Bonaventure — Opera Omnia

Dist. 43, Art. 1, Q. 1

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 43

Textus Latinus

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Articulus Unicus. De infinitate divinae potentiae.

Quaestio I. Utrum potentia Dei, secundum quod huiusmodi, sit infinita.

Primo ergo quaeritur, utrum Dei potentia sit infinita; et quod ipsa potentia, secundum quod huiusmodi, sit infinita, ostenditur sic.

Fundamenta.

1. Infinitum dicitur quod non habet terminum¹; sed divina potentia quantum ad posse non habet terminum: ergo etc. Prima manifesta est; secunda patet per Chrysostomum in quadam Homilia²: « Omnipotens dicitur, quia eius posse non invenit non posse »: ergo si semper invenit posse, semper quantitatem potentiae accipientibus est ultra accipere: ergo est infinita.

2. Item, omnis potentia activa, quae potest in effectus infinitos, est actu infinita; divina potentia est huiusmodi: ergo etc. Probatio primae: si potentia est pure in actu, ergo habet totum actualiter, quod potest habere: ergo si totum habet actualiter, et nihil potest ei accrescere nec de novo aliquid dari³, et potentia ut potens se extendebat ad infinita: ergo actu habet in se infinitatem. Minor patet, quia divina potentia nunquam potest in tot effectus, quin adhuc possit in plures: ergo manifestum est, quod est infinita.

3. Item, omnis potentia, quae potest in actum infinitum, si est omnino in actu, est simpliciter infinita; sed divina virtus est huiusmodi: ergo etc. Maior patet sic: sicut se habet potentia ad potentiam, sic actus ad actum; sed actus infinitus excedit finitum in infinitum, ergo et potentia potentiam:

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ergo si potentia est omnino in actu, est infinita. Minor patet, quia Deus dicitur durare in infinitum et potest creaturam conservare in infinitum: ergo etc.

4. Item, omnis potentia, quae potest super extrema in infinitum distantia, est infinita; sed potentia divina est huiusmodi, quia de nihilo aliquid facit, et inter aliquid et nihil est infinita distantia: ergo etc.

5. Item, omnis potentia, quae omnino indifferens est ab essentia, est infinita; sed divina potentia est huiusmodi: ergo etc. Probatio primae: quandocumque aliqua duo sunt omnino indistantia, ubicumque est unum, et reliquum⁴: ergo si potentia est omnino indifferens ab essentia, ubicumque est potentia, et essentia. Sed ubi est essentia, ibi est centrum potentiae: ergo ubicumque potest potentia talis, potest ut in centro: ergo cum nulla potentia limitetur in centro suo, sed amplius possit, aut divina potentia nihil potest, aut potest quantum vult, et sic in infinitum: ergo, quantum est de se, potentia illa potest in infinitis⁵ operari. Sed potentia illa omnino est indifferens et simplex: ergo idem est ibi factivum et intensum: ergo si extensive est infinita, et intensive: ergo omnino est infinita. Et hoc est, quod dicit Philosophus in libro de Causis⁶ quod « virtus quanto magis unita, tanto magis infinita ». Cum ergo divina potentia sit unitissima, quia est omnino idem cum sua origine, ubique potest tanquam in sua origine: ergo nunquam invenit non posse.

Contra:

1. Omne illud est finitum, in quo est reperire statum; sed in divina potentia est reperire statum, quia est assignare aliquid, quod non potest, sicut supra ostensum est⁷, ut actus corporales et actus deformes: ergo etc.

2. Item, quod exceditur⁸ ab aliquo est finitum, quia infinitum nullo modo exceditur; sed scientia excedit potentiam respectu scibilium plurium; enim est scientia quam potentia: scit enim mala, et non potest: ergo etc.

3. Item, videmus in potentiis creatis, quod infinitas est a materia, sed finitas est a forma: ergo cum potentia Dei sit omnino forma sive formalis, nihil omnino habens possibilitatis, ergo simpliciter est finita et nullo modo infinita.

4. Item, inter contradictorie opposita est distantia infinita; sed creaturae virtus finitum unum reducit ad alterum, ut non currentem facit currere, et tamen est finita: ergo⁹.

5. Item, video¹⁰ quod anima habet potentiam omnino indifferentem ab essentia, sicut potentia vivificandi corpus; habet etiam potentiam ad actum infinitum, sicut ad durandum sive permanendum in infinitum; habet potentiam nihilominus ad actus infinitos¹¹; et tamen ipsa potentia est finita in se: ergo videtur pari ratione de divina potentia, cum anima sit expressa imago Dei. Unde videntur rationes praedictae nihil valere.

Conclusio. Potentia divina est infinita in actu et in habitu.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod divinam potentiam est ponere omnino et in actu et in habitu infinitam; sicut probatum est¹² per effectum a posteriori, quia habet effectum infinitum duratione et infinitos appositione, ad quos comparatur ut actus purus et ut tota causa. Et ideo est¹³ habens in se plenam et perfectam actualitatem respectu infinitorum; et necesse est, cum habeat totum, quod unquam habitura est, et ex se habeat, quod ipsa infinita sit.

