Bonaventure — Opera Omnia

Dist. 30, Art. 1, Q. 1

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 30

Textus Latinus

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Articulus Unicus. De iis quae de Deo ex tempore dicuntur.

### Quaestio I. Utrum de Deo aliquid ex tempore dicatur.

Quod autem dicantur aliqua de Deo ex tempore, ostenditur sic.

1. «Non est dominus, nisi servum»¹, sicut dicit Augustinus; sed Deus dicitur dominus et non habuit ab aeterno servum, ergo ex tempore: ergo etc.

2. Item, actioni respondet passio, ita quod sunt simul²; sed Deus creat, ergo aliquid creatur; sed non creatur aliquid nisi ex tempore, ergo non creat nisi ex tempore: ergo etc.

3. Item, nulli convenit esse hominem nisi ex tempore, eo quod esse hominem³ habet principium; sed Deo convenit esse hominem: ergo ex tempore.

4. Item, sicut se habet temporale ad temporale, ita aeternum ad aeternum: ergo mutata proportione, sicut se habet aeternum ad temporale, ita temporale ad aeternum. Sed aeternum sic se habet, quod dicitur de temporali, ut cum dicitur: Petrus est praedestinatus: ergo et temporale poterit dici de aeterno.

Contra:

1. Omne temporale est creatum, sed Deus est increatus, et horum est summa distantia; sed illorum, inter quae est summa distantia, unum non praedicatur de altero: ergo etc.

2. Item, omne temporale est mutabile et variabile; sed omne illud, de quo praedicatur mutabile, ipsum est mutabile⁴: cum igitur Deus non sit mutabilis et variabilis, patet etc.

3. Item, nihil aeternum est ex tempore; sed omne quod praedicatur de Deo, est Deus, et ita aeternum: ergo nihil tale potest dici ex tempore.

4. Item, omne quod est aliquid ex tempore, incipit esse aliquid, quod non erat prius; et omne tale est mutabile: ergo nihil tale est in Deo, ergo etc.

Si dicas, quod non praedicatur aliquid de Deo statim⁵ ex tempore praedicatione per essentiam vel inhaerentiam, sed per causam, quae non ponit aliquid in Deo, sed in effectu; contra: cum dicitur: Deus est creator, hoc dicitur ex tempore, et non statim per causam: ergo responsio illa nulla. Probatio: Omne quod dicitur de aliquo per causam, de alio dicitur per essentiam, vel inhaerentiam; sed creator de nullo alio a Deo dicitur nec per essentiam, nec per inhaerentiam: ergo etc.

Item, quod dicitur de alio per causam, potest inferri per modum habitudinis causalis, ut: dies est sol lucens super terram⁶, ergo dies est a sole: ergo si per causam Deus est creator, pari ratione Deus a creatura, vel e converso.

Item, quod praedicatur solum per causam non est idem illi, de quo praedicatur; sed cum dicitur: Deus creat, actio Dei est Deus: ergo non praedicatur per causam.

Item, cum dicitur Deus dominus, dominus non dicit aliquod genus causae, et tamen dicitur de Deo: ergo praedicta responsio non est sufficiens.

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Conclusio.

Aliqua nomina dicuntur de Deo ex tempore non ratione principalis significati, sed ratione connotati in creatura.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod aliquid dici ex tempore est dupliciter: aut quia ipsum est temporale, aut quia dicit respectum ad temporale.

Primo modo nihil praedicatur de Deo per essentiam vel per inhaerentiam, sicut probant quatuor rationes ad hoc inductae; praedicatur tamen per causam, ut si dicatur Deus est patientia mea⁷; vel per unionem, ut si dicatur: Deus est homo; et hoc non ponit mutationem vel esse temporale circa Deum, sed circa creaturam.

Alio modo dicitur aliquid ex tempore eo quod, de ratione sui nominis, dicit comparationem ad aliquid temporale, ut dominus et creator, sed tamen de sua principali significatione importat essentiam. Nam dominus importat dominium, quod est potestas coercendi subditos⁸; et haec est divina essentia. Similiter creator importat divinam actionem, quae est divina essentia. Utrumque tamen significat in respectu ad creaturam, et ita connotat creatum et temporale.

