Dist. 37, Part 2, Art. 2, Q. 1
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 37
Articulus II.
De mutabilitate Angelorum per locum.
Consequenter de secundo articulo quaeritur, scilicet de mutatione1 Angeli, et circa hoc quaeruntur tria.
Primo quaeritur, utrum Angelus possit moveri localiter sine corpore.
Secundo quaeritur, utrum moveatur per medium, vel non.
Tertio, utrum pertranseat medium motu subito, vel successivo.
Quaestio I.
Utrum Angelus possit moveri localiter sine corpore.
The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (La.), then the English rendering (En.).
Quantum ad primum, quod Angelus non possit moveri sine corpore, ostenditur sic.
1. Bernardus super Cantica2: «Discurrere et de loco ad locum transire non est nisi corporum»: ergo si hoc convenit Angelo, non convenit nisi per corpus assumtum.
2. Item, ratione videtur, quia quod movetur, aut movetur per se, aut per accidens3; sed Angelus non movetur per se localiter, quoniam hoc est proprium corporum, et illi soli inest res per se, cui inest proprie: ergo si movetur, hoc est per accidens. Sed quod per accidens movetur, movetur alio moto, ut nauta mota navi: ergo videtur, quod Angelus non possit moveri, nisi moto corpore, et ita corpore assumto.
3. Item, omne quod movetur, movetur propter indigentiam4; sed in Angelis beatis nulla est indigentia: ergo etc. Si tu dicas, quod propter indigentiam nostram; ergo, circumscripta indigentia nostra, non videtur, quod Angelus possit moveri: si ergo indigentia nostra nullam dat virtutem Angelo, patet etc.
4. Item, «omne quod movetur, differt a motore», sicut proponit Philosophus5; sed Angelus non distat a se: ergo Angelus non movetur a se nec ab alio: ergo non potest moveri nisi movendo aliud, sicut movendo corpus.
Contra:
1. Ad Hebraeos primo6: Omnes sunt administratorii spiritus, missi propter eos etc.; sed aliquod ministerium exsequuntur sine corpore, ut suggerere bona, et huiusmodi: ergo possunt sine corpore moveri.
2. Item, Damascenus7: «Confestim inveniuntur ubi divinus iusserit nutus, velocitate naturae»: si ergo velocitas est dispositio ad motum, ex sui natura sunt mobiles.
3. Item, Angelus in uno loco tantum est et ibi est, ubi operatur: ergo virtus eius aut est ad unum tantum arctata, aut si non est arctata, nec substantia est arctata ad unum locum. Sed non potest esse in pluribus: ergo cum est in uno loco, est in potentia ad alterum. Sed quod est in potentia ad unum non fit actu in illo, nisi per motum secundum locum: ergo etc.
4. Item, quod moveatur sine corpore assumto, ostenditur per simile in anima. Anima enim, exuta a corpore, fertur in caelum vel descendit in infernum localiter; sed constat, quod anima non assumit aliud corpus quam suum: ergo movetur sine corpore, ergo pari ratione Angelus.
5. Item, Angelus in empyreo potest esse sine corpore, pari ratione et in terra: ergo si per eandem vim, per quam quiescit in terra, facit se esse in terra sive transfert8: ergo videtur, quod sine corpore.
Conclusio.
Angelus moveri potest tum sine corpore, tum corpore assumto: sine corpore transeundo locum definitive, sed cum corpore assumto circumscriptive.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod Angelus, sicut dicit Scriptura, habet moveri. Movetur autem non solum assumto corpore, sed etiam corpore non assumto, cum non sit minoris libertatis nec virtutis nec nobilitatis sine corpore, quam est cum corpore.
Ad intelligentiam autem obiectorum est notandum, quod sicut esse in loco est dupliciter sive esse locale — sicut tangit Magister in littera — scilicet quia circumscribitur, et quia definitur; et illud proprie est locale quod circumscribitur, aliud autem quodam modo est locale, quodam modo non: ita moveri per locum uno modo est per circumscriptionem ferri de loco ad locum, et sic est tantum corporum; alio modo moveri est minus proprie secundum definitionem transire, et sic est spirituum. Proprie ergo per circumscriptionem non movetur Angelus, nisi corpore assumto, minus proprie per definitionem movetur Angelus etiam sine corpore.