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Alia ratio ostendit hoc quasi a priori. Propter summam enim indivisionem virtutis cum essentia¹⁴, et propter summam unitatem ipsius virtutis, ubicumque potest, tota potest, et tantum in extremo mundi quantum in medio, et tantum in summo quantum in imis, et omni modo infinitatis.

Nec est consimilis ratio in aliqua creatura nec quantum ad causalitatem effectus, nec quantum ad productionem actus¹⁵, nec quantum ad unitatem.

Non quantum ad causalitatem, quia nulla virtus creaturae respectu durationis infinitae est pure activa, immo necesse est per divinam influentiam conservari. — Similiter nec quantum ad productionem actus, unde habet infinitatem passivam etiam in recipiendo, et ideo nulla est actu infinita, sed solum in potentia. Et quia infinitum in potentia pendet ex infinito in actu, ideo omnis infinitas durationis creatae et operationis pendet ex infinitate virtutis increatae. Et hoc est quod dicit Philosophus in libro de Causis¹⁶, quod « omnes virtutes infinitae pendentes sunt per unum infinitum primum, quod est virtus virtutum ». — Similiter non est simile de simplicitate sive unitate. Nam potentia divina est omnino in se simplex et omnino habet essentiam sive substantiam simplicem, omnino etiam ab illa est indifferens; et ideo omnimoda unione est unitissima, et ideo infinita. Sed nullius creaturae, quantumcumque nobilis, potentia est omnino simplex, quia omnis talis potentia dicit aliquem respectum dependentiae; nec fundatur in substantia omnino simplici; nec omnino est indifferens, quia nulla creatura est sua potentia, loquendo essentialiter¹⁷. — Et ideo quia deficit omnis creatura a ratione summae simplicitatis, et infinitatis per consequens. Et sic patet quod divina potentia est infinita¹⁸, et ratio infinitatis.

Et patet responsio ad ultimam rationem ostendentem, praedictas rationes non valere.

Ad argumenta pro parte negativa:

Ad 1, 2. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod invenit terminum, et quod invenit excessum; dicendum quod divina potentia est infinita respectu eorum quae posse est posse¹⁹; respectu aliorum, quae posse est impotentiae, nec est finita nec est infinita, quia nihil eis potest. — Quando enim dicitur, quod invenit terminum vel excessum; dicendum, quod falsum est, quia creatura et passibilis rei attenditur secundum ea ad quae res se extendit: et divina potentia se extendit solum ad bona, et quantum ad talia²⁰ nunquam est plurium scientia quam potentia; nec quantum ad talia invenit terminum. Et ideo patet illud.

Potest tamen et aliter dici, quod dupliciter est loqui de potentia et scientia: aut in se, aut per comparationem ad obiecta. Si in se, sic una non excedit aliam, quia quidquid scit, potest scire, et quidquid potest, scit se posse. Vel²¹ per comparationem ad obiectum, et sic est loqui dupliciter, aut secundum formam sive speciem, aut secundum numerum. Si secundum numerum, sic, cum potentia possit infinita, non exceditur a scientia; si autem secundum formam, sic, quia potentia est respectu bonorum tantum²², exceditur; tamen ex hoc non sequitur, quin sit infinita. — Et est exemplum: si quis imaginetur duas lineas infinitas, plures sunt duae quam una, quia non habebat una infinitatem secundum numerum, sed solum secundum longitudinem; et sic non sunt maiores vel longiores duae quam una. Similiter in proposito intelligitur. Potentia enim dicitur infinita respectu obiectorum secundum numerum, sed non secundum qualitatem, quia non potest in mala vel privatoria. — Et per hoc patet primum et secundum. Quamvis enim inveniat terminum respectu mali, non tamen respectu boni, et ille terminus vel excessus potius facit ad infinitatem, quia non est posse, sed non-posse; et ideo, quamvis hoc videatur dare terminum secundum rationem intelligendi, secundum veritatem non dat, quia quod non possit mala, hoc totum est propter immensitatem virtutis.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod infinitum est passio potentiae materialis; dicendum, quod hoc verum est de infinito per privationem completionis sive completi esse; sed non est verum de infinito per privationem limitationis. Primum enim est infinitum potentia passiva sive receptiva, et ita primo

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inest materiae; secundum est infinitum actu, et ideo in illo solo vere est et proprie, qui est tantum actus et actus purus et perfectissimus.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod creatura potest super ea quae summe distant; dicendum, quod ens et non-ens non dicuntur summe distantia, quia opponuntur contradictorie, sed quoniam nihil habent commune nec quantum ad genus subiectum nec quantum ad genus praedicabile; sed quiescere et moveri, sive moveri et non moveri, quod pro eodem accipitur, utroque modo habent commune²³: et ita non est distantia infinita, nec est simile.

