Bonaventure — Opera Omnia

Dist. 9, Dubia

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 9

Textus Latinus

p. 187

Dubia circa litteram Magistri.

Dub. I

In parte ista incidunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo dubitatur de hoc quod dicitur: Non est aliud Pater, aliud Filius, aliud Spiritus sanctus, quamvis personaliter etc. Videtur enim falsum quod dicitur, quia bene sequitur: Petrus est albus homo, ergo est animal album, quia idem significat albus et album: ergo pari ratione, quia idem significat¹ alius et aliud, sequitur: est alius, ergo est aliud ens. Si tu dicas, quod non est simile de hoc nomine alius et de hoc nomine ens; contra: bene sequitur: est alius homo, ergo est aliud animal: ergo a simili illud sequitur.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod quia in Deo est singularis alietas, quia alietas est suppositi cum omnimoda unitate naturae: ideo singulari modo oportet exprimi. Et quoniam masculinum genus importat quandam distinctionem vel discretionem², ideo respicit personam; sed neutrum propter indistinctionem respicit naturam: et ideo alius importat alietatem in persona, aliud³ in natura, et ideo in divinis non idem significant.

Posset etiam dici, quod in creaturis aliud significat⁴, cum dico: iste est alius ab illo, et aliud, cum dico: est aliud; et unum sequitur ad aliud. Non sic in divinis; et non est simile de albo, quia album imponitur a forma speciali, quae est albedo.

p. 188

Dub. II

Item dubitatur secundo de hoc quod dicit: Coaeternae sibi sunt tres personae. Videtur falsum, quia si coaeternae, et⁵ aeternae: ergo tres aeterni, quod est contra Symbolum, ubi dicitur: «Non tres aeterni»; et iterum contra rationem, quia numerus pluralis multiplicat formam. Unde non vere dicitur: tres sunt dii.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod nomen significans substantiam in divinis reperitur secundum triplicem modum. Quoddam enim significat⁶ substantiam et per modum substantiae, ut nomen substantivum, ut Deus; et tale nullo modo plurificatur nec dicitur pluraliter, sive sit substantivum, sive substantivatum; ut⁷ hoc nomen aeternus; sic accipitur in Symbolo. Quaedam significant substantiam per modum adiacentiae, sicut nomina adiectiva adiective retenta⁸; et talia, quia trahunt numerum a substantivis, dicuntur pluraliter, et de genere talium sunt verba et participia. Alia sunt nomina, quae important substantiam in adiacentia, connotando intra relationem mutuam, qualia sunt coaeterni⁹; et talia ex duplici causa possunt dici pluraliter, tum ratione consignificationis sive modi significandi, tum ratione connotationis. Et sic patet, quod nulla est contradictio.

Quod¹⁰ autem obiicitur, quod pluralis numerus plurificat formam; dicendum, quod hoc non est verum in adiectivis¹¹.

Dub. III

Qui hoc dicit, non intelligit, natum esse etc.

Hic ponit Magister quatuor rationes demonstrantes, Filium coaeternum Patri, et ita argumentum Arii non valere¹²: Filius est natus, ergo non est aeternus.

Prima sumta est a simili et est talis: splendor est eiusdem durationis cum igne sive aequalis, et tamen est generatus ab igne: ergo multo fortius, cum Filius sit splendor Patris¹³, quamvis ab ipso generetur, erit ei coaeternus: ergo conclusio praedictae rationis est falsa, et illa consequentia est interimenda: si natus est, erat quando non erat. Sed contra: Si emanatio procedens a Deo est ei coaeterna, sicut emanatio procedens a creatura est ei coaequaeva¹⁴: ergo cum res exierint a Deo, videtur quod ab aeterno.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod egressus splendoris¹⁵ a luce vel igne est egressus connaturalis; et talis est egressus Filii a Patre, non autem egressus creaturae a Creatore, immo est voluntarius; et argumentum est bonum in proposito.

p. 189

Item, Si Dei Filius, inquit Augustinus, virtus et sapientia. Haec est secunda ratio Augustini: Filius Dei est virtus et sapientia: ergo si non est aeternus, aliquando fuit Deus sine virtute et sapientia; sed hoc est impossibile: ergo etc. Sed contra hanc rationem sic obiicitur: si enim sequitur: si Pater non habet sapientiam genitam, non est sapiens, videtur quod sit sapiens sapientia genita, quod expresse negat Augustinus in sexto de Trinitate¹⁶.

Respondeo: Augustinus istam rationem redarguit in sexto de Trinitate¹⁷, ostendens, illam procedere ex malo intellectu verbi; attamen, quia Magister adducit eam, potest dici, quod ratio valet, non quia Pater sit sapiens Filio, qui est sapientia genita, sed quia eadem¹⁸ est sapientia genita et ingenita; et ita, si una incipit, et alia.

Eidem quoque Arianicae quaestioni. Haec est tertia ratio quam adducit, et est Ambrosii, sumta ab auctoritate Isaiae: Ante me non est Deus, et post me non erit: ergo nec Pater ante Filium, nec Filius post Patrem. Sed contra: In divinis personis est ordo; sed ordo non est nisi prioris ad posterius: ergo etc.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod, sicut infra patebit¹⁹, non est ibi ordo durationis, quo alter est prior altero, sed ordo originis, quo alter ex altero.

Invicem enim in se, Pater in Filio, et Filius in Patre cognoscitur. Haec est quarta ratio et est talis: relativa simul sunt natura²⁰; sed Pater et Filius sunt relativa: ergo simul; sed Pater est aeternus: ergo Filius coaeternus. Probatio, quod Pater est aeternus: quia, si prius fuit Deus et postea Pater, mutatus est²¹. Sed contra istam rationem potest argui pari ratione: prius fuit Deus et postea Dominus: ergo mutatus est.

Respondeo: Aliqui volunt dicere, quod ista ratio valet, quia generatio est de substantia generantis; et ideo si incipit generare, substantia mutatur. Sed hoc non videtur, quia generatio in divinis non dicit motum. Alii dicunt, quod quia genitus est consubstantialis gignenti, si mutatur genitus, et gignens; sed genitus mutatur, si de novo generatur: ergo et generans per consequens. Alius modus dicendi est, quod paternitas veram dicit habitudinem in Patre, non sic creatio vel dominatio; et ideo paternitas adveniens²² mutat, non sic dominatio.

