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Dist. 25, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 1

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 25

Textus Latinus
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Articulus Unicus. De libero arbitrio in comparatione ad rationem et voluntatem.

Ad intelligentiam huius partis incidit hic quaestio, quid sit liberum arbitrium secundum rem. Et quoniam eius quidditas et natura cognoscitur in assignando convenientiam et differentiam ipsius ad voluntatem et rationem, ideo de ipso quaerendum est in comparatione ad rationem et voluntatem. Ad huius autem comparationis dilucidationem circa sex contingit dubitare et quaerere.

Primo enim quaeritur, utrum liberum arbitrium sit in solis habentibus rationem et voluntatem.

Secundo, dato quod sic, quaeritur, utrum sit potentia distincta contra rationem et voluntatem, an non.

Tertio, dato quod non, quaeritur, utrum complectatur simul rationem et voluntatem.

Quarto, dato quod sic, quaeritur, utrum complectatur illas duas potentias per modum potentiae, an per modum habitus.

Quinto, dato quod per modum habitus, quaeritur, utrum habitus ille addat aliquid per essentiam rationi et voluntati.

Sexto et ultimo quaeritur, secundum quam illarum duarum potentiarum principalius insit animae libertas arbitrii, utrum videlicet secundum rationem, an secundum voluntatem.

Quaestio I. Utrum liberum arbitrium sit in solis habentibus rationem, an etiam sit in animalibus brutis.

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum liberum arbitrium sit in solis habentibus rationem: an etiam sit in animalibus brutis. Et quod sit in animalibus brutis, videtur.

1. Illa potentia libera dicitur esse, cuius est eligere bonum et fugere malum1; sed hanc potentiam videmus esse in brutis, sicut patet in ove, quae fugit lupum et quaerit pastorem: ergo etc.

2. Item, illa potentia libertatem habet, quae potens est in opposita; sed in brutis animalibus est potentia ad faciendum opposita, quia modo ostendunt benignitatem, modo ferocitatem, modo vadunt, modo veniunt: ergo talia animalia a libertate arbitrii non sunt aliena.

3. Item, illa potentia est libera, quae est domina sui actus2, haec autem est, quae potest se ipsam in suo actu refrenare et compescere; sed talis potentia reperitur in brutis animalibus, quod patet, quia ab his quae appetunt, per disciplinam compescuntur, sicut planum est in animalibus domitis et domesticatis: ergo etc.

4. Item, illa potentia libertatem habet in movendo, cuius motus incipit a principio intrinseco3; hic enim motus est potentiae perfectae in movendo; sed in animalibus brutis a principio intrinseco incipit: ergo etc.

5. Item, illa potentia libera est praecipue, cuius est gerere providentiam non solummodo circa praesentia, sed etiam circa futura4; sed talis est in brutis animalibus, sicut patet in formicis et aliis animalibus irrationalibus: ergo etc.

6. Item, illa potentia magis participat libertatem, quae non potest redigi in servitutem, quam quae potest5; sed homines in servitutem rediguntur, sed quaedam sunt animalia bruta, quae nequaquam domari possunt, sicut dracones et leones: ergo videtur, quod talia maxime habeant arbitrii libertatem.

Sed contra: 1. Liberum arbitrium sic definitur ab Augustino: «Liberum arbitrium est facultas rationis et voluntatis», sicut habitum est distinctione praecedenti6; sed in nullo est facultas rationis, in quo non sit ratio, et haec est in solis rationalibus: ergo et liberum arbitrium.

2. Item, omne quod habet liberum arbitrium est laudabile et vituperabile; sed sola rationalia sunt digna laude et vituperio, poena et praemio7: ergo etc.

3. Item, omne quod habet liberum arbitrium, natum est consiliari et deliberare; hoc autem est solius rationalis: ergo etc.

4. Item, liberum arbitrium est nobilissimum, quod sit in homine8: ergo si liberum arbitrium inveniretur in brutis, nobilissimum, quod est in homine, reperiretur in eis: ergo aeque nobilia essent bruta animalia, sicut sunt rationalia. Quod si hoc est inconveniens, patet etc.

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### Conclusio In solis substantiis rationalibus reperitur liberum arbitrium.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod absque dubio liberum arbitrium reperitur in solis substantiis rationalibus. — Et ratio huius sumitur tum ex parte libertatis, tum ex parte arbitrationis. Ex parte libertatis: libertas enim opponitur servituti. Unde illa sola potentia dicitur esse libera, quae dominium habet plenum tam respectu obiecti, quam respectu actus proprii. Illa autem potentia dominium habet ex libertate respectu obiecti, quae non est arctata ad aliquod genus appetibilis, sed nata est omnia appetibilia appetere et omne fugibile respuere. Tria autem sunt, quae sunt in appetitibus, et quorum opposita sunt in fugis, videlicet bonum, conferens et delectabile; et nomine boni ibi intelligitur honestum9. Cum autem bonum conferens et delectabile nata sint appeti ab irrationalibus, bonum honestum a solis rationalibus potest appeti; et ideo in eis solum reperitur virtus, quae non est ad aliquod genus appetibilis arctata, ac per hoc habens libertatem respectu obiecti.

