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Dist. 30, Art. 1, Q. 3

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 30

Textus Latinus
p. 524

Articulus Unicus. Quaestio III. Utrum nomina, quae de Deo ex tempore dicuntur, dicantur secundum substantiam, an secundum relationem.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum ea quae sic dicuntur de Deo ex tempore, dicantur secundum substantiam, an secundum relationem, quae sit vera relatio1. Et quod secundum relationem, videtur hoc modo.

1. Sicut Pater se ipso generat, ita se ipso creat; tamen, quamvis se ipso generet, generatio et paternitas dicitur vere in ipso secundum relationem: ergo pari ratione, quamvis se ipso creet et dominetur.

2. Item, nomina huiusmodi aut pure dicunt divinam substantiam, aut superaddunt aliquem respectum. Si pure divinam substantiam dicunt; sed substantia est aeterna et ab aeterno: ergo dicuntur de Deo ab aeterno, quod falsum est. Ergo superaddunt aliquem respectum, ergo relationem. Si dicas, quod non addunt respectum secundum rem, sed secundum modum2; contra: aut illi modo respondet aliquid in re, aut nihil. Si aliquid in re: ergo realiter dicuntur relative; si nihil: ergo falsus est modus intelligendi et inconveniens modus dicendi.

3. Item, sunt quaedam relativa secundum esse, quaedam secundum dici. Sed in relativis secundum dici est modus respectus, in relativis secundum esse est veritas respectus; sed dominus et servus sunt relativa secundum esse: ergo utrumque importat respectum, non tantum secundum modum, sed etiam secundum rem: ergo etc.

4. Item, dominium dictum de Deo ita bene dicit superpositionem3, sicut dictum de creatura: illa igitur superpositio aut ponitur in Deo, aut in creatura; non in creatura — constat, quia tunc idem sibi superponeretur — ergo ponitur in Deo. Sed superpositio est vere relatio: ergo etc.

5. Item, cum dico: Deus creat, hic notatur duplex respectus, scilicet causae ad effectum, et e converso. Aut ergo uterque est in creatura, aut uterque in Deo, aut unus in Deo, alter in creatura. Constat quod impossibile est utrumque esse in Deo, quia Deus non est effectus; et similiter in creatura, quia creatura non est sui causa, ergo necesse est quod alter in Deo: ergo etc.

6. Item, cum dico: Deus creat, Deus verissime est causa: et si vera ratio causae ponit veram relationem, huiusmodi nomina dicta de Deo ponunt veram relationem.

Contra:

1. Dionysius4: «In causalibus et causis non recipimus reciprocationem»: ergo cum Deus sit causa perfectissima creaturae, non refertur ad creaturam, quamvis e converso creatura referatur ad ipsum.

2. Item, Philosophus5 dicit, quod scientia secundum esse refertur ad scibile, sed non convertitur: ergo si minor est dependentia Dei ad creaturam quam scibilis ad scientiam, ergo nulla in eo est relatio.

3. Item, ratione videtur, quia huiusmodi nomina si dicunt relationem circa Deum, aut illa est pure divina essentia, aut aliquid superadditum. Si pure Dei essentia, ergo aeternum quid, ergo respectus huiusmodi nominum est aeternus: ergo de necessitate dicuntur ab aeterno. Si autem dicunt aliquid superadditum: ergo in Deo est aliqua compositio.

4. Item, omnis relatio dicit dependentiam vel saltem ordinem et habitudinem ad illud, respectu cuius dicitur; sed Deus non ordinatur nec terminatur6: ergo nihil dicitur de Deo relative respectu creaturae.

Conclusio.

Nomina, quae de Deo ex tempore dicuntur, non important aliquam relationem secundum rem in Deo, sed solum secundum modum intelligendi.

Respondeo: Ad hoc intelligendum est7, quod dici secundum relationem est dupliciter: aut secundum rem, aut secundum modum. Realis autem relatio triplex est. Aliquando enim fundatur super substantiam proprietatem accidentalem, ut similitudo in duplici albedine8; aliquando super dependentiam essentialem, sicut respectus vel relatio materiae ad formam — nam, sicut dicit Philosophus10, «materia hoc ipsum quod est, ad alterum est» — aliquando super originem naturalem, sicut effectus ad causam et filii ad patrem11.