Sed nulla praedictarum rationum dat vigorem huic rationi contra haereticos, quia haereticus dicebat, quod Filius non erat coaeternus, ac per hoc nec consubstantialis, nec idem in substantia. Propter hoc notandum, quod praedicta ratio bona est contra haereticum, facta eius suppositione; quia haereticus dicebat Patrem et Filium differentes in substantia et natura, sicut in generatione carnali. Pari ratione contra eum dicit Ambrosius: cum ita sit, quod Pater iste²³ mutetur accessione generationis, qui generat alium in substantia; et in divinis similiter Pater generat alium in substantia: ergo accessione generationis mutatur, ut²⁴ iste.

Quocumque tamen modo dicatur, non est magnum periculum, quia non omnia argumenta, quae fiunt ad veritatem, sunt necessaria²⁵.

Dub. IV

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Vox silet non mea tantum, sed et Angelorum. Videtur enim male dicere Angelorum, quia vox non est nisi habentium organa et respirationem; sed Angeli haec non habent. Si dicas, quod habent voces spirituales, non prolatas, sicut dicit Damascenus²⁶, quod tradant sibi intelligentias suas sine voce prolatas; quaero, quae sit necessitas vocis spiritualis, et quis modus loquendi, et quis modus audiendi?

Respondeo: Breviter hic dicendum est — quia hoc extra principale propositum est quantum ad partem istam — quod necessitas est locutionis²⁷; quia sicut unicuique naturae rationali data est voluntas libera, sic conscientia secreta. Unde sicut non potest aliquis voluntatem alterius in aliud vertere, sed solum inducere, nisi ipsa se inclinet, praeter solum Deum, in cuius manu sunt corda hominum: ita nemo potest²⁸ conceptiones alterius cognoscere, sed solum coniicere, praeter Deum, nisi ipsa intelligentia exprimat; et ipsa expressio locutio nuncupatur. Ratio autem huius est, quia solus Deus format mentem et quantum ad intellectum et quantum ad affectum; et modus loquendi similis est modo addiscendi. Sicut enim nos per sensum addiscimus, ita quod species per interiorem sensum pervenit ad intellectum, sic exprimimus; quia verbum cogitationis internae unitur voci²⁹ in excogitatione et postmodum voci sensibili in pronuntiatione, et ex hoc fit expressio in actu. Angelus autem unica virtute facit quod nos pluribus. Unde Angelus, sicut per applicationem speciei innatae ad ipsum cognoscibile ipsum cognoscit, sic ordinando speciem innatam ad alium Angelum cognoscentem, conceptus suos aperit; similiter alius mutua conversione recipit; et sic unus loquitur, alter audit. Simile est de duobus speculis sibi oppositis, si voluntarie possent abscondere aliis et offerre³⁰ quae in se relucent.

p. 190

Dub. V

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Dicamus ergo verius, semper natus; et ratio sua est, ut Deus aeternus et perfectus valeat designari. Sed contra hoc est, quod inter omnia tempora praesens maiorem convenientiam habet cum aeternitate; quia verius dicitur est de Deo, quam fuit et erit, sicut exponit Augustinus, sicut habitum est in praecedenti distinctione³¹. Et ratio huius est, quia praesens dicit ens in actu, alia tempora non.

Respondeo: Dicendum, sicut supra tactum est³², quod verba diversorum temporum dicta de Deo non significant aliquos temporales actus, sed important durationem divini esse sine initio, ut praeteritum; sine intervallo, ut praesens; sine termino, ut futurum. Et quia omnia ista aeque vere reperiuntur in Deo, ideo omnia aeque vere dicuntur de eo³³.

Sed tamen, quia multi erraverunt in generatione quantum ad initium, pauci vel nulli quantum ad intervallum vel terminum: ideo sacri Doctores, ut ora haereticorum obstruerent, eam³⁴ per verbum praeteriti temporis, quod semper significat ut praeteritum, et ita nunquam habere principium, expresserunt.

Alia ratio est, quia nos generationem divinam manuductione quadam intelligimus per generationem, quae circa nos est; et quia videmus in hac generatione, quia genitus, dum generatur, est imperfectus, ne credere posset aliquis, quod Dei Filius esset imperfectus semper³⁵, ideo decreverunt dici semper genitus.

Dicendum ergo, quod quantum est ex parte rei, aeque vere ac proprie dicitur unum, sicut reliquum. Quod vero dicit Gregorius, dicit quantum ad maiorem fidei explanationem, ne error habeat locum; et sic exponit Magister³⁶. Magis ergo convenit dicere: semper genitus, quam semper generatur. Nec est simile de hoc verbo est et fuit; quia hoc verbum est significat per modum quietis, et ideo esse, dum est, perfectum est; sed hoc verbum generari penes haec inferiora per modum fieri; et³⁷ quia in pluribus hoc verum est, quod aliquid, dum fit, non habet esse perfectum, ideo non est simile secundum rationem intelligentiae.

Dub. VI

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Ego hodie genui te, quia potest intelligi de die, quo ex matre natus est; sed hoc nihil videtur valere, quia secundum hanc generationem non habuit patrem, sed tantum matrem³⁸.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod illud verbum intelligendum est causaliter; secundum enim generationem ex matre dicitur genuisse, quia fecit generari. Similis est expositio super illud Matthaei tertio³⁹: Potens est de lapidibus illis suscitare filios Abrahae; Glossa: «In huius rei testimonium Deus de Sara genuit filium, id est, fecit generari».

Dub. VII

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit Origenes: Splendor autem non semel nascitur et desinit. Contra: si hoc simile rectum est, videtur quod Filius non semel nascatur: ergo quaeritur, quare magis generatio Filii assimilatur splendori quam aliis rebus, maxime cum non generetur a luce splendor nisi ad praesentiam corporis obiecti? Et praeterea, Filius dicitur lux⁴⁰; non ergo splendor lucis.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod generatio Filii habet in se perfectam conformitatem, coaeternitatem et aequalitatem⁴¹; et quia in creatura una simul haec non possumus invenire, ideo capimus ex multis, et ideo multas illi assimilamus. Quantum ergo ad conformitatem similis est generationi verbi⁴², quod est proles perfecte repraesentans illum, a quo est. Quantum ad coaeternitatem similis est egressui splendoris a luce, in quo est coaevitas⁴³, propter lucis actualitatem. Quantum ad aequalitatem similis est generationi viventis ex vivente, qui generat sibi aequale⁴⁴ omnino; et sic diversimode comparatur a Sanctis. Comparat igitur Origenes ad egressum splendoris, non quantum ad iterationis assimilationem, sed quantum ad privationem intermissionis sive interpolationis.

