd. F G I T V Y cum ed. 1 important pro important.
    Some codices, as H, cc, ff, omitting the word respectum, substitute dicuntur for dicunt; a less fitting reading. A little below, codices F G I T V Y with edition 1 read important [variant spelling].
  7. Libr. V. de Trin. c. 16. n. 17. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 1.
    Book V, On the Trinity, c. 16, n. 17. See here the littera of the Master, c. 1.
  8. Supple: dominium. — Vat. praeter fidem codd. et edd. post quod subiicit non, eandem particulam mox post sed supprimens. Nonnulli codd. cum edd. 4, 5 bis non exhibent et post quod et post sed; quod evidenter falsum est.
    Supply: dominium. — The Vatican edition, contrary to the testimony of the codices and editions, after quod inserts non, suppressing the same particle a little later after sed. A number of codices with editions 4 and 5 exhibit non twice, both after quod and after sed; which is evidently false.
  9. Codd. A T Y et alii cum ed. 1 appropriato.
    Codices A T Y and others with edition 1 read appropriato.
  10. Cfr. hic q. I. — Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 83. m. 1. B. — Albert., hic a. 6; et S. I. tract. 13. q. 82. — S. Thom., hic a. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 5. — Richard., hic q. 3. — Paulo ante pro omnia cod. Y' obiecta.
    Cf. here, q. I. — Alexander of Hales, Summa I, q. 83, m. 1, B. — Albert, here, a. 6; and Summa I, tract. 13, q. 82. — Thomas Aquinas, here, a. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here, a. 5. — Richard, here, q. 3. — A little before, for omnia, codex Y' reads obiecta.
  11. Cfr. Aristot., IV. Phys. text. 114. seqq. (c. 12.), ubi et quae hic sequuntur, insinuantur.
    Cf. Aristotle, Physics IV, text 114ff. (c. 12.), where the matters that follow here are also indicated.
  12. Scilicet II. Sent. d. 1. p. I. a. 1. q. 2. ad 3.
    Namely, II Sent., d. 1, p. I, a. 1, q. 2, ad 3.
  13. Pro verbis temporis existentiam cod. [?] exhibet temporis continentiam vel saltem temporis coexistentiam, et subinde post successivum addit ideo non coepit in tempore tanquam coexistente. Item tempus non fuit ante sui initium, ideo non coepit in tempore tanquam in continente, ideo etiam quae etc.
    For the words temporis existentiam, codex [?] reads temporis continentiam or at least temporis coexistentiam, and thereafter after successivum adds: "therefore it did not begin in time as coexistent. Likewise, time was not before its own beginning, therefore it did not begin in time as in a container, therefore also those things" etc.
  14. Pro exceditur multi codd. hic et paulo post extollitur, codd. L cum ed. 1 excellitur. Mox sola Vat. corrupte sic incipit: a tempore; sed illud nisi exceditur quod.
    For exceditur, many codices here and a little after read extollitur; codices L with edition 1 read excellitur. Immediately after, the Vatican edition alone corruptly begins: a tempore; sed illud nisi exceditur quod.
  15. Cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 83. m. 2. B. — Albert., hic a. 1. et 7. — S. Thom., hic circa lit.
    Cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa I, q. 83, m. 2, B. — Albert, here, a. 1 and 7. — Thomas Aquinas, here, around the littera.
  16. Sic bene maior pars codd. cum ed. 1; Vat. defectionem; cod. L desitionem.
    So correctly the greater part of the codices with edition 1; the Vatican edition reads defectionem; codex L reads desitionem.
  17. Intellige: accidente; vel lege: illa remota, scil. relatione.
    Understand: accidente; or read: illa remota, sc. relatione [i.e., "with it removed" = "with the relation removed"].
  18. Cod. W ent.
    Codex W reads ent [for est].
  19. Cfr. supra pag. 169, nota 4.
    Cf. above, p. 169, n. 4.
  20. Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 2. (VI. c. I.) de accidentibus generatim dicit, quod solummodo «entia dicuntur, eo quod sint quid vere entis» (substantiae), sive, ut communiter dicitur, accidentia non sunt entia, sed quid entis. Inter accidentia autem, sicut supra d. 26. q. 2. ad ult. dictum est, relatio «minimum habet de entitate», cuius unicum officium est, illa quibus accidit, ad invicem referre.
    Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, text 2 (VI, c. 1), says of accidents in general that they are called "beings" only in the sense that they are "something of a true being" (substance), or, as it is commonly said, accidents are not beings but something of beings. Among accidents, moreover, as was said above, d. 26, q. 2, ad ult., relation "has the minimum of being (entitas)," whose sole function is to refer to one another those things to which it is accidental.
  21. Supple cum Vat. ad se. — In fine obiectionis plures codd. cum ed. 1 referatur pro refertur.
    Supply with the Vatican edition ad se [to complete "posse referri ad se"]. — At the end of the objection, several codices with edition 1 read referatur for refertur.
  22. Pro communicante Vat. cum cod. cc donante.
    For communicante, the Vatican edition with codex cc reads donante.
  23. Intellige: Magister. — Cod. dd cum ed. 1 conceditur. In fine solut. post autem codd. N X Z aa bb addunt ipse. — Principia, in quibus haec solutio fundatur, fusius explicata inveniuntur supra d. 10. a. 2. q. 3. in corp., et d. XV. c. I, nec non d. 18. q. 1. in corp.
    Understand: the Master. — Codex dd with edition 1 reads conceditur. At the end of the solution, after autem, codices N X Z aa bb add ipse. — The principles on which this solution is founded are explained at greater length above, d. 10, a. 2, q. 3, in the body, and d. XV, c. I, as well as d. 18, q. 1, in the body.
← Dist. 30, Art. 1, Q. 3