Ad 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur de potentia vivendi²⁴; dicendum, quod vivere uno modo dicit actum consequentem, sicut moveri; et sic est ab anima mediantibus potentiis differentibus ab ipsa essentia. Alio modo dicitur vivere, secundum quod est actus primus, et est ab essentia animae ut in ratione formae, non in ratione agentis; et propter hoc non consideratur ibi esse tantum in operando, sicut albedo se ipsa dealbat, ita quod non notatur ibi nec est egressus alicuius, ut a potentia agente. Nos autem loquimur hic de potentia ut agente et producente aliquid, quae potentia, quantumcumque sit idem, tamen dicit aliquam inclinationem, et ideo dependentiam; et ideo privat simplicitatem, ac per hoc privat infinitatem. In Deo autem non sic; et ideo ratio illa non habet instantiam, recte intellecta.

Scholion

I. Definitiones et variae species infiniti, quae in hac distinctione occurrunt, plerumque ex Aristotele sumtae sunt, ut videri potest in notis nostris; vide etiam infra q. 2. — Pro explicatione terminorum servire potest locus Alexandri Hal. (S. p. I. q. 6. m. 1.): « Infinitum dicitur tripliciter, scil. negative, privative, contrarie sive disparate. Infinitum negative dicitur per abnegationem finis, et sic dicitur infinitum id quod non finitur: et hoc modo infinitum est quod non est natum finiri. Infinitum privative est quod natum est finiri, non tamen finitur. Infinitum contrarie est quod habet contrariam dispositionem sive disparatam ad finiendum. Primo modo essentia divina est infinita, quia non habet finem, sed est finiens omnia, neque est nata finiri. Similiter, si dicatur infinitum disparate, sic adhuc est infinita, quia habet disparatam dispositionem respectu simplicis; dicimus enim aliquid infinitum, quod in tot est, quod non potest esse in plura » etc. Et ibid. ad 1: « Cum finitum dicatur per inductionem finis, infinitum per ablationem finis; finis autem dicitur tripliciter, et finitum et infinitum. Finis enim dicitur terminus, et finitum et infinitum, secundum quod a fine accipiantur ; soli quantitati congruunt; ratione enim termini in quantitate sumuntur. Quia enim in continuo non est terminus suae divisionis, dicimus ipsum divisibile in infinitum sive infinitum decisione. Similiter, qui in numero non est terminus additionis, dicimus ipsum esse infinitum additione. Similiter iuxta formam dicitur finitum et infinitum circumscriptione; et circa tempus finitum et infinitum duratione. — Alio modo finis dicitur idem quod perfectio; nec dicitur sic infinitum nisi in habitudine ad finem; et sic dicitur materia secundum se infinita, quia caret perfectione. — Tertio modo dicitur finis secundum rationem propriam, quae quidem est id, propter quod unumquodque, et sic finitum dicitur a fine per ordinem ad finem, infinitum vero per deordinationem; et sic malum culpae dicitur infinitum. » Deinde auctor distinguit infinitatem secundum quantitatem dimensivam et aliam secundum quantitatem virtutis, quia illa Deo potest convenire. Infinitatem quae attribuitur materiae, S. Bonav., supra d. 30. a. 1. ad 1, nominat infinitatem per defectum, cui opponitur infinitas per excessum. S. Thomas (hic q. 2, a. 1; S. 1. q. 7. a. 1.) in eodem sensu distinguit infinitum ex parte materiae quod competit quantitati, et infinitum ex parte formae non determinatae per materiam quod habet rationem perfecti, unde Deo convenit. — De conceptu formali infiniti, quod convenit Deo, controvertitur inter scholam S. Thomae et Scoti, utrum consistat in negatione, quae tamen fundata sit in perfectione immensa Dei, ut prima schola vult, an potius in perfectione positiva omnis entitalis, ut Scotus dicit. Scoto favet S. Bonav., hic q. 2. praecipue ad 6. (cfr. quod idem supra d. 29. q. 1. docet de innascibilitate). Tamen Seraphicus non facit Scotisticam distinctionem inter infinitatem intensivam, ex qua Scotistae inferunt simplicitatem Dei, et infinitatem formalem; sed ipse (arg. 5. in fundam.) potius ex simplicitate divina ut priori infert infinitam potentiam (de quo cfr. supra d. 37. p. 1. a. 1. q. 1. in corp. et ad 3, et d. 8. p. II. q. 1, 2.).

II. Deum « intellectu ac voluntate omnique perfectione infinitum » esse (Vatican. const. de Fide, c. 1.), ipsa quoque ratio docet. — Distinctio (in principio resp.) inter potentiam

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infinitam in actu et in habitu, explicatur infra q. 3, in corp., et accipitur tantum secundum nostrum modum intelligendi, cum consideremus omnia in Deo esse per modum actus puri. — Arg. 1. in fundam., explicatur hic ad 1, et infra q. 3. ad 1, et II. Sent. d. 1. p. 1. a. 2, q. 2. Scotus autem (IV. Sent. d. 1. q. 1.) cum aliis negat, distantiam infinitam esse inter aliquid et nihil.

III. Alex. Hal., loc. cit. — Scot., de hac et seq. q. 1. Sent. d. 2. q. 2. q. 1. 2; I. Report. d. 2. q. 3; Quodl. q. 7. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1; S. 1. q. 25. a. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 1; S. p. I. tr. 19. q. 77. m. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 1. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 45. q. 5. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1. — Biel, hic q. 1. in fine.

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English Translation

Article Unique. On the infinity of the divine power.

