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Dist. 6, Art. 1, Q. 2

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 6

Textus Latinus
p. 127

Quaestio II

Utrum generatio in divinis sit secundum rationem voluntatis.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum generatio Filii sit secundum rationem voluntatis. Et quod non, ostenditur1 primo per auctoritates, secundo per rationes:

1. Primo ostenditur per auctoritatem Hilarii, qui dicit in libro de Synodis2: «Omnibus creaturis substantiam Dei voluntas attulit, sed Filio natura dedit».

2. Item, Augustinus decimo quinto de Trinitate3 reprehendit Eunomium, qui posuit Filium Dei esse Filium voluntatis: ergo si recte reprehendit, generatio Filii non est secundum conditionem voluntatis.

3. Item, rationibus ostenditur sic: Generatio, quantum est de se, est exitus naturalis sive per modum naturae; sed iste4 est alius modus producendi quam per voluntatem: ergo etc.

4. Item, Filius est sapientia Patris: ergo si procedit secundum rationem voluntatis, voluntas est prior sapientia; sed hoc est inconveniens, quia cognitio secundum naturalem ordinem5 intelligendi praecedit affectionem sive voluntatem: ergo etc.

Sed contra:

1. In omni natura ordinata positum naturalis subiacet voluntati, vel saltem conformatur voluntati, sicut patet in primo homine; sed in Deo est natura ordinatissima: ergo nihil est a natura vel per naturam, quod non sit per voluntatem: ergo etc.

2. Item, consimilis est modus procedendi in imagine6 creata et in Trinitate increata; sed in imagine notitia oritur mediante voluntate a mente: ergo et Filius a Patre mediante voluntate sive per voluntatem. Minor patet per Augustinum nono de Trinitate7: «Partum mentis praecedit appetitus, quo, dum quaerendo invenimus quod nosse volumus, nascitur proles, ipsa notitia».

3. Item, ubi est maior communicatio, ibi est liberalitas maior; sed Pater plus communicat Filio quam omnibus creaturis: ergo maior est ibi liberalitas: ergo cum creaturae procedant per modum liberalitatis, multo magis Filius.

4. Item, in creaturis8 in actu generationis simul movet natura et voluntas, et nihil ex hoc filio derogatur: ergo si Pater magis producit secundum se totum quam creatura: ergo multo fortius per naturam et voluntatem.

5. Item, ad hoc est auctoritas Hilarii in tertio de Trinitate9: «Pater ante omne tempus Filium procreavit, omne quod est Deus per caritatem nativitati eius impartiens»; si per caritatem: ergo per voluntatem.

6. Item, Origenes10 loquens de mente divina dicit: «Germen proferens voluntatis fit Verbi Pater»: ergo videtur, quod Filius generetur a Patre per voluntatem et quod sit Filius voluntatis.

Conclusio

Generatio Filii est secundum voluntatem ut in ratione approbantis, non vero ut in ratione producentis, nisi quatenus voluntas est principium coniunctum naturae — et quidem sic, ut natura producat principaliter, voluntate concomitante.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod voluntas potest dupliciter considerari respectu voliti, scilicet ut in ratione approbantis et diligentis; et sic est respectu omnis boni, sive sit11 necessarium sive sit contingens, sive creatum sive increatum sive ab alio, quod dicitur, quod alia sunt a natura, alia a voluntate; aut prout est coniunctum.

p. 128

Pater vult, se esse Deum12. Alio modo consideratur ut in ratione producentis. Et hoc dupliciter: aut prout est principium distinctum contra naturam, secundum quod dicitur, quod alia sunt a13 natura, alia a voluntate; aut prout est coniunctum.

Si prout est principium distinctum, sic distinguitur voluntas dupliciter, scilicet accedens et antecedens. Voluntas accedens est, qua aliquis de non volente fit volens; haec non est in Deo nec respectu Dei nec respectu creaturae14. Deus enim non habet aliquam novam voluntatem nec respectu sui nec respectu alterius. Voluntas antecedens praecedit effectum causalitate et duratione; haec quidem est in Deo, sed non respectu Dei, sed respectu creaturae solum; omnes enim divinae personae sunt simul.

Alio modo, prout voluntas consideratur ut principium coniunctum naturae, potest esse dupliciter; quia tunc natura et voluntas sunt principium; aut igitur natura est producens principaliter, voluntate concomitante15, aut e converso; utrumque enim principaliter esse non potest.

