Dist. 37, Part 2, Art. 2, Q. 2
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 37
Quaestio II.
Utrum Angelus moveatur per medium.
The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (La.), then the English rendering (En.).
Secundo quaeritur, utrum Angelus moveatur per medium, vel non. Et quod per medium, videtur.
1. Damascenus dicit, quod «Angelus cito pertransit velocitate et potestate naturae»1: sed pertransire est per medium transire: ergo etc.
2. Item, cum Angelus movetur a termino a quo ad terminum in quem, aut movetur in termino a quo, aut in termino in quem2; sed in termino a quo est non motum esse; in termino vero in quem est motum esse: ergo cum moveri sit medium inter utrumque, oportet quod sit in spatio intermedio.
3. Item, quod possit moveri per medium, videtur, quia certum est, quod Angelus existens Parisius3, potest esse Romae, eadem virtute et in quolibet intermedio loco, et prius in propinquiori et deinde in singulis locis consequenter se habentibus; sed hoc est transire per medium: ergo etc.
4. Item, quandocumque inter aliqua extrema cadit medium, quod habet naturalem ordinem ad extrema, impossibile est, quod agens virtutis finitae possit pervenire ab extremo in extremum sine medio, ut patet — quia inter album et nigrum est medius color, impossibile est, quod aliquod agens creatum faciat de albo nigrum quin faciat per colorem medium4 — sed inter caelum et terram naturali ordine sunt alia corpora media: ergo impossibile est, quod a caelo in terram fiat sive moveatur sine medii transitione.
Contra:
1. Augustinus super Genesim ad litteram, et Magister ponit in littera5: Deus movet creaturam spiritualem per tempora, non per loca: ergo quamvis fiat de uno loco in alium, hoc non est per locum medium.
2. Item, conclusio probata est in sexto Physicorum6, quod impossibile est, impartibile moveri super magnitudinem; sed Angelus, non assumto corpore, est impartibilis: ergo etc.
3. Item, ratione videtur, quia, si pertransit, aut ergo per simplicia, aut per composita: si per composita, ergo est compositus; si per simplicia; sed illa sunt infinita in quolibet continuo, et impossibile est infinita pertransire: ergo etc.
4. Item, si per simplicia; sed ex simplicibus non fit aliquod continuum7: ergo motus ille non erit continuus, ergo pertranseundo illa nunquam pertransit spatium: ergo si per medium movetur, nunquam pervenit ad terminum.
5. Item, «impossibile est, quod aliquid pertranseat spatium maius se, quin prius pertranseat spatium minus vel aequale»8: ergo si spiritus angelicus transit per spatium, prius transit aequale sibi vel minus quam maius. Sed aequale simplici non est nisi simplex; sed simplex additum simplici non facit maius: ergo in primo transitu tantum est, ac si nihil transeat, similiter nec in secundo transitu, ergo nec in tertio: et sic nunquam pertransit spatium aliquantum.
Conclusio.
Rationabiliter dicitur, quod Angelus per medium movetur.
Respondeo: Notandum est hic, quod circa hoc diversimode dixerunt diversi.
Quidam enim dixerunt, quod cum Angelus sit simplex, non potest medium pertransire; unde movetur ab extremo in extremum sine medio, et omnis locus, ad quem movetur, se habet ad illum per modum immediati. Unde loci mutatio in Angelo non est motus, sed mutatio tantum sine medio. — Sed ista positio non videtur conveniens. Certum enim est, quod Angelus, qui est custos hominis, potest ita custodire, quod non deserat ipsum, et sine corpore custodire potest: ergo potest inseparabiliter comitari eum: ergo homo cum vadit per medium, et Angelus non deserit eum, pariter et Angelus vadit per medium.