Question I. Whether the power of God, considered as such, is infinite.

First, then, it is asked whether the power of God is infinite; and that this power, considered as such, is infinite is shown thus.

Fundamenta (arguments for).

1. The infinite is said to be that which does not have a terminus¹; but the divine power, as to its capacity, does not have a terminus: therefore etc. The first [premise] is manifest; the second is clear from Chrysostom in a certain Homily²: "He is called omnipotent because his power-to-do does not encounter inability"; therefore, if he always finds [a] power-to-do, the quantity of his power always lies beyond what those who measure it can receive: therefore it is infinite.

2. Likewise, every active power that can produce infinite effects is actually infinite; the divine power is of this kind: therefore etc. Proof of the first [premise]: if a power is purely in act, then it has actually whatever it can have: therefore if it has the whole actually, and nothing can accrue to it nor anything be given to it anew³, and the power as having-the-power was extending itself to infinities: therefore it actually has in itself infinity. The minor [premise] is clear, because the divine power can never produce so many effects that it cannot still produce more: therefore it is manifest that it is infinite.

3. Likewise, every power that can [extend] to an infinite act, if it is wholly in act, is simply infinite; but the divine power is of this kind: therefore etc. The major is clear thus: as power is to power, so act to act; but infinite act exceeds finite in infinity, therefore power also [exceeds] power:

ergo if a power is wholly in act, it is infinite. The minor is clear, because God is said to endure unto infinity and can preserve a creature unto infinity: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, every power that can [extend] over extremes infinitely distant is infinite; but the divine power is of this kind, because it makes something from nothing, and between something and nothing is an infinite distance: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, every power that is wholly indifferent from its essence is infinite; but the divine power is of this kind: therefore etc. Proof of the first [premise]: whenever any two things are wholly without distance, wherever the one is, there too the other⁴: therefore if power is wholly indifferent from essence, wherever power is, there too essence. But where essence is, there is the center of the power: therefore wherever such a power can act, it can [act] as if at the center: therefore since no power is limited within its own center but can do more, either the divine power can do nothing, or it can do as much as it wills, and so unto infinity: therefore, as far as itself is concerned, that power can operate upon infinities⁵. But that power is wholly indifferent and simple: therefore factive and intensive are the same there: therefore if it is infinite extensively, also intensively: therefore it is wholly infinite. And this is what the Philosopher says in the book On Causes⁶, that "the more a power is unified, the more it is infinite." Since therefore the divine power is most unified, because it is wholly the same as its origin, everywhere it can act as if in its own origin: therefore it never encounters inability.

On the contrary:

1. Everything is finite in which a stopping-point can be found; but in the divine power a stopping-point can be found, because it is possible to point out something it cannot do, as was shown above⁷, such as corporeal acts and deformed acts: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, what is exceeded⁸ by something is finite, because the infinite is in no way exceeded; but knowledge exceeds power as regards more knowables; for there is more knowledge than power: for [God] knows evils, and cannot [do them]: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, we see in created powers that infinity is from matter, but finitude from form: therefore since the power of God is wholly form or formal, having nothing at all of possibility, therefore it is simply finite and in no way infinite.

4. Likewise, between contradictorily opposed things is an infinite distance; but the virtue of a creature reduces one finite to another, as it makes a non-runner run, and yet it is finite: therefore⁹.

5. Likewise, I see¹⁰ that the soul has a power wholly indifferent from its essence, such as the power of vivifying the body; it also has a power for an infinite act, such as for enduring or persisting in infinity; it nonetheless has a power for infinite acts¹¹; and yet that power is itself finite in itself: therefore the same seems by parity of reason about the divine power, since the soul is the express image of God. Hence the aforesaid arguments seem to be of no value.

Conclusion. The divine power is infinite in act and in habit.

I respond: It must be said that the divine power must be posited as wholly infinite both in act and in habit; as was proved¹² by effect a posteriori, because it has an effect infinite in duration and infinite [effects] by addition, to which it is compared as pure act and as the whole cause. And therefore it is¹³ having in itself the full and perfect actuality with respect to infinities; and it is necessary, since it has the whole that it ever will have, and has it from itself, that it itself be infinite.

Another reasoning shows this as it were a priori. On account of the supreme indivision of [the divine] power from [the divine] essence¹⁴, and on account of the supreme unity of that power itself, wherever it can act, it acts wholly, and as much at the extremity of the world as in the middle, and as much in the highest as in the lowest, and in every mode of infinity.

Nor is there a like reasoning in any creature, neither as to the causality of the effect, nor as to the production of act¹⁵, nor as to unity.

Not as to causality, because no virtue of a creature is purely active in respect of infinite duration; rather it is necessary that it be preserved by divine influence. — Similarly neither as to the production of act, whence it has a passive infinity even in receiving, and therefore none is actually infinite, but only in potency. And since the infinite in potency depends on the infinite in act, therefore every infinity of created duration and of operation depends on the infinity of the uncreated virtue. And this is what the Philosopher says in the book On Causes¹⁶, that "all infinite virtues are dependent through one first infinite, which is the virtue of virtues." — Similarly the case is not the same as to simplicity or unity. For the divine power is wholly simple in itself and wholly has a simple essence or substance, and is wholly indifferent from it; and therefore by every kind of union it is most unified, and therefore infinite. But of no creature, however noble, is the power wholly simple, because every such power expresses some relation of dependence; nor is it founded in a wholly simple substance; nor is it wholly indifferent, because no creature is its own power, speaking essentially¹⁷. — And therefore because every creature falls short of the character of supreme simplicity, and consequently of infinity. And thus it is clear that the divine power is infinite¹⁸, and is the ground of infinity.