Si voluntas est principium, concomitante natura, sic est processio Spiritus sancti, qui procedit per modum amoris, tamen similis in natura. Si vero natura est primum16 principium, concomitante voluntate, sic est generatio Filii, qui producitur ut omnino similis et per modum naturae, nihilominus ut dilectus; et ideo dicitur, quod sibi in eo complacet Pater17, et ad Colossenses primo dicitur Filius caritatis.

1. 5. 6. Ad illud quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod generatio est per modum voluntatis sive secundum rationem voluntatis; dicendum, quod hoc intelligitur aut de voluntate approbante, ut ostendunt duae auctoritates Hilarii et Origenis, aut de voluntate concomitante18, ut ratio, quae posita est primo.

2. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur de similitudine imaginis; dicendum, quod in hoc est dissimilis imago creata ipsi Trinitati increatae, ut dicit Augustinus decimo quinto de Trinitate19, quia ibi non nascitur verbum per inquisitionem, sicut potest nasci in nobis; unde potius valet ad oppositum quam ad propositum.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod maior est communicatio in generatione Filii; dicendum, quod maior communicatio vel minor non facit modum emanandi esse secundum liberalitatem vel secundum modum voluntatis, sed modus sive ratio communicandi. Et quia Pater communicat creaturis per voluntatem, ita quod voluntas eius est causa producens, Filio20 per fecunditatem naturae: ideo non sic dicitur Filius produci per voluntatem, sicut creaturae.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur21, quod in generatione hominis simul movet natura et voluntas; dicendum, quod hoc est propter defectum magis quam propter complementum; quia pater per se non potest generare, sed ex coniunctione cum alio distante, quod fit ad imperium voluntatis; Deus autem alio adiuvante non indiget; et ideo non est simile.

Scholion

I. De diversis modis volendi, quae hic tanguntur, Seraphicus in anecdota quaestione disputata: utrum stent simul Trinitas et summa necessitas, haec habet: «Est voluntas accedens, i. e. de novo adveniens; et haec non est in Deo. Est iterum voluntas antecedens; et haec est in Deo, sed non respectu sui, sed respectu creati, quod antecedit natura et aeternitate. Est tertio voluntas concomitans et acceptans; et haec est in Deo respectu sui et respectu creati; approbat enim et acceptat voluntas divina omne bonum sive creatum sive increatum, sive contingens sive necessarium».

II. Quoad processionem Spiritus sancti secundum rationem voluntatis cfr. infra d. 10. a. 1. q. 1. — Circa differentiam inter generationem et spirationem cfr. infra d. 26. q. 1. et ibi Scholion.

III. In conclusione doctores consentiunt: Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 42. m. 5. a. 1; et q. 43. m. 3. a. 2. — Scot., hic q. 1; Report., hic q. 1. 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 2; S. I. q. 41. a. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 1. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 2. — Durand., hic q. 2.

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English Translation

Question II

Whether the generation in God is according to the account of will.

Second it is asked whether the generation of the Son is according to the account of will. And that it is not, is shown1 first by authorities, second by reasons:

1. First, it is shown by the authority of Hilary, who says in the book On the Synods2: «To all creatures will gave the substance of God, but to the Son nature gave it».

2. Likewise, Augustine in the fifteenth book On the Trinity3 rebukes Eunomius, who held that the Son of God is Son of will: therefore if he rightly rebukes him, the generation of the Son is not according to the condition of will.

3. Likewise, by reasons it is shown thus: Generation, as it is in itself, is a natural going-forth, or by way of nature; but this4 is another mode of producing than through will: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, the Son is the Father's Wisdom: therefore if He proceeds according to the account of will, will is prior to wisdom; but this is incongruous, because cognition according to the natural order5 of understanding precedes affection or will: therefore, etc.

On the contrary:

1. In every well-ordered nature, what is naturally placed is subject to the will, or at least is conformed to the will — as is clear in the first man; but in God the nature is most well-ordered: therefore there is nothing from nature or through nature which is not also through will: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, the mode of proceeding is similar in the created image6 and in the uncreated Trinity; but in the image knowledge arises from the mind by means of the will: therefore so the Son [arises] from the Father by means of the will, or through the will. The minor premise is clear from Augustine, ninth book On the Trinity7: «The birth of the mind is preceded by appetite, by which — when, by seeking, we find what we wish to know — there is born an offspring, which is knowledge itself».

3. Likewise, where there is greater communication, there is greater liberality; but the Father communicates more to the Son than to all creatures: therefore there is greater liberality there: therefore, since creatures proceed by way of liberality, much more so the Son.

4. Likewise, in creatures8 in the act of generation nature and will move at the same time, and nothing of this is detracted from the son: therefore if the Father produces according to His whole self more than the creature does: therefore much more strongly through nature and will.

