Bonaventure — Opera Omnia

Dist. 6, Art. 1, Q. 1

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 6

Textus Latinus

p. 125

Quaestio I. Utrum generatio Filii sit secundum rationem necessitatis.

Circa primum, quod generatio sit secundum conditionem necessitatis,¹ sic ostenditur.

1. Fecundior et actualior est natura in Patre ad producendum Filium, quam sit in luce ad producendum radium; sed lucem necesse est radium producere, ita quod productio in ipsa est secundum conditionem necessitatis: ergo multo fortius in Patre respectu Filii.

2. Item, omne quod emanat ab alio², emanat secundum conditionem necessitatis, aut contingentiae: ergo et Filius emanat altero istorum duorum modorum; sed non secundum conditionem contingentiae, quia tunc contingens esset Filium generari: ergo etc.

3. Item, ab omnipotente detrahere maximum posse est impossibile; sed Deus Pater est omnipotens, cuius maximum posse est generare Filium: ergo detrahere ei posse generare Filium est impossibile. Sed in aeternis potentia est coniuncta actui³: ergo pari ratione impossibile est auferre actum generationis: ergo impossibile est non generare; sed impossibile non esse et necesse esse convertuntur: ergo necesse est generare.

Contra:

1. Augustinus ad Orosium, et Magister dicit in littera⁴: « Nec voluntate nec necessitate genuit Pater Filium, quia necessitas in Deo non est »: ergo etc.

2. Item, Hilarius in libro de Synodis⁵: « Non naturali necessitate ductus Pater genuit Filium »: ergo non fuit ibi necessitas naturalis nec necessitas alia, ut videtur; ergo etc.

3. Item, nobilius producens est illud quod dominatur suae actioni, quam quod subiacet; sed agens secundum rationem necessitatis subiacet actioni, quia velit nolit oportet ipsum facere: ergo si⁶ Pater, qui est nobilissimum agens, nobilissimo modo producit Filium, non igitur secundum conditionem necessitatis.

4. Item, hoc idem potest ostendi sic: quod gratis datur, non de necessitate datur; sed Richardus⁷ dicit, quod in Patre est amor gratuitus, quia dat esse Filio et Spiritui sancto: si ergo gratis dat, non de necessitate dat.

Conclusio. Generatio in divinis necessaria est necessitate immutabilitatis, non tamen alia specie necessitatis.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod multiplex est necessitas. Quaedam⁸ enim est necessitas proveniens ex principio disconveniente, quaedam ex principio deficiente, quaedam ex principio conveniente et sufficiente.

p. 126

Illa quae provenit ex principio disconveniente, est duplex: aut enim est ex ipso movente contra naturam, et haec est necessitas violentiae; aut contra voluntatem, et ista necessitas est coactionis⁹; et de istis duobus modis quaerit haereticus, qui sunt valde usitati.

Illa similiter, quae est ex principio deficiente, est duplex: aut enim est respectu eius, quo res est nata compleri; et haec est necessitas indigentiae, ut cibi et potus; de hac dicitur primae Ioannis tertio¹⁰: Qui viderit fratrem suum necessitatem patientem etc.; aut respectu eius, quod incurrit ex ipso defectu; et haec est necessitas inevitabilitatis, qualis est in morte et in primis motibus; hanc necessitatem incurrit homo ex carentia originalis iustitiae, Psalmus¹¹: De necessitatibus meis erue me.

Tertia similiter, quae est ex principio sufficiente et conveniente, est duplex: aut enim est ex principio sufficiente in disponendo, et haec est necessitas materiae dispositae, quae potest dici necessitas exigentiae; aut in complendo, et haec est necessitas immutabilitatis¹².

Et haec ultima¹³ necessitas cadit in Deo, et principaliter in Deo, quia ipse solus est qui sibi omnino sufficit et qui secum omnino convenit. Haec autem necessitas non repugnat libertati voluntatis, sed solum vertibilitati, qualis non est in Deo.

1. Ad illud quod obiicitur de littera, dicendum, quod illud intelligitur de necessitate coactionis, quae nullo modo cadit in Deo¹⁴, et de hac quaerebat haereticus.