In eis etiam solis reperitur potentia habens libertatem respectu actus proprii10; quod patet. Nam voluntas in rationalibus non solum compescit manum exteriorem vel pedem, sed etiam compescit se ipsam et refrenat, incipiens odire frequenter quod prius diligebat; et hoc ex sui ipsius imperio et dominio. In brutis autem animalibus, etsi aliquo modo sit reperire dominium respectu actus exterioris, quia bene refrenant11 aliquando, sicut patet in animalibus domesticis; respectu tamen actus proprii interioris, videlicet appetitus, dominium non est. Unde si aliquid amant, non possunt illud non amare, licet a prosecutione alicuius rei amatae arceantur timore alicuius passionis inflictivae. Et ideo dicit Damascenus12, quod «magis aguntur quam agant»; ac per hoc, cum non possint actum proprium reprimere, respectu actus proprii non habent libertatem, nec etiam respectu obiecti; et ideo, deficiente in eis libertate, liberum arbitrium non possunt participare.

Sumitur etiam ratio ex parte arbitrationis. Arbitrium enim idem est quod iudicium13, ad cuius nutum ceterae virtutes moventur et obediunt. Iudicare autem illius est secundum rationem completam, cuius est discernere inter iustum et iniustum, et inter proprium et alienum. Nulla autem potentia novit, quid iustum et quid iniustum, nisi illa sola, quae est particeps rationis et nata est cognoscere summam iustitiam, a qua est regula omnis iuris. Haec autem solum est in ea substantia, quae est ad imaginem Dei; qualis est tantum potentia rationalis14. Nulla enim substantia discernit, quid proprium et quid alienum, nisi cognoscat se ipsam et actum suum proprium. Sed nunquam aliqua potentia se ipsam cognoscit, vel super se ipsam reflectitur, quae sit alligata materiae15. Si igitur omnes potentiae sunt alligatae materiae et substantiae corporali praeter solam rationalem, sola illa est, quae potest se super se ipsam reflectere; et ideo ipsa sola est, in qua est plenum iudicium et arbitrium in discernendo, quid iustum et quid iniustum, quid proprium et quid alienum. — Tam igitur ratione libertatis, quam ratione arbitrationis liberum arbitrium in solis substantiis rationalibus reperitur. Et concedendae sunt rationes, quae hoc ostendunt.

Ad argumenta pro parte affirmativa:

1. Ad rationes vero ad oppositum plana est responsio per iam dicta. Ad illud enim quod primo obiicitur, quod bruta praeeligunt bonum malo; dicendum, quod verum est de bono conferenti et delectabili; sed non est verum de bono honesto, respectu cuius proprie liberum arbitrium consistit.

2. Ad illud similiter quod obiicitur, quod bruta possunt ad opposita moveri; patet responsio, quia non possunt moveri in omnia opposita, sed solum in illa quae sunt infra dignitatem liberi arbitrii.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod bruta dominantur actibus suis, quia possunt se reprimere; dicendum, quod non dominantur actibus interioribus, licet dominentur exterioribus; etsi enim comprimantur ab actu, non tamen retrahuntur ab appetitu. — Vel aliter potest dici, quod etsi etiam retrahantur ab actu suo, non tamen hoc est per dominium proprium; hoc enim est ex imaginatione

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mali exterioris, quod adeo exterret, ut magis retrahat, quam appetitus attrahat; et ideo sicut in appetendo et prosequendo magis aguntur quam agant, sic etiam in abstinendo vel se retrahendo magis reprimuntur quam se reprimant16.

4. Et per hoc patet responsio ad aliud, quod dicit17, quod principium motus est ab intrinseco in brutis animalibus. Dici enim potest, quod etsi principium motus exterioris procedat ab intrinseco, tamen appetitus interior potius habet ortum ab exteriori appetibili quam ex imperio appetitivae virtutis. Unde non quicumque motus ab intrinseco facit potentiam liberam, sed ille motus, quo vis motiva movet se ipsam; «voluntas enim et liberum arbitrium, ut dicit Anselmus18, est instrumentum se ipsum movens».

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod liberi arbitrii est providere; dicendum, quod providentia quaedam provenit ex actu deliberationis et praecognitionis, quaedam provenit ex instinctu naturali. Prima est libertatis arbitrariae et reperitur in solis rationalibus; secunda vero est naturalis sagacitatis et industriae; natura enim prudentissima est; et haec reperitur in brutis animalibus, et talis non ponit liberum arbitrium19.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quaedam animalia bruta domari non possunt; dicendum, quod aliquod animal non posse redigi in servitutem, hoc potest esse dupliciter: aut ratione voluntariae libertatis, aut ratione naturalis ferocitatis. Primo modo impossibile est, hominem redigi in servitutem. Quamvis enim aliquis possit aliquem compellere quantum ad actum exteriorem, quantum tamen ad interius velle nemo potest alterum compellere, sicut patebit infra20. Secundo modo bestiae aliquae sunt indomabiles nec possunt redigi in servitutem, quia tanta est earum ferocitas et impetus ad ea quae ferocitatis sunt, ut non possint assuefieri ad ea quae sunt lenitatis; et ideo ratio illa non cogit.