5. Likewise, for this is the authority of Hilary in the third [book] On the Trinity9: «The Father before all time procreated the Son, imparting all that He is as God by charity to His birth»; if through charity: therefore through will.

6. Likewise, Origen10, speaking of the divine mind, says: «Bearing the seed of will, He becomes Father of the Word»: therefore it seems that the Son is begotten by the Father through will, and that He is Son of will.

Conclusion

The generation of the Son is according to will as in the account of approving — but not as in the account of producing, except insofar as the will is a principle conjoined to nature; and this so that nature produces principally, with the will concomitant.

I respond: It must be said that the will can be considered in two ways with respect to what is willed — namely either as in the account of approving and loving; and so it is with respect to every good — whether it be11 necessary or contingent, whether created or uncreated, or from another (which is what is said: that some things are from nature, others from will); — or as conjoined.

The Father wills that He Himself is God12. In another way [the will] is considered as in the account of producing. And this in two ways: either as it is a principle distinct from nature — according to which it is said that some things are from13 nature, others from will — or as it is conjoined.

If as a distinct principle, the will is then distinguished in two ways: as accedent and antecedent. The accedent will is by which someone, from non-willing, becomes willing; this is not in God — neither with respect to God nor with respect to creature14. For God does not have any new will either with respect to Himself or with respect to another. The antecedent will precedes the effect in causality and in duration; this indeed is in God, but not with respect to God — only with respect to creature. For all the divine persons are simultaneous.

In another way, as the will is considered as a principle conjoined to nature, it can be in two ways; for then nature and will are the principle: either nature is the principal producer, with will concomitant15, or conversely; for both cannot be principal.

If the will is the principle, with nature concomitant — so is the procession of the Holy Spirit, who proceeds by way of love, yet similar in nature. If nature is the first16 principle, with the will concomitant — so is the generation of the Son, who is produced as wholly similar and by way of nature, yet as beloved; and therefore it is said that the Father is well-pleased in Him17, and at Colossians 1 He is called Son of charity.

1., 5., 6. To the objection on the contrary, that generation is by way of will or according to the account of will: it must be said that this is understood either of the will approving — as the two authorities of Hilary and Origen show — or of the will concomitant18, as the reason set down first holds.

2. To the objection from the likeness of the image: it must be said that in this respect the created image is unlike the uncreated Trinity itself, as Augustine says in the fifteenth book On the Trinity19 — because there a word is not born by inquiry, as it can be born in us; whence [the argument] avails for the opposite rather than for the proposition.

3. To the objection that there is greater communication in the generation of the Son: it must be said that greater or lesser communication does not make the mode of emanation be according to liberality or according to the mode of will, but rather the mode or account of communicating. And because the Father communicates to creatures through will (so that His will is the producing cause), and to the Son20 through the fruitfulness of nature: therefore the Son is not said to be produced through will in the same way as creatures are.

4. To the objection21 that in the generation of a man nature and will move together: it must be said that this is on account of defect rather than completion; because the father by himself cannot generate, but only through conjunction with another distant being — which happens at the command of the will. But God needs no other helper; and therefore it is not similar.

Scholion

I. On the various modes of willing touched on here, the Seraphic in a certain disputed unpublished question — whether the Trinity and supreme necessity stand together — has the following: «There is accedent will, i.e., coming anew; and this is not in God. There is also antecedent will, and this is in God, but not with respect to Himself, but with respect to the created — which it antecedes in nature and in eternity. There is third the concomitant and accepting will, and this is in God with respect to Himself and with respect to the created; for the divine will approves and accepts every good — whether created or uncreated, whether contingent or necessary».

II. On the procession of the Holy Spirit according to the account of will, see below d. 10, a. 1, q. 1. — On the difference between generation and spiration, see below d. 26, q. 1, and the Scholion there.