2. Similiter et Hilarius intelligit de hac eadem, unde et subdit¹⁵ in littera: non naturali necessitate, cum nollet; tunc enim ibi esset coactio, dum repugnaret voluntas.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod agens per necessitatem subiacet suae actioni; dicendum, quod falsum est, nisi sit necessitas repugnans voluntati. Cum enim est necessitas repugnans, necesse est voluntatem subiici, quia non potest praevalere. Sed quando est necessitas summe consonans, non potens discordare a voluntate, tunc nullam inducit subiectionem, sicut patet. Deus enim¹⁶ necessario est beatus et necessario vult esse beatus; et sicut necessarium est, ipsum esse beatum, ita et velle; sic intelligendum est in generatione Filii.

4. Ad illud quod ultimo¹⁷ obiicitur de amore gratuito, dicendum, quod duo sunt in gratuito amore: unum est, quod dat ex mera liberalitate, ita quod nulla est exigentia sive debitum meriti vel naturae; aliud, quod¹⁸ dat sine retributione, et quantum ad hoc secundum dicitur amor gratuitus in Patre, non quantum ad primum. Naturalis enim fecunditas Patris necessario est ratio communicandi naturam alii.

Scholion

I. Quoad ipsam generationem in divinis cfr. infra d. 9. per totam. — Easdem distinctiones necessitatis, paulo alio modo explicatas, S. Doctor habet in quadam quaestione disputata hucusque anecdota: utrum divinum esse sit summe necessarium, ex qua haec inserimus. « Triplex est necessitas: quaedam omnino extrinseca, quaedam partim extrinseca, partim intrinseca, et quaedam omnino intrinseca. Necessitas omnino extrinseca est illa quae ortum habet a principio, quod est extra, nihil cooperante passo; et haec dupliciter habet esse, vel respectu operum naturalium, vel respectu operum voluntariorum; et sic duplex est necessitas, scilicet violentiae et coactionis. Necessitas vero partim intra, partim extra est, quae aliquo modo est a principio intrinseco respiciente aliquid extra vel per modum principii moventis, vel per modum termini quiescentis; et sic est necessitas dupliciter dicta, scilicet inevitabilitatis et indigentiae. Quaedam vero est necessitas omnino intrinseca, quae inest rei ex propria natura; et haec est necessitas immutabilitatis et independentiae, et talis necessitas secundum quid reperitur in creatura, simpliciter autem non potest reperiri nisi in creatrice essentia. Ipsa enim sola est, quae non admittit aliquam dependentiam; cetera vero, cum sint creata, necessario dependent ab ipsa. Haec autem necessitas necessario ponitur in esse divino, quia est in se ipso et a se ipso » etc.

Ultima illa species necessitatis, quam S. Doctor in corp. vocat necessitatem immutabilitatis, intelligenda est in sensu absoluto, ita ut eius oppositum simpliciter sit impossibile. Hoc ideo notandum fuit, quia aliqui doctores necessitatem immutabilitatis aliter accipiunt, nempe pro ea qua aliquid ita habet esse, ut oppositum etiam possit esse, sed non simul cum suo opposito (cfr. Brulifer ad hunc locum). — De variis divisionibus necessitatis cfr. S. Bonav., II. Sent. d. 7. p. I. a. 2. q. 2. ad 3; et ibid. d. 25. p. II. q. 2. in corp.; III. Sent. d. 12. a. 2. q. 1. ad 5.

II. Quoad conclusionem ipsam cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 42. m. 5. a. 1. — Scot., hic q. 1, et Report., hic q. 3. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1; S. I. q. 41. a. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 1; S. p. I. tr. 7. q. 30. m. 3. a. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 1. et 2. — Henr. Gand., de hac et seq. q. 8. a. 54. q. 3.

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English Translation

Question I. Whether the generation of the Son is according to the account of necessity.

Concerning the first point, that the generation [of the Son] is according to the condition of necessity,¹ it is shown thus.

1. The nature in the Father is more fertile and more actual for producing the Son than [the nature] in light is for producing a ray; but it is necessary that light produce a ray, so that the production in it is according to the condition of necessity: therefore much more so in the Father with respect to the Son.