Scholion

I. Negatio liberi arbitrii est omnis impietatis fomentum; et cum satis de hoc fundamentali articulo doctrina ab antiquis temporibus plurimos semper habuerit adversarios, magni momenti est, doctrinam veram de ipso distincte determinare. Unde S. Bonav. cum aliis coaevis doctoribus plurimas (12) de hac re quaestiones solvere nititur, quae in scholis a praecedentibus magistris positae erant, ut patet ex Summa (p. II.) Praepositivi. Inter alia disputabatur, utrum liberum arbitrium sit potentia, an habitus, an actus, et si potentia sit, utrum rationis, an voluntatis, an utriusque. — Iuvat hic duo praenotare.

1. Cum S. Augustino et Magistro triplex libertas in creaturis distinguebatur: libertas a necessitate (coactione), a culpa, a miseria, sive libertas secundum naturam, gratiam et gloriam. Hinc variae libertatis definitiones circumferebantur, praecipue eae quarum Aristoteles et Ss. Augustinus, Bernardus, Anselmus sunt auctores; quas explicare et in concordiam redigere nititur S. Doctor, hic p. I. et II. Dub. 1-3.

2. Notandum est, illa aetate nomen libertatis in usu plerumque latius patuisse, quam nunc consuetudo scholarum patitur; quod etiam de termino coactionis dicendum est. Nunc enim nomen libertatis apud theologos bene restringitur ad tale voluntarium, quod non tantum excludit coactionem (violentiam) extrinsecus illatam, sed etiam necessitatem per interiorem determinationem ad unum, quae aufert potentiae indifferentiam, sive plenum dominium, quod habet voluntas super actus suos, ita ut in potestate eius sit velle et non velle. Hoc autem dominium requiritur ad actum electionis. In actu autem eligendi inter diversa media ad finem consequendum consistit propria et peculiaris liberi arbitrii operatio, praesertim quoad libertatem viatoris. Constat autem definitionibus Ecclesiae contra Baium et Iansenium, quod ad merendum, vel demerendum in statu naturae lapsae requiritur in homine non tantum libertas a coactione, sed etiam a necessitate (cfr. prop. 3. Iansenii, damnata ab Innocentio X. Alexandro VII. et Clemente XI; et Baii propp. 39. 67. 73. damnatae a S. Pio V. aliisque Summ. Pontif.). — Antiqui autem Scholastici, licet istas duas species voluntarii non raro iisdem nominibus significarent (ut v. g. S. Thom., S. I. q. 82. a. 1. ad 1.), tamen libertatem in sensu proprio, quae non tantum excludit coactionem, sed simul includit potentiam eligendi inter diversa media ad finem, bene distinguebant a libertate in sensu improprio, quae tantum importat spontaneitatem, quando scilicet voluntas intrinsecus determinata est ad unum. Talis determinatio est in viatoribus respectu finis, sive beatitudinis in genere; unde haec non cadit sub electione, nec circa ipsam ullo modo est libertas specificationis, sed tantum aliquatenus libertas exercitii. Comprehensores autem ad perpetuum actum amoris erga divinam bonitatem clare visam determinati sunt; unde hic actus propter ipsam summam cognitionis perfectionem perfectissime est voluntarius, sed non proprie liber. Tamen S. Bonav. (infra p. II. q. 2.) ita eundem nominat: «Et pro tanto dicitur liberum, quamvis immutabiliter ordinetur ad illud» (cfr. August., VI. Oper. imp. contra Iulian. c. 12.).

II. Ibidem autem et passim S. Bonav. duplex distinguit liberum arbitrium, scilicet secundum quod liberum (voluntarium) et secundum quod deliberans, et docet, deliberantis obiectum semper esse contingens; quod cum aliis approbat B. Albert. (hic a. 2.) his verbis: «Liberum arbitrium quantum ad actum deliberandi vel eligendi non est nisi futurorum contingentium per nos operabilium, quorum nos domini sumus». Ipse S. Bonav. (I. Sent. d. 40. a. 3. q. 2. ad 3.) dicit de electione, quod «omnis agens a proposito deliberans alteram partem contradictionis praeaccipit». S. Thom. (de Verit. q. 24. a. 1. ad 20.) similiter distinguit libertatem voluntatis a libertate liberi arbitrii his verbis: «De fine ultimo non iudicamus iudicio discussionis vel examinationis, sed naturaliter approbamus; propter quod de eo non est electio, sed voluntas. Habemus ergo respectu eius liberam voluntatem, cum necessitas naturalis inclinationis libertati non repugnet, secundum Augustinum, V. de Civitate Dei (c. 10), non omni libero iudicio, proprie loquendo, cum non cadit sub electione». Diffuso et egregie totam rem discutit idem, de Malo, q. 6. a. unicus (cfr. etiam huc q. unica a. 5. S. I. q. 83. a. 1-4.). — Quoad libertatem, quae requiritur ad merendum, vel demerendum, cfr. supra d. 7. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. et 2, infra d. 20. q. 6, d. 29. p. II. a. 3. q. 2; III. Sent. d. 12. a. 2. q. 1, d. 18. a. 1. q. 2. et q. 3. ad 3. — De variis speciebus necessitatis cfr. I. Sent. d. 6. q. 1. 2.