Ad argumenta pro parte affirmativa:
Ad 1. Ex hoc patet responsio ad primum obiectum, et Bernardus accipit discurrere et transire secundum proprietatem loci, quae est circumscriptio.
Ad 2. Ad illud ergo quod quaeritur, utrum per se aut per accidens; dicendum secundum praedictam distinctionem7-bis de motu, quod secundum primum motum non movetur spirituale nisi per accidens, alio moto. Sicut enim nauta, mota navi, movetur, sic spiritus, moto corpore, in quo est. Quantum ad secundum motum, sicut Angelus per se ipsum et sine corpore definitur loco, ita per se ipsum transfertur, ita quod non alio movente, nec per alium motum. Ipse autem obiicit de primo motu tantum, qui per se convenit corpori soli.
Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omne quod movetur, movetur propter indigentiam; dicendum, quod illud verum est in motu naturali, in quo natura non movet nisi per appetitum alicuius rei, qui ponit imperfectionem in natura — quia natura, habita perfectione sua, quiescit — sed non est verum in motu voluntario, in quo movetur aliquis sive propter aliud8-bis acquirendum, sive ad virtutem demonstrandam, sicut movetur miles in stadio. — Vel dicendum, quod illud verum est in omni motu, generaliter accipiendo indigentiam ad suam indigentiam et alienam, et suam quantum ad illud cuius privatio ponit imperfectionem, vel cuius privatio non imperfectionem ponit, sed limitationem9; et sic est in Angelo. Angelus enim, volens aliquid operari in terra, indiget transire ad terram, quia non potest simul esse in caelo et in terra propter hoc
quod habet virtutem finitam. Et sic patet illud, quod limitatio non repugnat summae perfectioni creaturae.
Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omne quod movetur differt a motore; dicendum, quod in naturali motu verum est, ubi nihil movet se, quia nihil reflectitur supra se propter alligationem cum materia: sed non est verum in voluntate, quae est instrumentum se ipsum movens; et virtus, quae est in substantia spirituali, potest supra substantiam reflecti, et ita movens idem esse cum mobili, tamen non secundum idem: quia Angelus habilis est ad moveri ex parte ipsius quod est sive substantiae vel materiae, si habet materiam, sed ad movere ex parte formae, sive ipsius quo est vel virtutis activae.
I. Vestigia Magistri secutus, S. Doctor hic incidenter agit de motu Angelorum quoad locum. Pro intelligentia huius quaestionis supponenda est doctrina de modo, quo Angeli sunt in loco, unde remittimus lectorem ad II. Sent. d. 2. p. II. a. 2. q. 1–4. Sufficiat hic breviter annotasse, quod, licet omnes concedant, Angelos esse in loco non circumscriptive, sed definitive, tamen de ratione formali praesentiae Angelorum in loco mire discrepant scholae et etiam eiusdem scholae auctores. Praescindendo ab opinione eorum qui cum Vasquez putant Angelos etiam in puncto indivisibili esse posse, ad duas principales positiones multitudo opinionum reduci potest: scil. fundamentum praesentiae ponitur vel in applicatione virtutis Angelorum, vel non in operatione, sed in propria et finita substantia Angelorum. Prima sententia est S. Thomae, quae tamen a suis discipulis non eodem modo explicatur; secunda est Scoti, Richardi a Med. et aliorum plurimorum, cui favet modus loquendi S. Bonaventurae. — Notanda est etiam thesis ab Universitate Parisiensi tempore Alexandri Hal. reprobata: Angelus in uno instanti potest esse in diversis locis, et etiam ubique si voluerit (cfr. II. Sent. d. 23. a. 2. q. 3. in fine).
