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Dist. 43, Art. 1, Q. 2

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 43

Textus Latinus
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Quaestio II

Utrum divina essentia sit infinita.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum divina essentia sit infinita sive divina potentia sit infinita quantum ad esse. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Quia nulla potentia nobilior est substantia1; sed divina potentia est infinita: ergo cum non sit nobilior nec maior substantia, necesse est, substantiam esse infinitam.

2. Item, si aliqua duo — liceat sic dicere — sint omnino idem, si unum est infinitum, et reliquum; sed divina essentia et potentia sunt idem, et esse et posse: ergo cum ipsum divinum posse sit infinitum, et esse, et ita essentia.

3. Item, quandocumque aliqua duo sic se habent, quod ad nihil se extendit unum, ad quod pariter non se extendat reliquum, si unum est infinitum, et reliquum; sed ad nihil omnino se extendit potentia, ad quod non se extendat essentia — nunquam Deus potest facere tot quin eius substantia possit esse in tot, secundum quod dicitur tertii Regum octavo3: Si caelum et caeli caelorum etc. — ergo etc.

4. Item, omni finito potest aliquid cogitari maius, scilicet infinitum ipsum; sed divina essentia est ita bona et magna, quod nihil maius nec melius cogitari potest4, alioquin non est Deus: ergo etc.

5. Item, omne finitum bonum melius est cum alio bono quam per se tantum, quia finitum additum finito facit maius: ergo si divina essentia est finita, maius aliquid cum alio erit quam per se tantum: ergo non est perfectissima nec optima; quod omnino nefas est dicere.

6. Item, omne finitum bonum contingit aliquando aequari et reddi per duplicationem finiti, ut patet in linea — et hoc dico, si illud quod duplatur, facit maius, hoc dico propter punctum5 — ergo si divina essentia est finita secundum nobilitatem et bonitatem, si dupletur bonitas creaturae, ascendendo aliquando perveniretur ad bonitatem aequalem divinae bonitati; hoc autem est falsum et impossibile, quod creatura sit proportionalis Creatori, et hoc dicit Augustinus octavo de Trinitate6: ergo et illud, ex quo sequitur, scilicet quod divina essentia sit finita.

Sed contra:

1. «Finitum et infinitum, ut dicit Philosophus7, sunt propriae passiones ipsius quantitatis»; sed essentia ut essentia non habet quantitatem molis: ergo si consideratur ut in abstractione virtutis ut essentia, divina essentia nec est finita nec infinita.

2. Item, omnis potentia, quae potest unum solum, ita quod non aliud, est potentia finita: ergo pari ratione omnis essentia, quae est unum solum, ita quod nihil aliud, est essentia finita; sed divina essentia est Deus et nihil aliud: ergo etc.

3. Item, omne illud quod est finitum summae veritati, est simpliciter finitum — et hoc patet, quia prima veritas iudicat de unoquoque, sicut est; patet etiam in simili, ut hoc est album et nigrum et bonum Deo, ergo simpliciter bonum — sed divina essentia est veritati divinae cognitionis finita, quia Deus ipsam comprehendit et novit perfecte et «quod scitur, ut dicit Augustinus8, scientis comprehensione finitur»: ergo etc.

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4. Item, nullum infinitum finit aliud, quia nihil dat alii quod non habet9: ergo si divina essentia est infinita, ergo nihil finit, ergo nullius est finis; et si hoc: ergo nihil bonum.

5. Item, nullum infinitum comprehenditur a finito; sed Deus comprehenditur a Beatis, quia aliter non essent beati, nisi Deum perfecte cognoscerent — semper enim appetitus ferretur ad amplius et non quiescerent, et ita non essent beati — si ergo comprehenditur, non est infinitus.

6. Item, nulla privatio est habitu nobilior: ergo cum infinitum dicat privationem, finitum dicat habitum, et omne nobilius Deo est attribuendum, patet etc.

Conclusio

Essentia divina est omnino infinita in actu.

