Dist. 30, Art. 1, Q. 2
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 30
Articulus Unicus. Quaestio II. Utrum nomina, quae de Deo dicuntur ex tempore, dicantur per se, vel per accidens.
Secundo quaeritur, utrum nomina, quae dicuntur de Deo ex tempore, dicantur per se, vel per accidens.
Et quod secundum accidens, ostenditur hoc modo.
1. Augustinus quinto de Trinitate et habetur in littera1: «Quod dominus esset hominis, ex tempore accidit ei.»
2. Item hoc ipsum videtur ratione, quia omne quod adest et abest praeter eius, de quo dicitur, corruptionem, praedicatur secundum accidens2 — haec est per se nota — sed omnia haec quae temporaliter dicuntur de Deo, sunt huiusmodi: ergo etc.
3. Item, quod praedicatur per se de aliquo, semper inest illi3; ergo ab oppositis, quod praedicatur de aliquo et non semper inest, praedicatur non per se, ergo per accidens: sed talia sunt huiusmodi nomina: ergo etc.
4. Item, omne quod praedicatur de aliquo, aut est convertibile cum subiecto, aut de ratione subiecti, aut praedicatur per accidens4; sed huiusmodi nomina nec sunt de ratione Dei, nec convertibilia, ut patet de hoc nomine dominus: ergo etc.
Contra: 1. Augustinus quinto de Trinitate5: «Nihil secundum accidens dicitur de Deo.»
2. Item, ostenditur ratione: quia in quocumque accidens, est ponere compositionem6 et per consequens varietatem; sed neutrum est in Deo: ergo etc.
3. Item, omne per accidens reducitur ad per se7; sed reductio est posterioris ad prius, non e converso, Deus autem non habet prius, nec simpliciter nec secundum quid: ergo nihil de Deo dicitur secundum accidens.
4. Item, omne quod dicitur de duobus, de uno per se, de altero per accidens, perfectiori modo dicitur de eo, de quo dicitur per se8; sed quidquid dicitur de Deo dicitur perfectissime: ergo nihil dicitur de Deo secundum accidens, ergo huiusmodi nomina non dicuntur de Deo per accidens, ergo per se.
Conclusio.
Nomina, quae de Deo ex tempore dicuntur, praedicantur per accidens solummodo in eo sensu, quo per accidens opponitur necessario.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod dici secundum accidens est tripliciter. Uno modo accidens dicitur per oppositionem ad substantiam; et sic dicitur accidens proprietas alii inhaerens, quae non est de rei
essentia.9 Et hoc quidem modo «nihil dicitur de Deo secundum accidens», sicut dicit Augustinus, eo quod hoc modo accidens ponit compositionem et varietatem in eo, de quo dicitur. — Alio modo dici secundum accidens est per oppositionem ad per se; et sic dicitur secundum accidens aut quod dicitur per aliud in essentia, ut si dicatur: paries disgregat10; aut per aliquid, cui est quodam modo idem, quodam modo diversum, ut puta, cum dicitur de superiori per inferius, ut: figura habet tres, vel de inferiori per superius: ut, isosceles habet tres11. Hoc modo non est aliquid dici de Deo secundum accidens. Hoc enim dici per accidens ponit in aliquo posterioritatem et imperfectionem, sicut ostendunt rationes ad hoc inductae; Deus autem nihil habet imperfecte, nihil habet ab alio12, quod omnino sit aliud, nec a superiori vel inferiori, quia haec non cadunt in Deo. — Tertio modo dici secundum accidens est per oppositionem ad necessarium, ut illud dicatur accidere, quod necessario non inest. Et hoc modo huiusmodi dicuntur de Deo secundum accidens, quia non dicuntur de ipso necessario; sed dicuntur de ipso per se, quia per comparationem ad creaturam. Comparatio autem ad creaturam per se est, quia Deus est sua actio; sed tamen, quia Deus agit per voluntatem, quae non semper nec de necessitate coniuncta est actui13, ideo non necessaria; et quantum ad hoc cadit ibi ratio dicendi secundum accidens. Unde hic modus dicendi per accidens opponitur per se in creaturis ratione eius, quod ad dici per se sequitur necessarium in creaturis; in Deo autem non, quoniam idem14 se ipso facit et voluntarie facit: et ideo in Deo non habet oppositionem ad per se.
Rationes ergo ostendentes, quod non dicuntur de Deo secundum accidens, procedunt secundum primam et secundam acceptionem.
Ad argumenta pro parte opposita:
Ad 1. Quod autem obiicitur, quod esse dominum accidit; sic intelligendum est, id est, non necessario nec semper convenit.
Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod absunt praeter corruptionem15; dicendum quod ista definitio est accidentis, secundum quod adesse est per inhaérentiam; sed sic non convenit Deo, ut visum est, sed solum creaturis: unde patet illud.
Ad 3. 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de per se, dicendum, quod loquitur de per se in creaturis. Ad per se enim in creaturis sequitur necessarium, sed non sic in Deo.
