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Dist. 25, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 2

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 25

Textus Latinus
p. 595

Quaestio II. Utrum liberum arbitrium sit potentia distincta a ratione et voluntate.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum liberum arbitrium sit potentia distincta contra rationem et voluntatem. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Bernardus, de Libero Arbitrio1, loquens de potentia liberi arbitrii: «Quid similius aeternitati, quod non sit aeternitas»? Si ergo aeternitas nec respicit rationem nec voluntatem, videtur, quod liberum arbitrium sit aliqua potentia praeter has.

2. Item, ratio respondet Filio, voluntas Spiritui sancto: ergo si in nobis est ponere aliquam potentiam reformandam correspondentem Patri, est in nobis ponere aliquam potentiam praeter rationem et voluntatem, quae spectat ad reformationem; talis autem non est nisi liberum arbitrium: ergo etc.

3. Item, ad productionem operis ista tria sunt necessaria, videlicet posse et scire et velle: ergo si scimus per rationem, volumus per voluntatem, videtur, quod in nobis sit ponere tertiam potentiam, per quam simus potentes; hanc autem dicimus liberi arbitrii facultatem: ergo etc.

4. Item, cum lapis movetur deorsum, ista tria reperiuntur: intentio, appetitus et virtus. Dicimus enim, quod lapis intendit deorsum moveri, cum natura sit operans per intentionem2; appetit etiam deorsum moveri; habet nihilominus virtutem, per quam deorsum movetur: ergo videtur, quod ista tria sit reperire in anima rationali. Si igitur rationis est intendere, voluntatis appetere, erit ponere tertiam potentiam, cuius sit virtualiter agere; hanc autem dicimus arbitrii facultatem: ergo etc.

5. Item, iudicans praeeminet iudicando, et movens praeeminet mobili; sed «liberum arbitrium est liberum de voluntate iudicium3»: ergo liberi arbitrii est iudicare de voluntate. Similiter liberi arbitrii est movere omnes vires animae et rationi imperare, ut discernat, et voluntati, ut appetat: ergo videtur, quod sit tertia potentia ab istis distincta.

Sed contra:

1. Potentiae animae rationalis sufficienter dividuntur per cognitivas et affectivas: ergo si ratio comprehendit virtutes4 cognitivas, et voluntas affectivas, non videtur, quod sit conveniens ponere tertiam potentiam ab his differentem.

2. Item, actus liberi arbitrii est iudicare5; sed de omni eo quod iudicamus, per rationem iudicamus: ergo non videtur, quod liberum arbitrium sit potentia a ratione et voluntate distincta.

3. Item, alia6 potentia circumscripta, remanente sola voluntate et ratione, possumus consentire, quia potest praecedere deliberatio per actum rationis, et subsequi praeoptatio per actum voluntatis: si ergo consentire est actus liberi arbitrii, videtur, quod liberum arbitrium non sit alia potentia a ratione et voluntate.

4. Item, liberi arbitrii est movere: aut ergo movet voluntatem, aut non. Si non: ergo non videtur esse plene liberum. Si movet voluntatem; et est alia potentia: ergo voluntas movetur ab alia potentia. Si movetur ab alia potentia: ergo non est libera: ergo si voluntas in nobis est maxime libera7, videtur etc.

5. Item, eadem est potentia cognitiva, qua intelligo aliquid et intelligo, me intelligere: ergo eadem virtus est, et non alia, qua volo aliquid et volo, me velle illud; sed potentia, qua volo me velle, p. 596 est liberum arbitrium, potentia, qua volo, est voluntas: ergo liberum arbitrium non est alia potentia a voluntate.

Conclusio.

Liberum arbitrium non dicit potentiam secundum rem distinctam a ratione et voluntate, tamen importat aliquam ab his potentiis distinctionem secundum rationem.

Respondeo: Ad praedictae quaestionis intelligentiam notandum est, quod super hac quaestione diversae fuerunt doctorum positiones.