III. In hac quaestione egregie demonstratur, ad libertatem omnino praerequiri rationem, scilicet ut haberi possit plenum dominium tam respectu obiecti quam respectu actus. Duplex hoc dominium explicatur infra q. 3; aliaque plura, quae hic dicuntur, ibi et in seqq. huius distinctionis quaest. magis determinantur. Si autem distinctius quaeritur, quomodo se habeat ratio respectu liberi arbitrii, diversae fuerunt opiniones, de quibus infra in scholiis ad q. 1. et 6. nonnulla dicuntur. — Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 72. m. 3. a. 2. — S. Thom., S. I. q. 83. a. 1; de Verit. q. 24. a. 1. 2. — B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 1. q. 94. m. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 2. — Durand., hic q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1.

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English Translation

Article Unique. On free choice in comparison to reason and will.

For the understanding of this part there arises here the question, what free choice is according to the thing itself. And since its quiddity and nature is known by assigning its agreement and difference with respect to the will and reason, therefore an inquiry must be made about it in comparison to reason and will. For the clarification of this comparison there are six points on which one may raise doubt and inquire.

First, then, it is asked whether free choice is in those alone that have reason and will.

Second, granted that it is so, it is asked whether it is a power distinct over against reason and will, or not.

Third, granted that it is not, it is asked whether it embraces reason and will together.

Fourth, granted that it does, it is asked whether it embraces those two powers after the manner of a power, or after the manner of a habit.

Fifth, granted that it is after the manner of a habit, it is asked whether that habit adds anything by essence to reason and will.

Sixth and last, it is asked according to which of those two powers the soul's freedom of choice more principally inheres, namely whether according to reason, or according to will.

Question I. Whether free choice is in those alone that have reason, or whether it is also in the brute animals.

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether free choice is in those alone that have reason, or whether it is also in the brute animals. And that it is in the brute animals seems to be the case.

1. That power is said to be free whose office is to choose the good and to flee evil1; but we see this power to be in the brutes, as is clear in the sheep, which flees the wolf and seeks the shepherd: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, that power has freedom which is able toward opposites; but in the brute animals there is a power for doing opposites, since now they show gentleness, now ferocity, now they go, now they come: therefore such animals are not foreign to freedom of choice.

3. Likewise, that power is free which is mistress of its own act2, and this is one that can restrain and check itself in its act; but such a power is found in the brute animals, which is clear, because from those things which they desire they are checked through training, as is plain in animals that are tamed and domesticated: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, that power has freedom in moving whose motion begins from an intrinsic principle3; for this is the motion of a power perfect in moving; but in the brute animals it begins from an intrinsic principle: therefore, etc.

5. Likewise, that power is especially free whose office is to exercise foresight not only concerning present things, but also concerning future ones4; but such is found in the brute animals, as is clear in ants and other irrational animals: therefore, etc.

6. Likewise, that power participates more in freedom which cannot be reduced to servitude than the one which can5; but men are reduced to servitude, whereas there are certain brute animals which can in no way be tamed, such as dragons and lions: therefore it seems that such have the freedom of choice in the highest degree.

On the contrary: 1. Free choice is thus defined by Augustine: «Free choice is the faculty of reason and will», as was held in the preceding distinction6; but in nothing is there a faculty of reason in which there is not reason, and this is in rational beings alone: therefore so too is free choice.

2. Likewise, everything that has free choice is praiseworthy and blameworthy; but rational beings alone are worthy of praise and blame, of punishment and reward7: therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, everything that has free choice is born to take counsel and to deliberate; but this belongs to the rational being alone: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, free choice is the noblest thing that is in man8: therefore if free choice were found in the brutes, the noblest thing that is in man would be found in them: therefore the brute animals would be equally noble, as the rational beings are. And if this is unfitting, the matter is clear, etc.

### Conclusion In rational substances alone is free choice found.

I respond: It must be said that without doubt free choice is found in rational substances alone. — And the reason for this is taken both on the side of freedom and on the side of arbitration (judgment). On the side of freedom: for freedom is opposed to servitude. Hence that power alone is said to be free which has full dominion both with respect to its object and with respect to its own act. Now that power has dominion from freedom with respect to its object which is not narrowed to some one genus of the desirable, but is born to desire all desirable things and to reject everything to-be-fled. Now there are three things which are among the things desired, and whose opposites are among the things fled, namely the good, the advantageous, and the pleasant; and by the name good there is understood the honorable (the morally good)9. But since the advantageous and pleasant good are born to be desired by irrational beings, the honorable good can be desired by rational beings alone; and therefore in them alone is found the power which is not narrowed to some genus of the desirable, and through this has freedom with respect to its object.