II. Angelos non tantum per accidens, sed etiam per se moveri, aliter tamen ac corpora, contra Peripateticos cum theologorum communi sententia Seraphicus hic tenet et bene explicat. — In solut. ad 4. S. Doctor supponit, quod substantia spiritualis potest super se reflecti ac se ipsam movere, non tamen secundum idem (cfr. II. Sent. d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 2. ad 4; d. 25. p. I. q. 1.), et quod se active moveat ex parte formae, passive ex parte materiae. Quoad ultimum autem problematice loquitur addens: «Si habet materiam». Hoc respicit sententiam, quam ipse II. Sent. d. 3. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. 2. 3. tanquam probabilem defendit, scil. quod etiam in Angelis aliquo modo distinctio materiae et formae admittenda sit.
III. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 33. m. I. 3. — Scot., II. Sent. d. 2. q. 9. — S. Thom., hic q. 4. a. 1; S. I. q. 53. a. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 22. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 5. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 1. — Durand., de hac et duabus seqq. qq. hic p. II. q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. 4. — Biel, de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. 3.
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Article II.
On the changeableness of angels with respect to place.
Next concerning the second article it is asked, namely about the change1 of an angel, and concerning this three things are inquired.
First it is asked whether an angel can be moved locally without a body.
Second it is asked whether he is moved through a medium, or not.
Third, whether he traverses the medium by a sudden motion, or by a successive one.
Question I.
Whether an angel can be moved locally without a body.
As to the first, it is shown thus that an angel cannot be moved without a body.
1. Bernard, On the Song of Songs2: "To run about and to pass from place to place belongs only to bodies": therefore, if this belongs to an angel, it does not belong save through an assumed body.
2. Likewise, by reason it appears, since whatever is moved is moved either per se or per accidens3; but an angel is not moved per se locally, since this is proper to bodies, and that thing belongs per se alone in which it inheres properly: therefore if he is moved, this is per accidens. But what is moved per accidens is moved by something else being moved, as a sailor by the moved ship: therefore it appears that an angel cannot be moved unless a body is moved, and so an assumed body.
3. Likewise, everything that is moved is moved on account of need4; but in the blessed angels there is no need: therefore etc. If you say, on account of our need; therefore, our need set aside, it does not appear that an angel can be moved: if therefore our need confers no power on the angel, the conclusion is plain.
4. Likewise, "everything that is moved differs from its mover," as the Philosopher proposes5; but an angel is not distant from himself: therefore an angel is not moved by himself nor by another: therefore he cannot be moved except by moving something else, as by moving a body.
On the contrary:
1. To the Hebrews, chapter 16: They are all ministering spirits, sent for those etc.; but they perform some ministry without a body, such as suggesting good things and the like: therefore they can be moved without a body.
2. Likewise, Damascene7: "Forthwith they are found wherever the divine bidding has commanded, by the swiftness of nature": if therefore swiftness is a disposition for motion, by their own nature they are mobile.
3. Likewise, an angel is in only one place, and is there where he operates: therefore his power is either restricted to one alone, or, if it is not restricted, neither is his substance restricted to one place. But he cannot be in many: therefore, when he is in one place, he is in potency to another. But what is in potency toward one does not become actual in it except through motion according to place: therefore etc.
4. Likewise, that he is moved without an assumed body is shown by the parallel in the soul. For the soul, stripped of the body, is borne to heaven or descends to hell locally; but it is agreed that the soul does not assume any body other than its own: therefore it is moved without a body, therefore by parallel reasoning so is the angel.
5. Likewise, an angel can be in the empyrean without a body, by parallel reasoning also on earth: therefore if by the same power by which he rests on earth he makes himself to be on earth or transfers himself8: therefore it appears that without a body.
Conclusion.
An angel can be moved both without a body and with an assumed body: without a body by passing through a place definitively, but with an assumed body circumscriptively.
I respond: It must be said that an angel, as Scripture says, has the property of being moved. He is moved, however, not only by an assumed body, but also without an assumed body, since he is not of less freedom or power or nobility without a body than he is with a body.
For the understanding of the objections it must be noted that, just as to be in a place is twofold, or to be local — as the Master touches in the text — namely because something is circumscribed and because it is defined; and that is properly local which is circumscribed, but the other is in one way local and in another way not: so to be moved through place in one way is to be borne by circumscription from place to place, and this belongs to bodies alone; in another way to be moved is, less properly, to pass according to definition, and this belongs to spirits. Properly therefore by circumscription an angel is not moved, except with an assumed body; less properly, by definition an angel is moved even without a body.
