Bonaventure

Quaestio III.

Utrum Deus sit ab omni loco separabilis vel extra omnem locum.

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (La.), then the English rendering (En.).

Tertio loco quaeritur, utrum sit Deus ab omni loco separabilis vel extra omnem locum. Et quod non, videtur:

1. Quia extra omnem locum nihil est; ergo si Deus est extra omnem locum, ergo nihil est¹ vel in nihilo².

2. Item, hoc quod est extra adverbium loci est: ergo si Deus extra omnem locum est, est in loco et praeter omnem locum; sed hoc est falsum et non intelligibile: ergo Deus non potest nec re nec intellectu separari ab omni loco.

3. Item, cum dicitur: Deus est extra mundum, extra aut stat pro aliquo, aut pro nihilo: si pro nihilo, ergo chimaera est extra mundum;

si pro aliquo, ergo pro creato, vel increato: non pro creato; constat³: ergo pro increato: ergo esse extra mundum est esse in Deo. Sed omnia sunt in Deo: ergo omnia sunt extra mundum.

4. Item, in nullo est Deus, quod non sit in ipso: sed nihil, quod sit extra mundum, est in Deo: ergo Deus non est extra mundum.

Contra:

1. Quod locus possit separari a Deo secundum intellectum, videtur, quia possibile est secundum intellectum, locum privari omni locato et remanere vacuum; sed vacuum est privatio, Deus autem in nullo est, quod non sit in ipso; privatio autem non est in Deo: ergo nec Deus in privatione, ergo nec in vacuo, et sic est separabilis a loco.

2. Item, quod Deus separetur a loco secundum rem, videtur, quia, sicut se habet Dei aeternitas ad omne tempus, ita immensitas⁴ ad omnem locum; sed Dei aeternitas fuit ante omne tempus: ergo Dei immensitas fuit extra omnem locum. Sed quod est extra aliquid est separatum ab eo: ergo etc.

3. Item, si Deus est tantum in locis creatis, cum illa sint finitae dimensionis, et quod commensurat se finito est definibile et finitum: ergo Deus esset finitus.

4. Item, Deus est adeo bonus, quod melior cogitari non potest, ergo adeo magnus et immensus, quod maior eo cogitari non potest; sed toto mundo potest cogitari linea maior, si intelligatur protendi extra circumferentiam caeli: ergo si ibi est Deus, Deus est extra, aut non est maximum.

5. Item, Angelus potest esse extra mundum; sed non extra Deum: ergo Deus est extra mundum.

Conclusio.

Deus secundum distantiam nec re nec intellectu separari potest ab omni loco, sed secundum independentiam et re et intellectu a loco est separatus.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod aliquid separari ab alio est dupliciter: vel secundum distantiam, vel secundum independentiam⁵. Primo modo aliqua duo, quae sunt in eodem loco, separantur, cum unum elongatur ab alio. Et hoc modo impossibile est esse⁶, nec intelligi, Deum separari ab omni loco. Nam ista separatio includit distantiam spatii, et hoc de necessitate includit locum; et ita implicantur duo opposita, scilicet quod Deus sit in loco, et distet ab omni loco. Si autem loquamur de separatione per independentiam; sic dicendum, quod Deus et re et intellectu est separatus a loco, quia in se ipso omnino est independens a loco, sicut ante productionem loci. Locus autem econtra non est separabilis a Deo nec re nec intellectu, sicut probant rationes ad hoc inductae.

Ad 1, 2. Similiter, cum quaeritur, utrum Deus sit extra omnem locum; dicendum, quod extra uno modo dicit situm et positionem; et sic est impossibile, sicut impossibile est, si ante dicat tempus, quod sit ante tempus. Alio modo ante et extra dicunt excessum et superexcellentiam divinae aeternitatis et immensitatis respectu temporis et loci; et sic concedendum, quod Deus est ante tempus et extra omnem locum. Nec ex hoc sequitur, quod separetur a loco, sed quod summa immensitas superexcedat omnem locum nec ad illum arctatur. Et hoc vult dicere Gregorius⁷, quod Deus est extra omnia, non exclusus, quia non distat; et infra omnia, non inclusus, quia non arctatur, quia in se ipso ens⁸ est omnino immensus, ita quod extra ipsum nihil potest esse nec cogitari, sive nihil potest cogitari ita immensum, sicut Deus est in se ipso.

Ad 3. Ex hoc patet sequens, quia quod non est extra, non est propter limitationem suam, sed loci defectionem.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de linea, dicendum, quod statim, dum intelligitur aliquid extra mundum, ex hoc datur intelligi, quod Deus sit ibi, sicut si intelligatur novus mundus fieri, absque dubio Deus esset in illo. Tamen non sequitur, quod ibi sit, quia illud nihil est.