In them alone too is found a power having freedom with respect to its own act10; which is clear. For the will in rational beings not only checks the outer hand or foot, but also checks and restrains itself, beginning often to hate what it previously loved; and this from its own command and dominion. But in the brute animals, even though in some manner dominion is to be found with respect to the outer act, since they do indeed restrain themselves11 at times, as is clear in domestic animals; yet with respect to the inner proper act, namely appetite, there is no dominion. Hence if they love something, they cannot not love it, although they may be kept from the pursuit of some loved thing by fear of some inflicting passion. And therefore Damascene says12 that they «are driven rather than drive»; and through this, since they cannot repress their own act, they do not have freedom with respect to their own act, nor even with respect to the object; and therefore, freedom being lacking in them, they cannot participate in free choice.

The reason is also taken on the side of arbitration. For arbitration (judgment) is the same as judgment13, at whose beck the other powers are moved and obey. But to judge belongs to that one, according to complete reason, whose office is to discern between the just and the unjust, and between the proper and the alien. Now no power knows what is just and what unjust except that one alone which is a participant of reason and is born to know the highest justice, from which is the rule of all right. And this is only in that substance which is to the image of God; such as is only the rational power14. For no substance discerns what is proper and what alien unless it knows itself and its own act. But never does any power know itself, or reflect upon itself, which is bound to matter15. If therefore all the powers are bound to matter and to corporeal substance except the rational alone, that alone is the one which can reflect upon itself; and therefore it alone is that in which there is full judgment and arbitration in discerning what is just and what unjust, what proper and what alien. — Therefore, both by reason of freedom and by reason of arbitration, free choice is found in rational substances alone. And the arguments which show this are to be granted.

To the arguments for the affirmative part:

1. To the arguments to the contrary the response is plain from what has been said. For to that which is objected in the first place, that brutes choose the good in preference to the evil, it must be said that this is true of the advantageous and pleasant good; but it is not true of the honorable good, in respect of which free choice properly consists.

2. To that likewise which is objected, that brutes can be moved toward opposites, the response is clear, because they cannot be moved toward all opposites, but only toward those which are below the dignity of free choice.

3. To that which is objected, that brutes have dominion over their acts because they can repress themselves, it must be said that they do not have dominion over their inner acts, although they have dominion over the outer ones; for even if they are restrained from the act, they are nonetheless not drawn back from the appetite. — Or it can be said otherwise, that even if they also are drawn back from their act, this is nonetheless not through their own dominion; for this is from the imagination

of an outer evil, which so terrifies that it draws back more than the appetite attracts; and therefore, just as in desiring and pursuing they are driven rather than drive, so also in abstaining or drawing back they are repressed rather than repress themselves16.

4. And through this the response to the other point is clear, which says17 that the principle of motion is from within in the brute animals. For it can be said that even though the principle of outer motion proceeds from within, nonetheless the inner appetite takes its rise rather from the outer desirable thing than from the command of the appetitive power. Hence not just any motion from within makes a power free, but that motion by which the moving force moves itself; «for the will and free choice, as Anselm says18, is an instrument moving itself».

5. To that which is objected, that it belongs to free choice to exercise foresight, it must be said that a certain foresight comes from the act of deliberation and foreknowledge, and a certain foresight comes from natural instinct. The first belongs to the freedom of choice and is found in rational beings alone; but the second is of natural sagacity and industry; for nature is most prudent; and this is found in the brute animals, and such does not posit free choice19.

6. To that which is objected, that certain brute animals cannot be tamed, it must be said that for some animal not to be reducible to servitude can be so in two ways: either by reason of voluntary freedom, or by reason of natural ferocity. In the first way it is impossible for a man to be reduced to servitude. For although someone may be able to compel another as to the outer act, yet as to the inner willing no one can compel another, as will be clear below20. In the second way certain beasts are untamable and cannot be reduced to servitude, because so great is their ferocity and impetus toward the things of ferocity that they cannot be habituated to the things of gentleness; and therefore that argument does not compel.

Scholion

I. The denial of free choice is the fomentation of all impiety; and since the doctrine concerning this fundamental article has always, from ancient times, had very many adversaries, it is of great moment to determine the true doctrine concerning it distinctly. Hence St. Bonaventure, together with other contemporary doctors, strives to resolve very many (12) questions on this matter, which had been posed in the schools by preceding masters, as is clear from the Summa (p. II.) of Praepositivus. Among other things it was disputed whether free choice is a power, or a habit, or an act, and, if it is a power, whether of reason, or of will, or of both. — It is helpful here to note two things beforehand.