Et nota, quod differunt splendor, radius et lumen, cum omnia dicant influentiam a luminoso: quia radius dicit emissionem secundum diametralem distantiam; lumen, secundum circumferentiam, utrumque⁴⁵ tamen in profundum transparentis; splendor dicit repercussionem ad corpus non transparens, tersum et limitatum. Sed tamen hic Origenes vocat splendorem lumen progrediens a luce.

Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod Filius est lux; dicendum, quod lux habet in se naturam manifestandi; et ita respicit cognitionem et appropriatur Filio; habet in se vim multiplicandi sive generandi splendorem; et ita appropriatur Patri⁴⁶.

p. 191

Dub. VIII

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit Hilarius, quod cum sacramento scientiae suae ex eo nascitur. Videtur enim secundum hoc, quod Pater secundum sacramentum scientiae generat Filium: ergo scientia est ratio generandi.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod Hilarius vocat hic⁴⁷ sacramentum sacrum secretum; dicit autem, Filium nasci cum sacramento scientiae, quia Filii generatio non tantum sacra, sed etiam secreta est, non, inquam, Deo secreta, sed nobis, quia nos eam non comprehendimus; ipse autem⁴⁸ perfecte novit eam. Ideo dicit cum sacramento etc.

Dub. IX

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Quod ex vivo vivum natum est habet nativitatis perfectum sine novitate naturae. Videtur enim falsum, quia puer nascitur de patre et matre viventibus, et tamen utrumque habet, scilicet imperfectionem et novitatem.

Respondeo: Ratio Hilarii, sicut patet per litteram sequentem⁴⁹, intelligenda est de vivo per essentiam; ubi enim est vivens per essentiam, non fit ex non vivo vivens, sicut fit in vivente per participationem, ubi non generatur vivum ex vivo nisi per non vivum, ut patet, quia homo non generatur ex homine nisi mediante semine.

Dub. X

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Neque ex derivatione, sed ex virtute nativitas est. Videtur contrarium, quia secundum Dionysium⁵⁰ et Anselmum Pater se habet ad Filium et Spiritum sanctum, ut fons, et illi ut rivi; sed rivus est a fonte per derivationem.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod nativitas, quae est per derivationem, attenditur quantum ad transmutationem aliquam circa illud quod transmutatur, et ita dicit passionem quandam, ac per hoc infirmitatem⁵¹; sed vivens, quod est vita, est actus purus, et ita vita pura, in qua non est infirmitas, sed pura actualitas; et ideo vult Hilarius dicere, quod Pater generans est totus⁵² vita, et quod generat non est per demutationem, quae attenditur in derivatione, sed per omnimodam virtutem: ergo Filius genitus est virtus, non per mutationem natus.

Dub. XI

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Ubi Pater auctor est, ibi et nativitas est. Videtur quod improprie dicit⁵³, quia auctoritas dicit causalitatem; sed haec non recipitur in divinis: ergo etc.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod auctoritas dicit quandam principalitatem sive auctoritatem in persona, quae nihil habet ab alio, sed ab ipso omnes; et ista auctoritas in Patre est innascibilitas; unde non dicit causalitatem, sed privationem principii, et per hoc summam principalitatem⁵⁴.

Dub. XII

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Quod vero ab aeterno natum est, id, si non aeternum natum est etc.; et innuit Hilarius hic tale argumentum: si Filius non est generatus sive natus ab aeterno, generatio eius non est aeterna; et si hoc⁵⁵, Pater non generat ab aeterno: ergo Pater non est aeternus: ergo qui derogat aeternitati Filii, derogat aeternitati Patris. Sed ista ratio non videtur valere, quia similiter ego arguam ex parte Creatoris et creaturae: si⁵⁶ creatura non est aeterna, non ab aeterno creavit Deus, et ita non est Creator aeternus.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod non est simile, sicut patet ex sequenti⁵⁷ eius quod Hilarius supponit, quod esse Patrem sit proprie proprium illius personae: ergo cum tale semper conveniat, aut aliter res non habet esse perfectum, sequitur de necessitate: aut Filius est aeternus, aut Pater ab aeterno non habet esse perfectum. Creare vero, etsi solius Dei sit, tamen ratione connotati habet imperfectionem coniunctam, secundum quam non tantum impossibile, sed etiam non intelligibile est, aliquid ab aeterno creari⁵⁸.

p. 192

Dub. XIII

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Sed se ipsum demutare nascendo; quia secundum hoc, cum Filius Dei prius esset et postea ex Virgine natus sit⁵⁹: ergo esset mutatus.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod ipse⁶⁰ Hilarius intelligit secundum eandem naturam, secundum quam prius erat. Si enim secundum eandem naturam prius erat et postea natus est, necesse est quod secundum illam naturam mutatus sit; sed si secundum aliam⁶¹, oportet mutationem fieri in illa natura, sed non in persona, cum illa natura non dicat aliquid in persona, sed magis aliquid cum persona. Unde nulla fit mutatio in alia natura.

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English Translation

Doubts concerning the text of the Master.

Doubt I

In this part there fall doubts about the text, and first there is a doubt about this which is said: The Father is not other [thing], the Son another, the Holy Spirit another, although personally etc. For what is said seems false, because it follows well: Peter is a white man, therefore he is a white animal, since white (masculine) and white (neuter) signify the same thing; therefore by parity of reason, since another (masculine) and another (neuter) signify¹ the same thing, it follows: he is another [person], therefore he is another being. If you say that the case of this name another (masc.) is not similar to that of this name being, on the contrary: it follows well: he is another man, therefore he is another animal; therefore by similitude that follows.