Quidam enim dicere voluerunt, quod sicut mens dupliciter accipitur: aliquando communiter, et sic comprehendit memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem; aliquando proprie, et sic distinguitur contra intelligentiam et voluntatem: sic liberum arbitrium dupliciter accipitur, videlicet communiter8, et sic non distinguitur contra rationem et voluntatem; et proprie, et sic contra rationem et voluntatem habet distingui et est virtus imperans rationi et voluntati et utramque regens et movens, cuius actus primus non est discernere et velle, sed actus reflexus super haec duo et haec duo movens et regens, ille videlicet, quo dicitur quis velle discernere, vel velle se velle. Et iste actus praeambulus est ad rationem et voluntatem, et ista potentia respondet Patri, pro eo quod actus eius maxime potens est et primus est, cum non moveatur, sed moveat. Et ideo a Sanctis dicitur facultas sive potestas voluntatis et rationis, id est potestas faciliter movens voluntatem et rationem; et consistit in istis tribus quaedam ratio imaginis ex parte motivae, quae principaliter per gratiam in via et per dotes in patria habet reformari.

Aliis autem aliter videtur, quod cum rationis et voluntatis sit reflectere se super se, et istae duae potentiae sufficiant ad omnes actus animae perficiendos, videlicet ad iudicandum et fugiendum et eligendum, quod frustra poneretur in anima aliqua potentia differens ab istis. Si igitur «natura nihil facit frustra10», potentiae animae rationalis sufficienter dividuntur per cognitivas et affectivas, sive per rationem et voluntatem; et ideo dicunt, quod liberum arbitrium non est potentia ab his duabus potentiis distincta.

Quaelibet autem harum positionum multum habet probabilitatis; et si velimus utramque earum intelligere diligenter et pie, inveniemus, eas ab invicem non discordare, sed ad unius veritatis maiorem expressionem concurrere. Cum enim dicimus, aliquam potentiam distingui ab aliis, hoc est dupliciter: aut secundum rem, aut secundum rationem. Secundum rem, sicut11 distinguitur intellectus et affectus; secundum rationem, sicut distinguitur ratio, ut est cognitiva et motiva, id est dictans moveri, vel disponens ad motum. —9 Loquendo igitur de distinctione secundum rationem, dici potest, liberum arbitrium quodam modo distingui a ratione et voluntate, in hoc scilicet, quod liberum arbitrium nominat12 in ratione moventis, voluntas vero et ratio in ratione moti; hoc in ratione imperantis, istae duae in ratione exsequentis. — Et ex ista parte per quandam rationem appropriationis invenitur in anima quaedam ratio imaginis; et per hunc modum intelligitur prima positio, et rationes currunt, quae ad primam partem inducuntur. Non enim concludunt distinctionem liberi arbitrii a ratione et voluntate secundum rem, sed solum secundum rationem et appropriationem, sicut patet discurrenti per singulas.

Loquendo autem de distinctione potentiarum secundum rem, sic liberum arbitrium non dicit potentiam diversam vel distinctam a ratione et voluntate, pro eo quod potentiae animae rationalis sufficienter dividuntur per cognitivam et motivam, et omnes actus animae per has potentias, quae sunt cognitiva et affectiva, sive ratio et voluntas, exerceri possunt, sicut rationes, quae ad hoc inducuntur, ostendunt. Cum enim tam ratio quam voluntas sit nata super se reflecti; cum nomino voluntatem ut volentem aliquid, et voluntatem ut volentem se velle, non dico potentiam aliam et aliam secundum rem. Movens enim et motum in spiritualibus non oportet differre secundum substantiam, quia, sicut dicit Anselmus13, «voluntas est instrumentum se ipsum movens», et ratio etiam est virtus se ipsam cognoscens, pari ratione; et ideo, si aliqua est ibi distinctio, haec est solum secundum rationem. — Et sic patet responsio ad quaestionem et ad rationes ad utramque partem14. Concedo enim, quod liberum arbitrium secundum rem non dicit potentiam distinctam a ratione et voluntate; concedo tamen nihilominus, quod aliquam distinctionem habet secun- p. 597 dum rationem, ratione cuius dicitur facultas utriusque. Quanta autem sit distinctio, melius patebit infra15. Ad praesens autem tantum dixisse sufficiat, quod non est tanta distinctio, quod faciat ipsum esse aliam potentiam in genere potentiae, a ratione et voluntate realiter distinctam.