1. With St. Augustine and the Master a threefold freedom was distinguished in creatures: freedom from necessity (coercion), from fault, from misery, that is, freedom according to nature, grace, and glory. Hence various definitions of freedom were circulated, especially those of which Aristotle and Saints Augustine, Bernard, and Anselm are the authors; which the holy Doctor strives to explain and to bring into harmony, here in p. I. and II. Dub. 1-3.

2. It must be noted that in that age the name of freedom in usage extended more broadly for the most part than the custom of the schools now allows; which must also be said of the term coercion. For now the name of freedom among theologians is rightly restricted to such a voluntary act as not only excludes coercion (violence) brought from without, but also necessity through an inner determination to one thing, which removes from the power its indifference, that is, the full dominion which the will has over its own acts, such that it is in its power to will and not to will. Now this dominion is required for the act of election. And in the act of choosing among diverse means for attaining the end consists the proper and peculiar operation of free choice, especially as regards the freedom of the wayfarer. Now it is established by the definitions of the Church against Baius and Jansenius that for meriting or demeriting in the state of fallen nature there is required in man not only freedom from coercion, but also from necessity (cfr. prop. 3 of Jansenius, condemned by Innocent X, Alexander VII, and Clement XI; and propp. 39, 67, 73 of Baius, condemned by St. Pius V and other Supreme Pontiffs). — But the ancient Scholastics, although they not rarely signified those two species of the voluntary by the same names (as e.g. St. Thomas, S. I. q. 82. a. 1. ad 1.), nonetheless rightly distinguished freedom in the proper sense, which not only excludes coercion but at the same time includes the power of choosing among diverse means to the end, from freedom in the improper sense, which only imports spontaneity, namely when the will is intrinsically determined to one thing. Such determination is in wayfarers with respect to the end, or to beatitude in general; hence this does not fall under election, nor is there in any way concerning it freedom of specification, but only to some extent freedom of exercise. But the comprehensors are determined to a perpetual act of love toward the divine goodness clearly seen; hence this act, on account of that highest perfection of cognition, is most perfectly voluntary, but not properly free. Yet St. Bonaventure (below, p. II. q. 2.) names it thus: «And to that extent it is said to be free, although it is immutably ordered to that thing» (cfr. Augustine, VI. Oper. imp. contra Iulian. c. 12.).

II. There too, and throughout, St. Bonaventure distinguishes a twofold free choice, namely according as it is free (voluntary) and according as it is deliberating, and he teaches that the object of the deliberating one is always contingent; which, with others, B. Albert approves (here a. 2.) in these words: «Free choice, as to the act of deliberating or choosing, is only of future contingents operable through us, of which we are masters». St. Bonaventure himself (I. Sent. d. 40. a. 3. q. 2. ad 3.) says of election that «every agent deliberating from purpose takes beforehand one part of the contradiction». St. Thomas (de Verit. q. 24. a. 1. ad 20.) likewise distinguishes the freedom of the will from the freedom of free choice in these words: «Concerning the last end we do not judge by a judgment of discussion or examination, but we approve it naturally; on which account there is no election concerning it, but volition. We have therefore with respect to it a free will, since the natural necessity of inclination is not repugnant to freedom, according to Augustine, V. of the City of God (c. 10), not by every free judgment, properly speaking, since it does not fall under election». The same author discusses the whole matter diffusely and excellently, de Malo, q. 6. a. unicus (cfr. also here q. unica a. 5. S. I. q. 83. a. 1-4.). — As to the freedom which is required for meriting or demeriting, cfr. above d. 7. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. and 2, below d. 20. q. 6, d. 29. p. II. a. 3. q. 2; III. Sent. d. 12. a. 2. q. 1, d. 18. a. 1. q. 2. and q. 3. ad 3. — On the various species of necessity cfr. I. Sent. d. 6. q. 1. 2.