Respondeo: Ad hoc voluerunt quidam dicere, quod divina essentia sub ratione essentiae est finita, sub ratione potentiae est infinita. Nam essentia nominat Deum ut in se, et sic est finitus, quia perfectus; finitus etiam, quia comprehenditur a finito ut a Beatis; et hoc dixerunt propter essentiae simplicitatem, quam dixerunt totam videri. In quantum autem consideratur sub ratione potentiae, sic dicit respectum ad effectus. Et quia non est status ibi, quia semper est aliquid extra accipere10, dixerunt, quod sub ratione potentiae erat infinita. — Sed ista positio erronea fuit manifeste. Nam ista duo sunt incompossibilia11, quod potentia sit infinita, omnino existente substantia finita, et quia idem sunt omnino, et quia prior secundum rationem intelligendi est substantia, et quia ad quidquid se extendit potentia sub ratione potentiae et essentia, ut ostensum est14.

Et propter hoc dixerunt aliqui, quod est infinitum12 simpliciter et infinitum nobis: et voluerunt dicere, quod tam essentia quam potentia est finita secundum veritatem, quia est finita Deo, qui est veritas; sed tamen utraque nobis est infinita, quia improportionaliter nos excedit. Unde «Deus infinitus dicitur, quia nec loco nec tempore nec comprehensione comprehenditur», sicut dicit Damascenus13. — Sed iterum ista positio non potest stare, quoniam sicut supra probatum est de potentia, quod ipsa non habet statum in possendo, et iterum, est omnino actu, et ideo ponitur vere infinita; sic etiam probari potest de essentia.

Necesse est ergo, quod omnino infinita sit actu. Et hoc concedendum est et tenendum est tanquam verum, eo quod magis est consonum fidei, quae dicit Deum immensum, et magis consonum auctoritatibus Sanctorum, qui omnes dicunt ipsum infinitum, unde Damascenus15 dicit, quod Deus est «quoddam pelagus substantiae infinitum»; magis etiam consonum sententiis magistrorum, magis etiam consonum rationi.

Ad intelligentiam igitur obiectorum in oppositum notandum, quod infinitum dicitur per abnegationem finis. Potest ergo dupliciter dici infinitum, scilicet a parte negationis, et similiter a parte finis16. A parte finis: nam finis dicitur dupliciter, uno modo, quod est complementum; et sic infinitum dicitur per privationem complementi, et hoc modo

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infinitum dicitur in materia et in genere substantiae et in aliis generibus; et hoc modo non cadit in Deo, quia ipse est perfectissimus. Alio modo finis dicitur terminus, sicut finis agri, et sic infinitum dicitur quod caret termino et statu. — Et hoc potest esse dupliciter secundum negationem, quia potest intelligi privative et negative: privative, quia non habet terminum, sed tamen natum est habere, propter hoc quod habet esse limitatum17, et hoc modo dicit incompletionem, et non est in Deo. Alio modo negative, quod non habet terminum nec est natum habere: et hoc modo ponitur in Deo propter summam immensitatem16.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod infinitum est passio quantitatis; dici potest, quod sicut nomen quantitatis extenditur ad quantitatem virtutis, similiter nomen infiniti. Quantitas autem virtutis non tantum attenditur quantum ad opus, sed etiam quantum ad nobilitatem valoris; et hoc patet, quia, ut dicit Augustinus18, «in spiritualibus idem est maius et melius».