I respond: It must be said that, because in God there is a singular otherness — since the otherness is of the supposit with an entirely complete unity of nature — therefore it must be expressed in a singular mode. And since the masculine gender imports a certain distinction or discretion², therefore it regards the person; but the neuter, on account of indistinction, regards the nature: and therefore alius imports otherness in person, aliud³ in nature, and so in divine matters they do not signify the same.

It could also be said that in creatures aliud signifies one thing⁴ when I say: this one is other (alius) than that, and another when I say: it is other (aliud); and the one follows from the other. Not so in divine matters; nor is the case of album (white) similar, because album is imposed from a special form, which is whiteness.

Doubt II

Likewise it is doubted, secondly, about this which he says: The three persons are coeternal to one another. It seems false, because if coeternal, then⁵ also eternal: therefore three eternals, which is against the [Athanasian] Creed, where it is said: «Not three eternals»; and again against reason, since the plural number multiplies the form. Whence it is not truly said: there are three gods.

I respond: It must be said that a name signifying substance in divine matters is found according to a triple mode. For some signifies⁶ substance and by the mode of substance, as a substantive noun, like God; and such a name is in no way pluralized nor said in the plural, whether it is substantive or substantivized; as⁷ this name eternal; thus it is taken in the Creed. Some [names] signify substance by the mode of adjacency, as adjective nouns kept adjectivally⁸; and such, because they draw their number from substantives, are said in the plural, and of the kind of such are verbs and participles. Other names are those which import substance in adjacency, connoting within a mutual relation, of which kind is coeternal⁹; and such for a twofold cause can be said in the plural, both by reason of consignification or mode of signifying, and by reason of connotation. And thus it is plain that there is no contradiction.

But to what¹⁰ is objected, that the plural number multiplies the form: it must be said that this is not true in adjectives¹¹.

Doubt III

He who says this does not understand that to be born etc.

Here the Master sets down four arguments demonstrating that the Son is coeternal with the Father, and so that the argument of Arius does not hold¹²: The Son is born, therefore he is not eternal.

The first is taken from a similitude and is such: the splendor [shining] is of the same duration with the fire, or equal, and yet it is generated from the fire: therefore much more strongly, since the Son is the splendor of the Father¹³, although he is generated from him, he will be coeternal to him: therefore the conclusion of the aforesaid argument is false, and that consequence must be destroyed: if he is born, there was [a time] when he was not. But on the contrary: If an emanation proceeding from God is coeternal to him, just as an emanation proceeding from a creature is coeval¹⁴ to it: therefore since things have come forth from God, it seems that [they came forth] from eternity.

I respond: It must be said that the going-forth of splendor¹⁵ from light or fire is a connatural going-forth; and such is the going-forth of the Son from the Father, but not the going-forth of the creature from the Creator, which rather is voluntary; and the argument is good with respect to the matter at hand.

Likewise, If [he is] the Son of God, says Augustine, [he is] virtue and wisdom. This is the second argument of Augustine: The Son of God is virtue and wisdom: therefore if he is not eternal, at some time God was without virtue and wisdom; but this is impossible: therefore etc. But against this argument it is objected thus: for if it follows: if the Father does not have begotten wisdom, he is not wise, it seems that he is wise by begotten wisdom, which Augustine expressly denies in book six On the Trinity¹⁶.

I respond: Augustine refutes that argument in book six On the Trinity¹⁷, showing that it proceeds from a bad understanding of the word; nevertheless, since the Master adduces it, it can be said that the argument is valid, not because the Father is wise by the Son, who is begotten wisdom, but because the same¹⁸ is the begotten and the unbegotten wisdom; and so, if the one begins, also the other.

To the same Arian question. This is the third argument which he adduces, and it is from Ambrose, taken from the authority of Isaiah: Before me there is no God, and after me there shall not be: therefore neither the Father before the Son, nor the Son after the Father. But on the contrary: In the divine persons there is order; but order is only of prior to posterior: therefore etc.

I respond: It must be said that, as will appear below¹⁹, there is not there an order of duration, by which one is prior to the other, but an order of origin, by which one is from the other.

For mutually they are known in themselves, the Father in the Son, and the Son in the Father. This is the fourth argument and is such: relatives are simultaneous by nature²⁰; but Father and Son are relatives: therefore [they are] simultaneous; but the Father is eternal: therefore the Son is coeternal. The proof that the Father is eternal: because, if first he was God and afterward Father, he is changed²¹. But against this argument one can argue by parity of reason: first he was God and afterward Lord: therefore he is changed.

I respond: Some wish to say that this argument is valid, because generation is from the substance of the one generating; and therefore if he begins to generate, the substance is changed. But this does not seem [right], because generation in divine matters does not say motion. Others say that, since the begotten is consubstantial with the begetter, if the begotten is changed, also the begetter; but the begotten is changed, if he is newly generated: therefore also the generator consequently. Another mode of speaking is that paternity says a true relation in the Father, not so creation or domination; and therefore paternity coming on²² [the Father] changes [him], not so domination.

But none of the aforesaid reasonings give force to this argument against the heretics, because the heretic was saying that the Son was not coeternal, and through this neither consubstantial nor the same in substance. On account of this it must be noted that the aforesaid argument is good against the heretic, granting his supposition; because the heretic was saying that the Father and Son differ in substance and nature, as in carnal generation. By parity of reason, against him Ambrose says: since it is so that this²³ father is changed by the accession of generation, who generates another in substance; and in divine matters likewise the Father generates another in substance: therefore by the accession of generation he is changed, as²⁴ this one [the carnal father].

In whatever mode, however, it is said, there is no great peril, because not all arguments which are made for the truth are necessary²⁵.

Doubt IV

Likewise it is asked about this which he says: The voice is silent, not mine alone, but also of the Angels. For he seems to speak ill of the Angels, because there is no voice except of those having organs and respiration; but the Angels do not have these. If you say that they have spiritual voices, not uttered, as Damascene says²⁶, that they hand over to themselves their thoughts without uttered voice; I ask, what is the necessity of a spiritual voice, and what the mode of speaking, and what the mode of hearing?