And the response is clear to the last argument showing that the aforesaid reasonings are of no value.

Replies to the contrary arguments:

To 1 and 2. To what is objected, that it finds a terminus, and that it finds an excess; it must be said that the divine power is infinite with respect to those things of which the can-be is a can-do¹⁹; with respect to other things, of which the can-be is of impotence, it is neither finite nor infinite, because it can do nothing of them. — For when it is said that it finds a terminus or an excess; it must be said that this is false, because the creature and the passible thing is regarded according to the things to which the thing extends itself: and the divine power extends itself only to good things, and as to such things²⁰ there is never more knowledge than power; nor as to such things does it find a terminus. And so that argument is clear.

It can also be said another way, that there is a twofold way of speaking about power and knowledge: either in themselves, or by comparison to objects. If in themselves, then the one does not exceed the other, because whatever [God] knows, he can know, and whatever he can [do], he knows that he can. Or²¹ by comparison to the object, and so there are two ways of speaking, either according to form or species, or according to number. If according to number, then, since power can [extend to] infinities, it is not exceeded by knowledge; if however according to form, then, since the power is with respect to goods only²², it is exceeded; nevertheless from this it does not follow that it is not infinite. — And there is an example: if someone should imagine two infinite lines, two are more than one, because the one did not have its infinity according to number, but only according to length; and so two are not greater or longer than one. Similarly is it understood in the matter at hand. For the power is called infinite with respect to objects according to number, but not according to quality, because it cannot [extend] to evils or privative things. — And by this the first and second are clear. For although it finds a terminus with respect to evil, yet not with respect to good, and that terminus or excess contributes rather to infinity, because it is not a can-do, but a non-can-do; and therefore, although this seems to give a terminus according to the manner of understanding, in truth it does not, because [the fact] that it cannot [do] evil is wholly on account of the immensity of [its] power.

To 3. To what is objected, that the infinite is a passion of material power; it must be said that this is true of the infinite by privation of completion or of completed being; but it is not true of the infinite by privation of limitation. For the first is the infinite in passive or receptive potency, and so is primarily

in matter; the second is the infinite in act, and therefore is truly and properly only in that being who is only act and pure and most perfect act.

To 4. To what is objected, that a creature can [act] upon things which are supremely distant; it must be said that being and non-being are not called supremely distant because they are opposed contradictorily, but because they have nothing common neither as to a subject genus nor as to a predicable genus; but resting and moving, or moving and not-moving, which is taken for the same thing, have a common [genus] in either mode²³: and so the distance is not infinite, nor is it a like case.

To 5. To what is objected concerning the power of living²⁴; it must be said that to live in one mode signifies a consequent act, like to be moved; and thus it [proceeds] from the soul through powers different from the essence itself. In another mode to live is said, insofar as it is a primary act, and is from the essence of the soul as in the character of form, not in the character of agent; and on account of this it is not considered to consist there only in operating, just as whiteness whitens by itself, so that there is not noted there any going-forth of anything, as from an active power. But we are here speaking of power as agent and producing something, and such a power, however much it is the same [as the essence], nevertheless expresses some inclination, and therefore dependence; and therefore strips away simplicity, and through this strips away infinity. But in God it is not so; and therefore that argument has no force, rightly understood.

