Bonaventure — Opera Omnia

Dist. 2, Art. 1, Q. 1

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 2

Textus Latinus

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Articulus unicus. De unitate divinae essentiae et pluralitate personarum.

Quaestio I. Utrum sit unus tantum Deus.

Circa primum, quod in Deo sit ponere essentiae sive naturae unitatem, videtur ratione ostensiva, triplici habita suppositione, quam oportet poni, tum propter eius simplicitatem, tum propter communem animi conceptionem, quae est, quod Deus est quo maius excogitari non potest; tum ratione status, qui non est nisi in summo et primo.

Fundamenta.

1. Suppositio prima est, quod Deus est simplicissimus.

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Ex hac arguitur, quod cum nullo alio diverso possit communicare aliquid¹, quia, si communicat, et differt: ergo non secundum idem; ergo est ibi compositio. Si nihil potest communicare, ergo nec deitatem nec entitatem; ergo si sunt duo dii, cum unus sit ens, alter non est ens, si unus est Deus, alter non est Deus: ergo si duo sunt dii, non sunt duo dii².

2. Item, secunda suppositio est, quod Deus est omnipotentissimus³. Ex hac arguitur: igitur poterit facere, quod omnis alia potentia a sua nihil possit: ergo si sunt duo dii diversi in natura, hoc potest facere unus de altero, quod alter nihil possit, et e converso. Sed cui potest potentia auferri, non est Deus: ergo si sunt duo dii, nullus est Deus.

3. Item, tertia suppositio est, quod Deus est simpliciter summum⁴. Ex hac arguitur: ergo omnia sunt infra ipsum: ergo omnia alia ab ipso et ad ipsum. Si ergo sunt duo dii, unus est infra alterum, et e converso; unus est ab alio secundum naturam diversam, et e converso; unus ad alterum, et e converso; sed quod est infra aliud in natura et ab alio et ad aliud, non est Deus: ergo etc.

Argumenta indirecta.

4. Item, hoc potest probari per deductionem ad impossibile. Si sunt duo dii, aut unus est ubi alius, aut non. Si unus ubi alter: ergo unus in altero, cum sint eodem modo essendi: ergo unus est alteri materialis: ergo alter non est Deus. Si unus non est ubi alter: ergo uterque limitatus, ergo neuter infinitus.

5. Item, si plures sunt dii boni⁵, aut unus intelligit alterum, aut non. Si non; ergo uterque est ignorans. Si intelligit; aut ergo per praesentiam, aut per speciem, aut per se ipsum ut per illius exemplar⁶. Si per praesentiam: ergo unus in altero, ergo Deus illabitur Deo et perficit Deum; si per speciem: ergo compositus; si per exemplar: ergo unus est exemplar alterius, ergo et principium.

6. Item, si sunt duo dii diversi, quorum uterque est summum bonum; aut unus diligit alterum, ut diligendus est, aut non. Si sic, cum uterque sit summum bonum, uterque est diligendus amore fruitionis: ergo uterque fruitur altero; sed qui fruitur alio bono a se, illo indiget: ergo unus indiget alio: ergo uterque est indigens, ergo neuter Deus.

Sed contra:

1. Plus potest Deus facere, quam intellectus noster possit cogitare. Sed intellectus humanus, utpote gentium⁷, intelligit plures deos omnipotentes: ergo Deus potest hoc facere. Sed quidquid potest esse in divina natura, est ibi, quia aeterna⁸: ergo etc.

2. Item, plura bona sunt meliora paucioribus; sed plures dii sunt plura bona: ergo melius aliquid erunt duo quam unus. Sed secundum Anselmum⁹ omne, quod melius est, circa Deum est ponendum: ergo est ponere plures deos.

3. Item, quorum diversa est operatio, diversa est virtus et diversa est natura¹⁰; sed operatio trium personarum est diversa, quia apparitio in columba fuit solius Spiritus sancti, et solus Filius assumsit humanam naturam: ergo sunt diversi in substantia: ergo sunt plures dii.

