← Back to Distinction 37

Dist. 37, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 2

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 37

Textus Latinus
p. 654

Quaestio II.

Utrum Deus sit mutabilis secundum locum.

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (La.), then the English rendering (En.).

Secundo quaeritur utrum Deus sit mutabilis secundum locum. Et quod non, videtur sic.

1. Magister in littera1 dicit et accipit ab Augustino super Genesim: «Deus est in omni tempore, et in omni loco, non tamen movetur per loca vel tempora».

2. Item, ratione ostenditur, quia «motus est actus imperfectus2»; sed in Deo nulla est imperfectio: ergo nec secundum locum mutatio.

3. Item, per omnem motum aliquid acquiritur3; sed Deus nullum locum potest acquirere, quia est ubique: ergo impossibile est, Deum secundum locum mutari.

4. Item, nobilior dispositio est quies quam motus4; sed quod nobilius est Deo est attribuendum: ergo impossibile est, Deum secundum locum mutari, quia semper quiescit.

Contra:

1. Augustinus ad Orosium5: «Deus movet se sine tempore et loco»: ergo videtur quod Deus moveatur; sed perfectissimus motuum est motus secundum locum: ergo etc.

2. Item, Isidorus6: «Cum sit illocalis Deus, localiter tamen ambulat in Sanctis»: ergo saltem videtur mutari per accidens.

3. Item, hoc videtur ratione, quia «motis nobis, moventur ea quae in nobis sunt». Hoc dicit Philosophus7, et dicit propter formas, quae non sunt in uno determinate: ergo si Deus est in nobis, Deus movetur in nobis saltem secundum accidens.

4. Item, quamvis Deus quantum ad existentiam per essentiam non determinet locum8, tamen quantum ad habitationem definite est in aliquibus, ita quod non in aliis: ergo saltem quantum ad hunc modum est mutabilis.

Conclusio.

Deus nec per se, nec per accidens mutatur per locum.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod sicut dicit Magister in littera9, Deus nullo modo mutatur per locum; et hoc verum est, quia nec per se, nec per accidens mutatur, et hoc est propter summam immensitatem, qua adest omnibus et nulli abest. Et si incipiat esse in re, vel desinat, hoc solum est secundum rei mutationem, non secundum mutationem eius: ut puta, si aere illuminato intelligatur creari crystallus, radius incipit esse in eo, et crystallo amoto, desinit esse, nulla facta mutatione in radio.

Ad 1, 2. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod Deus movet se; dicendum, quod Augustinus non dicit simpliciter, quod movet se, sed10 sine tempore et loco. Et quoniam omnis motus secundum Augustinum comprehenditur sub mutatione secundum tempus et secundum locum; ideo tantum est hoc dicere quantum esset dicere: movet se sine motu, et ita non movet se vere, nec implicatur contradictio. Sed cum in motu sint duo, scilicet quod est actus et quod est variatio sive imperfectio11, vult dicere Augustinus, quod movet se sine motu, quia semper est in actu, sed non in actu imperfecto, immo perfecto. — Quod dicit Isidorus est intelligendum

p. 655

metaphorice, vel causaliter, quia Sanctos facit ambulare, id est per fidem de virtute in virtutem12.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod motis nobis etc. dicendum, quod illud non habet veritatem, nisi in illis quae sunt in aliis per dependentiam et definitionem. Unde quia radius est in aere, sed non dependet ab aere, ideo non movetur, moto aere; et quia anima est in manu, nec definitur manu, ideo non movetur, mota manu. Deus autem non dependet a rebus nec definitur, ideo non movetur ad motum rerum.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de habitatione Dei, dicendum, quod determinate est in aliquibus non ratione immensitatis, sed ratione influentiae gratiae; et ideo non determinatur ipse Deus, sed effectus tantum. Hinc est, quod non per se, nec per accidens movetur nec moveri potest, quia a nullo dependet nec dependere potest13, a nullo definitur nec potest definiri; et non solum non est possibile, sed etiam non intelligibile.

Obiiciet autem aliquis sic: intelligamus corpus14 egredi a loco, nullo introeunte, tunc remanet vacuum: aut ergo ibi est Deus, aut non: si sic, ergo in eo est quod nihil est, quod stultum est dicere15; si non est, et prius ibi fuit, ergo videtur esse mutatus saltem per accidens: ergo videtur, quod Deus exeat cum re et cum re alia ingrediatur, quia si res tantum exiret, Deus non16 exiret. — Ad hoc respondeo, quod si per impossibile ponatur, locum evacuari, tunc remanere intelligitur capacitas loci privata; capacitas aliquid est, et in illa Deus est; privatio autem nihil est, et in illa Deus esse non potest: non ergo in17 eo quod desinit Deus esse, remanet post recessum corporis; sed cum res privatur, aufertur comparatio eius ad Deum. Quod enim nihil est, nullam habet comparationem.