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod est unum ita, quod non est aliud; dicendum, quod aliquid comparari ad multa potest esse dupliciter: aut secundum comparationem causalitatis, aut secundum comparationem identitatis. Comparari ad multa sub ratione causalitatis hoc convenit infinito, quia infinitum: sed secundum rationem identitatis, non. Unde quia infinitum, ideo se extendit ad multa19, sed non sequitur, quod sit multa. Unde si essentia vel potentia comparetur secundum rationem identitatis ad res, neutra est plurium: unde nec potentia divina est aliae potentiae, nec essentia aliae essentiae; si20 secundum rationem causalitatis, sic convenit et potentiae et essentiae. Nam sicut potentiae convenit facere plura, sic essentiae in pluribus esse.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod est finitum summae veritati; dicendum, quod haec21 est duplex: aut enim est finitum summae veritati, quia mentes iudicat, ipsum esse finitum, aut quia non excedit eius comprehensionem. Primo modo non est Deus sibi finitus, sed infinitus; vere enim scit se esse infinitum. Secundo modo est finitus, quia se non excedit, cum sit infinitus; et sic non valet argumentum, et est ibi fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter: si non excedit infinitum: ergo est finitum simpliciter.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod infinitum non finit; dicendum, quod infinitum per privationem perfectionis non finit; sed infinitum per negationem limitationis habet rationem finiendi, quia, cum sit summum, in ipso est omnis status: in hoc enim infinitas non repugnat simplicitati nec complemento.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod comprehenditur; dicendum, quod non comprehenditur per inclusionem, comprehenditur autem per perfectam visionem, dilectionem et tentionem, et hoc a parte comprehendentis et non comprehensi; et ideo, quia perficitur22, requiescit, quamvis ultra non attingat.

6. Quod ultimo obiicitur, solutum est; obiicit enim de infinito, secundum quod dicitur privative; sed prout dicitur de Deo, non dicit privationem secundum rem, sed solum quantum ad modum significandi23; et respondet ei summa positio. Nihil enim dicitur immensum, nisi quod habet summam et perfectissimam actualitatem et nihil coarctans et determinans. Unde etsi videatur dici privative, tamen secundum veritatem excludit omnem privationem.

Scholion

I. Opinionem secundam, in respons. positam, S. Doctor ad 2. militat contra pantheismum. Alex. Hal. (S. p. I. q. 6. m. 1. ad 3.) in eodem sensu dicit, «quod aliquid non debet dici finitum, quia sit hoc et non aliud, sed quia terminatur ad aliud, vel est propter aliud, vel quia perficitur ab alio». Mitius censurat quam primam, quia error, ut videtur, potius in perverso modo loquendi, quam in pravo intellectu consistere potest (cfr. ad 3. 4. et supra d. 35. q. 5. ad 1.). — Solut. ad 3. S. Thom. (S. I. q. 7. a. 1. ad 3.) eandem obiectionem solvit ex hoc principio, quod esse Dei est per se subsistens, non receptum in aliquo, et ideo distinguitur ab omnibus aliis, licet sit infinitum.

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II. Praeter laudatos: S. Thom., S. I. q. 7. a. 1; S. c. Gent. c. 43. — B. Albert., I. Sent. d. 2. a. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 1. — Henr. Gand., S. a. q. 1. 2.

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English Translation
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Question II

Whether the divine essence is infinite.

Secondly, the question is asked, whether the divine essence is infinite, or whether the divine power is infinite as to being. And that it is so, seems thus:

1. Because no power is nobler than its substance1; but the divine power is infinite: therefore, since the substance is not less noble nor smaller, it is necessary that the substance be infinite.

2. Likewise, if any two things — let it be permitted to speak so — are altogether the same, if one is infinite, so is the other; but the divine essence and power are the same, as also being and being able: therefore, since the divine being able itself is infinite, so is the being, and thus the essence.

3. Likewise, whenever any two stand in such relation that there is nothing to which the one extends to which the other does not equally extend, if one is infinite, so is the other; but there is nothing whatever to which the power extends to which the essence does not extend — God can never make so many things but that His substance can be in so many, according to what is said in 3 Kings 83: If heaven, and the heaven of heavens etc. — therefore etc.

4. Likewise, beyond every finite thing something greater can be thought, namely the infinite itself; but the divine essence is so good and great that nothing greater nor better can be thought4, otherwise He is not God: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, every finite good is better with another good than by itself alone, because a finite added to a finite makes a greater: therefore, if the divine essence is finite, something with another will be greater than it by itself alone: therefore it is not most perfect nor best — which it is altogether unlawful to say.

6. Likewise, every finite good can sometimes be matched and made equal through doubling the finite, as is clear in the line — and I say this if that which is doubled makes a greater [thing]; I say this on account of the point5 — therefore if the divine essence is finite according to nobility and goodness, if the goodness of a creature be doubled, ascending one would eventually arrive at a goodness equal to the divine goodness; but this is false and impossible, that a creature should be proportional to the Creator, and this Augustine says in On the Trinity VIII6: therefore also that from which it follows, namely that the divine essence be finite.