4. Item, magna potentia est, quae potest magnum, et maior, quae maius, et maxima, quae

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maximum; sed Deus super omnia est summe potens: ergo potest producere summum¹¹; sed hoc est Deus: ergo cum « in aeternis sit idem esse et posse », ergo etc.

Conclusio. Plures esse deos est impossibile, immo si recte intelligatur, quid sit Deus, non est intelligibile.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod impossibile est esse plures deos, et si recte accipiatur significatum huius nominis Deus, non solum est impossibile, sed etiam non intelligibile. Deus enim dicit simpliciter summum et in re et in opinione cogitantis. Quia in re, ideo omnia ab ipso et in ipso et ad ipsum, et in ipso omnino est status¹²; ideo impossibile est intelligere, salvo hoc intellectu, quod aliquid sibi parificetur aliud ab ipso. Item, nihil maius Deo cogitari potest nec etiam aequale, quia summum in opinione. Ideo impossibile et non intelligibile est ponere plures deos.

Ad argumenta:

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur de gentibus; dicendum, quod non fuit intellectus, sed fictio¹³; praeterea non intelligebant Deum secundum nobilitatem divinam: ideo non valet.

Et ad illud: plus potest Deus facere etc.; dicendum, quod duplex est intellectus, scilicet rationalis et phantasticus. De primo verum est, sed de secundo non; quia multa possumus cogitare secundum phantasiam, quae Deus non potest facere, quia non convenit illi, « in quo inconveniens est impossibile »¹⁴.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod plura bona sunt meliora paucioribus; dicendum, quod illud habet veritatem in bono creato et finito, quod ratione suae finitatis recipit bonitatis augmentum per additionem alterius boni; non autem habet veritatem in bono infinito, quia, quantumcumque addas bonum infinitum infinito, semper ego intelligo de bonitate tantum in uno, quantum tu¹⁵ in pluribus.

3. Ad aliud quod obiicitur de diversitate operationum; dicendum, quod Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus in omni operatione conveniunt, sed in relatione differunt. Unde in incarnatione est operatio productionis illius naturae et est unio; in primo conveniunt tres personae, in secundo non. — Similiter in columba est columbae formatio et eius significatio¹⁶; in primo conveniunt, in secundo non. Exemplum Augustini¹⁷ de Trinitate est, quod ad formationem huius nominis memoria concurrit memoria, intelligentia et voluntas; tamen hoc nomen memoria significat alteram potentiarum; simili modo est in proposito.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod magna potentia, etc.; dicendum, quod producere aliquem¹⁸ est tripliciter: vel de se ipso, vel de aliquo creato, vel de nihilo. De se ipso potest Deus producere summum simpliciter, sed ille non erit alius in natura propter naturae simplicitatem. De alio vel de nihilo non potest producere summum simpliciter, sed in genere, non propter defectum potentiae agentis, sed propter defectum creaturae, quam necesse est esse limitatam; et ita non potest producere alium Deum.

Scholion.

I. Argumentum primum in fundam. diffusius proponitur ab Alex. Hal., S. p. 1. q. 14. m. 2. et a Richard. a Med., I. Sent. d. 2. q. 3. — Contra secundum argumentum, sumtum ex omnipotentia, Scot. (I. Sent. d. 2. q. 3.) movet difficultatem, quia ipse contra communem sententiam supponit, Dei omnipotentiam non nisi ex fide certo sciri posse.

II. Contra doctrinam in solut. ad 2. traditam opponit Durand. (I. Sent. d. 44. q. 3.), quod Deus et mundus simul sint maius bonum quam Deus solus. Sed haec assertio merito ab omnibus theologis classicis ut falsa reprobatur; cfr. infra d. 43. q. 2. fundam. 5; Itiner. mentis c. 5. — In solut. ad 3. quoad propositionem: « In primo conveniunt tres personae, in secundo (scil. unione) non », notandum est, quod unio in duplici sensu accipi potest, vel ut actio unitiva, vel ut relatio unionis. Illa est communis tribus Trinitatis personis, haec vero spectat ad solam Filii personam; et de hac loquitur hic S. Doctor.