2. Likewise, everything that emanates from another² emanates either according to the condition of necessity or [according to the condition] of contingency: therefore the Son too emanates in one or the other of these two modes; but not according to the condition of contingency, because then it would be contingent that the Son be generated: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, to take away from the omnipotent the greatest power is impossible; but God the Father is omnipotent, whose greatest power is to generate the Son: therefore to take from him the power to generate the Son is impossible. But in eternal things potency is conjoined to act³: therefore by parallel reasoning it is impossible to take away the act of generation: therefore it is impossible not to generate; but to be impossible-not-to-be and to be necessary-to-be are convertible: therefore it is necessary to generate.

On the contrary:

1. Augustine to Orosius, and the Master says in the text⁴: « Neither by will nor by necessity did the Father beget the Son, because necessity is not in God »: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Hilary in the book On the Synods⁵: « Not led by natural necessity did the Father beget the Son »: therefore there was there neither natural necessity nor any other necessity, as it seems; therefore etc.

3. Likewise, the more noble producer is that which is master of its own action, rather than that which is subject [to it]; but an agent acting according to the account of necessity is subject to the action, because willing or unwilling it must do it: therefore if⁶ the Father, who is the most noble agent, produces the Son in the most noble manner, [it is] therefore not according to the condition of necessity.

4. Likewise, this same point can be shown thus: what is given gratuitously is not given of necessity; but Richard⁷ says that in the Father there is gratuitous love, because he gives being to the Son and to the Holy Spirit: if therefore he gives gratuitously, he does not give of necessity.

Conclusion. Generation in the divine [persons] is necessary by necessity of immutability, not however by any other species of necessity.

I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing, it must be noted that necessity is manifold. For there is one kind of necessity proceeding from a disagreeing principle, another from a deficient principle, another from an agreeing and sufficient principle.⁸

That [necessity] which proceeds from a disagreeing principle is twofold: for either it is from the mover itself acting against nature, and this is necessity of violence; or against the will, and this necessity is [the necessity] of coercion⁹; and concerning these two modes — which are very common — the heretic inquires.

Likewise that [necessity] which is from a deficient principle is twofold: for either it is with respect to that by which a thing is naturally completed; and this is necessity of indigence, as of food and drink; concerning this it is said in 1 John 3¹⁰: Whoever sees his brother suffering necessity etc.; or with respect to that which is incurred from the very defect; and this is necessity of inevitability, such as is in death and in first motions; man incurs this necessity from the lack of original justice, [as in] the Psalm¹¹: From my necessities deliver me.

Likewise the third [necessity], which is from a sufficient and agreeing principle, is twofold: for either it is from a principle sufficient in disposing, and this is the necessity of disposed matter, which can be called necessity of requirement; or [a principle sufficient] in completing, and this is the necessity of immutability.¹²

And this last¹³ necessity falls in God, and principally in God, because he alone is the one who is wholly sufficient unto himself and who wholly agrees with himself. But this necessity does not conflict with freedom of the will, but only with changeableness, such as is not in God.

1. To that which is objected from the text, it must be said that it is understood of the necessity of coercion, which in no way falls in God,¹⁴ and concerning this the heretic was inquiring.

2. Likewise Hilary too understands [this] of this same [necessity of coercion], whence he also adds¹⁵ in the text: not by natural necessity, when he was unwilling; for then there would be coercion, when the will resists.

3. To that which is objected, that an agent [acting] through necessity is subject to its action; it must be said that it is false, unless the necessity is one repugnant to the will. For when there is a repugnant necessity, the will must be subjected, because it cannot prevail. But when there is a necessity supremely consonant [with the will], not able to disagree with the will, then it induces no subjection, as is clear. For God¹⁶ is necessarily blessed and necessarily wills to be blessed; and just as it is necessary that he be blessed, so [is it necessary that he] will [it]; thus it is to be understood in the generation of the Son.

4. To that which is objected lastly¹⁷ concerning gratuitous love, it must be said that there are two [things] in gratuitous love: one is, that it gives from sheer liberality, so that there is no requirement or debt of merit or of nature; the other, that it¹⁸ gives without retribution, and as far as this second [sense] is concerned, [the love] in the Father is called gratuitous love, not as to the first. For the natural fecundity of the Father is necessarily the ground of communicating the nature to another.