On the contrary:

1. «The finite and the infinite, as the Philosopher says7, are proper affections of quantity itself»; but the essence as essence has not quantity of mass: therefore, if it be considered as in the abstraction of strength as essence, the divine essence is neither finite nor infinite.

2. Likewise, every power which can [do] one thing only, such that not another, is a finite power: therefore by parity of reason, every essence which is one thing only, such that nothing else, is a finite essence; but the divine essence is God and nothing else: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, everything that is finite to the supreme truth is simply finite — and this is plain, because the first truth judges of each thing as it is; it is plain also in a similar case, just as this is white and black and good to God, therefore simply good — but the divine essence is finite to the divine truth of cognition, because God comprehends it and knows it perfectly, and «what is known, as Augustine says8, is bounded by the comprehension of the knower»: therefore etc.

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4. Likewise, no infinite delimits another, because nothing gives to another what it does not have9: therefore if the divine essence is infinite, then it delimits nothing, therefore it is the end (finis) of nothing; and if so: therefore nothing is good.

5. Likewise, no infinite is comprehended by a finite; but God is comprehended by the Blessed, because otherwise they would not be blessed unless they knew God perfectly — for the appetite would always be carried toward more and they would not rest, and so they would not be blessed — if therefore He is comprehended, He is not infinite.

6. Likewise, no privation is more noble than a habit: therefore, since the infinite expresses a privation, and the finite a habit, and every more-noble thing must be attributed to God, it is plain etc.

Conclusion

The divine essence is altogether infinite in act.

I respond: To this some have wished to say that the divine essence under the aspect of essence is finite, under the aspect of power is infinite. For the essence names God as He is in Himself, and so He is finite, because perfect; finite also, because He is comprehended by a finite, as by the Blessed; and they said this on account of the simplicity of the essence, which they said is seen as a whole. Insofar, however, as He is considered under the aspect of power, so He bespeaks a respect to effects. And because there is no terminus there, since there is always something further to be received10, they said that under the aspect of power He was infinite. — But that position was manifestly erroneous. For these two are incompossible11, that the power be infinite while the substance is altogether finite, both because they are wholly the same, and because the substance is prior according to the order of understanding, and because to whatever the power extends under the aspect of power so also the essence, as has been shown14.

And on this account some have said that He is infinite12 simply and infinite for us: and they wished to say that both essence and power are finite according to truth, because [they are] finite to God, who is truth; but nevertheless each is infinite for us, because He exceeds us disproportionately. Whence «God is called infinite, because He is comprehended neither by place nor by time nor by comprehension», as Damascene13 says. — But again this position cannot stand, since, as has been proved above concerning the power, that it has no terminus in its capacity, and again, it is wholly in act, and therefore is rightly held to be truly infinite; so also can be proved concerning the essence.

It is necessary therefore that it be altogether infinite in act. And this is to be conceded and held as true, because it is more consonant with the faith, which calls God immense, and more consonant with the authorities of the Saints, who all call Him infinite, whence Damascene15 says that God is «a certain infinite sea of substance»; more consonant also with the judgements of the masters, more consonant also with reason.

For the understanding therefore of the objections on the opposite side, it is to be noted that the infinite is said by abnegation of an end. The infinite then can be said in two ways, namely on the side of the negation, and likewise on the side of the end16. On the side of the end: for end is said in two ways, in one way as that which is complement; and so the infinite is said by privation of complement, and in this way

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the infinite is said in matter and in the genus of substance and in the other genera; and in this way it does not fall in God, because He is most perfect. In another way end is said terminus, as the boundary of a field, and so the infinite is said to be that which lacks terminus and stopping-point. — And this can be in two ways according to negation, because it can be understood privatively and negatively: privatively, because it has no terminus, but is nevertheless of a nature to have one, on account of the fact that it has a limited being17, and in this way it bespeaks incompletion, and is not in God. In the other way negatively, in that it has no terminus and is not of a nature to have [one]: and in this way it is placed in God on account of His supreme immensity.