Ad 1, 2, 3. Et quod obiicit, quod est similius aeternitati, et appropriatur Patri, et est virtus, a qua est posse; totum illud non ponit nisi solummodo distinctionem quandam secundum quandam appropriationem et quandam rationem. Et hoc patet, quia ipsa ratio includit in se intelligentiam et memoriam, et ita aliquid, per quod assimilatur Patri, et aliquid, per quod assimilatur Filio. Ipsa voluntas includit in se irascibilem et concupiscibilem, et ita potentiam, per quam appetit, et potentiam, per quam potest. Et ideo non oportet, liberum arbitrium esse aliquam aliam potentiam praeter has.

Ad 5. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod iudicans praeeminet iudicato, et movens moto; dicendum, quod non oportet in spiritualibus, loquendo de praeeminentia, quae faciat diversitatem secundum essentiam. Sicut enim saepe dictum est, eadem est vis, quae vult aliquid et quae vult se velle, et quae iudicat et quae iudicat se iudicare; alioquin esset in infinitum abire. Nihilominus tamen sortitur quasi dignius officium, dum est in ratione iudicantis, quam cum est in ratione iudicati; et cum est in ratione moventis, quam cum est in ratione moti.

Scholion

I. Primam opinionem in corp. positam tenet Alex. Hal. (S. p. II. q. 72. m. 2. a. 1. § 2.), et consentit B. Albert. (S. p. II. tr. 14. q. 91. m. 3.), qui dicit, quod liberum arbitrium sit potentia specialis, tamen in multis aliis potentiis diffusa est, prius tamen in ratione, et deinde in voluntate; et idem docet hic a. 1. Quo posito principio, iidem etiam seqq. quaestiones solvunt, sibi constantes et ab aliis Scholasticis discrepantes. — S. Thom. autem (II. Sent. d. 24. q. 1. a. 3; S. I. q. 83. a. 4; de Verit. q. 24. a. 6.) docet, quod liberum arbitrium sit potentia non alia a voluntate. Eandem sententiam tenent Petr. a Tar., Richard. a Med., Scotus aliique plurimi. — Licet S. Bonav. duas istas sententias inter se conciliare nitatur, tamen in re S. Thomae consentit, dum cum eodem negat, liberum arbitrium esse potentiam aliam a voluntate et ratione, nec aliam admittit distinctionem, nisi secundum rationem et appropriationem, quae scilicet nihil secundum essentiam addat super rationem et voluntatem.

II. Praeter laudatos: Scot., apud Hier. de Monteforlino, l. II. q. 83. a. 4. — Petr. a Tar., II. Sent. d. 24. q. 2. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., de hac et seqq. qq. II. Sent. d. 24. a. 1. q. 3. — Aegid. R., II. Sent. d. 24. p. I. q. 1. a. 3. — Durand., de hac et seqq. qq. II. Sent. d. 24. q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seqq. qq. II. Sent. d. 24. q. 3. — Biel, de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. unica.

III. Sequentem (3.) quaest. resolvit Alex. Hal. (loc. cit. § 1.) sic: «Liberum arbitrium continet in se omnes vires, secundum quas est meritum vel demeritum; non tamen ideo est plures potentiae essentialiter [quod quidam docuerant; vide hic q. 4.], sed plurium potentiarum». Similiter B. Albert. (S. loc. cit. m. 2.) resolvit. — S. Thom. (II. Sent. d. 24. q. 1. a. 2.) docet, quod liberum arbitrium intellectum virtualiter in se colligit, licet formaliter et simpliciter sit voluntas; reprobat autem tum opinionem, quae vult, plures potentias colligi in eo, ut sint totum universale, sive essentialiter, tum aliam asserentem, plures potentias colligi ut totum integrale. — S. Bonav. hoc loco totus est in eo, ut probet necessitatem, quod actus rationis et voluntatis simul concurrant in libero arbitrio; quoad modum autem, quo duae potentiae concurrunt, consentit S. Thomae in hoc, quod non uniantur ut totum universale, vel integrale; ipse tamen vult, ut medio modo uniantur sive ut totum potentiale (ad 6.). Quomodo hoc intelligatur, explicatur in seqq. quaestionibus. — De eadem quaest. vide etiam: S. Thom., de Verit. q. 24. a. 6. — Petr. a Tar., II. Sent. d. 24. q. 2. a. 2. — Aegid. R., II. Sent. d. 24. p. I. q. 1. a. 2.