Prima relatio non potest esse in Deo, quia in Deo nulla est proprietas accidentalis. Secunda non potest esse in eo, quia nulla in Deo est dependentia. Tertia est in Deo, sed non respectu creaturae, sed respectu personae; haec enim non dicit compositionem nec dependentiae inclinationem, sicut prima et secunda, sed ponit distinctionem et ordinem. Et quoniam vere una persona ordinatur ad aliam et habitudinem habet et alio modo secundum rem se habet ad unam quam ad aliam; ideo haec relatio est in persona respectu personae9, sed non respectu creaturae. Nam Deus ad creaturam non habet

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ordinem nec habet aliam et aliam habitudinem. Et ideo nullo modo est realiter in Deo relatio respectu creaturae. — Creatura autem ad Deum habet ordinem et habitudinem, mediante proprietate accidentali et dependentia essentiali et origine naturali2s: ideo secundum omnem modum refertur creatura ad Deum.

Quoniam igitur intellectus noster, cum intelligit aliquid referri ad aliquid, intelligit etiam illud comparari ad illud: ideo intelligit Deum per modum respectus et relationis, cui respectui in Deo nihil respondet nisi divina essentia; ex parte creaturae respondet1s, et ideo non est vanus. — Concedendum ergo, quod huiusmodi nomina dicta de Deo non important relationem in Deo secundum rem, sed solum secundum modum intelligendi. Ex his patent quaesita.

Ad argumenta pro parte affirmativa:

Ad 1. Quod enim obiicitur de Patre, dicendum, quod non est simile, quia Patris ad Filium est ordo et habitudo, et alia habitudo ad Filium quam ad Spiritum sanctum: Deus autem, sicut dicit Philosophus3s, non habet ordinem nec aliquam habitudinem. Nam «prima causa eodem modo se habet ad omnia, quamvis alia alio et alio modo se habeant ad ipsam», et in duodecimo primae Philosophiae4s dicit, quod primum et summum bonum non ordinatur ad haec creata.

Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, si non dicunt relationem, ergo pure substantiam; dicendum, quod pure circa Deum dicunt substantiam secundum rem, sed relationem secundum modum intelligendi; in creatura vero secundum rem5s. Et quod obiicit, quod vanus est intellectus; dicendum, quod falsum est, quia intellectus fundatur super aliquid, scilicet super relationem creaturae, cui respondet relatio secundum dici in Deo.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quaedam sunt relativa secundum esse etc.; dicendum, quod quaedam sunt relativa secundum esse ex parte utriusque extremi, ut dominus et servus in creatura: quaedam ex parte alterius, ut scibile et scientia, et mensurabile et mensura6s; sic in proposito.

Ad 4. 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod dominus dicit superpositionem, et similiter creator7s causalitatem; dicendum, quod superpositio in Deo est vere superpositio, et vere causalitas, quia vere alii superponitur Deus, et vere efficit. Tamen illa superpositio non est vere relatio, similiter nec causalitas, sed est vere divina essentia, quia se ipsa8s superponitur et efficit.

Ad 6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod est ibi respectus causae et effectus; dicendum, quod respectus effectus ibi est vere respectus et vere relatio, sed respectus causae non est respectus nec relatio in Deo secundum rem, sed secundum modum intelligendi, secundum rem vero substantia vel essentia.

Scholion

I. Quae hic dicuntur de diversis speciebus relationis, ab Aristotele docentur et satis explicantur a S. Thom., S. 1. q. 13. a. 7. Quod relatio non semper inducat mutationem in utroque extremo, explanatur hic dub. 3, et diffusius a Ricardo, hic q. 1. — Pro intelligentia solutionum ad argg. opposita notandum quod licet relatio ipsa ad creaturam in Deo sit tantum rationis, fundamentum tamen habet reale in ipso (cfr. solut. ad 2. 5.).

II. Conclusioni solummodo Nominales contradicunt asserentes, in Deo esse realem relationem ad creaturas, acquisitam in tempore, sed sine mutatione ipsius. — Scotus non negat quod in Deo sit relatio rationis ad creaturas (ut perperam asserit Caietanus ad S. I. q. 13. a. 7.), sed potius in ipsa re cum Angelico et Seraphico convenit, licet aliquid objiciat contra formam rationis a S. Thoma allatae (cfr. Lychetus ad Scot., hic q. 2.).

III. Scot., loc. cit.; et Report. hic q. unica. — Thom. S. hic a. 3; S. I. q. 13. a. 7; S. c. Gent. II. c. 12. 13. — B. Albert. hic a. 8; S. p. I. tr. 13. q. 33. m. 1. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. unica, a. 3. i. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 3. i. — R. Aegid. hic I. princ. q. 2. 3. l. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 29. q. 3. n. i. — Durand., hic q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3. — Biel hic q. 3.