III. Unitas Dei definita est a Concilio Lateranensi IV. c. 1. Firmiter, nec non a Vaticano, Const. de Fide, tit. de Deo creatore. Plura circa hanc quaestionem S. Bonav. docet infra d. 4. q. 3; d. 23. a. 2. q. 3; II. Sent. d. 1. p. 1. a. 2. q. 1; Breviloq. p. 1. c. 2. 5. 6; Itiner. mentis c. 5. — Alex. Hal., S. p. 1. q. 14. m. 2. — Scot., hic q. 3; de Rerum Principio q. 1. — S. Thom., I. Sent. hic q. 1. a. 1; S. 1. q. 11. a. 3; et praecipue S. c. Gent. 1. c. 42. — B. Albert., hic a. 2. 21; S. p. 1. tr. 6. q. 29. a. 1. m. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 1. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 25. q. 2. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1.

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English Translation

Sole article. On the unity of the divine essence and the plurality of persons.

Question I. Whether there is only one God.

Concerning the first point, namely that one must posit in God the unity of essence or nature, the matter is shown by a demonstrative argument, when three suppositions are first laid down — suppositions that must be posited both because of his simplicity, and because of the common conception of the mind, which is that God is that than which a greater cannot be thought; and because of the rational ground of the terminus, which exists only in what is highest and first.

Fundamenta.

1. The first supposition is that God is most simple.

Ex hac arguitur, From this it is argued: since [he] cannot share anything in common with any other diverse [being]¹ — because, if he shares it, he also differs: therefore not according to the same; therefore there is composition there. If he can share nothing, therefore neither deity nor entity; therefore if there are two gods, since the one is a being, the other is not a being; if the one is God, the other is not God: therefore if there are two gods, there are not two gods².

2. Likewise, the second supposition is that God is most omnipotent³. From this it is argued: therefore he will be able to bring it about that every other power except his own can do nothing; therefore if there are two gods diverse in nature, the one can do this concerning the other, namely that the other can do nothing, and conversely. But that from which power can be taken away is not God: therefore if there are two gods, none is God.

3. Likewise, the third supposition is that God is simply the highest⁴. From this it is argued: therefore all things are below him; therefore all other things are from him and toward him. If therefore there are two gods, the one is below the other, and conversely; the one is from the other according to a diverse nature, and conversely; the one toward the other, and conversely; but that which is below another in nature, and from another and toward another, is not God: therefore etc.

Indirect arguments.

4. Likewise, this can be proved by reductio ad impossibile. If there are two gods, either the one is where the other is, or not. If the one is where the other is: therefore the one is in the other, since they are of the same mode of being: therefore the one is material to the other: therefore the other is not God. If the one is not where the other is: therefore each is limited, therefore neither is infinite.

5. Likewise, if there are several good gods⁵, either the one understands the other, or not. If not; therefore each is ignorant. If he understands; then either through presence, or through species, or through himself as through an exemplar of the other⁶. If through presence: therefore the one is in the other, therefore God flows into God and perfects God; if through species: therefore he is composite; if through exemplar: therefore the one is the exemplar of the other, therefore also the principle.

6. Likewise, if there are two diverse gods, of whom each is the highest good; either the one loves the other as he ought to be loved, or not. If so, since each is the highest good, each ought to be loved with a love of fruition: therefore each enjoys the other; but he who enjoys another good apart from himself is in need of it: therefore the one is in need of the other: therefore each is in need, therefore neither is God.

On the contrary:

1. God can do more than our intellect can think. But the human intellect — namely, that of the gentiles⁷ — understands several omnipotent gods: therefore God can do this. But whatever can be in the divine nature, is there, because it is eternal⁸: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, more goods are better than fewer; but several gods are several goods: therefore two will be something better than one. But according to Anselm⁹, whatever is better must be posited with regard to God: therefore one must posit several gods.