Sed cum res movetur, Deum non dimittit, nec ad Deum accedit, nec Deus cum re venit: quia sic est in re, ut sit extra rem idem; ideo nec res eum dimittit nec novum invenit. Et hoc est intelligibile, si quis potest intelligere, quod Deus sit simplex, et infinitus et immensus. Quia enim est immensus, ita est intra, quod extra18; quia simplex, secundum unum et idem est intra et extra: ideo nec dimittitur, nec acquiritur aliud in re; nec ab ipso itur ad ipsum, cum19 dimittitur, ut alibi et alibi inveniatur20.

Scholion

Duplex est motus sive mutatio secundum locum, scil. per se vel per accidens, ut docet Aristot., praecipue I. de Anima, text. 37. seqq. Neuter modus convenit Deo. Ut aliqua res per accidens moveatur, requiritur, ut ipsa in alia re, quae per se movetur, sit modo circumscriptivo, ut corpus in navi, vel saltem definitivo, ut anima est in corpore. — Terminus quiescit in ultimo arg. fundam. dicitur de Deo in sensu improprio, cum nec motus nec privatio motus proprie Deo conveniant. — In solut. ad 1. satis subtiliter replicatur. Hanc instantiam solvit Seraphicus hac distinctione: si remanet aliquid positivum (capacitas loci), tunc hoc positivum habet relationem ad Deum; quatenus autem per privationem nihil remanet, «aufertur comparatio ad Deum», id est respectus, quem res existens habet realiter ad Deum, et Deus secundum rationem ad rem, penitus aufertur, quin tamen Deus nec per se nec per accidens moveatur.

Auctores: B. Albert., hic a. 19. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 2. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 30. n. 5.

---

English Translation
p. 654

Question II.

Whether God is mutable according to place.

Secondly it is asked whether God is mutable according to place. And that he is not, is seen thus.

1. The Master in the littera1 says, taking [it] from Augustine On Genesis: "God is in every time, and in every place, yet he is not moved through places or times."

2. Likewise, it is shown by reason, since "motion is an imperfect act2"; but in God there is no imperfection: therefore neither change according to place.

3. Likewise, through every motion something is acquired3; but God can acquire no place, since he is everywhere: therefore it is impossible that God be changed according to place.

4. Likewise, rest is a more noble disposition than motion4; but what is more noble must be attributed to God: therefore it is impossible that God be changed according to place, since he always rests.

On the contrary:

1. Augustine to Orosius5: "God moves himself without time and place": therefore it seems that God is moved; but the most perfect of motions is motion according to place: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Isidore6: "Although God is non-local, yet locally he walks in the Saints": therefore at least he seems to be changed per accidens.

3. Likewise, this is seen by reason, since "when we are moved, those things which are in us are moved." This the Philosopher says7, and he says it on account of forms, which are not in one [place] determinately: therefore if God is in us, God is moved in us at least per accidens.

4. Likewise, although God as to existence by essence does not determine a place8, nevertheless as to habitation he is definitely in some [things], in such a way that not in others: therefore at least according to this mode he is mutable.

Conclusion.

God is changed according to place neither per se nor per accidens.

I respond: It must be said that, as the Master says in the littera9, God is in no way changed according to place; and this is true, since he is changed neither per se nor per accidens, and this is on account of [his] highest immensity, by which he is present to all and absent from none. And if he begin to be in a thing, or cease, this is only according to a change of the thing, not according to a change of him: as for example, if a crystal be understood to be created in the air [already] illuminated, the ray begins to be in it, and when the crystal is removed, [the ray] ceases to be, no change having been made in the ray.

To 1 and 2. To that which is objected, that God moves himself; it must be said that Augustine does not say simply that he moves himself, but10 without time and place. And since every motion according to Augustine is comprehended under change according to time and according to place, therefore to say this is just as much as to say: he moves himself without motion, and so he does not truly move himself, nor is a contradiction implied. But since in motion there are two [things], namely what is act and what is variation or imperfection11, Augustine wishes to say that he moves himself without motion, since he is always in act, but not in imperfect act, but rather in perfect [act]. — What Isidore says is to be understood

p. 655

metaphorically, or causally, since he makes the Saints to walk, that is, through faith from virtue to virtue12.

To 3. To that which is objected, that "when we are moved" etc., it must be said that this does not have truth except in those things which are in others through dependence and definition. Hence because the ray is in the air, but does not depend on the air, therefore it is not moved when the air is moved; and because the soul is in the hand, nor is it defined by the hand, therefore it is not moved when the hand is moved. But God does not depend on things nor is defined [by them], therefore he is not moved at the motion of things.