Scholion

I. The definitions and various species of infinite that occur in this distinction are mostly taken from Aristotle, as can be seen in our notes; see also below q. 2. — For an explanation of the terms, the passage of Alexander of Hales (Summa, p. I. q. 6. m. 1.) can serve: "Infinite is said in three ways, namely negatively, privatively, and contrarily or disparately. Negatively infinite is said by negation of an end, and so what does not have an end is called infinite: and in this mode the infinite is what is not apt to be ended. Privatively infinite is what is apt to be ended, yet is not ended. Contrarily infinite is what has a contrary or disparate disposition to being ended. In the first mode the divine essence is infinite, because it does not have an end, but is what ends all things, nor is it apt to be ended. Similarly, if it be called infinite disparately, then likewise it is infinite, because it has a disparate disposition with respect to the simple; for we call something infinite which is so much that it cannot be in more" etc. And in the same place, ad 1: "Since the finite is called so by induction of an end, the infinite by removal of an end; and end is said in three ways, [in each of which there is both] finite and infinite. For end is said [first as] terminus, and finite and infinite [in this sense] insofar as they are taken from end; these belong only to quantity, for by reason of terminus they are taken in quantity. For since in a continuum there is no terminus of its division, we say it is divisible into infinity, that is, infinite by decision. Similarly, that in number which is no terminus of addition, we call infinite by addition. Likewise, according to form, finite and infinite are said by circumscription; and around time, finite and infinite by duration. — In another mode end is said as the same as perfection; and so a thing is not called infinite except in relation to an end; and thus matter is said in itself to be infinite, because it lacks perfection. — In a third mode end is called according to its proper notion, which indeed is that on account of which everything [is], and thus the finite is so called from end by ordering to an end, the infinite however by deordination; and thus the evil of guilt is called infinite." Then the author distinguishes infinity according to dimensive quantity from another infinity according to the quantity of power, because the latter can apply to God. The infinity which is attributed to matter, St. Bonaventure, above d. 30. a. 1. ad 1, names infinity by defect, to which is opposed infinity by excess. St. Thomas (here q. 2. a. 1; S. 1. q. 7. a. 1.) in the same sense distinguishes infinity on the side of matter which pertains to quantity, and infinity on the side of form not determined by matter which has the character of the perfect, whence it belongs to God. — Concerning the formal concept of infinity which belongs to God, there is controversy between the school of St. Thomas and that of Scotus, whether it consists in a negation founded in the immense perfection of God (as the first school holds), or rather in the positive perfection of every entity (as Scotus says). The Seraphic favors Scotus here, q. 2 especially ad 6 (cf. what the same teaches above, d. 29. q. 1. on innascibility). Nevertheless, the Seraphic does not make the Scotistic distinction between intensive infinity, from which the Scotists infer the simplicity of God, and formal infinity; but he himself (arg. 5 in fundam.) rather, from the divine simplicity as prior, infers infinite power (on which see above d. 37. p. 1. a. 1. q. 1. in corp. and ad 3, and d. 8. p. II. q. 1, 2.).

II. That God is "infinite in intellect and will and every perfection" (Vatican Constitution on the Faith, c. 1) — reason itself also teaches. — The distinction (at the beginning of the response) between power infinite in act and in habit is explained below at q. 3 in corp., and is taken only according to our manner of understanding, since we consider all things in God to be by way of pure act. — Arg. 1 in fundam. is explained here ad 1, and below at q. 3 ad 1, and II Sent. d. 1. p. 1. a. 2, q. 2. Scotus however (IV Sent. d. 1. q. 1.) with others denies that an infinite distance lies between something and nothing.

III. Alexander of Hales, loc. cit. — Scotus, on this and the following q. 1. Sent. d. 2. q. 2. q. 1. 2; I. Reportata d. 2. q. 3; Quodlibetal q. 7. — St. Thomas, here q. 1. a. 1; Summa 1. q. 25. a. 2. — B. Albert, here a. 1; Summa p. I. tr. 19. q. 77. m. 3. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1. a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 2. — Aegidius Romanus, here 1. princ. q. 1. — Henry of Ghent, Summa a. 45. q. 5. — Durandus, here q. 1. — Dionysius Carthusianus, here q. 1. — Biel, here q. 1. in fine.