I. S. Thom. (hic q. 1. ad 2.) duos tantum modos ponit, quibus aliquid dicitur per accidens. S. Bonav. autem hic triplicem modum distinguit, quibus aliquid tum per accidens tum per se dicitur. — Ad tres conclusiones principales Seraphicus hic addit corollarium, quo docetur, quod ea quae contingenter et ita per accidens de Deo dicuntur, nihilominus etiam per se de ipso praedicantur. In creaturis enim id quod de aliquo per accidens dicitur et ideo contingenter, non potest dici de eo per se, quia id quod dicitur per se, est necessarium (cfr. text. Aristotelis in 3. ad opposit.).
II. Alex. Hal., de hac et seq. q. S. p. 1. q. 53. m. 3. 4. — S. Thom., loc. cit. — B. Albert., hic a. 2; S. p. 1. tr. 13. q. 52. q. 3. incident. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. unica, a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1.
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Articulus Unicus. Question II. Whether the names which are predicated of God in time are predicated per se or per accidens.
Second, it is asked whether the names that are said of God in time are said per se or per accidens.
And that they are said according to accident is shown in this way.
1. Augustine, in the fifth book On the Trinity, and found in the letter1: "That he was Lord of the human being accrued to him in time."
2. Likewise, this same point seems clear from reason, because everything that is present and absent apart from the corruption of that of which it is predicated, is predicated according to accident2 — this is self-evident — but all those things that are predicated of God temporally are of this kind: therefore, etc.
3. Likewise, what is predicated per se of something always inheres in it3; therefore, by the opposite, what is predicated of something and does not always inhere in it, is predicated not per se, therefore per accidens: but such are names of this kind: therefore, etc.
4. Likewise, everything that is predicated of something is either convertible with the subject, or of the formal character of the subject, or is predicated per accidens4; but names of this kind are neither of the formal character of God nor convertible with him, as is clear for the name lord: therefore, etc.
On the contrary: 1. Augustine, in the fifth book On the Trinity5: "Nothing is said of God according to accident."
2. Likewise, it is shown by reason: because wherever there is accident, there is positing of composition6 and consequently of variety; but neither is in God: therefore, etc.
3. Likewise, everything per accidens is reduced to per se7; but reduction is of the posterior to the prior, not the other way around; yet God has no prior, neither simply nor in some respect: therefore, nothing is said of God according to accident.
4. Likewise, everything that is said of two things — of one per se and of the other per accidens — is said in a more perfect manner of that of which it is said per se8; but whatever is said of God is said most perfectly: therefore, nothing is said of God according to accident; therefore, names of this kind are not said of God per accidens; therefore, they are said per se.
Conclusion.
The names that are said of God in time are predicated per accidens only in that sense in which per accidens is opposed to the necessary.
I respond: It must be said that to be said according to accident is threefold. In one way, accident is said by opposition to substance; and in this way, accident is said to be a property inhering in another, which is not of the essence of the thing.
And in this way9 "nothing is said of God according to accident," as Augustine says, because in this way accident posits composition and variety in that of which it is said. — In another way, to be said according to accident is by opposition to per se; and in this way, something is said per accidens either because it is said through another in essence, as when one says: the wall disperses10; or through something with which it is in some way the same and in some way different, as when something is predicated of a superior through an inferior, as: a figure has three, or of an inferior through a superior, as: an isosceles has three11. In this way, nothing is said of God according to accident. For to be said per accidens in this way posits in something posteriority and imperfection, as the arguments adduced for this show; but God has nothing imperfectly, nothing from another12 that is wholly other, nor from something superior or inferior, because these do not obtain in God. — In the third way, to be said according to accident is by opposition to the necessary, such that what does not necessarily inhere is said to happen accidentally. And in this way, names of this kind are said of God according to accident, because they are not said of him necessarily; but they are said of him per se, because through comparison to the creature. Now comparison to the creature is per se, because God is his own action; but yet, because God acts through will, which is not always and not necessarily joined to the act13, it is therefore not necessary; and to this extent the reason for saying it per accidens obtains there. Hence this mode of saying per accidens is opposed to per se in creatures by reason of the fact that, for per se in creatures, the necessary follows; but not so in God, because he himself14 does the same thing and does it voluntarily: and therefore in God this does not stand in opposition to per se.
The reasons, therefore, that show that these names are not said of God according to accident, proceed according to the first and second acceptation.
To the arguments on the opposing side:
To 1. As for what is objected, that to be Lord accrued to him: this is to be understood in this way, that is, it does not belong necessarily nor always.
To 2. To the objection that they are absent apart from corruption15: it must be said that this definition belongs to accident insofar as being-present-in is through inherence; but this does not apply to God, as has been seen, but only to creatures: hence the point is clear.
To 3. 4. To the objection about per se, it must be said that the argument speaks of per se in creatures. For in creatures the necessary follows upon per se, but not so in God.
I. St. Thomas (hic q. 1, ad 2) posits only two modes in which something is said per accidens. St. Bonaventure here distinguishes a threefold mode by which something is said both per accidens and per se. — To the three principal conclusions the Seraphic Doctor here adds a corollary, by which it is taught that what is said of God contingently and thus per accidens is nevertheless also predicated of him per se. For in creatures, what is said of something per accidens and therefore contingently, cannot be said of it per se, because what is said per se is necessary (cf. the text of Aristotle in argument 3 against).
