Bonaventure

Quaestio I. Utrum potentia generandi dicat aliquid absolutum, vel relativum.

Circa primum, quod posse generare dicat quid, ostenditur:

1. Primo per auctoritatem Magistri in littera¹: quod « Pater non est potens nisi natura, eiusque potentia ipsa² essentia est vel essentia »; sed natura et potentia dicunt quid, non ad aliquid: ergo et potentia generandi.

2. Item³, ratione ostenditur sic: generare est sibi simile in natura producere; sed secundum Philosophum⁴ « natura est vis insita rebus similia ex similibus procreans »: ergo vis generandi respicit ipsam naturam sive essentiam de se, non personam; sed omne tale dicit quid: ergo etc.

3. Item, « in perpetuis non differt esse et posse »⁵: ergo multo fortius in aeternis; ergo idem est esse et posse, et potentia et essentia; sed esse et essentia in divinis dicunt quid, non ad aliquid, sive per se dicatur, sive cum adiuncto; unde essentia Patris dicit quid: ergo pari ratione potentia generandi.

4. Item, in divinis idem est secundum rem posse scire et velle; sed non est in divinis scientia propria sive ad aliquid⁶, immo scientia dicit quid et est trium, similiter et voluntas: ergo potentia generandi dicit quid sive essentiam.

Sed contra:

1. Magister dicit in littera, et habetur primo capitulo⁷: Posse generare non est posse aliquid, ergo non dicit quid; et dicit quid vel ad aliquid: ergo etc.

2. Item, ratione ostenditur sic: potentiae distinguuntur per actus⁸: ergo si actus potentiae dicit quid, et potentia; et si dicit ad aliquid, tunc et potentia similiter. Sed constat quod generare in divinis non dicit quid, sed ad aliquid: ergo nec posse generare.

3. Item, quamvis in creaturis differant virtus et operatio, tamen in Deo idem sunt, sicut vult Dionysius⁹: ergo in Deo idem est posse generare et generare; sed generare in divinis dicit ad aliquid et non quid: ergo similiter posse.

4. Item, Pater generat et potest generare: aut ergo ideo potest, quia generat; aut ideo generat, quia potest. Constat quod non ideo potest generare, quia generat: ergo ideo generat, quia potest generare¹⁰. Si ergo ratio proprii debet esse propria, ergo potentia generandi debet esse propria; et nihil est proprium in divinis, nisi quod dicit ad aliquid: ergo etc.

5. Item, omnis potentia activa, quae inest creaturae, inest secundum aliquas conditiones sive¹¹ proprietates, ut patet. Posse enim illuminare inest luminoso per lucem, posse calefacere calido per caliditatem. Quamvis autem potentia generandi non sit activa, tamen activae similis est: ergo cum insit Patri, inest per aliquam proprietatem; illa autem proprietas aut dicit quid, aut ad aliquid. Si quid: ergo¹² inest omnibus personis, et ita posse generare, quod manifeste negat Magister: ergo dicit ad aliquid: ergo et potentia, quae inest secundum illam: ergo etc.

Conclusio. Inter tres de hac re opiniones videtur probabilior ea quae asserit, potentiam generandi significare tam relationem quam substantiam, sed in recto relationem.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod circa hoc problema tres fuerunt positiones.

Opinio 1. Fuerunt¹³ quidam, qui distinxerunt potentiam generandi dicentes, quod potentia generandi potest dici potentia nuda, vel potentia disposita. Si dicatur potentia nuda, sic voluerunt¹⁴ dicere, quod dicit quid et in omnibus tribus personis est, quoniam haec potentia sic dicta consequitur naturam; unde cum natura sit in qualibet persona, similiter et potentia huiusmodi. Secundum autem quod dicit potentiam dispositam, quia non habet dispositionem nec convenientiam, ut exeat in actum generationis¹⁵ nisi in sola persona Patris, voluerunt dicere, quod dicit ad aliquid.