Scholion

I. Concerning generation in the divine [persons] itself, see below d. 9 throughout. — The same distinctions of necessity, explained in a slightly different manner, the holy Doctor has in a certain disputed question hitherto unpublished: whether the divine being is supremely necessary, from which we insert these [words]. « Necessity is threefold: one [is] entirely extrinsic, one partly extrinsic and partly intrinsic, and one entirely intrinsic. Entirely extrinsic necessity is that which has its origin from a principle which is outside, with the patient cooperating in nothing; and this has its being in two ways, either with respect to natural works or with respect to voluntary works; and thus necessity is twofold, namely [necessity] of violence and of coercion. But the necessity partly within and partly without is [the necessity] which in some way is from an intrinsic principle regarding something outside, either by way of a moving principle or by way of a resting term; and thus necessity is said in two ways, namely [necessity] of inevitability and of indigence. But there is a certain necessity entirely intrinsic, which is in a thing from its own nature; and this is the necessity of immutability and of independence, and such necessity is found in a creature only in a qualified sense, but absolutely cannot be found except in the creating essence. For it [the creating essence] alone is that which admits no dependence; but the rest, since they are created, necessarily depend on it. But this necessity is necessarily posited in the divine being, because it is in itself and from itself » etc.

That last species of necessity, which the holy Doctor in the body [of the article] calls necessity of immutability, must be understood in an absolute sense, so that its opposite is simply impossible. This had to be noted because some doctors take necessity of immutability otherwise, namely for that by which something has its being in such a way that the opposite can also be, but not at the same time as its opposite (cf. Brulifer at this place). — On the various divisions of necessity see St. Bonaventure, II Sent. d. 7. p. I. a. 2. q. 2. ad 3; and ibid. d. 25. p. II. q. 2. in the body; III Sent. d. 12. a. 2. q. 1. ad 5.

II. Concerning the conclusion itself see Alex. of Hales, S. p. I. q. 42. m. 5. a. 1. — Scotus, here q. 1, and Reportata, here q. 3. — St. Thomas, here q. 1. a. 1; S. I. q. 41. a. 2. — Bl. Albert, here a. 1; S. p. I. tr. 7. q. 30. m. 3. a. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1. a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 1. — Giles of Rome, here 1. princ. q. 1. et 2. — Henry of Ghent, On this and the following q. 8. a. 54. q. 3.