3. Likewise, of those things whose operation is diverse, the power is diverse and the nature is diverse¹⁰; but the operation of the three Persons is diverse, since the appearance in the dove was of the Holy Spirit alone, and the Son alone assumed human nature: therefore they are diverse in substance: therefore they are several gods.

4. Likewise, that is a great power which can [produce] something great, and a greater [power] which [can produce] something greater, and the greatest, which [can produce] the greatest; but God above all things is supremely powerful: therefore he can produce the highest¹¹; but this is God: therefore since « in eternal things to-be and to-be-able are the same », therefore etc.

Conclusion. That there should be several gods is impossible; nay rather, if it be rightly understood what God is, it is not even intelligible.

I respond: It must be said that it is impossible that there be several gods, and if the signification of this name God be rightly taken, not only is it impossible, but it is also not intelligible. For God signifies simply the highest both in reality and in the opinion of the one thinking. Because [he is highest] in reality, therefore all things are from him and in him and toward him, and in him entirely is the status (the term)¹²; therefore it is impossible to understand, while preserving this very understanding, that anything other than him be made equal to him. Likewise, nothing greater than God can be thought, nor even anything equal, because [he is] the highest in opinion. Therefore it is impossible and not intelligible to posit several gods.

To the arguments:

1. To that, then, which is objected concerning the gentiles: it must be said that it was not understanding, but a fiction¹³; moreover, they did not understand God according to divine nobility: therefore [the argument] is not valid.

And to that other: God can do more etc.; it must be said that the intellect is twofold, namely the rational and the phantastic. Concerning the first it is true, but concerning the second not; because we can think many things according to phantasy which God cannot do, since they do not befit him, « in whom what is unfitting is impossible »¹⁴.

2. To that which is objected, that more goods are better than fewer; it must be said that this holds true in a created and finite good, which by reason of its finitude receives an increase of goodness through the addition of another good; but it does not hold true in an infinite good, because, however much you add an infinite good to an infinite good, I always understand as much goodness in the one alone as you¹⁵ [understand] in the many.

3. To the other, which is objected concerning the diversity of operations; it must be said that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit agree in every operation, but differ in relation. Hence in the Incarnation there is an operation of producing that nature and there is the union; in the first the three Persons agree, in the second not. — Similarly in [the appearance of] the dove there is the formation of the dove and its signification¹⁶; in the first they agree, in the second not. The example of Augustine¹⁷ in On the Trinity is that to the formation of this name memory there concur memory, intelligence, and will; yet this name memory signifies one of those powers; in like manner is the case here.

4. To that which is objected, that great power, etc.; it must be said that to produce someone¹⁸ is threefold: either out of himself, or out of something created, or out of nothing. Out of himself God can produce the highest simply, but that one will not be other in nature, on account of the simplicity of nature. Out of another, or out of nothing, he cannot produce the highest simply, but [only] in [some] genus, not on account of any defect of the agent's power, but on account of the defect of the creature, which must necessarily be limited; and so he cannot produce another God.

Scholion.

I. The first argument in the fundamenta is more amply set forth by Alexander of Hales, Summa p. 1, q. 14, m. 2, and by Richard de Mediavilla, I Sent. d. 2, q. 3. — Against the second argument, drawn from omnipotence, Scotus (I Sent. d. 2, q. 3) raises a difficulty, because he supposes — against the common opinion — that God's omnipotence cannot be known with certainty except by faith.

II. Against the doctrine handed down in the solution to objection 2, Durandus (I Sent. d. 44, q. 3) objects that God and the world together are a greater good than God alone. But this assertion is rightly rejected as false by all classical theologians; cf. below d. 43, q. 2, fundam. 5; Itinerarium mentis c. 5. — In the solution to objection 3, regarding the proposition: « In the first the three Persons agree, in the second (namely the union) not », it must be noted that union can be taken in a twofold sense: either as a unitive action, or as a relation of union. The former is common to the three Persons of the Trinity, the latter belongs to the Person of the Son alone; and it is of this that the Holy Doctor here speaks.