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Apparatus Criticus

Cfr. Aristot., III. Phys. text. 63. (c. 6.), et XI. Metaph. c. 9. (X. c. 10.).
Cf. Aristotle, Physics III, text 63 (c. 6), and Metaphysics XI c. 9 (X c. 10).
Vide lit. Magistri dist. praeced. c. 3. — In sequenti propositione definitio illa infiniti respicitur, quae habetur in Aristot., III. Phys. text. 63. (c. 6.): Infinitum igitur id est, cuius secundum quantitatem accipientibus semper aliquid accipere extra est.
See the text of the Master (Lombard), preceding distinction, c. 3. — In the following proposition is regarded that definition of the infinite which is found in Aristotle, Physics III, text 63 (c. 6): "The infinite, therefore, is that of which, for those taking it according to quantity, there is always something more to take beyond."
Fide complurium codd., inter quos et cod. T, et suffragante ed. 1, substituimus dari pro dare, quod Vat. falso exhibet.
On the faith of several codices, among which is also cod. T, and with the support of ed. 1, we have substituted dari for dare, which the Vatican edition wrongly exhibits.
Vat. et cod. cc particulae et praefigunt ibi. Mox codd. F S, verbis transpositis, sic: ubicumque est essentia, et potentia. — Conclusio, quae adtexitur, nititur illo axiomate: idem est principium operandi et essendi, sive operari sequitur esse; de quo cfr. supra pag. 84, nota 7.
The Vatican edition and cod. cc prefix ibi to the particle et. Soon after, codd. F S, with the words transposed, read: wherever there is essence, there is also power. — The conclusion which is appended rests on the axiom: the principle of operating and of being is the same, or operari sequitur esse; on which cf. above p. 84, note 7.
Vat. cum aliquibus codd. infinitum.
The Vatican edition with some codices reads infinitum.
Prop. 17. — Mox, lectionem codd. L X secuti, unitissima substituimus pro infinitissima, quod Vat. perperam exhibet, quia vox infinitissima non respondet processui argumentationis.
Liber de Causis, prop. 17. — Soon after, following the reading of codd. L X, we have substituted unitissima for infinitissima, which the Vatican wrongly exhibits, because the word infinitissima does not correspond to the course of the argument.
Dist. 42. q. 2.
Distinction 42, question 2.
Retinuimus cum Vat. exceditur, quod et in cod. T habetur, aliis codd. non paucis dissentientibus, qui ponunt habet exitum.
We have retained, with the Vatican, exceditur, which is also found in cod. T, although not a few other codices dissent, which place habet exitum.
Cfr. Aristot., III. Phys. text. 63-66. (c. 6.), et VII. Metaph. text. 40. (VI. c. 11.), ex quo libro iam supra pag. 612, nota 7. aliqua allata sunt. — Mox pro possibilitatis Vat. materialitatis, et non pauci codd. mendose impossibilitatis. — Cfr. de hac propos. Boeth., de Trin. c. 2, ubi divinam substantiam sine materia formam esse docetur.
Cf. Aristotle, Physics III, text 63-66 (c. 6), and Metaphysics VII, text 40 (VI c. 11), from which book already above p. 612 note 7 some things have been adduced. — Soon after, for possibilitatis the Vatican has materialitatis, and not a few codices erroneously have impossibilitatis. — Cf. on this proposition Boethius, De Trinitate c. 2, where the divine substance is taught to be a form without matter.
Obiectio haec opposita est iis quae dicta sunt in fundam. 1; quare conclusio erit haec: ergo, licet Deus de nihilo faciat aliquid, potentia eius erit finita. — Paulo ante pro finitum unum Vat. unum tantum.
This objection is opposed to what was said in fundamentum 1; whence the conclusion will be: therefore, although God makes something from nothing, his power will be finite. — A little earlier, for finitum unum the Vatican has unum tantum.
Potentia enim intellectiva, quia in se incorruptibilis et perpetua, non tot actus elicere potest, quin non possit elicere plures (infinitos syncategorematice sive indefinitos). — In cod. hic additur sicut dicitur tertio de Anima, ubi text. 20. (c. 8.) intellectivae parti animae immortalitas attribuitur et perpetuitas. Subinde post ipsa potentia in codd. V X inseritur eius. Iidem codd. V X etiam in principio huius argumenti Item, videtur loco Item, video.
For an intellective power, because in itself incorruptible and perpetual, cannot elicit so many acts that it cannot still elicit more (infinite syncategorematically or indefinite). — In cod. here is added as is said in book III of On the Soul, where text 20 (c. 8) immortality and perpetuity is attributed to the intellective part of the soul. Then after ipsa potentia in codd. V X is inserted eius. The same codd. V X also at the beginning of this argument have Item, videtur instead of Item, video.
Hic fundam. 2. 4. Locutio, quae paulo post occurrit infinitos (effectus) appositione, apud Aristot. invenitur, III. Phys. text. 56. (c. 6.), ubi Philosophus infinitum distinguens sic ait: « Dicitur igitur ipsum (infinitum) esse aliud quidem potentia, aliud vero actu. Et infinitum est quidem appositione, est etiam ablatione. » Quae verba Averroes ita exponit: Id est, et infinitum potentia invenitur in additione numerorum et in divisione mensurarum (magnitudinum)... non in actu. Idem Averroes in libro de Substantia orbis duplicem distinguit potentiam infinitam, scil. infinitam duratione et infinitam vigore. Cfr. etiam Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 6. m. 1. ad 1.
Here fundam. 2 and 4. The expression which occurs a little later, infinite (effects) by addition, is found in Aristotle, Physics III, text 56 (c. 6), where the Philosopher, distinguishing the infinite, says thus: "It is said therefore that the infinite is one thing in potency, another in act. And the infinite is by addition, and also by ablation." Which words Averroes thus expounds: That is, the infinite in potency is found in the addition of numbers and in the division of measures (magnitudes)... not in act. The same Averroes, in the book On the Substance of the Orb, distinguishes two kinds of infinite power, namely infinite in duration and infinite in vigor. Cf. also Alex. of Hales, Summa p. I. q. 6. m. 1. ad 1.
Pro Et ideo est Vat. cum cod. cc Et ratio, at maior pars codd. et ed. 1 Et ideo, ad quae verba ex cod. M (T in marg.) apposuimus est. Pro est habens codd. V X habet. Paulo inferius post cum habeat codd. V X Z interiiciunt in se.