I respond: Briefly here it must be said — since this is outside the principal proposition with respect to this part — that there is necessity of speech²⁷; because just as to each rational nature a free will has been given, so [also] a secret conscience. Whence just as no one can turn the will of another into something else, but only induce it, unless it itself inclines, except God alone, in whose hand are the hearts of men: so no one can²⁸ know the conceptions of another, but only conjecture, except God, unless the intelligence itself express them; and that very expression is called speech. The reason for this, however, is that God alone forms the mind both as to intellect and as to affect; and the mode of speaking is similar to the mode of learning. For just as we learn through sense, so that the species through the interior sense arrives at the intellect, so we express; because the word of internal cogitation is united to the voice²⁹ in cogitation, and afterward to the sensible voice in pronunciation, and from this expression in act comes about. But the Angel by a single power does what we [do] by many. Whence the Angel, just as by the application of the innate species to the very knowable thing he knows it, so by ordering the innate species to another knowing Angel, he opens his concepts; similarly the other by mutual conversion receives [them]; and thus one speaks, another hears. It is similar in the case of two mirrors set opposite each other, if voluntarily they could hide from others and offer³⁰ [to one] the things which shine in them.

Doubt V

Likewise it is asked about this which he says: Let us say therefore more truly, always born; and his reason is that God may be designated as eternal and perfect. But against this is, that among all tenses the present has a greater agreement with eternity; because is is more truly said of God than was and will be, as Augustine expounds, as has been held in the preceding distinction³¹. And the reason for this is that the present says being in act, the other tenses do not.

I respond: It must be said, as has been touched above³², that verbs of diverse tenses said of God do not signify any temporal acts, but import the duration of the divine being without beginning, as the past; without interval, as the present; without term, as the future. And since all these are equally truly found in God, therefore all are equally truly said of him³³.

But nevertheless, because many have erred concerning the generation as to its beginning, [and] few or none as to interval or term: therefore the holy Doctors, in order to stop the mouths of heretics, expressed it³⁴ by a verb of past tense, which always signifies as past, and so as never having a beginning.

Another reason is that we understand the divine generation by a certain leading-by-the-hand through the generation that is around us; and because we see in this generation that the begotten, while it is being generated, is imperfect, lest anyone could believe that the Son of God was always³⁵ imperfect, therefore they decreed that he be said always begotten.

It must be said therefore that, as far as concerns the thing itself, the one is said equally truly and properly as the other. But what Gregory says, he says with regard to the greater explanation of the faith, lest error have a place; and so the Master expounds³⁶. Therefore it is more fitting to say always begotten than always being begotten. Nor is the case of this verb is and was similar; because this verb is signifies by the mode of rest, and therefore being, while it is, is perfect; but this verb to be generated among these lower things [signifies] by the mode of becoming; and³⁷ since in many things this is true, that something, while it is becoming, does not have perfect being, therefore the case is not similar according to the account of understanding.

Doubt VI

Likewise it is asked about this which he says: Today I have begotten thee, because it can be understood of the day on which he was born from his mother; but this seems to be of no avail, because according to this generation he did not have a father, but only a mother³⁸.

I respond: It must be said that that word must be understood causally; for he is said to have begotten according to the generation from the mother, because he caused [him] to be generated. Similar is the exposition upon that text of Matthew chapter three³⁹: He is able to raise up sons of Abraham from those stones; the Gloss: «In testimony of this matter, God begot a son from Sarah, that is, caused [him] to be generated».

Doubt VII

Likewise it is asked about this which Origen says: But splendor is not born once and ceases. Against [this]: if this similitude is correct, it seems that the Son is not born once: therefore it is asked, why the generation of the Son is more assimilated to splendor than to other things, especially since splendor is not generated from light except in the presence of the body opposite? And besides, the Son is called light⁴⁰; therefore not the splendor of light.

I respond: It must be said that the generation of the Son has in itself perfect conformity, coeternity, and equality⁴¹; and since in one creature we cannot find these together, therefore we take from many [creatures], and so we assimilate it to many. As to conformity, then, it is similar to the generation of a word⁴², which is offspring perfectly representing him from whom it is. As to coeternity, it is similar to the going-forth of splendor from light, in which there is coevity⁴³, on account of the actuality of the light. As to equality it is similar to the generation of a living thing from a living thing, which generates [something] altogether equal⁴⁴ to itself; and thus it is compared diversely by the Saints. Origen, therefore, compares [it] to the going-forth of splendor, not as to the assimilation of iteration, but as to the privation of intermission or interpolation.

And note that splendor, ray, and lumen differ, since all say an influence from a luminous [body]: because ray says emission according to a diametral distance; lumen, according to circumference, both⁴⁵ however into the depth of a transparent body; splendor says repercussion against a body not transparent, polished, and limited. But nevertheless here Origen calls splendor the light proceeding from a [source of] light.

To that, then, which is objected, that the Son is light: it must be said that light has in itself the nature of manifesting; and so it regards cognition and is appropriated to the Son; it has in itself the power of multiplying or generating splendor; and so it is appropriated to the Father⁴⁶.

Doubt VIII

Likewise it is asked about this which Hilary says, that with the sacrament of his knowledge he is born from him. For it seems according to this that the Father generates the Son according to the sacrament of knowledge: therefore knowledge is the ground of generating.

I respond: It must be said that Hilary here⁴⁷ calls sacramentum a sacred secret; he says, however, that the Son is born with the sacrament of knowledge, because the generation of the Son is not only sacred, but also secret, not, I say, secret to God, but to us, because we do not comprehend it; he himself, however⁴⁸, perfectly knows it. Therefore he says with the sacrament etc.

Doubt IX

Likewise it is asked about this which he says: That which is born living from the living has the perfection of nativity without newness of nature. For it seems false, because a boy is born from a living father and mother, and yet he has both, namely imperfection and newness.

I respond: The argument of Hilary, as is plain by the following text⁴⁹, must be understood of the living-by-essence; for where there is a living-by-essence, the living does not come to be from the non-living, as comes about in a living-by-participation, where the living is not generated from the living except through the non-living, as is plain, because man is not generated from man except by means of seed.

Doubt X

Likewise it is asked about this which he says: Nor by derivation, but by power is the nativity. The contrary seems [true], because according to Dionysius⁵⁰ and Anselm the Father holds himself toward the Son and the Holy Spirit as a font, and they as streams; but a stream is from the font by derivation.