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English Translation

Question II. Whether free choice is a power distinct from reason and will.

Secondly it is asked whether free choice is a power distinct over against reason and will. And that it is so, seems [to be the case].

1. Bernard, On Free Choice1, speaking of the power of free choice: «What is more like eternity than that which is not eternity»? If therefore eternity regards neither reason nor will, it seems that free choice is some power besides these.

2. Likewise, reason corresponds to the Son, will to the Holy Spirit: therefore if in us a power corresponding to the Father is to be posited as something to be reformed, then there is to be posited in us some power besides reason and will which pertains to reformation; but such [a power] is nothing other than free choice: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, for the production of a work these three are necessary, namely to be able and to know and to will: therefore if we know through reason, we will through will, it seems that there is to be posited in us a third power through which we are able; and this we call the faculty of free choice: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, when a stone is moved downward, these three are found: intention, appetite, and power. For we say that the stone intends to be moved downward, since nature operates through intention2; it also has an appetite to be moved downward; nonetheless it has power by which it is moved downward: therefore it seems that these three are to be found in the rational soul. If therefore it belongs to reason to intend, to will to seek, there will be a third power to be posited whose [function] is to act with power; and this we call the faculty of choice: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, the one judging takes precedence over the thing judged, and the mover takes precedence over the movable; but «free choice is a free judgment concerning the will3»: therefore it belongs to free choice to judge concerning the will. Likewise it belongs to free choice to move all the powers of the soul and to command reason, that it may discern, and the will, that it may seek: therefore it seems that it is a third power distinct from these.

On the contrary:

1. The powers of the rational soul are sufficiently divided into cognitive and affective: therefore if reason comprehends the cognitive powers4, and will the affective, it does not seem fitting to posit a third power differing from these.

2. Likewise, the act of free choice is to judge5; but everything that we judge, we judge through reason: therefore it does not seem that free choice is a power distinct from reason and will.

3. Likewise, with another6 power set aside, while will and reason alone remain, we can consent, because deliberation can precede through an act of reason, and a prior choosing can follow through an act of will: if therefore to consent is an act of free choice, it seems that free choice is not a power other than reason and will.

4. Likewise, it belongs to free choice to move: therefore either it moves the will, or not. If not: then it does not seem to be fully free. If it moves the will; and it is another power: then the will is moved by another power. If it is moved by another power: then it is not free: therefore if the will in us is most free7, it seems etc.

5. Likewise, it is the same cognitive power by which I understand something and I understand that I understand: therefore it is the same power, and not another, by which I will something and I will that I will it; but the power by which I will that I will p. 596 is free choice, [and] the power by which I will is will: therefore free choice is not a power other than will.

Conclusion.

Free choice does not name a power really distinct from reason and will, yet it implies some distinction from these powers according to reason.

I respond: For the understanding of the aforesaid question it must be noted that concerning this question there have been diverse positions among the doctors.

For some have wished to say that, just as mind is taken in two ways: sometimes commonly, and thus it comprehends memory, intelligence, and will; sometimes properly, and thus it is distinguished over against intelligence and will: so free choice is taken in two ways, namely commonly8, and thus it is not distinguished over against reason and will; and properly, and thus over against reason and will it can be distinguished and is a power commanding reason and will and ruling and moving each, whose first act is not to discern and to will, but a reflexive act over these two and moving and ruling these two, namely that [act] by which one is said to will to discern, or to will to will. And this act is preambulary to reason and will, and this power corresponds to the Father, for the reason that its act is most powerful and is first, since it is not moved, but moves. And therefore by the Saints it is called the faculty or power of will and reason, that is, a power readily moving the will and reason; and there consists in these three a certain character of image on the part of the motive [power], which is principally reformed through grace in the wayfaring state and through the endowments in the homeland.