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English Translation
p. 524

Article Unicus. Question III. Whether the names which are predicated of God in time are predicated according to substance or according to relation.

Third, it is asked whether those things which are thus predicated of God in time are predicated according to substance or according to relation, which would be a true relation1. And that it is according to relation is shown in this way.

1. Just as the Father generates by himself, so he creates by himself; yet, although he generates by himself, generation and paternity are truly said of him according to relation: therefore by the same reasoning, although he creates and exercises lordship by himself [the same would follow].

2. Likewise, names of this sort either predicate purely the divine substance, or they add some respect over and above it. If they predicate purely the divine substance: but substance is eternal and from eternity: therefore [these names] are predicated of God from eternity, which is false. Therefore they add some respect, and therefore a relation. If you say that they do not add a respect according to reality, but according to a mode2; on the contrary: either something in reality corresponds to that mode, or nothing. If something in reality: then they are predicated relatively in a real sense; if nothing: then the mode of understanding is false and the mode of speaking is unsuitable.

3. Likewise, some things are relative according to being, others according to predication. But in things relative according to predication there is a mode of respect, while in things relative according to being there is the truth of respect; but lord and servant are relative according to being: therefore both import a respect, not merely according to mode but also according to reality: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, lordship predicated of God signifies a superposition3 just as well as when predicated of a creature: therefore that superposition is either posited in God or in the creature; not in the creature — that is evident, because then the same thing would be superposed over itself — therefore it is posited in God. But superposition is a true relation: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, when I say God creates, a twofold respect is indicated, namely of cause to effect and conversely. Therefore either both are in the creature, or both in God, or one in God and the other in the creature. It is evident that it is impossible for both to be in God, because God is not an effect; and similarly [impossible for both] in the creature, because the creature is not its own cause; therefore it is necessary that one be in God: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, when I say God creates, God is most truly a cause: and if the true account of cause posits a true relation, then names of this sort predicated of God posit a true relation.

On the contrary:

1. Dionysius4: «In causes and caused things we do not accept reciprocation»: therefore, since God is the most perfect cause of the creature, he is not referred to the creature, although conversely the creature is referred to him.

2. Likewise, the Philosopher5 says that knowledge according to being is referred to the knowable, but not conversely: therefore if God's dependence upon the creature is less than that of the knowable upon knowledge, then there is no relation in him.

3. Likewise, this is shown from reason, because if names of this sort predicate a relation about God, then either that relation is the pure divine essence, or something added over and above it. If it is the pure essence of God, then it is something eternal, and therefore the respect of such names is eternal: therefore they are necessarily predicated from eternity. But if they predicate something added over and above: then there is some composition in God.

4. Likewise, every relation expresses a dependence or at least an order and orientation toward that with respect to which it is predicated; but God is neither ordered nor terminated6: therefore nothing is predicated of God relatively with respect to the creature.

Conclusion.

The names which are predicated of God in time do not import any relation according to reality in God, but only according to a mode of understanding.

I respond: For understanding this7, it must be said that to be predicated according to relation is twofold: either according to reality or according to mode. Real relation, moreover, is threefold. For sometimes it is founded upon an accidental property of substance, as similarity in two instances of whiteness8; sometimes upon an essential dependence, as the respect or relation of matter to form — for, as the Philosopher10 says, «matter, this very thing that it is, is toward another» — sometimes upon a natural origin, as effect to cause and children to father11.

The first relation cannot be in God, because in God there is no accidental property. The second cannot be in him, because there is no dependence in God. The third is in God, but not with respect to the creature but with respect to the person; for this relation does not express composition nor an inclination of dependence, as the first and second do, but posits distinction and order. And since one person is truly ordered toward another and has an orientation and according to reality relates differently to one than to another, therefore this relation is in a person with respect to a person9, but not with respect to the creature. For God toward the creature has no

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order, nor does he have one orientation and another orientation. And therefore in no way is there really in God a relation with respect to the creature. — The creature, however, has order and orientation toward God, by means of an accidental property and an essential dependence and a natural origin2s: therefore according to every mode the creature is referred to God.