Reprobatur. Sed verba istius positionis non videntur vera nec sana. Non, inquam, vera, quoniam cuius potentia est nuda, nata est pariter esse disposita; si ergo trium¹⁶ est potentia generandi, ut est potentia nuda, similiter et disposita; et ita quaelibet posset generare. Praeterea non videtur sana: ponere enim potentiam nudam, quae similiter se habet ad esse et non esse respectu generationis, quam omnino necessarium est esse, non videtur sane dictum esse sive proprie.

Opinio 2. Fuerunt etiam alii, qui dixerunt, quod cum in divinis sit idem posse et esse, et potentia et essentia, quod, quemadmodum potentia et essentia dicunt quid, similiter esse et posse. Et quemadmodum, cum dico essentiam Patris et essentiam Filii et Spiritus sancti, sive esse Patrem¹⁷, esse Filium, esse Spiritum sanctum, non dico aliam essentiam nec aliud esse, sed alterius et alterius; ita quando dico potentiam Patris, sive Patrem posse generare et Filium posse gigni, non dico aliud et aliud posse, sed alterius. Et huius positionis fuit Magister, sicut evidenter apparet in littera¹⁸. Unde isti dicebant, quod posse generare dicit quid, sed secundum respectum ad aliquid, quia est essentiale tractum ad personam. Cum enim non sit omnimodae abstractionis, potest ad personam trahi.

Et ista positio Magistri¹⁹ satis est probabilis et satis bene videtur sustineri posse.

Opinio 3. Fuerunt etiam tertii moderniores, qui dixerunt, quod potentia generandi dicit ad aliquid in divinis de se. Et ratio eorum est, quoniam potentia dicit habitudinem originalis principii ad principiatum. Et quoniam habitudo potest esse personae ad personam, et tunc vere est habitudo; et essentiae ad creaturam, et tunc secundum modum dicendi sive intelligendi: hinc est, quod principium de sui ratione non tantum est essentiale appropriatum per additionem, immo etiam dicit proprium personae. Pari ratione, cum potentia dicat originalem habitudinem, non tantum essentialem, non solum²⁰ dicitur vel trahitur ad personam, ut dicat essentiam personaliter, immo dicit proprium, et ita ad aliquid de se.

Et positio ista sine praeiudicio videtur probabilior. Nam potentia generandi non videtur dicere nisi fecunditatem ad actum generationis; et illa est proprium personae, unde similiter et potentia²¹. Nec est simile de posse et esse nisi uno modo. Hoc enim verbum est aliquando per se praedicatur, aliquando est tertium adiacens. Quando per se dicitur, tunc dicit actum absolutum, quia dicit actum entis ratione essentiae; et tunc oportet, quod dicatur absolute et quod dicat quid. Quando vero est tertium adiacens, ut cum dicitur Pater est Deus²², Pater est Pater, tunc hoc verbum est dicit habitudinem praedicati ad subiectum. Et quoniam potest dicere habitudinem ad praedicatum essentiale vel personale, ideo potest dicere esse essentiale et modum essendi personalem. Posse autem de sui ratione propria dicit habitudinem secundum originem; et hinc est, quod specificatur per adiunctum, ut dicat conditionem principii essentialis, vel personalis. Hanc ergo positionem sustinendo respondeo²³ argumentis probantibus, quod dicit quid.

*Ad argumenta probantia quod dicit quid:*

Ad 1. Quod enim primum obiicitur, patet: concedo enim, Magistrum fuisse huius positionis. Unde dixerunt, quod eadem potentia potest Filius gigni, qua Pater potest gignere; quod non esset²⁴, nisi potentia diceret quid. Unde dixit, quod potentia generandi est in Filio, sed non ad generare, sed ad generari. Haec autem positio²⁵ dicit, quod est in solo Patre, quia non tantum respicit naturam, sed proprietatem personae.

Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod²⁶ generare consequitur naturam; dicendum, quod in divinis non consequitur naturam simpliciter, sed naturam ut in persona; quia non in qualibet persona est natura fecunda, sed solum in persona Patris, et hoc est per aliquam proprietatem, quae est solius illius personae; non sic est in inferioribus, sicut iam patebit²⁷: ideo patet quod illud non valet.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod in aeternis est idem esse et posse; dicendum, quod verum est; sed tamen argumentum nihil²⁸ valet. Quamvis enim omnino sit idem in divinis esse et esse Patrem, non tamen sequitur, quod si esse Patrem est proprium, quod esse sit proprium. Similiter nec si esse sit commune, quod propter hoc esse Patrem²⁹. Similiter dicendum in proposito.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de scientia, quod dicit quid, sive per se dicatur, sive cum alio; dicendum, quod non est simile de scientia et potentia. Scientia enim, quantum est de se, dicit qualitatem absolutam, et ideo, quantum est de se, dicit quid, nisi trahatur; sed potentia dicit

habitudinem ad³⁰ originem, et ideo potest dicere habitudinem propriam et personae ad personam. Unde illud simile Magistri non valet secundum hanc positionem, quod³¹, sicut una est voluntas, qua Pater vult esse Pater et non vult esse Filius, et e converso, similiter una est potentia, ut videtur.

Ad argumenta contra: Si quis autem vult sustinere positionem Magistri, de facili potest ad omnes rationes in oppositum respondere.

Ad 1. Nam nulla ratio probat, quod potentia de se dicat proprium, sed quod potentia generandi active dicta sive posse generare dicat ex adiuncto respectum ad personam, et ita dicit ad aliquid; sed hoc est solum ratione additi. Unde³² notandum, quod quatuor sunt genera nominum in divinis. Quaedam enim essentialia sunt dicta essentialiter, ut deitas et maiestas; quaedam essentialia personaliter dicta, ut potentia generandi; quaedam personalia dicta personaliter, ut generans et genitus; quaedam personalia dicta essentialiter, ut missus, incarnatus et huiusmodi³³, quae dicunt respectum ad personam, et ideo personalia, et effectum in creatura, et ideo essentialiter sunt dicta.

Ad 2. Duabus rationibus sequentibus facile est respondere, quia illud non habet veritatem, nisi quando actus complectitur totam potentiam³⁴; non sic est in potentia Dei, quia eadem est potentia gignere et gigni in Deo.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod idem est posse generare et generare; dicendum, quod non valet. Quamvis enim idem sit Pater et substantia, non tamen sequitur, quod si Pater dicitur ad aliquid, quod et substantia, sicut melius patebit infra³⁵.

Ad 4 et 5. Duabus ultimis rationibus difficile est bene respondere; tamen potest quis dicere, quod rationes illae non concludunt, quod potentia dicat ad aliquid de se, sed solum ratione adiuncti, quod est generare; et sic patent cetera³⁶.

Question I. Whether the power of begetting signifies something absolute or relative.

Concerning the first, that "to be able to beget" signifies something (a what), is shown:

1. First, by the authority of the Master in the text¹: that « the Father is not powerful save by nature, and his power is the very² essence, or essence »; but nature and power signify something, not in relation to something: therefore so also does the power of begetting.

2. Likewise³, it is shown by reason thus: to beget is to produce that which is similar to oneself in nature; but according to the Philosopher⁴ « nature is a force implanted in things which procreates like from like »: therefore the power of begetting regards nature itself or essence in itself, not the person; but every such thing signifies something: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, « in things perpetual, to be and to be able do not differ »⁵: therefore much more strongly in things eternal; therefore being and being-able, and power and essence, are the same; but being and essence in divine matters signify something, not in relation to something, whether they are said by themselves or with an adjunct; hence the essence of the Father signifies something: therefore by parity of reasoning so does the power of begetting.

4. Likewise, in divine matters, the ability to know and the ability to will are really the same; but in divine matters there is no proper knowledge or knowledge in relation to something⁶, rather knowledge signifies something and is of the three [persons], and likewise the will: therefore the power of begetting signifies something, that is, essence.