1. To the objection therefore that the infinite is an affection of quantity, it can be said that just as the name quantity is extended to quantity of strength, so likewise the name infinite. Quantity of strength, however, is considered not only as to the work, but also as to the nobility of value; and this is plain because, as Augustine says18, «in spiritual things the greater is the same as the better».

2. To the objection that He is one in such a way that He is not another; it must be said that something can be compared to many in two ways: either according to the comparison of causality, or according to the comparison of identity. To be compared to many under the aspect of causality belongs to the infinite, because [He is] infinite: but according to the aspect of identity, no. Whence, because [He is] infinite, therefore He extends to many19, but it does not follow that He is many. Whence if the essence or the power be compared according to the aspect of identity to things, neither is of many: whence neither is the divine power some other powers, nor the essence some other essences; if20 according to the aspect of causality, so it belongs both to the power and to the essence. For just as it belongs to the power to make many, so to the essence to be in many.

3. To the objection that it is finite to the supreme truth; it must be said that this21 is twofold: for either it is finite to the supreme truth because the [supreme] mind judges that it is finite, or because it does not exceed His comprehension. In the first way God is not finite to Himself, but infinite; for He truly knows Himself to be infinite. In the second way He is finite, because He does not exceed Himself, since He is infinite; and so the argument is not valid, and there is the fallacy of qualified and simple: if it does not exceed the infinite, then it is simply finite.

4. To the objection that the infinite does not delimit; it must be said that the infinite by privation of perfection does not delimit; but the infinite by negation of limitation has the character of delimiting, because, since He is supreme, in Him is every stopping-place: for in this case infinity is not repugnant to simplicity nor to complement.

5. To the objection that He is comprehended; it must be said that He is not comprehended by inclusion, but is comprehended by perfect vision, love, and holding, and this on the side of the one comprehending and not of the one comprehended; and therefore, because [the comprehender] is perfected22, he rests, although he does not reach beyond.

6. What was lastly objected has been answered; for it objects concerning the infinite according as it is said privatively; but as it is said of God, it does not bespeak a privation according to reality, but only as to the mode of signifying23; and the supreme position answers to it. For nothing is called immense, except what has the supreme and most perfect actuality and constricts and determines nothing. Whence, even though it may seem to be said privatively, yet according to truth it excludes every privation.

Scholion

I. The second opinion, set in the response, the Holy Doctor in [his reply] to 2. uses against pantheism. Alexander of Hales (Summa p. I, q. 6, m. 1, ad 3) in the same sense says that «something ought not to be called finite because it be this and not another, but because it is terminated at another, or is on account of another, or because it is perfected by another». He censures it more mildly than the first, because the error, as it seems, may consist rather in a perverse mode of speaking than in a depraved understanding (cf. ad 3, 4 and above d. 35, q. 5, ad 1). — Solution to 3. St. Thomas (Summa I, q. 7, a. 1, ad 3) solves the same objection from this principle: that the being of God is per se subsistent, not received in any [other], and therefore is distinguished from all others, although it be infinite.