Since therefore our intellect, when it understands something as related to something, also understands that thing as compared to that thing: therefore it understands God in the manner of a respect and a relation, to which respect in God nothing corresponds except the divine essence; from the side of the creature something corresponds1s, and therefore it is not empty. — It must be conceded, therefore, that names of this sort predicated of God do not import a relation in God according to reality, but only according to a mode of understanding. From these considerations the questions are resolved.

Replies to the arguments on the affirmative side:

To 1. As for what is objected concerning the Father: it must be said that the case is not similar, because the Father's [relation] to the Son is an order and an orientation, and a different orientation toward the Son than toward the Holy Spirit; but God, as the Philosopher3s says, has no order nor any orientation. For «the first cause relates in the same way to all things, although other things relate to it in one way and another», and in the twelfth [book] of the primary Philosophy4s he says that the first and highest good is not ordered toward these created things.

To 2. As for what is objected — if [these names] do not predicate a relation, then they predicate purely substance — it must be said that about God they purely predicate substance according to reality, but a relation according to a mode of understanding; in the creature, however, [they also predicate relation] according to reality5s. And as for the objection that the intellect is empty: it must be said that this is false, because the intellect is founded upon something, namely upon the relation of the creature, to which there corresponds a relation according to predication in God.

To 3. As for what is objected — that some things are relative according to being, etc. — it must be said that some things are relative according to being from the side of both extremes, as lord and servant in the creature: some only from the side of one, as the knowable and knowledge, and the measurable and the measure6s; so it is in the present case.

To 4. 5. As for what is objected — that lord expresses a superposition, and similarly creator7s expresses causality — it must be said that the superposition in God is a true superposition, and truly a causality, because God is truly set over another and truly effects. Nevertheless that superposition is not a true relation, nor similarly is causality, but is truly the divine essence, because by itself8s [God] is set over and effects.

To 6. As for what is objected — that there is in this case a respect of cause and effect — it must be said that the respect of effect is there a true respect and a true relation, but the respect of cause is not a respect nor a relation in God according to reality, but according to a mode of understanding; according to reality, however, it is substance or essence.

Scholion

I. What is said here about the different species of relation is taught by Aristotle and sufficiently explained by St. Thomas, Summa I. q. 13. a. 7. That relation does not always induce a change in both extremes is explained here in dub. 3, and more diffusely by Richard, here q. 1. — For understanding the solutions to the opposing arguments, it must be noted that although the relation itself to the creature in God is only of reason, it nevertheless has a real foundation in him (cf. solut. to 2. 5.).

II. Only the Nominalists contradict the Conclusion, asserting that in God there is a real relation to creatures, acquired in time, but without change in him. — Scotus does not deny that in God there is a relation of reason to creatures (as Cajetan wrongly asserts at Summa I. q. 13. a. 7.), but rather agrees in the matter itself with the Angelic and Seraphic [Doctors], although he objects something against the form of the argument put forward by St. Thomas (cf. Lychetus on Scotus, here q. 2.).