I respond: It must be said that the nativity which is by derivation is regarded as to some transmutation around that which is transmuted, and so says a certain passion, and through this an infirmity⁵¹; but a living [being], which is life, is pure act, and so pure life, in which there is no infirmity, but pure actuality; and therefore Hilary wishes to say that the Father generating is wholly⁵² life, and that he generates not by alteration, which is regarded in derivation, but by every-mode power: therefore the begotten Son is power, not born by change.

Doubt XI

Likewise it is asked about this which he says: Where the Father is author, there also is nativity. It seems that he speaks improperly⁵³, because authority says causality; but this is not received in divine matters: therefore etc.

I respond: It must be said that authority says a certain principality or authoritative-status in the person, which has nothing from another, but from himself all [have all]; and that authority in the Father is unbegottenness; whence it does not say causality, but privation of principle, and through this the highest principality⁵⁴.

Doubt XII

Likewise it is asked about this which he says: But that which is born from eternity, that, if it has not been born eternal etc.; and Hilary intimates here such an argument: if the Son is not generated or born from eternity, his generation is not eternal; and if this⁵⁵, the Father does not generate from eternity: therefore the Father is not eternal: therefore he who derogates from the eternity of the Son derogates from the eternity of the Father. But this argument does not seem to hold, because similarly I will argue on the side of the Creator and creature: if⁵⁶ the creature is not eternal, God did not create from eternity, and so the Creator is not eternal.

I respond: It must be said that the case is not similar, as is plain from what follows⁵⁷ of that which Hilary supposes, that to be Father is properly proper to that person: therefore since such a thing always belongs [to him], otherwise the thing does not have perfect being, it follows of necessity: either the Son is eternal, or the Father from eternity does not have perfect being. But to create, although it belongs to God alone, nevertheless by reason of what is connoted has an imperfection conjoined, according to which it is not only impossible, but also unintelligible, that anything be created from eternity⁵⁸.

Doubt XIII

Likewise it is asked about this which he says: But that he changed himself in being born; because according to this, since the Son of God existed before and afterward was born from the Virgin⁵⁹: therefore he would have been changed.

I respond: It must be said that Hilary himself⁶⁰ understands [this] according to the same nature, according to which he existed before. For if according to the same nature he existed before and afterward was born, it is necessary that according to that nature he be changed; but if according to another⁶¹, the change must take place in that nature, but not in the person, since that nature does not say something in the person, but rather something with the person. Whence no change comes about in the other nature.