To others, however, it seems otherwise, namely that since it belongs to reason and will to reflect upon themselves, and these two powers suffice for accomplishing all the acts of the soul, namely for judging and fleeing and choosing, it would be in vain that any power differing from these be posited in the soul. If therefore «nature does nothing in vain10», the powers of the rational soul are sufficiently divided into cognitive and affective, or into reason and will; and therefore they say that free choice is not a power distinct from these two powers.

But each of these positions has much probability; and if we are willing to understand each of them carefully and devoutly, we shall find that they do not disagree with one another, but converge toward a greater expression of one truth. For when we say that some power is distinguished from others, this is in two ways: either according to the thing, or according to reason. According to the thing, as11 intellect and affection are distinguished; according to reason, as reason is distinguished, insofar as it is cognitive and motive, that is, dictating that there be motion, or disposing toward motion. —9 Speaking therefore of distinction according to reason, it can be said that free choice is in a certain manner distinguished from reason and will, namely in this, that free choice names12 [something] in the character of mover, while will and reason [are] in the character of moved; this in the character of commander, those two in the character of executor. — And from this part, through a certain character of appropriation, a certain character of image is found in the soul; and through this manner the first position is understood, and the reasons hold which are adduced for the first part. For they do not conclude to a distinction of free choice from reason and will according to the thing, but only according to reason and appropriation, as is clear to one running through them one by one.

But speaking of the distinction of powers according to the thing, free choice in this way does not name a power diverse or distinct from reason and will, for the reason that the powers of the rational soul are sufficiently divided into the cognitive and the motive, and all the acts of the soul can be exercised through these powers, which are the cognitive and the affective, or reason and will, as the reasons adduced for this show. For since both reason and will are born to reflect upon themselves; when I name will as willing something, and will as willing to will, I do not name one power and another according to the thing. For mover and moved in spiritual things need not differ according to substance, because, as Anselm says13, «the will is an instrument moving itself», and reason also is a power knowing itself, by like reasoning; and therefore, if there is any distinction there, this is only according to reason. — And thus the answer to the question is clear, and to the reasons on each side14. For I concede that free choice according to the thing does not name a power distinct from reason and will; yet I concede nonetheless that it has some distinction accord- p. 597 ing to reason, by reason of which it is called the faculty of both. But how great the distinction is, will appear better below15. For the present let it suffice to have said only this, that the distinction is not so great as to make it be another power in the genus of power, really distinct from reason and will.

To 1, 2, 3. And as for what is objected, that it is more like eternity, and is appropriated to the Father, and is a power from which there is being-able; all that posits nothing but only a certain distinction according to a certain appropriation and a certain reason. And this is clear, because reason itself includes in itself intelligence and memory, and so something through which it is assimilated to the Father, and something through which it is assimilated to the Son. The will itself includes in itself the irascible and the concupiscible, and so a power through which it seeks, and a power through which it is able. And therefore it is not necessary that free choice be some other power besides these.

To 5. As for that which is objected last, that the one judging takes precedence over the thing judged, and the mover over the moved; it must be said that in spiritual things, speaking of precedence, it is not necessary [that there be a precedence] which makes a diversity according to essence. For as has often been said, it is the same power which wills something and which wills to will, and which judges and which judges that it judges; otherwise it would go on to infinity. Nonetheless it obtains as it were a more worthy office, while it is in the character of the one judging, than when it is in the character of the thing judged; and when it is in the character of the mover, than when it is in the character of the moved.

Scholion

I. The first opinion set down in the body is held by Alexander of Hales (S. p. II. q. 72. m. 2. a. 1. § 2.), and Blessed Albert agrees (S. p. II. tr. 14. q. 91. m. 3.), who says that free choice is a special power, yet diffused through many other powers, prior however in reason, and then in will; and the same is taught here in a. 1. With this principle laid down, the same authors also solve the following questions, consistent with themselves and disagreeing from the other Scholastics. — Saint Thomas, however (II. Sent. d. 24. q. 1. a. 3; S. I. q. 83. a. 4; de Verit. q. 24. a. 6.), teaches that free choice is a power not other than the will. The same opinion is held by Peter of Tarentaise, Richard of Mediavilla, Scotus, and very many others. — Although Saint Bonaventure strives to reconcile these two opinions with each other, yet in fact he agrees with Saint Thomas, since with him he denies that free choice is a power other than will and reason, nor does he admit any other distinction except according to reason and appropriation, which namely adds nothing according to essence over reason and will.