Replies to the arguments for the affirmative:
To 1. From this the response to the first objection is plain, and Bernard takes to run about and to pass through according to the property of place, which is circumscription.
To 2. To that which is asked, whether per se or per accidens; it must be said, according to the aforesaid distinction7-bis concerning motion, that according to the first kind of motion a spiritual thing is not moved except per accidens, by something else being moved. For just as a sailor, by the moved ship, is moved, so a spirit, by the moved body in which he is. As to the second kind of motion, just as an angel by himself and without a body is defined to a place, so by himself he is transferred, so that nothing else is the mover, nor is it through another motion. He himself, however, raises the objection only about the first motion, which belongs per se to body alone.
To 3. To that which is objected, that everything which is moved is moved on account of need; it must be said that this is true in natural motion, in which nature does not move except by appetite for some thing, which posits imperfection in nature — because nature, having attained its perfection, comes to rest — but it is not true in voluntary motion, in which someone is moved either to acquire something else8-bis, or to display power, as a soldier is moved in the stadium. — Or it must be said that this is true in every motion, taking need generally as both one's own need and another's, and one's own as regards that whose privation posits imperfection, or whose privation does not posit imperfection but limitation9; and so it is in the angel. For an angel, willing to do something on earth, needs to pass to earth, because he cannot be at the same time in heaven and on earth, on account of the fact that
he has finite power. And so that point is plain, that limitation does not contradict the highest perfection of a creature.
To 4. To that which is objected, that everything which is moved differs from its mover; it must be said that in natural motion this is true, where nothing moves itself, because nothing is reflected upon itself on account of its bond with matter: but it is not true in the will, which is an instrument moving itself; and the power which is in a spiritual substance can be reflected upon the substance, and so the mover can be the same as the moved, yet not in the same respect: because an angel is apt to be moved on the part of his quod est (that which he is) or substance or matter, if he has matter, but to move on the part of form, that is, of his quo est (that by which he is) or active power.
I. Following the footsteps of the Master, the holy Doctor here treats incidentally of the motion of the angels with respect to place. For the understanding of this question one must presuppose the doctrine of the manner in which angels are in a place, for which we refer the reader to II Sent. d. 2. p. II. a. 2. q. 1–4. Let it suffice here briefly to note that, although all concede that the angels are in a place not circumscriptively but definitively, yet concerning the formal account of the angels' presence in a place the schools, and even authors of the same school, marvelously disagree. Setting aside the opinion of those who, with Vasquez, think that angels can even be in an indivisible point, the multitude of opinions can be reduced to two principal positions: namely, the foundation of presence is placed either in the application of the angels' power, or not in operation but in their proper and finite substance. The first opinion is that of St. Thomas, which however is not explained in the same way by his disciples; the second is that of Scotus, Richard of Mediavilla, and very many others, which the manner of speaking of St. Bonaventure favors. — There is also to be noted the thesis reproved by the University of Paris in the time of Alexander of Hales: An angel can in one instant be in different places, and even everywhere if he wills it (cfr. II Sent. d. 23. a. 2. q. 3. at the end).
II. That angels are moved not only per accidens but also per se, yet otherwise than bodies, the Seraphic Doctor here, against the Peripatetics, holds and well explains, with the common opinion of the theologians. — In the reply to 4 the holy Doctor supposes that a spiritual substance can reflect upon itself and move itself, yet not in the same respect (cfr. II Sent. d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 2. ad 4; d. 25. p. I. q. 1.), and that it moves itself actively on the part of form, passively on the part of matter. As to the last point, however, he speaks only problematically, adding: "If it has matter." This regards the opinion which he himself defends as probable in II Sent. d. 3. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. 2. 3., namely, that even in angels some sort of distinction of matter and form is to be admitted.