Et ideo fuerunt alii qui dixerunt, quod Angelus et per medium et sine medio potest moveri, quia motus eius est ad nutum suae voluntatis secundum virtutem divinitus sibi collatam; et ideo, cum vult, facit se in extremum immediate, et cum vult, pertransit. Et ponunt simile, quod intellectus noster potest cogitare de Parisius et de Roma dupliciter: aut ita quod immediate cogitet de uno et post de alio, vel ita, quod primo de uno et post de via et tertio de tertio. Et quia Angelo ita facile est ferri, sicut nobis cogitare, cum non sit alligatus corpori, dicunt, quod sic et sic habet moveri. — Sed quidquid sit de positione, exemplum non est conveniens: quoniam cogitans penes se habet speciem Romae et speciem Parisiorum, nec ista habent situm in anima nec ordinem secundum situm, immo quaelibet aequaliter est praesens aspectui; et ideo ad libitum potest de una et alia cogitare. Sed in re est ordo et situs naturalis, et necessario interiacet medium inter unam civitatem et aliam. Et propter hoc exemplum illud non est conveniens, nec propter hoc aperitur nobis via ad intelligendum.
Et quoniam illud est intelligibile aliquo modo, quod feratur per medium, et ratio concordat et auctoritas; ideo videtur rationabiliter illud esse dicendum. Sed illud membrum, quod dicit, quod possit sine medio, arbitror reiiciendum, non quia asseram esse falsum, sed quia non est auctoritas in promptu, quae hoc dicat, et ratio non cogit, immo non capit. Possibile tamen est, quod Deus aliquid dederit substantiis illis spiritualibus, quod carnales intellectus non capiunt. — Concedendae igitur sunt rationes probantes, quod Angelus moveatur per medium.
1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod Deus non movet per locum Angelum; dicendum, quod facienda est vis in verbo secundum intellectum Augustini: quod patet ex littera. Ipse enim spiritum dixit non moveri per loca, quia proprietates loci, scilicet circumscriptionem et dimensionem, non obtinet, cum transfertur de loco ad locum; sed proprietatem temporis, quae est variatio et innovatio aliqua, vere et proprie admittit spiritus. Nam novae affectiones succedunt spiritibus per naturam et cogitationes, et
ulterius illae intenduntur et remittuntur, ita quod vere potest esse partibilitas a parte formae sive proprietatis acquirendae.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Philosopho, quod impartibile non movetur supra magnitudinem; dicendum, quod Philosophus probat et concludit de impartibili, quod habet situm in magnitudine, quod est impartibile et situatur in impartibili. Hoc non potest moveri supra magnitudinem, quia si movetur, movetur ad acquirendum situm; et quod acquiritur per motum, acquiritur, ita quod pars post partem; et situs impartibilis non potest acquiri, ita quod pars post partem acquiratur: et ideo verum est, quod tale impartibile non potest moveri supra ipsam magnitudinem. Sed Angelus tale impartibile est, quod non habet situm in impartibili, nec est dicere, quod Angelus sit in loco impartibili, sicut patebit: et ideo demonstrationes Philosophi non habent hic locum.
3. 4. Ad illud quod quaeritur: aut pertransit per simplicia, aut per composita; respondendum est, quod transit per composita, quia non est in loco simplici, sed composito; hoc suppono ad praesens, sed suo loco probabitur. Nec valet: transit per composita, ergo est compositus, sicut nec valet: anima est in composito, ergo est composita: quia sic est in illo, ut non sit pars in parte, sed ipsum totum simplex sit in qualibet parte, ita tamen quod illae partes sint unus locus.
Posset tamen dici, si quis vellet se huiusmodi implicare, quod etiamsi pertransiret per simplicia, tamen non propter hoc pertransiret infinita. Et hoc patet, quia si quis imaginetur, sphaeram moveri super planum, non tangit nisi in puncto: ergo non tangit nisi per simplicia, nec tamen pertransit infinita actu, quoniam sphaera illa fertur super planum et non quiescit in quolibet situ; et ita nulli puncto se commetitur, sed nec numerat puncta in illo, sed cum sit in continua latione, respicit illa indivisibilia ut unita, et ita ut sunt in continuo; et sic, cum continuum sit finitum actu et infinitum in potentia, et illa potentia non reducatur ad actum, non pertransit infinita actu, quia non respicit illa ut actu numerata. — Verumtamen, quia exemplum habet calumniam, et dictum non videtur esse consonum dicto Philosophi, qui omnino dicit, impartibile non moveri; priori responsioni magis adhaereo.