Quoniam ergo quod implicat in se contingens et necessarium denominatur totum contingens; similiter, quod aeternum et temporale totum denominatur temporale propter naturam totius copulati, quod ponit utramque partem et falsificatur pro utraque parte et pro altera⁹; hinc est, quod talia dicuntur ex tempore non ratione principalis significati, sed ratione connotati in creatura. Et per hoc patent quatuor argumenta sequentia¹⁰. Concedendum est enim, quod non omne quod ex tempore dicitur de Deo, dicitur per causam, sed vel dicitur per causam, vel per unionem, vel per quandam comparationem ad temporale. Et sic patent omnia.

1. 2. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod temporale est creatum, et mutabile; dicendum, quod loquitur de temporali primo modo; et hoc non dicitur de Deo nisi per causam vel per unionem.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omne quod praedicatur de Deo est aeternum; dicendum, quod haec est duplex, quia aeternum potest teneri adiective, vel substantive. Si adiective, sic falsa est: aliquid enim praedicatur de Deo, cuius duratio non est aeterna. Si substantive, vera est, et est: omne quod praedicatur de Deo, est aliquid aeternum. Nec tamen sequitur: est¹¹ aeternum; immo est ibi fallacia accidentis, sicut hic: creatio est Deus; et Deus est aeternus: ergo creatio est aeterna; ita et in praedicta. Aliquid enim, quod est aeternum ratione principalis significati, id est, quod est aliquid aeternum, ratione connotati dicitur temporale.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod illud quod est ex tempore, incipit aliquid esse; dicendum, quod illud non est in Deo propter mutationem aliquam factam in ipso, sed in creatura: et illud determinatum est supra, distinctione octava¹².

Scholion

I. De differentia quae est inter incipere ex tempore, in tempore, cum tempore cfr. hic dub. 2. — Quinque modi praedicandi aliquid de Deo in respons. enumerantur, scil. per essentiam (ut Deus est suum esse), per inhaerentiam (i. e. quasi inhaerentiam, ut Deus est sapiens), per causam (Deus spes mea), per unionem (Deus homo factus est), per quandam relationem ad temporale (Deus est creator). Cfr. III. Sent. d. 7. a. 1. q. 1. in corp. Ab aliis enumerantur tantum quatuor modi, ut a Petro a Tar. (I. Sent. d. 30. q. I. a. 1.): «Quatuor modis invenitur aliquid de aliquo praedicari: primo per essentiam, ut homo est animal; secundo modo per denominationem vel inhaerentiam accidentalem, ut homo est albus; tertio modo per causam, ut dies est sol; quarto modo per respectum seu habitudinem, ut iste est dexter illi». Richard. a Med. (hic q. 1.) habet octo, scilicet: «Illud quod dicitur de aliquo aut significat essentiam illius, aut aliquid de essentia, aut aliquid accidens absolutum inhaerens ei, aut causam illius sive illius effectum, aut rationem ipsam denominantem, aut actionem illius transeuntem in rem exteriorem, aut actionem alterius modo passivo significatam, aut rem unitam ei de quo dicitur». Ui octo modi ad illos quinque reduci possunt. Plura vide infra d. 33. q. 3, d. 34. q. 2.

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II. Non defuerunt qui nomina dominus et creator acceperunt pro habitu sive potentia dominandi vel creandi; unde concluserunt, ea dicenda esse de Deo ab aeterno (cfr. hic dub. 1.). Sed communis sententia tenet, ipsa accipi pro actu et dici tantum ex tempore.

Cum Alexandro Hal. (S. p. I. q. 53. m. 3, et m. 1. a. 3.) S. Bonav. dicit, quod tum nomen dominus, tum nomen creator, «de suo principali significato important essentiam». At S. Thom. (S. I. q. 13. a. 7. ad 1.) distinguit inter nomen dominus et creator. Quod creator «significat actionem Dei, quae est eius essentia», ipse concedit; dominus autem, ut ait, «non significat substantiam divinam directe, sed indirecte». Attamen vix videtur esse dissensio inter utramque sententiam. Aliud enim est aliquid significare principalius, aliud significare directe.

III. Fallacia accidentis, quae notatur in 3. arg. ad opposit., in hoc consistit, quod ibi non attenditur ad differentiam inter duplicem significationem quae est in nomine dominus et creator. Nam quatenus haec verba significant divinam essentiam, dicunt aliquid aeternum; sed non, quatenus significant respectum ad creaturam, qui Deo per accidens convenit.