III. In this question it is excellently demonstrated that for freedom there is altogether prerequired reason, namely that there may be had full dominion both with respect to the object and with respect to the act. This twofold dominion is explained below in q. 3; and many other things which are said here are more fully determined there and in the following questions of this distinction. But if it is asked more distinctly how reason stands with respect to free choice, there were diverse opinions, concerning which some things are said below in the scholia to q. 1 and 6. — Alex. of Hales, S. p. II. q. 72. m. 3. a. 2. — St. Thomas, S. I. q. 83. a. 1; de Verit. q. 24. a. 1. 2. — B. Albert, S. p. II. tr. 1. q. 94. m. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1. a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 2. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 1. a. 2. — Durand, here q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 1.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Liberum per oppositionem ad naturale i. e. quod determinatum est ad unum, dicit generatim quandam actus indifferentiam, quae, si est ad actus speciei diversae, vocatur indifferentia specificationis sive contrarietatis; si vero est ad positionem vel negationem actionis, v. g. amare, vel non amare, nuncupatur indifferentia exercitii sive contradictionis. Ex prima indifferentia deducuntur duo prima argg. (cfr. supra pag. 153, nota 5. et pag. 183, nota 7.); ex secunda arg. tertium.
    Free by opposition to natural, i.e. what is determined to one thing, signifies generally a certain indifference of act which, if it is toward acts of a diverse species, is called indifference of specification or of contrariety; but if it is toward the positing or the negating of an action, e.g. to love or not to love, it is termed indifference of exercise or of contradiction. From the first indifference the first two arguments are deduced (cfr. above p. 153, note 5, and p. 183, note 7); from the second, the third argument.
  2. Aristot., I. Metaph. c. 3. (c. 2.) illum hominem vocat liberum, «qui sui ipsius et non alterius gratia est». Nemesius, episc. Emesenus, in libro de Natura hominis, c. 41. sic ait: Si autem [quis] sit dominus actionum, omnino liberam habebit agendi voluntatem. Cfr. Damasc., II. de Fide orthod. c. 26. seq., ubi summa doctrinae laudati Nemesii exhibetur. — In fine arg. pro domesticatis nonnulli codd. cum Vat. et edd. 2, 3, 4 domesticis.
    Aristotle, I. Metaphysics c. 3 (c. 2) calls that man free «who is for his own sake and not for the sake of another». Nemesius, bishop of Emesa, in the book On the Nature of Man, c. 41, says thus: But if anyone be master of his actions, he will have an altogether free will of acting. Cfr. Damascene, II. On the Orthodox Faith c. 26 seq., where a summary of the doctrine of the said Nemesius is set forth. — At the end of the argument, for domesticatis some codices with the Vatican and editions 2, 3, 4 read domesticis.
  3. Liberum enim, oppositum violenti, supponit spontaneum et voluntarium, quod secundum Aristot., III. Ethic. c. 1, est illud, «cuius principium est in eo qui agit, particularia cognoscente, in quibus actio consistit».
    For free, opposed to violent, presupposes the spontaneous and the voluntary, which according to Aristotle, III. Ethics c. 1, is that «whose principle is in the one who acts, who knows the particulars in which the action consists».
  4. Siquidem liberum supponit et includit consultationem et electionem mediorum ad obtinendum finem. Cfr. Aristot., III. Ethic. c. 2. seq.; Nemesius, loc. cit. c. 33. seq.; Damasc. loc. cit.
    For indeed free presupposes and includes consultation and the choice of means for attaining the end. Cfr. Aristotle, III. Ethics c. 2 seq.; Nemesius, loc. cit. c. 33 seq.; Damascene, loc. cit.
  5. Aristot., I. Polit. c. 3. (c. 2.) servum, oppositum libero, definit: Quicumque sui ipsius non est, sed alterius.
    Aristotle, I. Politics c. 3 (c. 2) defines the slave, the opposite of the free man: Whoever is not his own, but another's.
  6. In lit. Magistri, c. 3: «Liberum arbitrium est facultas rationis et voluntatis, qua bonum eligitur, gratia assistente, vel malum, eadem desistente». Hanc definitionem, quae in seqq. qq. saepe saepius recurrit, Magister delibavit ex Hugone (Sent. tr. 3. c. 8, ubi Augustino tribui videtur); secundum B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 1. q. 16. m. 1. seq. sumta est ex August., I. de Lib. Arb. (c. 7. n. 16. seqq.).
    In the text of the Master, c. 3: «Free choice is the faculty of reason and will, by which the good is chosen, grace assisting, or evil, the same desisting». This definition, which recurs very often in the following questions, the Master drew from Hugh (Sentences tr. 3. c. 8, where it seems to be attributed to Augustine); according to B. Albert, S. p. II. tr. 1. q. 16. m. 1. seq., it is taken from Augustine, I. On Free Choice (c. 7. n. 16. seqq.).
  7. Cfr. de hoc et seq. arg. Aristot., III. Ethic. c. 1. seqq.
    Cfr. on this and the following argument Aristotle, III. Ethics c. 1 seqq.
  8. Richard. a S. Vict., de Statu interioris hominis, tr. I. c. 3. sic ait: Inter omnia creationis bona nihil in homine sublimius, nihil dignius libero arbitrio. Cfr. supra pag. 113, nota 6. Aristot., II. Moral. Eudem. c. 7. (c. 6.) eloquitur sic: Solus omnium animantium homo actionum quarundam principium est; quippe quod praeter hunc nullum agere praeterea dicitur. — Paulo inferius pro aeque nobilia cod. aa aeque nobilissima.