5. Et per illam patet sequens. Obiicit enim ac si Angelus esset in puncto, quod omnino falsum credo, quia non esset in loco, cum punctus non sit locus, nec sit actu in continuo. Sed hoc totum melius patebit in secundo libro.
I. Pro hac quaestione solvenda distinguendus est duplex motus, scil. continuus, quo mobile successive per partes deserit terminum a quo et per partes acquirit terminum ad quem, et non continuus (discretus), quo mobile deserit totum simul terminum a quo et immediate acquirit totum terminum ad quem. Modus continuus implicat transitum per loca intermedia; sed motus non continuus hunc transitum excludit, unde potius simplex mutatio loci quam motus esse videtur.
S. Bonav. hic loquitur tantum de motu Angelorum secundum modum eis naturalem, praescindendo a potentia divina. Circa hanc quaestionem tres hic ponuntur opiniones. Prima, quae hic et communiter reprobatur, asserit, Angelos non posse se movere nisi motu non continuo; secunda e contrario asserit, non nisi motu continuo; tertia vero utroque modo. Tertiam sententiam docet S. Thomas secundum principia, quae habet circa modum, quo Angeli sunt in loco. Secundam tenent Alex. Hal. et fere omnes extra scholam S. Thomae. Hanc cum quadam restrictione praefert S. Bonav., et quidem ob rationes attentione dignas. Scotus autem secundam opinionem cum distinctione approbat. Distinguit enim extrema in extrema continua, sive quae in toto loco virtuti Angeli adaequato includuntur, et extrema ita distantia, ut habeant medium distinctum ab extremis. His suppositis, docet, in loco cum extremis continuis Angelos posse, si velint, se movere sive locum mutare, non transito medio; in aliis vero «videtur probabiliter, quod non», ut ait II. Sent. d. 2. q. 12. n. 3.
II. Pro intelligentia solutionis ad 2. notanda est definitio puncti, quam habet Aristoteles (I. de Anima, text. 68, vide in hac pagina notam): «Punctum unitas est positionem habens». Tota solutio huius difficultatis fundata est in distinctione inter indivisibile (impartibile) in se et quoad locum, ut punctum, et inter indivisibile in se quidem, sed quoad virtutem occupandi locum quasi virtualiter divisibile, ut anima, quae, indivisibilis in se, coexistit quantitati totius corporis. Axioma Aristotelis verum est relate ad primum divisibile (cfr. II. Sent. d. 2. p. II. a. 2. q. 3, et S. Thom., S. I. q. 53. a. 1. ad 1.). — Secunda solutio ad ult. eruitur ex hoc principio, quod quando corpus movetur per locum compositum per puncta indivisibilia et in potentia infinita, non movetur motu non continuo ab uno tali puncto ad aliud. Tunc enim sequeretur, ut observat S. Thom. (loc. cit. a. 2.), quod «vel non transeat omnia media vel quod actu numeret media infinita; quod est impossibile». Sed manifestum est, illud moveri motu continuo et per loca media, quae in potentia sunt infinita, sed actu sunt unita ad unum continuum finitum formandum.
III. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 33. m. 2. — Scot., II. Sent. d. 2. q. 12. — S. Thom., hic q. 4. a. 2; S. I. q. 53. a. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 23. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 5. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 2. — Ægid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 2.
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Question II.
Whether the angel is moved through a medium.
Secondly it is asked whether the angel is moved through a medium, or not. And that he is moved through a medium, is shown.
1. Damascene says that "the angel quickly passes through, by the swiftness and power of his nature"1: but to pass through is to pass through a medium: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, when the angel is moved from a terminus from-which to a terminus to-which, either he is moved at the terminus from-which, or at the terminus to-which2; but at the terminus from-which it is not-to-have-been-moved; whereas at the terminus to-which it is to-have-been-moved: therefore, since to be moved is the middle between the two, it must be that he is in an intermediate space.
3. Likewise, that he can be moved through a medium is seen, because it is certain that the angel, while at Paris3, can be at Rome by the same power, and at any intermediate place — and first at the nearer place and then at the several places successively — but this is to pass through a medium: therefore etc.