III. On the conclusion the doctors agree: Alexander of Hales, Summa p. I, q. 42, m. 5, a. 1; and q. 43, m. 3, a. 2. — Scotus, here q. 1; Reportatio here qq. 1, 2. — St. Thomas, here q. 2; Summa I, q. 41, a. 2. — Blessed Albert, here aa. 1, 3. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 2. — Richard of Middleton, here q. 2. — Giles of Rome, here 2 princ. q. 2. — Durandus, here q. 2.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Fide vetustiorum mss. et ed. I posuimus ostenditur loco videtur.
    On the authority of the older manuscripts and the first edition we have placed ostenditur ("is shown") for videtur ("seems").
  2. Hilar., de Synodis n. 88. XXIV: Omnibus creaturis substantiam voluntas Dei attulit, sed naturam Filio dedit ex impassibili ac non nata substantia perfecta nativitas. Ex his verbis patet, posteriorem propositionis partem a S. Bonaventura quoad sensum tantum esse allegatam.
    Hilary, On the Synods n. 88, XXIV: «To all creatures the will of God brought substance, but to the Son the perfect nativity from an impassible and unbegotten substance gave nature». From these words it is clear that the latter part of the proposition is cited by St. Bonaventure only as to its sense.
  3. De Trin. XV, c. 20, n. 38. Verba ipsius vide hic in lit. Magistri circa initium. — In fine argumenti Vat. cum cod. cc rationem loco conditionem, sed obstant ceteri codd. cum ed. 1.
    [Augustine,] On the Trinity XV, c. 20, n. 38. See his words here in the Master's text near the beginning. — At the end of the argument the Vatican edition with codex cc [reads] rationem ("account") for conditionem ("condition"), but the other codices with the first edition stand against it.
  4. Substituimus ope antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 iste pro ille.
    With the help of the older manuscripts and the first edition we have substituted iste ("this") for ille ("that").
  5. Ita vetustiores codd. cum ed. 1, sed Vat. cum cod. cc rationem loco naturalem ordinem.
    Thus the older codices with the first edition; but the Vatican edition with codex cc [reads] rationem ("account") for naturalem ordinem ("natural order").
  6. Vat. cum cod. cc producendi in trinitate loco procedendi in imagine, sed contra ceteros codd. et ed. 1 nec non contra subnexa, in quibus semper de modo procedendi agitur. Paulo infra post ergo restituimus ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 particulam et.
    The Vatican edition with codex cc [reads] producendi in trinitate ("of producing in the Trinity") for procedendi in imagine ("of proceeding in the image"), but against the other codices and the first edition and also against what follows, in which the discussion is always about the mode of proceeding. A little below, after ergo ("therefore"), we have restored from the older manuscripts and the first edition the particle et ("and").
  7. Cap. 12. Vide supra d. 3. p. II. a. 2. q. 2. arg. 1. ad opp.
    Chapter 12. See above d. 3, p. II, a. 2, q. 2, arg. 1, ad oppositum.
  8. Fide antiquiorum mss. et ed. I expunximus existentibus, quod Vat. cum cod. cc hic minus apte addit. Paulo infra cod. O generationi filii pro filio.
    On the authority of the older manuscripts and the first edition we have expunged existentibus ("existing"), which the Vatican edition with codex cc less aptly adds here. A little below, codex O [reads] generationi filii ("to the generation of the son") for filio ("to the son").
  9. Hilar., III de Trin. n. 3: Hic ergo ingenitus ante omne tempus ex se Filium genuit, non ex aliqua subiacente materia... sed incomprehensibiliter, inenarrabiliter, ante omne tempus et saecula. Unigenitum ex his quae ingenita in se erant procreavit, omne quod Deus est per caritatem atque virtutem nativitati eius impartiens.
    Hilary, On the Trinity III, n. 3: «He, therefore, the unbegotten, before all time begot the Son from Himself, not from any underlying matter... but incomprehensibly, inenarrably, before all time and ages. He procreated the Only-Begotten from those things which were unbegotten in Him, imparting to His nativity all that God is by charity and power».
  10. Haec verba referuntur a Pamphylo Martyre inter fragmenta Origenis Comment. in Ioan. tom. II. sub n. 30. ed. Migne (Patr. Graec. tom. XIV. col. 184), secundum quam editionem loco fit habetur factus est. — Vat. hoc et praecedens argumentum collocat immediate post primum, sed contra mss. et minus bene ob confusionem scil. argumentorum ex ratione et auctoritate.
    These words are reported by Pamphilus the Martyr among the fragments of Origen's Commentary on John tom. II, under n. 30, in Migne's edition (Patrologia Graeca tom. XIV, col. 184), according to which edition factus est ("was made") is read for fit ("becomes"). — The Vatican edition places this and the preceding argument immediately after the first, but against the manuscripts and less well, on account of the confusion namely of arguments from reason and from authority.