    Richard of St. Victor, On the State of the Inner Man, tr. I. c. 3, says thus: Among all the goods of creation there is nothing in man more sublime, nothing more worthy than free choice. Cfr. above p. 113, note 6. Aristotle, II. Eudemian Ethics c. 7 (c. 6) speaks thus: Man alone of all living things is the principle of certain actions; for besides him nothing else is said to act. — A little below, for aeque nobilia (equally noble) codex aa reads aeque nobilissima (equally most noble).
  9. Cfr. Aristot., I. Rhetor. c. 16. seqq. (c. 6. seqq.), et tom. I. pag. 34, nota 4, nec non pag. 40, nota 3, ubi Ciceronis et Augustini dicta de hac re allata sunt. — Quod ad seq. propositionem attinet, referimus illud Aristot., I. Magn. Moral. c. 20. (c. 22.): Neque enim cetera animalia, praeter hominem, dicimus temperantia, quod ab ipsis ratio absit, qua honestum deligimus; omnis siquidem virtus honesti est et ad honestum tendit.
    Cfr. Aristotle, I. Rhetoric c. 16 seqq. (c. 6 seqq.), and tome I. p. 34, note 4, as well as p. 40, note 3, where the sayings of Cicero and Augustine on this matter are adduced. — As regards the following proposition, we refer to that saying of Aristotle, I. Great Ethics c. 20 (c. 22): For we do not call the other animals besides man temperate, because reason, by which we choose the honorable, is absent from them; since indeed every virtue is of the honorable and tends toward the honorable.
  10. Cod. aa addit quae [qua?] se refrenant respectu actus interioris et exterioris. Paulo inferius pro et refrenat, incipiens cod. cc cum ed. 1 et refrenans incipit.
    Codex aa adds which restrain themselves with respect to the inner and outer act. A little below, for et refrenat, incipiens codex cc with edition 1 reads et refrenans incipit.
  11. Scilicet actum exteriorem; plures codd., ut E F N aa, adiiciunt se; ed. 1 refrenantur.
    Namely the outer act; several codices, such as E F N aa, add se (themselves); edition 1 reads refrenantur (they are restrained).
  12. Libr. II. de Fide orthod. c. 27. Vide supra pag. 186, nota 1. — Paulo ante pro inflictione nonnulli codd. inflictae.
    Book II. On the Orthodox Faith c. 27. See above p. 186, note 1. — A little before, for inflictione some codices read inflictae.
  13. Libr. III. Hypognosticon (inter opera August.), c. 1: Arbitrium scilicet ab arbitrando rationali consideratione vel discernendo, quid eligat, quidve recuset, puto quod nomen accepit; ideo liberum dictum, quod in sua sit positum potestate, habens agendi quod velit possibilitatem, quod est vitalis et rationalis animae motus.
    Book III. Hypognosticon (among the works of Augustine), c. 1: Arbitration, namely, I think received its name from arbitrating, by a rational consideration or discerning of what it should choose and what reject; therefore it is called free, because it is placed in its own power, having the possibility of doing what it wills, which is a vital and rational motion of the soul.
  14. Aristot., II. de Part. animal. c. 10. ait: Quae autem una cum vita sensu etiam praedita sunt, haec speciem multiformiorem numerosioremque varietatem recipiunt; atque inter ea aliis alia magis et eo amplius, quod non solum vivendi, sed etiam bene vivendi rationem natura eorum obtinuit, quale hominum genus est, quippe quod aut unum ex omnibus animalibus nobis cognitis divinitatis particeps sit, aut omnium maxime. — Aliqui codd. cum Vat. et edd. 3, 4 substantia rationalis. Immediate post pro substantia codd. K T Y bb potentia.
    Aristotle, II. On the Parts of Animals c. 10 says: But those which together with life are also endowed with sense receive a more multiform appearance and a more numerous variety; and among these, some more than others, and the more so because their nature has obtained the principle not only of living but also of living well, such as the human race is, inasmuch as it is either the one being among all the animals known to us that is a partaker of divinity, or most of all so. — Some codices with the Vatican and editions 3, 4 read substantia rationalis (rational substance). Immediately after, for substantia codices K T Y bb read potentia (power).
  15. Cfr. Liber de Causis, prop. 15.
    Cfr. the Book of Causes, prop. 15.
  16. Vat., pro retrahendo posito reprimendo, et ante reprimant omisso se, post reprimant cum codd. 10 P V W addit et retrahuntur quam retrahant. Aliquanto superius pro hoc enim est eadem Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 substituit simpliciter sed.
    The Vatican edition, for retrahendo having placed reprimendo, and before reprimant having omitted se, after reprimant, with codices 10 P V W, adds et retrahuntur quam retrahant. Somewhat above, for hoc enim est the same Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 substitutes simply sed.
  17. Cod. cc et ed. 1 obiicitur.
    Codex cc and edition 1 read obiicitur.
  18. De Concord. praesc. et lib. arb. q. 3. c. 11.
    On the Concord of [Divine] Foreknowledge and Free Choice, q. 3. c. 11.
  19. Aristot., VIII. de Histor. animal. c. 1: Ut enim in homine ars, sapientia, prudentia, sic in nonnullis brutis inest vis quaedam eiusmodi; altera naturalis. — Circa initium solutionis Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 contingit loco provenit.
    Aristotle, VIII. On the History of Animals c. 1: For as in man there is art, wisdom, prudence, so in some brutes there is present a certain force of this kind; the other [being] natural. — Near the beginning of the solution the Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 reads contingit in place of provenit.
  20. Part. II. huius dist. q. 4. seq. — Circa finem solutionis post lenitatis cod. U addit et servitutis.
    Part II. of this distinction, q. 4 seq. — Near the end of the solution, after lenitatis codex U adds et servitutis.
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