III. The unity of God was defined by the Fourth Lateran Council, c. 1, Firmiter, and also by the [Council of the] Vatican, Constitutio de Fide, title de Deo creatore. St. Bonaventure teaches more on this question below at d. 4, q. 3; d. 23, a. 2, q. 3; II Sent. d. 1, p. 1, a. 2, q. 1; Breviloquium p. 1, c. 2, 5, 6; Itinerarium mentis c. 5. — Alex. Hal., Summa p. 1, q. 14, m. 2. — Scot., here q. 3; de Rerum Principio q. 1. — St. Thomas, I Sent. here q. 1, a. 1; Summa I, q. 11, a. 3; and especially Summa contra Gentiles I, c. 42. — Bl. Albert, here a. 2, 21; Summa p. 1, tr. 6, q. 29, a. 1, m. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 1. — Richard de Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, here 1 princ. q. 1. — Durandus, here q. 1. — Henry of Ghent, Summa a. 25, q. 2, 3. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 1.

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Apparatus Criticus

Haec phrasis: communicare aliquid cum aliquo hic et alibi significat: habere aliquid cum aliquo commune, sive: convenire cum aliquo in aliqua re. — Vat. contra codd. et ed. 1 hic omittit aliquid et mox, ponendo sunt loco secundum, vim argumenti elidit. Deinde codd. XYZ legunt unum pro idem. — Cfr. Aristot., X. Metaph. text. 12. (ed. Paris. IX. c. 3.).
This phrase, to share something with someone, here and elsewhere signifies: to have something in common with another, or: to agree with another in some matter. — The Vatican edition, against the codices and ed. 1, here omits aliquid, and shortly afterwards, by putting sunt in place of secundum, weakens the force of the argument. Further, codd. XYZ read unum for idem. — Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics X, text 12 (Paris ed., IX, c. 3).
Argumentum hoc a S. Doctore paucis exhibitum sic explicari potest. Primo: si Deus est simplex, non potest habere aliquid commune cum alio Deo, qui supponitur esse. Probatur: si unus Deus aliquid haberet commune cum alio sive si communicaret in aliquo, v. g. in deitate, cum alio, deberet etiam differre, ut sit alius Deus; cum idem secundum idem nequeat cum alio simul communicare seu convenire et differre: ergo alio convenirent, alio differrent seu distinguerentur: ergo uterque esset compositus. Secundo: si autem nihil habent commune: ergo nec deitatem nec entitatem; ex quo sequitur absurdum in littera notatum.
This argument, set forth briefly by the Holy Doctor, can be explained thus. First: if God is simple, he cannot have anything in common with another God who is supposed to be. Proof: if one God had anything in common with another, or if he shared in something, e.g. in deity, with another, he would also have to differ, in order that he be another God; since the same according to the same cannot at once share or agree with another and differ: therefore they would agree by one [aspect] and differ or be distinguished by another: therefore each would be composite. Second: if, however, they have nothing in common: therefore neither deity nor entity; from which follows the absurdity noted in the text.
Plures codd. ut ACGLORSU etc. cum edd. 1, 2, 3, 6 omnipotentissimum. Paulo infra post duo ex cod. T adiecimus certe supplendum Dii.
Several codices, such as ACGLORSU etc., together with eds. 1, 2, 3, 6, [read] omnipotentissimum. A little below, after duo, we have added from cod. T certe, supplying Dii.
Ad normam multorum mss. ut ACGLORSTUWaa bb cc ff et edd. 1, 2, 3, 6 loco summus posuimus summum.
Following many manuscripts, such as ACGLORSTUWaa bb cc ff, and eds. 1, 2, 3, 6, in place of summus we have placed summum.
Codd. OYZ omittunt boni, quae lectio magis placeret, si maiore numero codd. fulciretur.
Codd. OYZ omit boni; this reading would be more pleasing if it were supported by a greater number of codices.