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II. Besides those praised: St. Thomas, Summa I, q. 7, a. 1; Summa contra Gentiles c. 43. — Blessed Albert, I Sent. d. 2, a. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here q. 1. — Henry of Ghent, Summa a. q. 1. 2.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Supple cum cod. M potentia. Subinde idem cod. M post maior interserit quam. — Huc argumentum fundatur in axiomate: operari sequitur esse.
    Supply with codex M potentia. Then the same codex M after maior inserts quam. — This argument is founded on the axiom: operation follows being.
  2. Vers. 27, et II. Paralip. 2, 6. Primus locus sic prosequitur: te capere non possunt, quanto magis domus haec, quam aedificavi. — Paulo superius voci nunquam cod. Y praefigit quia; Vat. eidem voci nunquam adiicit enim, et dein pro eius substantia exhibet etiam substantia.
    Verse 27, and 2 Chronicles 2:6. The first passage continues thus: cannot contain thee, how much less this house which I have built. — A little above, codex Y prefixes quia to the word nunquam; the Vatican ed. adds enim to the same word nunquam, and then in place of eius substantia it also displays substantia.
  3. Boeth., III. de Consol. prosa 10, et Anselm., Proslog. c. 2, nec non libr. contra Insipientem, c. 1 seqq. — Proxime post pro est Deus Vat. esset Deus.
    Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy III, prose 10, and Anselm, Proslogion c. 2, as also his book Against the Fool, c. 1 and following. — Just after, in place of est Deus the Vatican ed. [reads] esset Deus.
  4. Nam punctum additum puncto non facit maius. Cfr. supra pag. 660, nota 6. — Paulo ante pro duplicatur aliqui codd. duplicetur, aliqui cum cod. T duplicetur.
    For a point added to a point does not make a greater. Cf. above p. 660, note 6. — A little earlier, in place of duplicatur some codd. [read] duplicetur, some with codex T [read] duplicetur.
  5. Cap. 2. n. 3.
    Chapter 2, number 3.
  6. Libr. I. Phys. text. 15. (c. 2.): «Infinitum enim in quanto est… infiniti enim ratio [definitio] quanto utitur, sed non substantia nec quali». Quae verba Averroes sic interpretatur: «Infinitum enim et finitum sunt de differentiis quantitatis». De quantitate molis et virtutis cfr. August., libr. de Quant. animae, c. 3. n. 4. — Ante virtutis supple cum ed. I a quantitate. In Vat. desideratur molis, et loco virtutis legitur a quantitate. Dein post ut essentia codd. V X subiiciunt est.
    Physics I, text 15 (c. 2): «For the infinite [is found] in quantity… for the account [definition] of the infinite makes use of quantity, but not of substance nor of the qualitative». Which words Averroes interprets thus: «For the infinite and the finite are among the differences of quantity». On quantity of mass and of strength cf. Augustine, On the Quantity of the Soul c. 3, n. 4. — Before virtutis supply with ed. 1 a quantitate. In the Vatican ed. molis is lacking, and in place of virtutis is read a quantitate. Then after ut essentia codd. V X subjoin est.
  7. Libr. XII. de Civ. Dei. c. 18.
    On the City of God XII, c. 18.
  8. Aristot., II. Elench. c. 3. (c. 22.). — Ultima huius argumenti conclusio: ergo nihil bonum, plane consequitur ex praecedentibus, dummodo illud axioma adhibetur: finis et bonum sunt idem sive convertuntur, quod axioma apud Aristot. saepe saepius occurrit, sic I. Rhetor. c. de Bono et utili (c. 6.), I. Ethic. c. 1, I. Magnor. Moral. c. 2. seq. (c. 1.), V. Metaph. text. 3. (IV. c. 2.). — Cod. Y in fine argumenti adiungit: sed hoc falsum: ergo et illud unde sequitur.
    Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations II, c. 3 (c. 22). — The last conclusion of this argument, therefore nothing is good, plainly follows from what precedes, provided that the axiom is applied: end and good are the same, or are converted, which axiom in Aristotle very often occurs: thus Rhetoric I, c. on the Good and the Useful (c. 6); Ethics I, c. 1; Greater Morals I, c. 2 and following (c. 1); Metaphysics V, text 3 (IV, c. 2). — Codex Y at the end of the argument adds: but this is false: therefore also that from which it follows.
  9. Respicitur Aristotelica definitio infiniti, supra pag. 764, nota 3.
    It refers to the Aristotelian definition of the infinite, [given] above p. 764, note 3.
  10. Hic in tribus primis fundamentis.
    Here in the first three fundamenta.
  11. Vat. cum cod. cc finitum. In ed. I legitur sic: Et propter hoc dixerunt aliqui, quod [essentia divina] non est infinita simpliciter, sed infinita nobis.