II. Besides those praised: Scotus, in Hieronymus de Montefortino, l. II. q. 83. a. 4. — Peter of Tarentaise, II. Sent. d. 24. q. 2. a. 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, on this and the following questions, II. Sent. d. 24. a. 1. q. 3. — Giles of Rome, II. Sent. d. 24. p. I. q. 1. a. 3. — Durandus, on this and the following questions, II. Sent. d. 24. q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the following questions, II. Sent. d. 24. q. 3. — Biel, on this and the following questions, here, the sole question.

III. The following (3rd) question Alexander of Hales (loc. cit. § 1.) resolves thus: «Free choice contains in itself all the powers according to which there is merit or demerit; yet not for that reason is it several powers essentially [which certain ones had taught; see here q. 4.], but [it is] of several powers». Similarly Blessed Albert (S. loc. cit. m. 2.) resolves it. — Saint Thomas (II. Sent. d. 24. q. 1. a. 2.) teaches that free choice virtually gathers the intellect into itself, although formally and simply it is will; but he rejects both the opinion which holds that several powers are gathered in it so as to be a universal whole, or essentially, and the other asserting that several powers are gathered as an integral whole. — Saint Bonaventure in this place is wholly intent on proving the necessity that the act of reason and of will concur together in free choice; as to the manner, however, in which the two powers concur, he agrees with Saint Thomas in this, that they are not united as a universal whole, or an integral one; he wishes nonetheless that they be united in a middle manner, that is, as a potential whole (to 6). How this is to be understood is explained in the following questions. — On the same question see also: Saint Thomas, de Verit. q. 24. a. 6. — Peter of Tarentaise, II. Sent. d. 24. q. 2. a. 2. — Giles of Rome, II. Sent. d. 24. p. I. q. 1. a. 2.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Cap. 9. n. 28.
    [Bernard, On Free Choice] c. 9, n. 28.
  2. Cfr. Aristot., II. Phys. text. 75. seqq. (c. 8.), ubi naturam propter finem agere ostenditur.
    Cf. Aristotle, Physics II, text 75 ff. (c. 8), where it is shown that nature acts for the sake of an end.
  3. Boeth., III. Maior. Comment. in librum de Interpretatione (Periherm.), ed. secunda, ait: Sed est liberum arbitrium, quod ipsa quoque vocabula produnt, liberum nobis de voluntate iudicium. — Quoad maiorem hic afferimus illud August., de Vera Relig. c. 29. n. 53: «Iam vero illud videre facillimum est, praestantiorem esse iudicantem, quam illa res est, de qua iudicatur»; et ex Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 19. (c. 5.) haec: Semper enim honorabilius est agens patiente. — Pro iudicando, quod ducibus codd. I' II K T V cc ee etc. et ed. 1 posuimus, Vat. iudicato, forsan quia et in solutione fere omnes codd., excepto cod. H, et edd. exhibent iudicato.
    Boethius, Greater Commentary on the book On Interpretation (Periherm.), book III, second edition, says: But there is free choice, which the very words make evident, [namely] a free judgment for us concerning the will. — As to the major [premise] we here adduce that statement of Augustine, On True Religion c. 29, n. 53: «But now it is most easy to see that the one judging is more excellent than the thing about which judgment is made»; and from Aristotle, On the Soul III, text 19 (c. 5), this: For the agent is always more honorable than the patient. — For iudicando (judging), which on the lead of codd. I', II, K, T, V, cc, ee etc. and ed. 1 we have set down, the Vatican [edition reads] iudicato (the thing judged), perhaps because in the solution too nearly all the codices, except cod. H, and the editions read iudicato.