Adiecimus ex cod. I ut per illius exemplar, quae verba ultimum disiunctionis membrum exprimunt clarius necnon formam totius argumenti reddunt perfectiorem, quia infra omnes mss. et edd. 1, 3, 6 habent per exemplar loco per se ipsum, quod Vat. ponit. Codd. T cc etiam prima vice pro per se ipsum ponunt per exemplar, sed a secunda manu scriptum.
We have added from cod. I ut per illius exemplar, which words express the last member of the disjunction more clearly and render the form of the whole argument more perfect, since below all the mss. and eds. 1, 3, 6 have per exemplar in place of per se ipsum, which the Vatican edition prints. Codd. T cc, also at the first occurrence, in place of per se ipsum read per exemplar, but written by a second hand.
Codd. F aa bb gentilium.
Codd. F aa bb [read] gentilium.
Aristot., III. Phys. text. 32: Posse enim ab ipso esse nihil differt in perpetuis. — Idem textus recurrit infra in 4. arg. ad opp.
Aristotle, Physics III, text 32: « For in eternal things, to-be-able and to-be from itself differ in nothing. » — The same text recurs below in the 4th argument ad oppositum.
Monolog. c. 15: Sicut nefas est putare, quod substantia summae naturae sit aliquid, quo melius sit aliquo modo non-ipsum: sic necesse est, ut sit quidquid omnino melius est, quam non-ipsum. Illa enim sola est, qua penitus nihil est melius; et quae melior est omnibus, quae non sunt quod est ipsa. Cfr. etiam Proslog. c. 8. Convenit Aristot., XII. Metaph. text. 39. (ed. Paris. XI. c. 7.): Dicimus itaque, Deum sempiternum optimumque vivens esse, quare vita et aevum continuum et aeternum Deo inest, hoc enim est Deus. Cfr. et Boeth., III. de Consol. Prosa 10.
Anselm, Monologion c. 15: « Just as it is unlawful to think that the substance of the highest nature is something than which what is not itself is in some way better, so it is necessary that it be whatever is altogether better than what is not itself. For that alone is such that nothing whatever is better than it; and it is better than all things which are not what it itself is. » Cf. also Proslogion c. 8. Aristotle agrees, Metaphysics XII, text 39 (Paris ed., XI, c. 7): « We say therefore that God is the eternal and best living being, wherefore life and continuous and eternal duration belong to God; for this is God. » Cf. also Boethius, de Consolatione III, prose 10.
Averroes, XII. Metaph. text. 26: Activa diversificantur in potentia et actu per diversitatem formarum et materiarum. Boeth., III. de Consol. Prosa 11. conversam huius propositionis exhibet: Eadem namque substantia est eorum, quorum naturaliter non est diversus effectus. Utraque propositio fundatur in illo axiomate: operari sequitur esse, seu: idem est principium essendi et operandi. — In conclusione huius argumenti cod. O habet natura pro substantia. — B. Albert., S. 1. tract. 6. q. 29. m. 1. a. 1. idem argumentum profert, dein adiungit: Et haec fuit fortior obiectio Arianorum et Nestorianorum et Eutychianorum et Paulisamosalenorum.
Averroes, Metaphysics XII, text 26: « Active things are diversified in potency and act through the diversity of forms and matters. » Boethius, de Consolatione III, prose 11, presents the converse of this proposition: « For the substance of those things is the same whose effect is not naturally diverse. » Each proposition is founded on this axiom: acting follows upon being, or: the same is the principle of being and of acting. — In the conclusion of this argument cod. O has natura in place of substantia. — Bl. Albert, Summa I, tract. 6, q. 29, m. 1, a. 1, sets forth the same argument and then adds: « And this was the stronger objection of the Arians and Nestorians and Eutychians and Paul-of-Samosata-ites. »
Vat. cum recentiore cod. cc contra omnes antiquiores codd. et ed. 1 indebite adiungit bonum.