To 4. To that which is objected concerning the habitation of God, it must be said that he is definitely in some [things] not by reason of [his] immensity, but by reason of the influence of grace; and therefore God himself is not determined, but only the effect. Hence it is, that he is moved neither per se nor per accidens nor can be moved, since he depends on nothing and cannot depend [on anything]13, is defined by nothing nor can be defined; and it is not only not possible, but also not intelligible.

But someone will object thus: let us understand a body14 to go forth from a place, with nothing entering, then a vacuum remains: either therefore God is there, or not: if so, then he is in that which is nothing, which is foolish to say15; if he is not, and previously was there, therefore he seems to have been changed at least per accidens: therefore it seems that God goes out with the thing and enters with another thing, since if only the thing went out, God would not16 go out. — To this I respond, that if by the impossible it be supposed that the place is emptied, then there is understood to remain a privative capacity of place; capacity is something, and in it God is; but privation is nothing, and in it God cannot be: therefore it is not in17 that wherein God ceases to be that he remains after the withdrawal of the body; but when the thing is deprived [of being], its comparison to God is taken away. For what is nothing, has no comparison.

But when the thing is moved, it does not let go of God, nor does it approach to God, nor does God come with the thing: since he is in the thing in such a way that he is the same outside the thing; therefore neither does the thing let go of him nor find [him] anew. And this is intelligible, if anyone can understand, that God is simple, and infinite and immense. For because he is immense, he is so within, that [he is] without18; because [he is] simple, according to one and the same [thing] he is within and without: therefore neither is he let go, nor is anything else acquired in the thing; nor is there a passing from him to him, when19 he is let go, so that he should be found in one place and another20.

Scholion

Twofold is motion or change according to place, namely per se or per accidens, as Aristotle teaches, especially in On the Soul I, text 37 ff. Neither mode befits God. For some thing to be moved per accidens, it is required that it itself, in another thing which is moved per se, exist in a circumscriptive mode, like a body in a ship, or at least definitively, as the soul is in the body. — The terminus rests in the last argument of the fundamenta is said of God in an improper sense, since neither motion nor privation of motion properly befits God. — In the solutio to 1, [the matter] is rather subtly replied to. The Seraphic [Doctor] solves this instance by this distinction: if something positive remains (the capacity of place), then this positive [item] has a relation to God; but inasmuch as through privation nothing remains, "the comparison to God is taken away," that is, the regard which the existing thing has really to God, and God according to reason to the thing, is wholly taken away, without however God being moved per se or per accidens.

Authors: B. Albert., here a. 19. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 3, a. 2. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 30, n. 5.