III. Alex. of Hales, Summa p. II. q. 33. m. I. 3. — Scotus, II Sent. d. 2. q. 9. — St. Thomas, here q. 4. a. 1; S. I. q. 53. a. 1. — Bl. Albert, here a. 22. — Peter of Tarantasia, here q. 5. a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 3. q. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, here 2. princ. q. 1. — Durandus, on this and the two following questions here p. II. q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the following questions here q. 4. — Biel, on this and the following questions here q. 3.
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- Vat. cum cod. cc mutabilitate.The Vatican edition, with codex cc, reads mutabilitate ("changeableness").
- Serm. 5. n. 2. <!-- Quaracchi p. 658 footnote-block uses ad-hoc per-page numbering; Bernard Sermones in Cantica serm. 5 standardly cited as locus of discurrere et de loco ad locum transire phrase -->Sermon 5, n. 2.
- Cfr. Aristot., V. Phys. text. 1, VIII. Phys. text. 27. (c. 4.), de Anima, text. 37. seqq. (c. 3.).Cfr. Aristotle, Physics V, text 1; Physics VIII, text 27 (c. 4); On the Soul, text 37 ff. (c. 3).
- Cfr. Aristot., de Animalium motu, c. 4. seqq. (c. 6. seqq.), ubi finem motus constituit in bono aliquo consequendo.Cfr. Aristotle, On the Motion of Animals, c. 4 ff. (c. 6 ff.), where he places the end of motion in attaining some good.
- Libr. VIII. Phys. text. 27. seqq. (c. 4.); verbotenus autem est in Comment. Averrois. Ibi Aristot. recolligit quae diversis locis, praesertim in libr. VII. Phys. docuit.Book VIII of the Physics, text 27 ff. (c. 4); but verbatim it is in Averroes' Commentary. There Aristotle gathers up what he has taught in various places, especially in book VII of the Physics.
- Vers. 14, in quo textu Vulgata verbo sunt praemittit in ministerium. — Mox pro exsequuntur, quod ex codd. P Q bb et ed. 1 restituimus, Vat. male consequuntur. Dein post bona eadem Vat. cum cod. cc interiicit et revelare secreta.Verse 14, in which text the Vulgate prefixes in ministerium to the word sunt. — Soon, in place of exsequuntur, which we have restored from codices P Q bb and edition 1, the Vatican edition has wrongly consequuntur. Then after bona the same Vatican edition, with codex cc, inserts et revelare secreta ("and to reveal secrets").
- Libr. II. de Fide orthod. c. 3. Pro inveniuntur, quod et in textu originali et in codd. P Q et in ed. 1 exhibetur, Vat. invenitur.Book II On the Orthodox Faith c. 3. In place of inveniuntur, which is given both in the original text and in codices P Q and in edition 1, the Vatican edition has invenitur.
- Pro distinctionem plurimi codd. definitionem, pauci cum Vat. divisionem; nostrae lectioni suffragantur codd. D P Q R Y cc et ed. 1 nec non contextus. Subinde post de motu non pauci codd. omittunt quod, et post pauca Vat. verbis alio modo praefigit scilicet.In place of distinctionem very many codices have definitionem, a few with the Vatican divisionem; codices D P Q R Y cc, edition 1, and the context support our reading. Further on, after de motu not a few codices omit quod, and a little later the Vatican edition prefixes scilicet to the words alio modo.
- Sensus est: si Angelus potest esse in terra sine corpore, et consequenter sola vi spirituali, sequitur, ut et sola vi spirituali possit se transferre in terram.The sense is: if an angel can be on earth without a body, and consequently by spiritual power alone, it follows that by spiritual power alone he can transfer himself to earth.
- Pro aliud cod. T aliquid.In place of aliud codex T has aliquid.
- Hoc sibi vult: indigentia dicit in subiecto indigenti vel privationem proprie dictam, scil. carentiam perfectionis debitae, vel simplicem negationem ulterioris perfectionis sive limitationem; prior non est in Angelo, sed tantum posterior. — Aliquanto superius pro et suam cod. V ad suam.This is the meaning: "need" in the needy subject signifies either privation properly so called, namely the lack of a perfection that is owed, or simple negation of further perfection, that is, limitation; the former is not in an angel, but only the latter. — Somewhat above, in place of et suam, codex V has ad suam.