IV. Notandum est, quod in 1. arg. ad opposit. ad instantiam affirmatur, ea quae de Deo dicuntur ex tempore, de ipso dici per causam. Ad hanc non sufficientem evasionem eludendam opponens affert quatuor argumenta, ut probet, nomina creator et dominus non praedicari per causam de Deo. S. Bonav. non respondet explicite ad haec argumenta, sed tantum generaliter in fine respons. concedenrdo quod non omne ex tempore de Deo dictum per causam dicatur, sed plura vel per unionem (ut Deus est homo), vel per respectum ad creaturam (ut Deus est

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creator). Manifestum enim est, quod nomen creator non potest Deo ex tempore convenire a parte actionis divinae, quae est ipsa aeterna Dei essentia. Ut autem melius duo prima argumenta replicationis, quae sunt satis subtilia, intelligantur, notandum quod aliqua dici de Deo praedicatione causali dupliciter intelligi potest: primo, quia Deus id quod praedicato significatur, causat; sic dicitur: Deus patientia mea, quae locutio respondet exemplo allato: dies est sol lucens super terram; et tunc recte infertur: dies est a sole, patientia est a Deo. Secundo intelligi potest, non quia ipsum praedicatum causetur, sed quia in eo implicatur habitudo causae. Sic in nomine creator importatur habitudo ad id quod causatur, scil. ad creaturam, manifeste autem non importatur, quod ipse Creator causetur. Alia duo argumenta non habent difficultatem.

V. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 53. m. 1. 2. 3. — Scot., hic q. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1. 2; S. I. q. 13. a. 7. — B. Albert., hic a. 1; S. p. 1. tr. 13. q. 32. 53. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. unica, a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 1. — Ægid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 1. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 1. 2.

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English Translation

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Article Unicus. On those things that are said of God in time.

### Question I. Whether anything is predicated of God in time.

That certain things are said of God in time is shown as follows.

1. "There is no lord, unless there be a servant"¹, as Augustine says; but God is called lord and did not have a servant from eternity, therefore [he is lord] in time: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, action corresponds to passion, so that they are simultaneous²; but God creates, therefore something is created; but nothing is created except in time, therefore [God] does not create except in time: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, it belongs to nothing to be a human being except in time, because being a human being³ has a beginning; but it belongs to God to be a human being: therefore [it belongs to him] in time.

4. Likewise, as the temporal stands to the temporal, so the eternal [stands] to the eternal: therefore, changing the proportion, as the eternal stands to the temporal, so the temporal [stands] to the eternal. But the eternal stands thus, that it is said of the temporal, as when it is said: Peter is predestined: therefore the temporal also will be able to be said of the eternal.

On the contrary:

1. Everything temporal is created, but God is uncreated, and between these there is the greatest distance; but of those things between which there is the greatest distance, one is not predicated of the other: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, everything temporal is mutable and variable; but everything of which the mutable is predicated is itself mutable⁴: since therefore God is not mutable and variable, it is clear etc.

3. Likewise, nothing eternal is [predicated] in time; but everything that is predicated of God is God, and thus eternal: therefore nothing of that kind can be said in time.

4. Likewise, everything that is something in time begins to be something that it was not before; and everything of that kind is mutable: therefore nothing of that kind is in God, therefore etc.

If you say that something is not predicated of God at once⁵ in time by a predication through essence or inherence, but through cause, which places nothing in God but [only] in the effect; on the contrary: when it is said: God is creator, this is said in time, and not at once through cause: therefore that response is of no avail. Proof: Everything that is said of something through cause, is said of something else through essence or inherence; but creator is not said of anything other than God either through essence or through inherence: therefore etc.

Likewise, what is said of another through cause can be inferred by way of causal relation, as: the day is the sun shining upon the earth⁶, therefore the day is from the sun: therefore if through cause God is creator, by equal reasoning God [comes] from the creature, or conversely.

Likewise, what is predicated only through cause is not identical with that of which it is predicated; but when it is said: God creates, the action of God is God: therefore it is not predicated through cause.

Likewise, when it is said God is lord, lord does not express any genus of cause, and yet is said of God: therefore the aforesaid response is not sufficient.

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Conclusion.

Certain names are said of God in time not by reason of the principal signified, but by reason of what is connoted in the creature.

I respond: It must be said that something is said in time in two ways: either because it itself is temporal, or because it expresses a relation to what is temporal.

In the first way nothing is predicated of God through essence or through inherence, as the four reasons adduced for this prove; it is predicated, however, through cause, as if it were said "God is my patience"⁷; or through union, as if it were said: God is man; and this places no change or temporal being around God, but around the creature.