4. Likewise, whenever between any extremes there falls a medium which has a natural order to the extremes, it is impossible that an agent of finite power should arrive from one extreme to the other without the medium, as is plain — for between white and black there is an intermediate color, and it is impossible that any created agent should make black from white without making it through the intermediate color4 — but between heaven and earth there are by natural order other bodies as media: therefore it is impossible that anything should come from heaven to earth, or be moved, without traversing the medium.
On the contrary:
1. Augustine On Genesis according to the letter, and the Master places it in the littera5: God moves spiritual creature through times, not through places: therefore, although he passes from one place to another, this is not through a middle place.
2. Likewise, the conclusion is proved in the sixth [book] of the Physics6, that it is impossible that an indivisible be moved over a magnitude; but the angel, with no body assumed, is indivisible: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, by reason it appears that, if he passes through, then either through simples or through composites: if through composites, then he is composite; if through simples — but these are infinite in any continuum, and it is impossible to traverse infinites: therefore etc.
4. Likewise, if through simples; but out of simples no continuum is made7: therefore that motion will not be continuous, therefore by passing through them he never traverses a space: therefore if he is moved through a medium, he never reaches the terminus.
5. Likewise, "it is impossible that anything traverse a space greater than itself, unless it has first traversed a space less than or equal to itself"8: therefore if the angelic spirit passes through a space, he first passes through one equal to himself or less than the greater. But what is equal to a simple is nothing but a simple; and a simple added to a simple does not make something greater: therefore in the first traversal there is just as much, as if nothing were traversed, and likewise in the second traversal, therefore not in the third either: and thus he never traverses any space at all.
Conclusion.
It is reasonably said that the angel is moved through a medium.
I respond: It must be noted here that, concerning this, different writers have spoken in different ways.
For some have said that, since the angel is simple, he cannot pass through a medium; whence he is moved from one extreme to the other without a medium, and every place to which he is moved is related to him in the manner of an immediate. Hence change of place in the angel is not a motion, but only a change without a medium. — But this position does not seem fitting. For it is certain that the angel who is the guardian of a man can guard him so as not to abandon him, and can guard him without a body: therefore he can accompany him inseparably: therefore, when a man goes through a medium, and the angel does not abandon him, equally the angel goes through the medium.
And therefore there were others who said that the angel can be moved both through a medium and without a medium, since his motion is at the bidding of his will according to the power divinely conferred on him; and therefore, when he wills, he places himself at the extreme immediately, and when he wills, he passes through. And they put forward an example, that our intellect can think of Paris and of Rome in two ways: either in such a way that it thinks immediately of one and afterwards of the other, or in such a way that it thinks first of one and afterwards of the way and thirdly of the third. And because for the angel motion is as easy as thinking is for us, since he is not bound to a body, they say that thus and thus he has to be moved. — But whatever is to be said of the position, the example is not fitting: because the thinker has within himself the species of Rome and the species of Paris, and these have no situation in the soul nor any order according to situation, but rather each is equally present to the gaze; and therefore at will he can think of the one or the other. But in reality there is a natural order and situation, and necessarily there lies a medium between one city and another. And on this account that example is not fitting, nor is a way opened to us through it for understanding.
And since it is in some way intelligible that he be carried through a medium, and reason agrees and authority too; therefore it seems reasonable that this should be said. But that limb [of the alternative] which says that he could [be moved] without a medium, I judge ought to be rejected — not because I would assert it false, but because there is no authority at hand which says this, and reason does not compel, indeed does not grasp [it]. It is, however, possible that God may have given to those spiritual substances something which carnal intellects do not grasp. — Therefore the reasons proving that the angel is moved through a medium ought to be conceded.
1. To that which is objected, that God does not move the angel through place; it must be said that force is to be done to the word according to Augustine's understanding: which appears from the littera. For he himself said that the spirit is not moved through places, because the properties of place — namely circumscription and dimension — it does not have, when transferred from place to place; but the property of time, which is some variation and innovation, the spirit truly and properly admits. For new affections succeed in spirits by nature and thoughts, and
further they are intensified and remitted, so that there can truly be partibility on the side of form or of property to be acquired.