On the contrary:

1. The Master says in the text, and it is found in the first chapter⁷: To be able to beget is not to be able [to do] something, therefore it does not signify something; and it signifies either something or in relation to something: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, by reason it is shown thus: powers are distinguished by their acts⁸: therefore if the act of a power signifies something, so does the power; and if it signifies in relation to something, then so does the power likewise. But it is established that to beget in divine matters does not signify something but in relation to something: therefore neither does the ability to beget.

3. Likewise, although in creatures power and operation differ, yet in God they are the same, as Dionysius will it⁹: therefore in God it is the same to be-able-to-beget and to beget; but to beget in divine matters signifies in relation to something and not something: therefore likewise the ability.

4. Likewise, the Father begets and is able to beget: either, then, he is able because he begets, or he begets because he is able. It is established that he is not able to beget because he begets: therefore he begets because he is able to beget¹⁰. If, then, the ground of a property must itself be proper, therefore the power of begetting must be proper; and nothing is proper in divine matters except what signifies in relation to something: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, every active power which is in a creature is in it according to certain conditions or¹¹ properties, as is plain. For the ability to illuminate is in a luminous body through light, the ability to heat in a hot thing through heat. Now although the power of begetting is not active, yet it is similar to an active power: therefore since it is in the Father, it is there through some property; and that property either signifies something or in relation to something. If something: therefore¹² it is in all the persons, and so likewise is the ability to beget — which the Master manifestly denies: therefore it signifies in relation to something: therefore so does the power which is in [the Father] according to it: therefore etc.

Conclusion. Among the three opinions on this matter, that one seems more probable which asserts that the power of begetting signifies both relation and substance, but in the direct sense [signifies] relation.

I respond: It must be said that, concerning this problem, there have been three positions.

Opinion 1. There were¹³ some who distinguished the power of begetting, saying that the power of begetting can be called a bare power or a disposed power. If it is called a bare power, then they wished¹⁴ to say that it signifies something and is in all three persons, since this power so understood follows nature; whence, since nature is in every person, so likewise is a power of this kind. But insofar as it is called a disposed power, since it does not have the disposition or fitness for it to issue into the act of generation¹⁵ except in the person of the Father alone, they wished to say that it signifies in relation to something.

It is rejected. But the words of this position do not seem true or sound. Not true, I say, because that whose power is bare is by nature equally apt to be disposed; if therefore the power of begetting belongs to the three¹⁶, inasmuch as it is a bare power, it likewise [belongs to them] as disposed; and so any [person] could beget. Moreover it does not seem sound: for to posit a bare power, which is indifferent to being and not-being with respect to a generation which it is altogether necessary should be, does not seem soundly or properly stated.

Opinion 2. There were also others who said that, since in divine matters being-able and being are the same, and power and essence are the same, then just as power and essence signify something, so likewise being and being-able. And just as, when I say "the essence of the Father" and "the essence of the Son" and "[the essence] of the Holy Spirit," or "for the Father to be"¹⁷, "for the Son to be," "for the Holy Spirit to be," I do not say another essence nor another being, but [the being] of one and of another; so when I say "the power of the Father," or "the Father can beget" and "the Son can be begotten," I do not say another and another being-able, but [the being-able] of one and of another. And of this position was the Master, as evidently appears in the text¹⁸. Whence they said that to-be-able-to-beget signifies something, but with a respect to something else, because it is an essential drawn to the person. For since it is not of an utterly abstract sort, it can be drawn to the person.

And this position of the Master¹⁹ is sufficiently probable, and seems sufficiently well able to be sustained.

Opinion 3. There were also a third group, the more modern, who said that the power of begetting signifies in relation to something in divine matters of itself. And their reason is: because power signifies a relation of an originating principle to that which is principiated. And because a relation can be of person to person — and then it is truly a relation — and of essence to creature — and then it is according to the manner of speaking or of understanding — hence it is that "principle" by its very account is not only an essential [term] appropriated by addition, but rather also signifies a property of a person. By like reasoning, since power signifies an originating relation, not merely an essential one, it is not only²⁰ said or drawn to the person so as to signify essence personally, but rather it signifies a property, and so [signifies] in relation to something of itself.