    The Vatican ed., with codex cc, [reads] finitum. In ed. 1 it reads thus: And on this account some have said that [the divine essence] is not infinite simply, but infinite for us.
  12. Libr. I. de Fide orthod. c. 4. In textu cit. pro dicitur plures codd. est; aliqui codd. omittunt dicitur nec pro eo substituunt aliud verbum.
    On the Orthodox Faith I, c. 4. In the cited text, in place of dicitur several codd. [read] est; some codd. omit dicitur and do not substitute another word for it.
  13. Quaest. praeced. — Paulo inferius pro actu in Vat. habetur actus, et dein omittitur vere.
    The preceding Question. — A little below, in place of actu in the Vatican ed. is found actus, and then vere is omitted.
  14. Libr. I. de Fide orthod. c. 9. — Post verba consonum rationi in cod. M largum habetur additamentum, quod ex iis quae postea sequuntur, confectum videtur, paucis tantum additis. Additur igitur: Vel melius ad praedictorum intelligentiam notandum, quod in quaestione, in qua est multiplicitas nominis, prius oportet secundum artem distinguere, quam aliquid asserere vel negare. Intelligendum ergo, quod infinitum dupliciter dicitur, scilicet privative et negative. Secundum quod dicitur privative, sic privat actum et relinquit aptitudinem, et hoc modo dicitur infinitum, quod est natum finiri, non tamen est finitum et sic sonat in incompletionem, ut materia dicitur infinita; secundum autem quod dicitur negative, sic simpliciter removet finem seu finitatem. Sed hoc dupliciter habet intelligi secundum duplicem acceptionem finis: dicitur enim finis terminus, finis complementum, et ideo infinitum dicitur vel per abnegationem finis complementi, et sic dicitur malum infinitum vel per abnegationem finis termini, et hoc dupliciter potest esse secundum duplicem terminum: est enim terminus secundum quantitatem materialem, et est terminus secundum quantitatem spiritualem. Prima dicitur quantitas molis, secunda dicitur quantitas virtutis. Infinitum igitur per abnegationem termini circa quantitatem molis semper dicit aliquam incompletionem aliquo modo vel actu vel potentia, quia dicit recessum a simplici quantitate; talis enim quantitas non simul stat cum simplicitate in eodem et secundum idem, et tale infinitum nunquam est actu, sed solum potentia, actu autem finitum. Infinitum vero per abnegationem termini circa quantitatem virtutis non dicit aliquam imperfectionem, sed summam perfectionem, quia non repugnat simplicitati, immo non potest esse nisi in summe simplici; et tali modo Scripturae auctoritas et fidei confessio ponunt infinitatem sive immensitatem in ipso Deo simplicissimo.
    On the Orthodox Faith I, c. 9. — After the words consonant with reason, in codex M there is a large addition, which appears to have been compiled from what afterwards follows, with only a few additions. It is added therefore: Or, better, for the understanding of what was foresaid it must be noted that in a question in which there is a multiplicity of meaning of a name, one ought first to distinguish according to art before asserting or denying anything. It is to be understood therefore that the infinite is said in two ways, namely privatively and negatively. Insofar as it is said privatively, it deprives of act and leaves [only] aptitude, and in this way the infinite is said to be that which is of a nature to be finished, but yet is not finished — and so resounds with incompletion, as matter is called infinite; insofar however as it is said negatively, it simply removes end or finitude. But this is to be understood in two ways according to the twofold sense of «end»: for end is said as terminus, end as complement, and therefore the infinite is said either by the abnegation of end-as-complement, and so an evil is called infinite, or by the abnegation of end-as-terminus, and this can be in two ways according to the twofold terminus: for there is terminus according to material quantity, and there is terminus according to spiritual quantity. The first is called quantity of mass, the second is called quantity of strength. The infinite therefore by abnegation of terminus with respect to quantity of mass always bespeaks some incompletion in some way, either in act or in potency, because it bespeaks a recession from simple quantity; for such a quantity does not stand together with simplicity in the same [thing] and in the same respect, and such an infinite is never in act, but only in potency, and is in act finite. But the infinite by abnegation of terminus with respect to quantity of strength does not bespeak any imperfection, but the supreme perfection, because it is not repugnant to simplicity — indeed it cannot be except in the supremely simple; and in this way the authority of Scripture and the confession of faith place infinity or immensity in God Himself, the most simple.