2. To that which is objected from the Philosopher, that an indivisible is not moved over a magnitude; it must be said that the Philosopher proves and concludes about an indivisible which has a situation in a magnitude, that it is indivisible and is situated in an indivisible. This cannot be moved over a magnitude, because if it is moved, it is moved to acquire a situation; and what is acquired through motion is acquired in such a way that part comes after part; and the situation of the indivisible cannot be acquired in such a way that part is acquired after part: and therefore it is true that such an indivisible cannot be moved over the magnitude itself. But the angel is such an indivisible as does not have a situation in an indivisible, nor is it to be said that the angel is in an indivisible place, as will be made plain: and therefore the demonstrations of the Philosopher do not have a place here.
3. 4. To that which is asked: whether he passes through simples or through composites; the answer is that he passes through composites, since he is not in a simple place but in a composite [place]; this I suppose for the present, but in its [own] place it will be proved. Nor is it valid to say: he passes through composites, therefore he is composite — just as it is not valid to say: the soul is in a composite, therefore it is composite: because it is in it in such a way that there is no part in a part, but the simple itself as a whole is in any part, in such a way nevertheless that those parts are one place.
It could however be said, if anyone wished to embarrass himself with this kind [of objection], that even if he were to pass through simples, he would not on this account pass through infinites. And this appears thus: that if anyone imagine a sphere being moved over a plane, it does not touch except in a point: therefore it does not touch except through simples, and yet it does not actually traverse infinites — since that sphere is carried over the plane and does not rest in any situation; and so it commensurates itself with no point, but neither does it count the points in [the plane], but, since it is in continuous motion, it regards those indivisibles as united, and so as they are in a continuum; and thus, since the continuum is actually finite and infinite in potency, and that potency is not reduced to act, it does not actually traverse infinites, since it does not regard them as actually numbered. — Nevertheless, since the example bears a charge against it, and the saying does not seem consonant with the saying of the Philosopher, who absolutely says that an indivisible is not moved; I adhere rather to the prior response.
5. And by it the next [objection] is plain. For he objects as if the angel were in a point — which I believe is altogether false, since he would not be in a place, since a point is not a place, nor is it actually in the continuum. But all this will be made better plain in the second book.
I. For the solution of this question a twofold motion is to be distinguished, namely continuous, by which a mobile successively, by parts, deserts the terminus from-which and by parts acquires the terminus to-which; and not continuous (discrete), by which a mobile deserts the whole terminus from-which at once and immediately acquires the whole terminus to-which. The continuous mode implies a transit through intermediate places; but the not-continuous motion excludes this transit, whence it seems rather a simple change of place than a motion.
S. Bonav. here speaks only of the motion of angels according to the mode natural to them, prescinding from the divine power. On this question three opinions are here set down. The first, which is here and commonly reproved, asserts that angels cannot move themselves except by a not-continuous motion; the second, on the contrary, asserts they can do so only by a continuous motion; but the third, by either mode. The third opinion S. Thomas teaches according to the principles he holds concerning the manner in which angels are in a place. The second is held by Alex. Hal. and almost all outside the school of S. Thomas. This, with a certain restriction, S. Bonav. prefers, and indeed for reasons worthy of attention. Scotus, however, approves the second opinion with a distinction. For he distinguishes extremes in continuous extremes — that is, those which are included in the whole place adequate to the angel's power — and extremes so distant that they have a medium distinct from the extremes. These things being supposed, he teaches that in a place with continuous extremes the angels can, if they will, move themselves or change place without traversing a medium; but in others "it seems probable that not", as he says in II. Sent. d. 2. q. 12. n. 3.