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Apparatus Criticus

Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 hic et paulo ante significant.
The Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and ed. 1, reads significant here and shortly before.
Vat. praeter fidem mss. et sex primarum edd. aliud ens.
The Vatican edition, beyond the testimony of the manuscripts and the first six editions, reads aliud ens.
Codd. antiquiores inter se non consentiunt; alii enim ut T W cum ed. 1 omittunt distinctionem vel, alii autem ut AFGHIKSVXYZ etc. vel discretionem.
The older codices do not agree among themselves; for some, like T W, with ed. 1, omit distinctionem vel, while others, like AFGHIKSVXYZ etc., omit vel discretionem.
Vat. repetit hic alietatem, quod deest in mss. et ed. 1. Ed. 1 significatur et paulo post consequitur loco sequitur. — Plura de hac re vide supra d. 4. q. 2.
The Vatican edition repeats alietatem here, which is absent in the manuscripts and ed. 1. Ed. 1 reads significatur and shortly after consequitur for sequitur. — More on this matter, see above d. 4, q. 2.
Unus alterque cod. ut PQ ergo loco et.
One or another codex, like PQ, reads ergo for et.
Ita plurimi antiquiores codd., dum Vat. cum ed. 1 et cod. cc legit Quaedam enim significant.
So most of the older codices, while the Vatican edition with ed. 1 and codex cc reads Quaedam enim significant.
Vat. cum cod. cc, interpunctione mutata, loco ut ponit et. — Sub voce substantivatum intellige adiectivum vel aliud nomen loco substantivi adhibitum.
The Vatican edition with codex cc, with the punctuation changed, reads et for ut. — By substantivatum, understand an adjective or other name used in place of a substantive.
Pro non congruo vocabulo tenta ope mss. et ed. 1 substituimus retenta; mox antiquioribus mss. cum ed. 1 consentientibus, lectionem perturbatam Vat. et cod. cc correximus ponendo quia pro quae.
For the incongruous word tenta, with the help of the manuscripts and ed. 1, we have substituted retenta; shortly after, with the older manuscripts agreeing with ed. 1, we have corrected the disturbed reading of the Vatican edition and codex cc by putting quia for quae.
Nonnulli codd. ut H M Y ee cum ed. 1 addunt et huiusmodi. Paulo post fide antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 pro significationis substituimus consignificationis, quod primam rationem, scilicet quatenus sunt adiectiva seu important substantiam in adiacentia, distinctius exhibet; secunda ratio fundatur in connotata mutua relatione.
Some codices, like H M Y ee, with ed. 1, add et huiusmodi. Shortly after, on the authority of the older manuscripts and ed. 1, for significationis we have substituted consignificationis, which more distinctly presents the first reason, namely insofar as they are adjectives or express substance in adjacency; the second reason is founded on the connoted mutual relation.
Ed. 1 Ad illud quod obiicitur. Mox cod. dd multiplicat loco plurificat.
Ed. 1 reads Ad illud quod obiicitur. Shortly after, codex dd reads multiplicat for plurificat.
De hac solutione vide infra d. 24. a. 1. q. 2. Cfr. etiam Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 49. m. 3. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 2, et S. I. q. 39. a. 3. — B. Albert., hic a. 7. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic circa litteram.
On this solution, see below d. 24, a. 1, q. 2. Cf. also Alexander of Hales, Summa p. I, q. 49, m. 3. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 2, and Summa I, q. 39, a. 3. — B. Albert, here a. 7. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3, a. 2. — Richard of Middleton, here on the text.
Vat. hic addit quod tale est, quae tamen verba desunt in codd. et ed. 1. Nonnulli codd. ut EFIKWYZ valet pro valere. Mox post ergo non supplevimus ex mss. et ed. 1 est.
The Vatican edition here adds quod tale est, which words however are absent in the codices and ed. 1. Some codices, like EFIKWYZ, read valet for valere. Shortly after ergo non, we have supplied est from the manuscripts and ed. 1.
Fide mss. et ed. 1 expunximus hic superflue additum et, e contra paulo infra post consequentia adiecimus est.
On the authority of the manuscripts and ed. 1, we have deleted the superfluously added et here; conversely, a little below after consequentia we have added est.
Codd. inter se dissentiunt, alii enim ut EFINUXZ habent coaeva loco coaequaeva, alii ut A G K S T W dd ff falso addunt coaeterna, sicut et ed. 1 falso habet coaeva et coaeterna.
The codices disagree among themselves, for some, like EFINUXZ, have coaeva for coaequaeva, others, like A G K S T W dd ff, falsely add coaeterna, just as ed. 1 falsely has coaeva et coaeterna.
Vat. praeter fidem mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 hic addit a sole, et paulo infra post talis est contra vetustiores codd. et ed. 1 habet egressio loco egressus.
The Vatican edition, beyond the testimony of the manuscripts and eds. 1, 2, 3, here adds a sole, and a little below after talis est, against the older codices and ed. 1, reads egressio for egressus.
Cap. 1. n. 1. Vide etiam ibid. VII. c. 1. n. 2. et XV. c. 7. n. 12.
Ch. 1, n. 1. See also ibid. VII, c. 1, n. 2 and XV, c. 7, n. 12.
Cap. 1. n. 2.
Ch. 1, n. 2.
Ed. 1 addit sapientia. — Plura hac de re vide infra d. 32. a. 2. q. 1.
Ed. 1 adds sapientia. — More on this matter, see below d. 32, a. 2, q. 1.
Dist. 20. a. 2. q. 1. et 2. — Paulo infra multi codd. ut AFGHIKTVWX etc. prius loco prior.
Dist. 20, a. 2, q. 1 and 2. — A little below, many codices, like AFGHIKTVWX etc., read prius for prior.
Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Relativis. — Mox post simul fide antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 substituimus sed loco si et Probatio pro Probatur.
Aristotle, Categories, chapter on Relatives. — Shortly after simul, on the authority of the older manuscripts and ed. 1, we have substituted sed for si and Probatio for Probatur.
Est ratio Ambrosii, quae habetur in lit. Magistri c. 2. in fine.
This is the argument of Ambrose, which is found in the Master's text, c. 2, at the end.
Fide plurium mss. ut HIKM etc. et ed. 1 substituimus adveniens loco veniens.
On the authority of several manuscripts, like HIKM etc., and ed. 1, we have substituted adveniens for veniens.
Cod. D responsionum. Mox cod. Y haereticum pro haereticos. Paulo infra in Vat. contra antiquiores codd. et ed. 1 post coaeternus additur Patri et pro nec habetur non, ac post idem omittitur in. Auctoritate mss. et ed. 1 delevimus hic superflue repetitum carnalis.
Codex D reads responsionum. Shortly after, codex Y reads haereticum for haereticos. A little below, in the Vatican edition, against the older codices and ed. 1, after coaeternus is added Patri and for nec is read non, and after idem is omitted in. On the authority of the manuscripts and ed. 1, we have deleted the superfluously repeated carnalis here.
Vat., obnitentibus mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3, et loco ut.
The Vatican edition, with the manuscripts and eds. 1, 2, 3 opposing, reads et for ut.
Hoc dubium fusius explicatur hic q. 3.
This doubt is more fully explained here in q. 3.
Libr. II. de Fide orthod. c. 3: Sed sine ulla prolati sermonis ope mutuo sibi sensa sua communicant et consilia.
Book II, De Fide Orthodoxa, c. 3: But without any help of spoken speech, they mutually communicate to each other their thoughts and counsels.
Sequimur codd. YZ, dum multi cum ed. 1 ponunt, sed non ita bene quia necessitas locutionis, Vat. autem cum praecedentibus coniungendo legit: quae sit in Angelis necessitas locutionis.
We follow codices YZ, while many with ed. 1 read, but not so well, quia necessitas locutionis; the Vatican edition, however, joining with the preceding, reads: quae sit in Angelis necessitas locutionis.
Cod. V addit cogitationes seu.
Codex V adds cogitationes seu.
In cod. T a secunda manu additum est intelligibili.
In codex T, by a second hand, intelligibili has been added.