In the other way something is said in time because, by the account of its name, it expresses a comparison to something temporal, as lord and creator, but it imports essence in its principal signification. For lord imports lordship, which is the power of constraining subjects⁸; and this is the divine essence. Likewise creator imports the divine action, which is the divine essence. Each, however, signifies in relation to the creature, and thus connotes the created and the temporal.

Since, therefore, what in itself implies the contingent and the necessary is denominated wholly contingent; likewise, what [implies] the eternal and the temporal is denominated wholly temporal by reason of the nature of the whole compound, which posits both parts and is falsified with respect to each part and with respect to either⁹; hence it is that such things are said in time not by reason of the principal signified, but by reason of what is connoted in the creature. And through this the following four arguments are made manifest¹⁰. For it must be conceded that not everything which is said of God in time is said through cause, but it is said either through cause, or through union, or through a certain comparison to what is temporal. And thus all is made manifest.

1. 2. To that, therefore, which is objected, that the temporal is created and mutable; it must be said that [this] speaks of the temporal in the first way; and this is not said of God except through cause or through union.

3. To that which is objected, that everything that is predicated of God is eternal; it must be said that this is twofold, because eternal can be taken adjectively or substantively. If adjectively, it is false in that sense: for something is predicated of God whose duration is not eternal. If substantively, it is true, and is: everything that is predicated of God is something eternal. Nor does it follow: it is¹¹ eternal; rather there is there a fallacy of accident, as here: creation is God; and God is eternal: therefore creation is eternal; so also in the aforesaid. For something that is eternal by reason of the principal signified, that is, that is something eternal, is said to be temporal by reason of what is connoted.

4. To that which is objected, that what is in time begins to be something; it must be said that that does not obtain in God on account of any change made in him, but in the creature: and that was determined above, in the eighth distinction¹².

Scholion

I. On the difference between to begin from time, in time, with time, see hic dub. 2. — Five modes of predicating something of God are enumerated in the response, namely: through essence (as "God is his own being"), through inherence (i.e. quasi-inherence, as "God is wise"), through cause ("God [is] my hope"), through union ("God was made man"), through a certain relation to the temporal ("God is creator"). Cf. III Sent. d. 7. a. 1. q. 1. in corp. Others enumerate only four modes, as Peter of Tarentaise (I Sent. d. 30. q. I. a. 1.): "In four modes is something found to be predicated of something: first through essence, as 'man is an animal'; in the second mode through denomination or accidental inherence, as 'man is white'; in the third mode through cause, as 'the day is the sun'; in the fourth mode through respect or relation, as 'this one is to the right of that one'." Richard of Middleton (hic q. 1.) has eight, namely: "That which is said of something either signifies the essence of that thing, or something of the essence, or some absolute accident inhering in it, or its cause or the effect of it, or the denominating account itself, or its action passing over into an external thing, or the action of another signified in the passive mode, or the thing united to that of which it is said." These eight modes can be reduced to those five. See more below d. 33. q. 3, d. 34. q. 2.

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II. There were those who received the names lord and creator as a habit or potency of ruling and creating; hence they concluded that these ought to be said of God from eternity (cf. hic dub. 1.). But the common opinion holds that they are taken for the act and said only in time.

With Alexander of Hales (S. p. I. q. 53. m. 3, et m. 1. a. 3.), St. Bonaventure says that both the name lord and the name creator "import essence from their principal signified." But St. Thomas (S. I. q. 13. a. 7. ad 1.) distinguishes between the name lord and creator. That creator "signifies the action of God, which is his essence," he concedes; lord, however, as he says, "does not signify the divine substance directly, but indirectly." Yet there scarcely seems to be disagreement between the two opinions. For it is one thing for something to signify more principally, another to signify directly.

III. The fallacy of accident that is noted in the 3rd argument on the opposite side consists in this, that there the difference between the twofold signification that is in the name lord and creator is not attended to. For insofar as these words signify the divine essence, they express something eternal; but not insofar as they signify the relation to the creature, which belongs to God by accident.