The Vatican edition, together with the more recent cod. cc, against all the older codices and ed. 1, improperly adds bonum.
Respicitur illud ad Rom. 11, 36: Quoniam ex ipso et per ipsum et in ipso sunt omnia. Sensus est: a Deo omnia procedunt, in Deo omnia conservantur, ad Deum omnia referuntur. Cfr. infra d. 36. dub. 4. — In ipso omnino est status i. e. Deus est principium, ultra quod in resolvendo seu causas quaerendo nullo modo possumus transire. — Paulo infra ed. 1 ei loco sibi.
This refers to Rom. 11:36: « For from him and through him and in him are all things. » The sense is: from God all things proceed, in God all things are conserved, to God all things are referred. Cf. below d. 36, dub. 4. — In ipso omnino est status, that is: God is the principle, beyond which, in resolving or in seeking causes, we can in no way pass. — A little below, ed. 1 has ei in place of sibi.
Cod. U non male: fictio potius; non enim intelligebant. Cod. T veritatem pro nobilitatem.
Cod. U, not badly: « rather a fiction; for they did not understand. » Cod. T [reads] veritatem in place of nobilitatem.
Anselm., I. Cur Deus homo, c. 20: Sed hoc est praestitutum, quia quamlibet (quodlibet) parvum inconveniens in Deo impossibile est. — Vat. contra mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 post inconveniens addit minimum. Paulo ante cod. I phantastica loco secundum phantasiam.
Anselm, Cur Deus homo I, c. 20: « But this is laid down, that however small (whatever) unfitting thing is impossible in God. » — The Vatican edition, against the mss. and eds. 1, 2, 3, after inconveniens adds minimum. A little earlier cod. I [has] phantastica in place of secundum phantasiam.
Ex plurimis antiquioribus mss. ut ACFGHKLOPST etc. adiecimus tu. Paulo ante codd. SX post bonum omittunt infinitum; lectio haud spernenda.
From a great many older manuscripts, such as ACFGHKLOPST etc., we have added tu. A little earlier codd. SX, after bonum, omit infinitum; a reading not to be despised.
Sic plures codd. ut KRXYZ ff cum ed. 1; alii sunt dubiae lectionis; codd. I aa figuratio; sed Vat. cum aliquibus codd. significatio.
Thus several codices, such as KRXYZ ff, with ed. 1; others are of doubtful reading; codd. I aa [have] figuratio; but the Vatican edition, with some codices, [reads] significatio.
Libr. IV. de Trin. c. 21. n. 30: Quemadmodum cum memoriam meam et intellectum et voluntatem nomino, singula quidem nomina ad res singulas referuntur, sed tamen ab omnibus tribus singula facta sunt etc. Sensus est: ad formationem vocabuli memoria omnes tres animi potentiae active concurrunt, tamen significatio eiusdem refertur ad unam solam potentiam.
[Augustine], de Trinitate IV, c. 21, n. 30: « Just as when I name my memory and understanding and will, the individual names refer to individual things, yet each is brought about by all three together, etc. » The sense is: to the formation of the word memory all three powers of the soul actively concur, yet the signification of that same word refers to one single power.
Fide plurimorum mss. ut ACFGHLORSTUZ etc. et ed. 1 substituimus aliquem pro aliquid. Agitur enim de productione Dei, et in subnexis habetur genus masculinum ille, quod refertur ad summum simpliciter absque dubio pro eodem genere sumendum, scil. summum aliquem etc. Cod. H habet Deum producere aliquem.
On the testimony of very many manuscripts, such as ACFGHLORSTUZ etc., and of ed. 1, we have substituted aliquem for aliquid. For the matter concerns the production of God, and in what follows the masculine ille is used, which refers to summum simpliciter and is without doubt to be taken in the same gender, namely summum aliquem etc. Cod. H has Deum producere aliquem.

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