Ad 5. Similiter, si fiat Angelus extra mundum; Deus tunc est extra non secundum motum suum, sed Angeli. Sed forte hoc est magis fictionis quam veritatis, quod Angelus extra universum exeat, sicut patebit⁹. Attamen illud quod cogitandum est, divinum esse, non potest cogitari habere terminum sicut in duratione, sic non potest cogitari nec debet habere terminum in existentia et praesentialitate; et sicut non potest cogitari habere intercisionem in duratione, sic nec in praesentialitate. Hic intellectus habendus est; caveat tamen, qualiter quis imaginetur et exprimat per sermonem.

Question III.

Whether God is separable from every place or [is] outside every place.

In the third place it is asked whether God is separable from every place, or is outside every place. And that he is not, it seems:

1. Because outside every place there is nothing; therefore if God is outside every place, then he is nothing¹ or in nothing².

2. Likewise, that which is outside is an adverb of place: therefore if God is outside every place, he is in a place and beyond every place; but this is false and unintelligible: therefore God can neither in reality nor in understanding be separated from every place.

3. Likewise, when it is said: God is outside the world, outside either stands for something, or for nothing: if for nothing, then a chimaera is outside the world;

if for something, then either for a created or an uncreated [thing]: not for a created [thing]; that is established³: therefore for an uncreated [thing]: therefore to be outside the world is to be in God. But all things are in God: therefore all things are outside the world.

4. Likewise, in nothing is God, which is not in him: but nothing which is outside the world is in God: therefore God is not outside the world.

On the contrary:

1. That a place can be separated from God according to the understanding, seems [so], because it is possible according to the understanding for a place to be deprived of every located thing and to remain empty; but the void is privation, and God is in nothing which is not in him; but privation is not in God: therefore neither is God in privation, therefore neither in the void, and thus he is separable from place.

2. Likewise, that God should be separated from place in reality seems [so], because, just as God's eternity stands to all time, so [his] immensity⁴ [stands] to every place; but God's eternity was before all time: therefore God's immensity was outside every place. But what is outside something is separated from it: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, if God is only in created places, since these are of finite dimension, and what commensurates itself with the finite is definable and finite: therefore God would be finite.

4. Likewise, God is so good that one cannot be thought greater, therefore so great and immense that none greater than he can be thought; but a line greater than the whole world can be thought, if it is understood to extend beyond the circumference of the heaven: therefore if God is there, God is outside, or [he] is not the greatest.

5. Likewise, an Angel can be outside the world; but [it can]not [be] outside God: therefore God is outside the world.

Conclusion.

God cannot be separated from every place according to distance, neither in reality nor in understanding, but according to independence he is separated from place both in reality and in understanding.

I respond: It must be said that something is separated from another in two ways: either according to distance, or according to independence⁵. In the first way, two things which are in the same place are separated when one is moved far from the other. And in this way it is impossible to be⁶, or to be understood, [that] God is separated from every place. For that separation includes a distance of space, and this of necessity includes a place; and thus two opposites are implied, namely that God is in a place, and is distant from every place. But if we speak of separation by independence, then it must be said that God is in reality and in understanding separated from place, since in himself he is wholly independent of place, just as before the production of place. But place, on the contrary, is not separable from God either in reality or in understanding, as the reasons brought to this point prove.

To 1, 2. Likewise, when it is asked whether God is outside every place, it must be said that outside in one way denotes situation and position; and in this way it is impossible, just as it is impossible, if before denotes time, that he be before time. In another way before and outside denote excess and superexcellence of the divine eternity and immensity in respect of time and place; and in this way it must be conceded that God is before time and outside every place. Nor does it follow from this that he is separated from place, but that the highest immensity superexcels every place and is not constrained to it. And this Gregory⁷ means [when he says] that God is outside all things, not excluded, since he is not distant; and within all things, not included, since he is not constrained, because in himself the [Being]⁸ is wholly immense, in such a way that outside himself nothing can be or be thought, or rather nothing can be thought so immense as God is in himself.

To 3. From this what follows is clear: that what is not outside [him] is not on account of his limitation, but on account of the defect of place.

To 4. To that which is objected concerning the line, it must be said that as soon as something is understood [to be] outside the world, from this it is given to understand that God is there, just as if a new world were understood to be made, without doubt God would be in it. Yet it does not follow that he is there, since that [which is supposed] is nothing.

To 5. Likewise, if an Angel be made outside the world; God is then outside, not according to his own motion, but [the motion] of the Angel. But perhaps it is more of fiction than of truth, that an Angel should go forth outside the universe, as will appear⁹. Nevertheless, that which must be thought, the divine being, cannot be thought to have a term [as in duration]; just as in duration [it cannot be thought to have a term], so neither can it be thought, nor ought it to have, a term in existence and presentiality; and as it cannot be thought to have an interruption in duration, so neither in presentiality. This understanding must be held; let one nonetheless take care how one imagines [it] and expresses [it] through speech.