  11. In plurimis mss. et ed. 1 deest sit.
    In most manuscripts and the first edition the word sit ("be") is missing.
  12. Vat. absque auctoritate mss. et trium primarum edd. vult esse Deus.
    The Vatican edition, without the authority of the manuscripts and the first three editions, [reads] vult esse Deus ("[He] wills to be God").
  13. Ex antiquis mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus a, quod Vat. cum cod. cc hic et paulo post minus bene omittit. Mox loco coniunctum alii codd. ut ABDEFGHIXZ habent communicans, alii ut KLOPQSTUWY cum ed. 1 concomitans, sed falso, uti ex subnexis patet, ubi hoc membrum explicatur et ubi omnes codd. ponunt coniunctum. Codd. aa bb addunt naturae.
    From the older manuscripts and the first edition we have supplied a ("from"), which the Vatican edition with codex cc here and a little later less well omits. Soon, in place of coniunctum ("conjoined"), other codices such as ABDEFGHIXZ have communicans ("communicating"), others such as KLOPQSTUWY with the first edition [have] concomitans ("concomitant"), but falsely, as is clear from what follows, where this member is explained and where all the codices place coniunctum. Codices aa bb add naturae ("of nature").
  14. Sequimur cod. I, qui nec respectu creaturae addit, quod tam in aliis mss. quam in Vat. deest, sed minus bene, ut ex contextu colligitur. Paulo infra ope plurium mss. ut G H Y aa bb ee ff et ed. 1 substituimus aliquam pro aliam; lectio certe praeferenda.
    We follow codex I, which adds nec respectu creaturae ("nor with respect to creature"), which is missing both in the other manuscripts and in the Vatican edition, but less well, as is gathered from the context. A little below, with the help of several manuscripts such as G H Y aa bb ee ff and the first edition, we have substituted aliquam ("any") for aliam ("other"); certainly the preferred reading.
  15. Fide plurimorum mss. et ed. 1 posuimus hic et paulo infra bis concomitante loco communicante, quod minus congrue habetur in Vat.
    On the authority of most manuscripts and the first edition we have placed here and a little below, twice, concomitante ("with [will] concomitant") for communicante ("communicating"), which is less congruously found in the Vatican edition.
  16. Addidimus ex vetustioribus mss. et ed. I primum, non bene omissum in Vat. et cod. cc.
    We have added from the older manuscripts and the first edition primum ("first"), not well omitted in the Vatican edition and codex cc.
  17. Matth. 17, 5. et II. Petri I, 17. — In textu ex Epist. ad Coloss. 1, 13. desumto Vulgata et Vat. loco caritatis habent dilectionis, sed mss. et ed. I nec non August., XV. de Trin. c. 19. n. 37. stant pro lectione nostra.
    Matthew 17:5 and II Peter 1:17. — In the text taken from the Epistle to the Colossians 1:13, the Vulgate and the Vatican edition have dilectionis ("of love") for caritatis ("of charity"), but the manuscripts and the first edition, and also Augustine, On the Trinity XV, c. 19, n. 37, stand for our reading.
  18. Vat. etiam hic communicante cum natura loco concomitante, sed obstat auctoritas plurimorum codd. et ed. 1. Paulo ante plerique codd. omittunt ostendunt; ed. I loco ostendunt duae ponit dicunt. — Post ratio supple: ostendit.
    The Vatican edition here also [reads] communicante ("communicating") with nature for concomitante ("concomitant"), but the authority of most codices and the first edition stands against it. A little before, most codices omit ostendunt ("show"); the first edition in place of ostendunt duae ("the two show") puts dicunt ("they say"). — After ratio ("reason") supply: ostendit ("shows").
  19. August., XV de Trin. c. 13. n. 22: Nostra vero scientia in rebus plurimis propterea et amissibilis est et receptibilis... Propter hoc, sicut nostra scientia illi scientiae Dei, sic et nostrum verbum, quod nascitur de nostra scientia, dissimile est illi Verbo Dei, quod natum est de Patris essentia.
    Augustine, On the Trinity XV, c. 13, n. 22: «But our knowledge in most things is for that reason both losable and receivable... For this reason, as our knowledge [is] to that knowledge of God, so also our word, which is born of our knowledge, is unlike that Word of God which was born of the Father's essence».
  20. Cod. R addit vero.
    Codex R adds vero ("but/indeed").
  21. Revocamus ex vetustioribus mss. et ed. I in Vat. et cod. cc omissum quod obiicitur et paulo infra substituimus coniunctione loco communicatione. Circa finem solutionis cod. B adminiculo pro adiuvante.
    We restore from the older manuscripts and the first edition the phrase quod obiicitur ("which is objected"), omitted in the Vatican edition and codex cc, and a little below we substitute coniunctione ("conjunction") for communicatione ("communication"). Near the end of the solution, codex B [reads] adminiculo ("by the help") for adiuvante ("helping").
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