Fide plurium mss. ut FHPQ cc dd ee substituimus bonam lectionem offerre pro auferre, loco cuius cod. Y ponit ostendere et ed. 1 afferre. — Plura de locutione Angelorum vide II. Sent. d. 10. a. 3. q. 1.
On the authority of several manuscripts, like FHPQ cc dd ee, we have substituted the good reading offerre for auferre, in place of which codex Y reads ostendere and ed. 1 afferre. — More on the speech of Angels, see II Sent., d. 10, a. 3, q. 1.
Parte 1. lit. Magistri c. 1. et dub. 7. — Mox ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 adiecimus particulam Et, quam etiam paulo superius post fuit substituimus loco aut.
Part 1, Master's text, c. 1, and dub. 7. — Shortly after, from the older manuscripts and ed. 1, we have added the particle Et, which we have also substituted a little above after fuit for aut.
In praeced. dist. loco paulo supra citato. Cfr. etiam hic q. 4. — Fide vetustiorum mss. et ed. 1 expunximus post Dicendum superflue additum quod. Paulo infra cod. E motus pro actus.
In the preceding distinction, at the place cited a little above. Cf. also here q. 4. — On the authority of the older manuscripts and ed. 1, we have deleted quod superfluously added after Dicendum. A little below, codex E reads motus for actus.
Vat. contra plures codd. ut AGISTVXZ etc. cum ed. 1 Deo.
The Vatican edition, against several codices, like AGISTVXZ etc., with ed. 1, reads Deo.
Mss. cum ed. 1 omittunt eam certe supplendum.
The manuscripts with ed. 1 omit eam, which certainly must be supplied.
Restituimus ex mss. et ed. 1 hic non bene omissum semper.
We have restored from the manuscripts and ed. 1 semper, which was improperly omitted here.
Hic, c. 2.
Here, c. 2.
Supplevimus ope mss. et sex primarum edd. particulam et.
We have supplied the particle et with the help of the manuscripts and the first six editions.
Cod. X ultimam propositionis partem sic exhibet: generationem pater non genuit, sed tantum mater. Mox post Dicendum fide antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 adiecimus quod.
Codex X presents the last part of the proposition thus: generationem pater non genuit, sed tantum mater. Shortly after Dicendum, on the authority of the older manuscripts and ed. 1, we have added quod.
Vers. 9, in quo textu Vulgata post est addit Deus et pro illis habet istis. Glossam vide apud Lyranum in hunc locum. — Paulo ante supplevimus ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 post Similis verbum est.
Verse 9, in which text the Vulgate after est adds Deus and for illis has istis. For the Gloss, see Nicholas of Lyra on this passage. — Shortly before, we have supplied from the older manuscripts and ed. 1, after Similis, the word est.
Ioan. 1, 9. — In Vat. ante praeterea deest Et, quod tamen in vetustioribus mss. et ed. 1 habetur.
John 1:9. — In the Vatican edition, before praeterea, Et is missing, which however is found in the older manuscripts and ed. 1.
Cod. T coaequalitatem.
Codex T reads coaequalitatem.
Unus alterque cod. ut M Y addit ex mente.
One or another codex, like M Y, adds ex mente.
Praeferimus lectionem paucorum mss. ee, ff et ed. 1 coaevitas pro coaeternitas, utpote quae in se verior est.
We prefer the reading of a few manuscripts, ee, ff, and ed. 1, coaevitas for coaeternitas, as being more true in itself.
Cod. W simile. Paulo infra cod. V terminationis loco iterationis.
Codex W reads simile. A little below, codex V reads terminationis for iterationis.
In Vat., obnitentibus mss. et ed. 1, utrinque, et mox transferentis loco transparentis. Paulo infra post corpus duce cod. O adiecimus non, quae lectio et in se probatur et ex auctoritate confirmatur aliorum auctorum v. g. B. Albert., hic a. 8. et 21; Scot., II. Sent. d. 13. q. unica; Richard. a Med., II. Sent. d. 13. a. 2. q. 1; Petr. a Tar., hic q. 4. a. 1. ad 4. etc. — De differentia inter lucem, lumen, colorem cfr. infra d. 17. p. I. q. 1. in corp.
In the Vatican edition, with the manuscripts and ed. 1 opposing, utrinque, and shortly after transferentis for transparentis. A little below, after corpus, led by codex O, we have added non, which reading is both approved in itself and confirmed by the authority of other authors, e.g. B. Albert, here a. 8 and 21; Scotus, II Sent., d. 13, q. unica; Richard of Middleton, II Sent., d. 13, a. 2, q. 1; Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 4, a. 1, ad 4, etc. — On the difference between lux, lumen, and color, cf. below d. 17, p. I, q. 1, in the body.
Plura de hac similitudine sumta a splendore exhibent Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 42. m. 5. a. 3, et ceteri auctores paulo supra allegati et Aegid. R., hic circa lit.
More on this similitude taken from splendor is presented by Alexander of Hales, Summa p. I, q. 42, m. 5, a. 3, and the other authors cited a little above, and Giles of Rome, here on the text.
Vat. contra plurimos codd. et ed. 1 minus bene hoc.
The Vatican edition, against most codices and ed. 1, less well reads hoc.
Aliqui codd. ut AITZ bb cc enim; ed. 1 vero.
Some codices, like AITZ bb cc, read enim; ed. 1 reads vero.
Quae Hilarii verba vide in lit. Magistri c. 4. post medium. — Mox plures codd. ut FHITXYZ etc. cum ed. 1 intelligitur loco intelligenda est.
For these words of Hilary, see the Master's text, c. 4, past the middle. — Shortly after, several codices, like FHITXYZ etc., with ed. 1, read intelligitur for intelligenda est.
De Div. Nom. c. 2. § 8: Pater fons in supersubstantiali Deitate. Anselm., de Fide Trin. c. 8. et de Process. Spiritus S. c. 17, ubi haec similitudo fuse exponitur.
De Divinis Nominibus, c. 2, § 8: The Father is the font in the supersubstantial Godhead. Anselm, De Fide Trinitatis, c. 8, and De Processione Spiritus Sancti, c. 17, where this similitude is extensively expounded.
Multi codd. ut ACFGHIKLRSTUV etc. cum subnexis non cohaerenter informitatem.
Many codices, like ACFGHIKLRSTUV etc., inconsistently with what follows, read informitatem.
Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 minus apte tota. Mox cod. M ita quod pro et quod. Paulo infra post demutationem in Vat. additur seu diminutionem, quod abest ab antiquis mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3.
The Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and ed. 1, less aptly reads tota. Shortly after, codex M reads ita quod for et quod. A little below, after demutationem, in the Vatican edition is added seu diminutionem, which is absent from the old manuscripts and eds. 1, 2, 3.
Vat. dicat. Mox cod. Y reperitur loco recipitur.
The Vatican edition reads dicat. Shortly after, codex Y reads reperitur for recipitur.
Cod. Z addit sive auctoritatem.
Codex Z adds sive auctoritatem.
In cod. M additur ergo.
In codex M, ergo is added.
Fide codd. F T Y substituimus si pro sed. Mox verbis ab aeterno codd. WXY cum ed. 1 praemittunt ergo, Vat. cum aliquibus mss. enim; cod. H ponit quia non ab aeterno; multi codd. ut A F G T V etc. quamlibet particulam omittunt.
On the authority of codices F T Y, we have substituted si for sed. Shortly after, before the words ab aeterno, codices WXY with ed. 1 place ergo, the Vatican edition with some manuscripts enim; codex H reads quia non ab aeterno; many codices, like A F G T V etc., omit any particle.
Cod. W consequenti.
Codex W reads consequenti.
De quo vide II. Sent. d. 1. p. I. a. 1. q. 2.
On which see II Sent., d. 1, p. I, a. 1, q. 2.
Vat. cum ed. 1, mutata interpunctione, sic, at codd. AFGHIKT etc. exhibent textum nostrum.
The Vatican edition with ed. 1, with changed punctuation, reads sic, but codices AFGHIKT etc. present our text.
Vat. contra plurimos codd. minus bene hic pro ipse.
The Vatican edition, against most codices, less well reads hic for ipse.
Oportet mutationem fieri in illa natura — scilicet humana, quam assumpsit — sed non in persona divina.
The change must take place in that nature — namely the human one, which he assumed — but not in the divine person. ---

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