For Et ideo est the Vatican with cod. cc reads Et ratio, but the majority of codices and ed. 1 read Et ideo, to which words from cod. M (T in margin) we have added est. For est habens codd. V X read habet. A little below, after cum habeat codd. V X Z insert in se.
Id est propter summam identitatem virtutis et essentiae. — Paulo ante Vat. cum cod. cc sic: Alia ratione ostenditur hoc a priori. Propter summam etc.
That is, on account of the supreme identity of [the divine] virtue and essence. — A little earlier the Vatican with cod. cc reads thus: By another reasoning this is shown a priori. On account of the supreme etc.
Ex codd. V X adiecimus verba nec quantum ad productionem actus, quae, ut ex sequentibus liquet, Vat. falso praetermisit. Mox post causalitatem supple cum Vat. et cod. cc effectus. Post pauca pro creaturae codd. X Z creata.
From codd. V X we have added the words nor as to the production of act, which, as is clear from what follows, the Vatican falsely omitted. Soon after causalitatem supply, with the Vatican and cod. cc, effectus. A little later for creaturae codd. X Z have creata.
Prop. 16: « Omnes virtutes, quibus non est finis, pendentes sunt » etc. Quam propositionem S. Thomas in suo Comment. in hunc librum sic exponit: Ubi primo considerandum est, quod infinita potentia dicitur cuiuslibet semper existentis... in quantum scilicet videmus, quod quae plus durare possunt, habent maiorem virtutem essendi. Unde illa quae in infinitum durare possunt, habent quantum ad hoc infinitam potentiam... ideo secundum intentionem huius auctoris hoc primum infinitum, a quo omnes virtutes infinitae dependent, est primum simpliciter, quod est Deus.
Liber de Causis, prop. 16: "All virtues for which there is no end are dependent" etc. Which proposition St. Thomas in his Commentary on this book expounds thus: "Where first it must be considered that infinite power is said of anything always existing... insofar, namely, as we see that those things which can endure longer have a greater virtue of being. Hence those which can endure unto infinity have, as to this, infinite power... therefore according to the intention of this author, this first infinite, on which all infinite virtues depend, is the first simply, which is God."
Cfr. supra d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 3, praecipue in solut. obiect., et d. 8. p. II. q. 2. per totam.
Cf. above d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 3, especially in the solution of the objections, and d. 8. p. II. q. 2 throughout.
Vat. cum ed. 1 hic addit et quod sola est infinita, et subinde post infinitatis Vat. adiungit verba est summa simplicitas.
The Vatican with ed. 1 here adds and that it alone is infinite, and then after infinitatis the Vatican adds the words is supreme simplicity.
Pro est posse Vat. est potentiae. Paulo superius pro terminum codd. L O statum.
For est posse the Vatican has est potentiae. A little above, for terminum codd. L O have statum.
Pro talia Vat. cum cod. cc perperam alia. In initio huius propos. pro Quando enim ed. 1 Quando ergo. — Cfr. Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 21. et 22. (IV. c. 16. et 17.).
For talia the Vatican with cod. cc wrongly has alia. At the beginning of this proposition, for Quando enim ed. 1 has Quando ergo. — Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics V, text 21 and 22 (IV c. 16 and 17).
Pro Vel cod. C Si.
For Vel cod. C has Si.
Vat. et cod. cc hic adiungunt: scientia vero bonorum et malorum, ideo. Deinde paulo inferius pro habebat una infinitatem Vat. habebant unam infinitatem.
The Vatican and cod. cc here add: but knowledge is of goods and evils, therefore. Then a little below, for habebat una infinitatem the Vatican has habebant unam infinitatem.
Nam quies et motus fundantur in eadem reali potentia subiecti, ideoque et ad idem praedicamentum pertinent; cfr. Aristot., IX. Metaph. text. 19. (VIII. c. 9.): at ens et non-ens non fundantur in eodem subiecto: cfr. Aristot., IV. Phys. text. 67. (c. 8.), ubi dicitur, nihil nullam rationem sive proportionem habere ad ens. — Post commune codd. V b adiiciunt: scilicet ipsum subiectum motus et quietis.
For rest and motion are founded in the same real potency of the subject, and so they belong to the same predicament; cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics IX, text 19 (VIII c. 9): "but being and non-being are not founded in the same subject": cf. Aristotle, Physics IV, text 67 (c. 8), where it is said that nothing has no relation or proportion to being. — After commune codd. V b add: namely the very subject of motion and rest.
Vat. cum cod. cc vivificandi. Mox post actum consequen-tem codd. aa bb addunt: alio modo actum primum. Sed secundum quod dicit actum consequentem... et consequenter post pauca pro Alio modo dicitur vivere substituunt Secundum quod est actus primus, est. Haec posterior lectio invenitur etiam in bene multis aliis codd. — De duplici significatione verbi vivere cfr. Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 8. seq., et text. 24. seq. (c. 1. et 2.). — Vat. adiungit sed in informando. — Voculae quae in plerisque codd. et ed. 1 falso omittitur; in cod. T ab alia manu eius loco vocabulo potentia praefigitur. Sciendum est primum, scil. ex dictis duobus modis vivendi. Pro quae cod. X quia, Vat. autem cum cod. cc verbo potentia adiungit vero animae. — Quae differentia sit inter potentias animae et ipsam animam, vide supra d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 3.
The Vatican with cod. cc reads vivificandi. Soon after actum consequentem codd. aa bb add: in another mode an act-first. But in the mode in which it says a consequent act… and consequently, a little later, instead of Alio modo dicitur vivere they substitute Insofar as it is a primary act, it is. This latter reading is found also in quite a few other codices. — On the double signification of the verb vivere cf. Aristotle, On the Soul II, text 8 ff., and text 24 ff. (c. 1 and 2). — The Vatican adds but in informing. — The little word quae, which in most codices and ed. 1 is wrongly omitted; in cod. T by another hand the word potentia is prefixed in its place. It must first be known, namely, from the two said modes of living. For quae cod. X has quia; the Vatican, however, with cod. cc adds to the word potentia the word vero animae. — On what the difference is between the powers of the soul and the soul itself, see above d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 3.

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