III. Scotus, loc. cit.; and Reportata, here q. unica. — Thomas, Summa, here a. 3; S. I. q. 13. a. 7; S. c. Gent. II. c. 12. 13. — B. Albert., here a. 8; S. p. I. tr. 13. q. 33. m. 1. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. unica, a. 3. i. — Richard of Middleton, here q. 3. i. — Aegidius Romanus, here I. princ. q. 2. 3. l. — Henry of Ghent, S. a. 29. q. 3. n. i. — Durandus, here q. 3. — Denis the Carthusian, here q. 3. — Biel, here q. 3.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Ed. I addit ista.
    Ed. I adds ista [i.e., the word "ista"].
  2. Scilicet intelligendi sive dicendi. Notamus, quod in hac quaestione S. Doctor verbis: relatio secundum modum, secundum rationem, secundum dici promiscue utitur ad significandam eandem rem, nempe relationem rationis, quae opponitur relationi reali, ut ex corp. q. et ex solut. argum. apparet. Idem occurrit supra d. 28. dub. 3, et infra d. 31. q. 2. ad 6. — Multi codd. in hac propositione omittunt non ante addunt, et dein pro sed substituunt et etiam; perperam.
    That is, according to a mode of understanding or of speaking. We note that in this question the holy Doctor uses the terms relation according to mode, according to reason, according to predication interchangeably to signify the same thing, namely a relation of reason, which is opposed to a real relation, as appears from the body of the question and from the solution of the arguments. The same occurs above at d. 28. dub. 3, and below at d. 31. q. 2. to 6. — Many codices in this proposition omit non before addunt, and then substitute et etiam for sed; incorrectly.
  3. Id est, ordinem superioritatis.
    That is, an order of superiority.
  4. De Divin. Nom. c. 9. § 6. Cfr. supra pag. 346, nota 1.
    Dionysius, On the Divine Names, c. 9. § 6. Cf. above p. 346, n. ?-dn1.
  5. De Praedicam. c. de Relatione, et V. Metaph. text. 20. (IV. c. 15.).
    Aristotle, Categories, ch. on Relation, and Metaphysics V, text 20 (IV. c. 15.).
  6. Simul audi: a creatura. — Vide supra pag. 433, nota 4.
    Understand simultaneously: "by the creature." — See above p. 433, n. 4.
  7. Vat., mutata interpunctione, addit sciendum, pro quo codd. X Z notandum.
    The Vatican edition, with changed punctuation, adds sciendum [i.e., "it is to be known"], in place of which codices X Z read notandum [i.e., "it is to be noted"].
  8. Hinc et Aristot. similia vocat «quae sunt unum in qualitate». Cfr. supra pag. 342, nota 6.
    Hence Aristotle also calls similar things "those which are one in quality." Cf. above p. 342, n. 6.
  9. Cfr. supra pag. 433, nota 6.
    Cf. above p. 433, n. 6.
  10. Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 20. (IV. c. 15.).
    Aristotle, Metaphysics V, text 20 (IV. c. 15.).
  11. Cfr. supra d. 8. p. II. q. 1. ad 2, d. 20. a. 2. q. 1.
    Cf. above d. 8. p. II. q. 1. to 2, d. 20. a. 2. q. 1.
  12. Supple: aliquid. — Solummodo Vat.: ex parte tamen creaturae bene aliquid respondet.
    Supply: "something." — The Vatican edition alone reads: from the side of the creature, however, something indeed corresponds.
  13. Cfr. infra dub. 4.
    Cf. below, dub. 4.
  14. Intellige auctorem libri de Causis, qui prop. 24. ait: «Causa prima existit in omnibus rebus secundum unam dispositionem, sed res omnes non existunt in causa prima secundum unam dispositionem». Richard. a Mediavilla, hic q. i. verbis istis haec adiungit: «Sed si ea quae dicuntur de Deo ex tempore, ponerent in Deo reales relationes ad creaturam, non existeret in omnibus secundum dispositionem unam: ergo non ponunt in Deo aliquam realem relationem ad creaturam». — Paulo superius post alia habitudo vetustiores codd. cum ed. I omittunt ad Filium.
    Understand the author of the Book of Causes, who at prop. 24 says: "The first cause exists in all things according to one disposition, but all things do not exist in the first cause according to one disposition." Richard of Middleton, here q. i., adds these words to that text: "But if those things which are predicated of God in time were to posit in God real relations to the creature, [the first cause] would not exist in all things according to one disposition: therefore they do not posit in God any real relation to the creature." — A little above, after alia habitudo, older codices with ed. I omit ad Filium.
  15. Aristot., XII. Metaph. text. 52. Verba ipsa invenies supra pag. 133, nota 4.
    Aristotle, Metaphysics XII, text 52. The very words can be found above p. 133, n. 4.
  16. Pro rem Vat. cum cod. cc esse.
    In place of rem [reality], the Vatican edition with codex cc reads esse [being].
  17. Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 20. (IV. c. 13.): Mensurabile autem et scibile et intelligibile, eo quod aliud ad illud dicitur, ad aliquid (i. e. relativa) dicuntur. Nam intelligibile significat quod eius est intellectus; non est autem intellectus ad illud cuius intellectus est: idem enim profecto bis dictum esset. — Pro mensurabile multi codd. mensuratio, cod. Iv et ed. I mensuratum; sed incongrue.
    Aristotle, Metaphysics V, text 20 (IV. c. 13.): But the measurable and the knowable and the intelligible are said to be in relation to something, because another is related to them. For the intelligible signifies that there is a knowledge of it; but knowledge is not related to that of which it is the knowledge: for then the same thing would have been said twice. — In place of mensurabile [measurable], many codices read mensuratio [measuring], codex Iv and ed. I read mensuratum [measured thing]; but inaptly.
  18. Vat. cum cod. cc creatio.
    The Vatican edition with codex cc reads creatio [creation] [in place of creator].
  19. Codd. A S T V X Z et alii cum ed. I se ipso.
    Codices A S T V X Z and others with ed. I read se ipso [by himself] [in place of se ipsa].
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