II. Alexander of Hales, on this and the following question, Summa p. 1, q. 53, m. 3. 4. — St. Thomas, loc. cit. — Blessed Albert., hic a. 2; Summa p. 1, tr. 13, q. 52, q. 3, incidentally. — Peter of Tarantaise, hic q. unica, a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, hic q. 2. — Aegidius Romanus, hic 1. princ. q. 2. — Dionysius Carthusianus, hic q. 1.
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- Cap. I.Augustine, On the Trinity, Bk. V, c. 1.
- Aristot., I. Topic. c. 4.Aristotle, Topics, Bk. I, c. 4.
- Aristot., I. Poster. c. 4.Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, Bk. I, c. 4.
- Aristot., I. Topic. c. 4.Aristotle, Topics, Bk. I, c. 4.
- Cap. 16. n. 17. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 1.Augustine, On the Trinity, Bk. V, c. 16, n. 17. See here the letter of the Master, c. 1.
- Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 21. (VI. c. 6.): Quod autem secundum accidens dicitur, ut musicum aut album, propterea quod duplex significat [scil. formam et subiectum], non est verum dicere quod idem sit quod quid erat esse [i. e. essentia] et ipsum. Cfr. et I. Phys. text. 26. seqq. (c. 3.).Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. VII, text. 21 (Bk. VI, c. 6): "What is said according to accident, such as the musical or the white, because it signifies something twofold [namely form and subject], it is not true to say that it is identical with what it was to be [i.e., the essence] and itself." Cf. also Physics, Bk. I, text. 26 ff. (c. 3).
- Aristot., II. Phys. text. 66. (c. 6.): Nihil autem secundum accidens est prius iis quae per se sunt. Cfr. et XI. Metaph. c. 7. (X. c. 8.).Aristotle, Physics, Bk. II, text. 66 (c. 6): "But nothing according to accident is prior to those things that are per se." Cf. also Metaphysics, Bk. XI, c. 7 (Bk. X, c. 8).
- Cfr. Aristot., III. Topic. c. 1.Cf. Aristotle, Topics, Bk. III, c. 1.
- Cfr. Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 2. seqq. (VI. c. 1.) — Pro modo dicendi per se et per accidens cfr. Aristot., I. Poster. c. 4–8, et V. Metaph. text. 23. (IV. c. 18.). Essentia cod. K substantia. Paulo ante pro oppositionem Vat. et plures codd. oppositum. Cod. Y aliquo.Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. VII, text. 2 ff. (Bk. VI, c. 1). — For the mode of saying per se and per accidens, cf. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, Bk. I, c. 4–8, and Metaphysics, Bk. V, text. 23 (Bk. IV, c. 18). Codex K reads substantia for essentia. Shortly before, for oppositionem, the Vatican edition and several codices read oppositum. Codex Y reads aliquo.
- Intellige: visum, ratione albedinis. Nam, ut ait Aristot., X. Metaph. text. 23. (IX. c. 7.): «hic (albus) quidem disgregativus color, et ille (niger) vero congregativus color». Si igitur dicitur: paries disgregat, hoc convenit parieti non ratione sui, sed ratione albedinis ab ipso distinctae.Understand: "seen," by reason of whiteness. For as Aristotle says (Metaphysics, Bk. X, text. 23, Bk. IX, c. 7): "this (white) is the dispersive color, and that (black) the congregative color." If therefore one says: the wall disperses, this belongs to the wall not by reason of itself, but by reason of the whiteness distinct from it.
- Supple hic et paulo superius post tres vocabulum angulos. Figurae enim, quae est genus, convenit habere tres angulos ratione speciei, scil. trianguli; sed isosceles (τὸ ἰσοσκελές) sive triangulum, quod duo tantum latera habet aequalia, est species inferior triangulo simpliciter dicto, et habere tres angulos ipsi convenit ratione superioris, scil. trianguli.Supply here and a little above after three the word angles. For to "figure," which is the genus, it belongs to have three angles by reason of the species, namely the triangle; but the isosceles (τὸ ἰσοσκελές), that is, the triangle having only two equal sides, is a species inferior to the triangle simply so called, and to have three angles belongs to it by reason of the superior, namely the triangle.
- Cod. Y aliquo.Codex Y reads aliquo [for aliud].
- Intelligas hoc de actu voluntatis, quatenus transit in creaturam sive respicit ipsam, non quatenus est in ipso Deo. Immediate post particulae non aliqui codd. ut V W Y aa adiungunt est. Deinde pro secundum accidens codd. P Q per accidens.Understand this of the act of will insofar as it passes into the creature or regards it, not insofar as it is in God himself. Immediately after the particle not, some codices such as V W Y aa add is. Then in place of secundum accidens, codices P Q read per accidens.
- Cod. M addit ipsum.Codex M adds ipsum [sc. idem ipsum].
- Cod. K hic bene intericit et. Subinde cod. Q (in marg.) voci corruptionem praemittit subiecti.Codex K here rightly inserts et. Then codex Q (in margin) prefixes to the word corruption [the word] of the subject.