And this position, without prejudice, seems more probable. For the power of begetting does not seem to signify anything but the fecundity for the act of generation; and that is a property of a person, whence likewise so is the power²¹. Nor is the case of being-able and being similar except in one mode. For this verb is is sometimes predicated by itself, sometimes is the third adjacent. When it is said by itself, then it signifies an absolute act, because it signifies the act of being by reason of essence; and then it must be said absolutely and must signify something. But when it is the third adjacent, as when it is said the Father is God²², the Father is the Father, then this verb is signifies a relation of predicate to subject. And because it can signify a relation to either an essential or a personal predicate, therefore it can signify essential being and a personal mode of being. But "to be able," by its own proper account, signifies a relation according to origin; and hence it is that it is specified by its adjunct, so as to signify the condition of an essential or of a personal principle. Sustaining this position, then, I respond²³ to the arguments which prove that it signifies something.

*To the arguments proving that it signifies something:*

To 1. As to what is first objected, the matter is plain: for I concede that the Master was of this position. Whence they said that the Son can be begotten by the same power by which the Father can beget; which would not be so²⁴ unless the power signified something. Whence he said that the power of begetting is in the Son, but not for begetting, but for being begotten. But this position²⁵ says that it is in the Father alone, because it does not regard nature only, but a property of the person.

To 2. As to what is objected, that²⁶ begetting follows nature; it must be said that, in divine matters, it does not follow nature simply, but nature as in a person; because not in every person is there a fecund nature, but only in the person of the Father, and this is through some property which is of that person alone; it is not so in lower things, as will soon be plain²⁷: hence it is plain that that [argument] is not valid.

To 3. As to what is objected, that in eternal things being and being-able are the same; it must be said that this is true; but nevertheless the argument is worth nothing²⁸. For although in divine matters being and being-the-Father are utterly the same, yet it does not follow that, if being-the-Father is proper, therefore being is proper. Likewise neither, if being is common, that on this account being-the-Father [is common]²⁹. Likewise it must be said in the case proposed.

To 4. As to what is objected concerning knowledge, that it signifies something whether said by itself or with another; it must be said that knowledge and power are not alike. For knowledge, as far as concerns itself, signifies an absolute quality, and therefore, as far as concerns itself, signifies something, unless it be drawn [to a person]; but power signifies a relation to³⁰ origin, and therefore can signify a proper relation, and one of person to person. Whence that comparison of the Master is not valid according to this position, namely³¹ that, just as there is one will by which the Father wills to be the Father and does not will to be the Son, and conversely, so likewise there is one power, as it seems.

To the arguments on the contrary: But if anyone wishes to sustain the position of the Master, he can easily reply to all the arguments on the opposite side.

To 1. For no reason proves that power of itself signifies a property, but only that the power of begetting taken actively, or "to be able to beget," signifies from the adjunct a respect to the person, and so signifies in relation to something; but this is only by reason of what is added. Whence³² it is to be noted that there are four kinds of names in divine matters. For some essential ones are said essentially, as deity and majesty; some essentials are said personally, as power of begetting; some personals are said personally, as begetting and begotten; some personals are said essentially, as sent, incarnate, and the like³³, which signify a respect to the person, and therefore are personal, and an effect in the creature, and therefore are said essentially.

To 2. It is easy to reply to the two following arguments, since that does not have truth except when the act exhausts the whole power³⁴; it is not so in the power of God, since the same is the power to beget and to be begotten in God.

To 3. As to what is objected, that to-be-able-to-beget and to beget are the same; it must be said that it is not valid. For although the Father and the substance are the same, yet it does not follow that, if the Father is said in relation to something, the substance also is, as will be better shown below³⁵.

To 4 and 5. It is difficult to reply well to the two last arguments; nevertheless one can say that those reasons do not conclude that power signifies in relation to something of itself, but only by reason of the adjunct, which is "to beget"; and so the rest are clear³⁶.