---

Apparatus Criticus
  1. Cap. 3. Locus S. Augustini secundum sensum est VIII. Genes. ad lit. c. 20. n. 39. 40.
    Chapter 3. The passage of St. Augustine according to its sense is On Genesis according to the Letter VIII, c. 20, n. 39–40.
  2. Aristot., III. Phys. text. 15. (c. 2.): Motus actus quidem aliquis esse videtur, imperfectus tamen.
    Aristotle, Physics III, text 15 (c. 2): "Motion seems indeed to be some act, yet imperfect."
  3. Aliter possibile esset, aliquem simul moveri et motum esse, quo movebatur, quando movebatur, ut «si quis Thebas it, impossibile est simul ire Thebas et ivisse Thebas», ut ait Aristot., VI. Phys. text. 7. (c. 1.).
    Otherwise it would be possible that someone be at once moved and have been moved, by that by which he was being moved, when he was being moved, as "if someone goes to Thebes, it is impossible at once to be going to Thebes and to have gone to Thebes," as Aristotle says, Physics VI, text 7 (c. 1).
  4. Aristot., VI. Topic. c. 3. (c. 4.): Prius enim est et notius quod manens est et definitum eo, quod indefinitum et in motu est. — In fine argumenti pro quia semper, quod cum codd. etiam edd. 1, 2, 3 habent, Vat. sed semper.
    Aristotle, Topics VI, c. 3 (c. 4): "For prior and better known is what is abiding and definite than what is indefinite and in motion." — At the end of the argument, in place of quia semper, which along with the codices also editions 1, 2, 3 have, the Vatican [edition reads] sed semper.
  5. Sive Quaestionum 65 Dialogus, q. 41. De minori cfr. Aristot., VIII. Phys. text. 37. seqq. (c. 7.).
    Or rather the Dialogue of the 65 Questions, q. 41. On the minor, cf. Aristotle, Physics VIII, text 37 ff. (c. 7).
  6. Libr. I. Sent. sive de Summo bono, c. 2. n. 5.
    Book I of the Sentences or On the Highest Good, c. 2, n. 5.
  7. Libr. II. Topic. c. 3. (c. 7.), ubi et verba subsequentia: «et dicit propter formas, quae non sunt in uno determinate», explicantur. Aristot. enim tractans de ideis Platonicis ait: Nam et moveri et quiescere easdem (ideas) accidet et etiam sensibiles et insensibiles esse; nam videntur ideae quiescere et immobiles et intelligibiles esse iis qui ponunt, ideas esse; attamen cum sint in nobis, impossibile est immobiles esse; nam motis nobis necessarium est, et quae in nobis sunt omnia simul moveri. Cfr. supra pag. 116, nota 8.
    Book II of the Topics c. 3 (c. 7), where also the words that follow, "and he says it on account of forms, which are not in one [place] determinately," are explained. For Aristotle, treating of the Platonic ideas, says: "For both being moved and resting will happen to the same (ideas), and likewise being sensible and insensible; for the ideas seem to those who posit ideas to exist to rest and to be unmoved and intelligible; nevertheless, since they are in us, it is impossible that they be unmoved; for when we are moved, it is necessary that those things also which are in us all be moved together." Cf. above page 116, note 8.
  8. Id est, non sit determinate in aliquibus tantum, sed in omnibus. — Mox pro habitationem cod. Y inhabitationem.
    That is, that he be not determinately in some [things] only, but in all. — Soon, for habitationem, codex Y [reads] inhabitationem.
  9. Cap. 5. seq. — Post pauca pro per locum V bene secundum locum.
    Chapter 5 ff. — A little after, in place of per locum, [codex] V well [reads] secundum locum.
  10. Plures codd. ut F N W X (T in marg.) hic repetunt verba praecedentia quod movet se, Vat. autem cum cod. cc hic subiicit cum his additionibus. — De propositione sequenti consule hic lit. Magistri, c. 6, ubi et ipsa verba Augustini proferuntur.
    Several codices such as F N W X (T in margin) here repeat the preceding words quod movet se; the Vatican [edition], however, with codex cc here adds cum with these additions. — On the proposition that follows, consult here the littera Magistri, c. 6, where the very words of Augustine are produced.
  11. Aristot., III. Phys. text. 6. seqq. (c. 1.) motum definit sic: motus est actus entis in potentia prout in potentia, i. e. actualis tendentia rei mobilis ad terminum. — Paulo ante pro movet se vere maior pars codd. cum ed. 1 movet vere (omisso se), quae lectio contextui non respondet; Vat. movetur. Paulo inferius post quod movet rursum non pauci codd. perperam omittunt se.
    Aristotle, Physics III, text 6 ff. (c. 1) defines motion thus: "motion is the act of a being in potency insofar as it is in potency," that is, the actual tendency of a movable thing toward its terminus. — A little before, in place of movet se vere, the greater part of the codices with ed. 1 [read] movet vere (omitting se), a reading which does not correspond to the context; the Vatican [edition reads] movetur. A little below, after quod movet, again not a few codices wrongly omit se.
  12. Respicitur illud II. Cor. 5, 7: Per fidem enim ambulamus; et illud Psalm. 83, 8: Ibunt de virtute in virtutem. — Pro per fidem Vat. cum ed. 1 proficere.
    Reference is to that of 2 Cor. 5:7: "For we walk by faith"; and that of Psalm 83:8: "They shall go from virtue to virtue." — In place of per fidem, the Vatican [edition] with ed. 1 [reads] proficere.
  13. Cfr. Aristot., VIII. Phys. text. 46. seqq. (c. 8.), ubi docetur, primum motorem esse omnino immobilem nec moveri per se nec per accidens.
    Cf. Aristotle, Physics VIII, text 46 ff. (c. 8), where it is taught that the first mover is altogether immovable and is moved neither per se nor per accidens.
  14. Cod. T addit aliquid.
    Codex T adds aliquid ("something").
  15. Et sic Deus esset in nihilo, quod absurdum est dicere.
    And thus God would be in nothing, which is absurd to say.
  16. Ante exiret ex codd. L O revocavimus non, quod in Vat. desideratur, sed a contextu exigitur.
    Before exiret, from codices L O we have restored non, which is missing in the Vatican [edition], but is required by the context.
  17. Ex cod. R restituimus in pro ab, quod Vat. exhibet.
    From codex R we have restored in in place of ab, which the Vatican [edition] gives.
  18. Cod. K in eo intra rem, quod ed. extra.
    Codex K [reads] in eo intra rem, [where] the edition [reads] extra.
  19. Ita codd. cum edd. 1, 2, 3, in qua lectione omnino supplendum est res, quae scil. a loco ad locum dimittitur. Vat. nec pro cum, quae lectio nobis minus arridet.
    Thus the codices with editions 1, 2, 3, in which reading res must altogether be supplied, namely [the thing] which is let go from place to place. The Vatican [edition reads] nec in place of cum, a reading which pleases us less.
  20. Sola Vat. omittit nihil est.
    The Vatican [edition] alone omits nihil est.
← Dist. 37, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 1Dist. 37, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 3→