  15. Sensus est: infinitum, quia est vocabulum compositum ex particula negativa in et verbo finitum, dupliciter considerari potest, et secundum particulam negativam, et secundum verbum.
    The sense is: infinitum, because it is a word composed from the negative particle in and the verb finitum, can be considered in two ways, both according to the negative particle, and according to the verb.
  16. De hac duplici acceptione infiniti cfr. Aristot., III. Phys. text. 63. seqq. (c. 6.), et V. Metaph. text. 21. (IV. c. 16). De discrimine, quod est inter negationem et privationem, cfr. Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Oppositis, et IV. Metaph. text. 1. nec non V. text. 27. (III. c. 2, et IV. c. 22.). — Paulo superius pro quod habet esse limitatum cod. T quod dicit esse limitatum.
    On this twofold acceptance of the infinite cf. Aristotle, Physics III, text 63 and following (c. 6), and Metaphysics V, text 21 (IV, c. 16). On the distinction between negation and privation, cf. Aristotle, On the Categories c. on Opposites, and Metaphysics IV, text 1, as also V, text 27 (III, c. 2, and IV, c. 22). — A little above, in place of quod habet esse limitatum codex T [reads] quod dicit esse limitatum.
  17. Libr. VI. de Trin. c. 8. n. 11.: Quae non mole magna sunt, hoc est maius esse quod est melius esse. — Solutionis sententia haec est: quantitas virtutis non tantum attenditur in effectu sive opere, ad magnitudinem exteriorem, sed etiam relate ad intrinsecam nobilitatem et essentialem valorem; unde divina essentia, cum sit quantitas virtutis, quia nobilissima est, erit et infinita.
    On the Trinity VI, c. 8, n. 11: In those things that are not great by mass, this is the greater being which is the better being. — The sense of the solution is this: quantity of strength is not considered only in effect or work, with respect to outer magnitude, but also in relation to intrinsic nobility and essential worth; whence the divine essence, since it is a quantity of strength, because it is most noble, will also be infinite.
  18. Codicibus nec non ed. I refragantibus, Vat. ideo transformavit in in Deo, et dein post ad multa prosequitur: quia potentia vel essentia eius comparatur ad multa, ex hoc tamen non sequitur etc.
    Against the codd. and ed. 1, the Vatican ed. transformed ideo into in Deo, and then after ad multa continues: because His power or essence is compared to many, yet from this it does not follow etc.
  19. Pro si Vat. cum aliquibus mss. sed.
    In place of si the Vatican ed., with some mss., [reads] sed.
  20. Scilicet propositio. — Aliquanto inferius pro Secundo modo est finitus plures codd. perperam Secundo modo est infinitus. Circa finem solutionis ante non excedit interiecimus si, auctoritate codd. A R T. — Cfr. supra d. 19. p. I. q. 1. ad 3.
    Namely, the proposition. — Somewhat below, in place of Secundo modo est finitus, several codd. wrongly [read] Secundo modo est infinitus. Toward the end of the solution before non excedit we have inserted si, on the authority of codd. A R T. — Cf. above d. 19, p. I, q. 1, ad 3.
  21. Id est, quia comprehendens completur et satiatur. Cfr. supra d. 1. a. 3. q. 2. ad 2. — Vat. cum nonnullis codd. quin perficitur res secundum suam capacitatem, quiescit, quamvis ultra non attingat. Alii codd. non pauci sic: quin perficitur res, requiescit, quamvis etc. Nostra lectio, quae est receptior, descripta est ex codd. R O.
    That is, because the one comprehending is completed and satiated. Cf. above d. 1, a. 3, q. 2, ad 2. — The Vatican ed. with some codd. [reads] quin perficitur res secundum suam capacitatem, quiescit, quamvis ultra non attingat. Other codd. not a few thus: quin perficitur res, requiescit, quamvis etc. Our reading, which is the more received, has been transcribed from codd. R O.
  22. Pro posito Vat. cum cod. cc potentia. Paulo post pro unde etsi videatur multi codd. Unde si dicatur; incongrue.
    In place of posito the Vatican ed. with codex cc [reads] potentia. A little later, in place of unde etsi videatur, many codd. display Unde si dicatur; incongruously.
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