II. For the understanding of the solution to [arg.] 2., the definition of point that Aristotle has (I. de Anima, text. 68; see the note on this page) is to be noted: "A point is a unity having position." The whole solution of this difficulty is founded on the distinction between the indivisible (impartible) in itself and as to place — like a point — and the indivisible which is so in itself indeed, but, with respect to the power of occupying place, virtually divisible — like the soul, which, indivisible in itself, coexists with the quantity of the whole body. Aristotle's axiom is true relative to the first kind of indivisible (cfr. II. Sent. d. 2. p. II. a. 2. q. 3, and S. Thom., S. I. q. 53. a. 1. ad 1.). — The second solution, to the last [objection], is drawn from this principle: that when a body is moved through a place composed of indivisible points and infinite in potency, it is not moved by a not-continuous motion from one such point to another. For then it would follow, as S. Thom. observes (loc. cit. a. 2.), that "either it would not pass through all the media, or it would actually number infinite media; which is impossible." But it is manifest that that thing is moved with continuous motion and through intermediate places, which are infinite in potency, but actually are united to form one finite continuum.
III. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 33. m. 2. — Scot., II. Sent. d. 2. q. 12. — S. Thom., here q. 4. a. 2; S. I. q. 53. a. 2. — B. Albert., here a. 23. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 5. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., here a. 3. q. 2. — Ægid. R., here 2. princ. q. 2.
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- Libr. I. de Fide orthod. c. 13.Book I, On the Orthodox Faith, c. 13.
- Anselm., de Concord. praesc. Dei cum lib. arb. q. 3. c. 11; Unde (voluntas) dici potest instrumentum se ipsum movens. Cfr. et supra d. 17. p. I. q. 2. ad 4. — Mox post etiam movens codd. T X repetunt potest, et subinde pro esse Vat. cum aliquibus mss. substituit est. Vat. tertium membrum adiungit aut in spatio intermedio. Cfr. de hoc argumento Aristot., VI. Phys. text. 7. (c. 1.).Anselm, On the Concordance of the Foreknowledge of God with Free Choice, q. 3, c. 11; Whence (the will) can be called an instrument moving itself. See also above d. 17. p. I. q. 2. ad 4. — Just after etiam movens codices T X repeat potest, and shortly after, in place of esse, the Vatican edition with some manuscripts substitutes est. The Vatican edition adds a third member, or in an intermediate space. On this argument see Aristotle, Physics VI, text 7 (c. 1).
- Codd. cum ed. I Parisius.The codices, with the first edition, read Parisius.
- Vide Aristot., VI. Phys. text. 32. (c. 4.). — Paulo inferius pro fiat Vat. veniat. In cod. V verbo fiat adiungitur motus.See Aristotle, Physics VI, text 32 (c. 4). — A little below, in place of fiat the Vatican reads veniat. In codex V the word motus is added to fiat.
- Hic c. 6.Here, c. 6.
- Text. 86–90. (c. 10.), ubi plures rationes afferuntur. Verbum impartibile accipe «indivisibile secundum quantitatem», ut Aristot. interpretatur loc. cit., et verbis super magnitudinem subiice notionem: spatium extensum.Texts 86–90 (c. 10), where several reasons are adduced. The word impartibile is to be taken as "indivisible according to quantity," as Aristotle interprets at the cited place; and beneath the words super magnitudinem understand the notion: extended space.
- Aristot., I. de Caelo et Mundo, text. 35. (c. 5.), et III. text. 19. (c. 2.). — Aristot., VI. Phys. text. 1, et XI. Metaph. c. 9. (X. c. 10.).Aristotle, On the Heavens and the World I, text 35 (c. 5), and III, text 19 (c. 2). — Aristotle, Physics VI, text 1, and Metaphysics XI, c. 9 (X, c. 10).
- Aristot., VI. Phys. text. 89. (c. 10.). — Mox post prius transit codd. aa bb addunt per spatium. — Cfr. et Aristot., III. Metaph. text. 16. (II. c. 4.): Cetera quodammodo quidem addita facient maius… punctum vero et unitas minime, sed plus efficit. Cfr. I. de Gener. et Corrupt. text. 8. (c. 2.).Aristotle, Physics VI, text 89 (c. 10). — Just after prius transit, codices aa bb add per spatium. — See also Aristotle, Metaphysics III, text 16 (II, c. 4): Other things, in some way, when added do make something greater… but a point and a unity by no means, but [the addition] makes more. See also On Generation and Corruption I, text 8 (c. 2).