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Apparatus Criticus

Vat. respondet ad haereticum hominem arguendo, sed obstant mss. et ed. 1.
The Vatican edition reads he responds to the heretical man by arguing, but the manuscripts and the first edition stand against [it].
Nonnulli codd. ut K W X Y ee aliquo pro alio.
Some codices, as K W X Y, [read] ee aliquo in place of alio.
Aristot., III. Phys. text. 32 (c. 1): Posse enim ab ipso esse nihil differt in perpetuis. — Paulo infra post auferre cod. O addit ei. — De conversione harum propositionum modalium impossibile non esse et necesse esse cfr. Aristot., II. Periherm. c. 3 (c. 13) et de relatione inter omnipotentiam et potentiam vide infra d. 7. q. 1.
Aristotle, Physics III, text 32 (c. 1): For in eternal things, to be able to be does not differ from being itself. — A little below, after auferre, codex O adds ei. — On the conversion of these modal propositions impossible-not-to-be and necessary-to-be, cf. Aristotle, De interpretatione II, c. 3 (c. 13), and on the relation between omnipotence and power see below d. 7. q. 1.
In principio huius distinctionis.
At the beginning of this distinction.
Num. 58. XXV: Non enim nolente Patre, coactus Pater naturali necessitate ductus, cum nollet, genuit Filium.
N. 58. XXV: For not with the Father unwilling, [nor] coerced, did the Father, led by natural necessity, when he was unwilling, beget the Son.
Vat., refragantibus antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1, simpliciter pro si. Paulo ante post actioni cod. O adiungit sine.
The Vatican edition, with the older manuscripts and the first edition resisting, [reads] simpliciter in place of si. A little before, after actioni, codex O adds sine.
Libr. V. de Trin. c. 17-19, in quorum primo capite ait: Gratuitum autem amorem se habere ostendit, qui procedentibus de se plenitudinis suae abundantiam tam largiter, quam libenter et gratis impendit. — Et in ultimo capite dicta recolligens ait: Constat namque, quia in uno ex tribus (divinis personis) est amor summus et solum gratuitus; in altero vero sic summus etc. — Vat. mox quo pro quia, sed contra mss. et ed. 1, et in fine argumenti post non repetit dat.
Book V On the Trinity, c. 17–19; in the first of these chapters he says: He shows himself to have a gratuitous love, who, to those who proceed from himself, expends the abundance of his own fullness as bountifully as gladly and gratuitously. — And in the last chapter, gathering up what was said, he says: For it is established that in one of the three (divine persons) there is supreme and only gratuitous love; but in another it is thus supreme etc. — The Vatican edition presently [reads] quo in place of quia, but against the manuscripts and the first edition, and at the end of the argument after non it repeats dat.
In Vat. et cod. cc additur autem.
In the Vatican edition and codex cc, autem is added.
De duplici hac necessitate cfr. Aristot., III. Ethic. c. 1, et I. Magnor. Moral. c. 11-16 (c. 12-17). — Paulo ante ex vetustioribus mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus ista. — De haeretico, quem S. Doctor hoc loco introducit, vide hic lit. Magistri.
On this twofold necessity see Aristotle, Ethics III, c. 1, and I Magna Moralia c. 11–16 (c. 12–17). — A little before, from the older manuscripts and the first edition, we have supplied ista. — On the heretic whom the holy Doctor here introduces, see here the text of the Master.
Vers. 17, in quo textu Vulgata pro patientem legit habere.
Verse 17, in which text the Vulgate reads habere in place of patientem.
24, 17.
[Ps.] 24, 17.
Cfr. Aristot., I. Phys. text. 81 (c. 9), ubi agit de materiae naturali appetitu respectu formae; et V. Metaph. text. 6 (IV. c. 5), ubi praeter necessitatem immutabilitatis alias proponit necessitatis species, quae in praecedentibus tactae sunt.
Cf. Aristotle, Physics I, text 81 (c. 9), where he treats of the natural appetite of matter with respect to form; and Metaphysics V, text 6 (IV. c. 5), where, besides necessity of immutability, he proposes other species of necessity, which were touched on in the preceding [passages].
Vat. cum cod. cc, obnitentibus antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1, Et hoc ultimo modo, et paulo infra post est qui minus apte repetit principaliter. In fine corp. cod. T cum pluribus aliis post qualis omittit non, quae lectio explicatur lectione cod. R quare est in Deo.
The Vatican edition with codex cc, with the older manuscripts and the first edition resisting, [reads] Et hoc ultimo modo ["And in this last mode"], and a little below, after est qui, less aptly repeats principaliter. At the end of the body, codex T with several others, after qualis, omits non, which reading is explained by the reading of codex R quare est in Deo ["wherefore it is in God"].
Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 Deum.
The Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and the first edition, [reads] Deum.
Substituimus ex mss. et ed. 1 et subdit loco subiungit. — Textum Hilarii supra in argum. 2. ad opp. integre exhibuimus.
We have substituted, from the manuscripts and the first edition, et subdit ["and he adds"] in place of subiungit. — We have given the text of Hilary in full above in argument 2 ad oppositum.
Fide mss. et ed. 1 adiecimus enim.
On the trust of the manuscripts and the first edition we have added enim.
Vat. cum cod. cc hic omittit ultimo, et paulo infra post dat omittit ex, sed obstant codd. antiquiores cum ed. 1.
The Vatican edition with codex cc here omits ultimo, and a little below, after dat, omits ex, but the older codices with the first edition stand against [this].
Ex plurimis mss. et ed. 1 substituimus quod loco quia. Circa finem solutionis Vat. praeter fidem antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 omittit naturalis et in fine alii. Edd. 2,3,4,5,6 cum cod. cc naturae pro naturalis, omittunt etiam in fine alii.
From very many manuscripts and the first edition we have substituted quod in place of quia. Toward the end of the solution, the Vatican edition, beyond the trust of the older manuscripts and the first edition, omits naturalis and at the end alii. Editions 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 with codex cc [read] naturae in place of naturalis, and also omit at the end alii.

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