IV. It must be noted that in the 1st argument on the opposite side, to the instantiation, it is affirmed that those things that are said of God in time are said of him through cause. In order to defeat this insufficient escape, the objector adduces four arguments to prove that the names creator and lord are not predicated of God through cause. St. Bonaventure does not respond explicitly to these arguments, but only generally at the end of the response, conceding that not everything said of God in time is said through cause, but many things either through union (as "God is man"), or through relation to the creature (as "God is

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creator"). For it is manifest that the name creator cannot belong to God in time from the side of the divine action, which is the divine essence itself eternal. But so that the two first arguments of the replication, which are rather subtle, may be better understood, it must be noted that something being said of God by a causal predication can be understood in two ways: first, because God causes that which the predicate signifies; thus it is said: "God [is] my patience," which locution corresponds to the adduced example: "the day is the sun shining upon the earth"; and then it is rightly inferred: the day is from the sun, patience is from God. In the second way it can be understood, not because the predicate itself is caused, but because in it is implied a relation of cause. Thus in the name creator is imported a relation to that which is caused, namely to the creature; but it is manifestly not imported that the Creator himself is caused. The other two arguments present no difficulty.

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Apparatus Criticus

August., V. de Trin. c. 16. n. 17. Vide hic lit. Magistri.
Augustine, On the Trinity V, c. 16, n. 17. See here the text of the Master.
Cfr. Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 20. (IV. c. 15.), ubi actio et passio ponuntur inter relativa; et III. Phys. text. 19. (c. 3.) dicitur, quod actio et passio sint unus motus in passo sicut in subiecto. Et Gilbert. Porret., de Sex princ. c. de Actione: Omnis enim actus passionis est effectiva, et omne passionem inferens actio est.
Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics V, text 20 (IV, c. 15), where action and passion are placed among relatives; and Physics III, text 19 (c. 3), where it is said that action and passion are one motion in the patient as in a subject. And Gilbert of Poitiers, De Sex Principiis, c. On Action: "For every act of passion is effective, and everything that brings about passion is an action."
Cod. M omne esse humanum.
Codex M reads omne esse humanum ["all human being"].
Permulti codd. ut C F G H K R S T U V X cc cum edd. 1, 2, 3 voci ipsum praefigunt circa.
Very many codices, as C F G H K R S T U V X cc together with editions 1, 2, 3, prefix circa to the word ipsum.
Cod. I nullum.
Codex I reads nullum.
Similis definitio diei habetur in Aristot., VI. Topic. c. 3. (c. 1.): Dies est solis latio super terram. — Mox post pari ratione Deus in cod. I repetitur est.
A similar definition of the day is found in Aristotle, Topics VI, c. 3 (c. 1.): "The day is the passage of the sun over the earth." — Shortly after by equal reasoning, Codex I repeats est after Deus.
Psalm. 70, 5: Quoniam tu es patientia mea, Domine.
Psalm 70, 5: "For thou art my patience, O Lord."
Boeth., de Trin. c. [4]. dominium sic definit: Potestas quaedam, qua servus coercetur. Cfr. et Ambros., I. de Fide, c. 1. n. 7. Verba Ambrosii invenies supra pag. 47, nota 3.
Boethius, On the Trinity, c. [4], defines lordship thus: "A certain power by which a servant is constrained." Cf. also Ambrose, On the Faith I, c. 1, n. 7. The words of Ambrose are found above p. 47, note 3.
Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 118. m. 1: Nam destruere facilius est quam construere omnino, ut dicit Aristoteles (VII. Topic. c. 3.). Ad hoc enim, ut sim homo albus, necessaria sunt duo, scilicet ut sim homo et ut sim albus; et ad hoc, ut non sim homo albus, sufficit, ut non sim albus. Cfr. etiam supra d. 12. a. 1. q. 1. ad 6, et Aristot., I. Prior. c. 15, ubi idem docetur respectu syllogismi, cuius una propositio est necessaria, altera contingens. — Paulo superius post similiter, quod suppple cum cod. I in se implicat.
Alexander of Hales, Summa p. I, q. 118, m. 1: "For to destroy is easier than to construct altogether, as Aristotle says (Topics VII, c. 3.). For to this end, that I be a white man, two things are necessary, namely that I be a man and that I be white; and to this end, that I not be a white man, it suffices that I not be white." Cf. also above d. 12. a. 1. q. 1. ad 6, and Aristotle, Prior Analytics I, c. 15, where the same is taught with respect to a syllogism, of which one proposition is necessary, the other contingent. — A little above, after similarly, supply with Codex I in se implicat ["implies in itself"].
Nempe ultima argumenta, quae replicant ad instantiam in 1. opposit. factam.
Namely the final arguments, which respond to the instantiation made in the 1st objection on the opposite side.
Codd. M bb ergo est.
Codices M and bb read ergo est ["therefore it is"].
Pars II. d. 1. 2.
Part II, d. 1. 2.

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