  4. Plurimi codd. cum ed. 1 minus bene potentias; cfr. supra d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. in fine corp.
    Very many codices with ed. 1 read, less well, potentias (powers); cf. above d. 24, p. I, a. 2, q. 1, at the end of the body.
  5. Bernard., de Lib. Arb. c. 4. n. 11: Arbitrium quippe iudicium est. Sicut vero iudicii est discernere, quid liceat, vel quid non liceat, sic profecto consilii probare, quid expediat etc.
    Bernard, On Free Choice c. 4, n. 11: For choice is judgment. But just as it belongs to judgment to discern what is permitted, or what is not permitted, so indeed [it belongs] to counsel to weigh what is expedient etc.
  6. Codd. Y bb ee omni alia.
    Codd. Y, bb, ee read omni alia (every other).
  7. August., III. de Lib. Arb. c. 3. n. 7: Nihil tam in nostra potestate quam ipsa voluntas est. — In codd. F K T V et pluribus aliis nec non in ed. 1 desiderantur verba si movetur ab alia potentia.
    Augustine, On Free Choice III, c. 3, n. 7: Nothing is so much in our power as the will itself. — In codd. F, K, T, V and in many others, as also in ed. 1, the words si movetur ab alia potentia (if it is moved by another power) are lacking.
  8. Vat. cum edd. 2, 3, 4 sic: communiter et proprie. Communiter, et sic etc. Eaedem edd. omittunt dein et ante proprie. Paulo inferius pro utramque, quod ex cod. aa restituimus, contextu exigente, Vat. utrumque.
    The Vatican [edition] with edd. 2, 3, 4 reads thus: communiter et proprie. Communiter, et sic etc. The same editions then omit et before proprie. A little below, for utramque, which we have restored from cod. aa, the context requiring it, the Vatican reads utrumque.
  9. Cfr. supra pag. 592, nota 6.
    Cf. above p. 592, note 6.
  10. Aristot., I. de Caelo et mundo, text. 32. (c. 4.). Cfr. supra pag. 44, nota 3. — Paulo superius verbo iudicandum cod. cc et ed. 1 praefigunt videndum, quod verbum codd. T bb (a prima manu) et nonnulli alii substituunt pro iudicandum.
    Aristotle, On the Heavens I, text 32 (c. 4). Cf. above p. 44, note 3. — A little above, to the word iudicandum [judging] cod. cc and ed. 1 prefix videndum [seeing], which word codd. T, bb (by the first hand) and some others substitute for iudicandum.
  11. Nonnulli codd. cum edd. 2, 3, 4 hic et paulo inferius sic.
    Some codices with edd. 2, 3, 4 [read] thus here and a little below.
  12. Codd. I W cc et ed. 1 nominatur. Paulo inferius pro hoc [i. e. liberum arbitrium] in ratione nonnulli codd. cum edd. haec in ratione.
    Codd. I, W, cc and ed. 1 read nominatur [it is named]. A little below, for hoc [i.e. free choice] in ratione, some codices with the editions read haec in ratione.
  13. De Concord. praesc. et lib. arb. q. 3. c. 11. — Pro se ipsum plures codd., ut K T V bb etc., cum edd. 1, 2 minus recte se ipsam. Paulo superius post secundum rem Vat. cum ed. 4 addit sed secundum rationem. Paulo inferius codd. F T bb cc ee cum edd. 1, 2 hoc est pro haec est.
    [Anselm,] On the Concord of Foreknowledge [and Predestination and Grace] with Free Choice q. 3, c. 11. — For se ipsum (itself, masc.) several codices, such as K, T, V, bb etc., with edd. 1, 2 read, less correctly, se ipsam (itself, fem.). A little above, after secundum rem the Vatican with ed. 4 adds sed secundum rationem (but according to reason). A little below, codd. F, T, bb, cc, ee with edd. 1, 2 read hoc est for haec est.
  14. Cod. 1 addit inductas.
    Cod. 1 adds inductas (adduced).
  15. Ib. q. 5. [scil. infra, in hac dist. p. I. a. un. q. 5.]
    Ibidem, q. 5 [i.e. below, in this distinction, p. I, a. un., q. 5].
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