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Dist. 10, Art. 1, Q. 1

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 10

Textus Latinus

Quaestio I. Utrum in divinis ponenda sit persona procedens per modum liberalitatis.

Circa primum, quod sit necesse ponere personam procedentem per modum liberalitatis, ostenditur hoc modo.

1. Perfectior est dilectio mutua quam reflexa1, et perfectior adhuc mutua communicata quam non communicata, quia talis, scilicet2 non communicata, videtur sapere amorem libidinosum: ergo si in Deo est summa dilectio et summa delectatio et beatitudo, non est ibi persona, quae mutuo non ametur, sed cui amor mutuus communicetur3; sed communicatio amoris mutui est per liberalitatem: ergo etc.

2. Item, in his inferioribus duplex invenitur modus procedendi4 nobilis, scilicet per modum naturae et per modum voluntatis: primo modo emanat Filius a Patre, secundo modo donum a datore; sed omne quod nobilitatis est in creatura, est attribuendum Deo: ergo etc.

3. Item, in Deo est ponere naturam et voluntatem, et sicut naturam perficit fecunditas, ita voluntatem summa liberalitas; sed natura perfecta fecunditate, producit persona aliam personam: ergo pari ratione, voluntate perfecta liberalitate, producit persona5 aliam personam: et sic etc.

4. Item, omnes creaturae a Deo procedunt per cognitionem, et voluntatem; sed ante creaturarum productionem ponere fuit in divinis emanationem Verbi ab aeterno, in quo Pater omnia fienda disposuit6: ergo pari ratione necesse fuit emanare personam, in qua omnia vellet et donaret; sed talis procedit per modum liberalitatis: ergo etc.

Contra: 1. Non est similis modus procedendi sive exeundi7 in creaturis respectu Dei et in personis; nam creaturae sunt extrinsecus, personae vero in essentia unum; sed exitus creaturarum a Deo est per modum liberalitatis: ergo non est ponere personam hoc modo procedere.

2. Item, exiens per modum voluntatis ab aliquo non assimilatur in substantia producenti, nec aequatur, nec necessario producitur; sed persona, si procedit in divinis, est in substantia similis et in potestate aequalis nec potens se aliter habere: ergo etc.

3. Item, in his inferioribus non tantum sunt ista principia nobilia, scilicet natura et voluntas, verum etiam ratio sive operans per artem8: ergo si ponuntur duae personae his duobus modis procedentes, debet poni tertia, quae tertio modo procedat; sed illa non ponitur9: ergo nec per modum voluntatis ponetur aliqua pari ratione.

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4. Item, quanto pluribus communicatur dilectio, tanto perfectior, quia omne bonum in commune deductum pulcrius elucescit: ergo non solum est ponere tertiam personam, cui amor communicetur secundae10, sed etiam quartam, cui amor communicetur tertiae; et sic in infinitum; sed hoc est impossibile in divinis, ut ostensum est supra11: ergo est stare in prima persona producente: ergo non est persona procedens per modum liberalitatis.

Conclusio.

In divinis per modum liberalitatis procedit tertia persona, quae dicitur Donum.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod, sicut probatum est12, in divinis est ponere tertiam personam procedentem per modum liberalitatis, quae dicitur Donum. Et ratio huius est perfectio dilectionis, perfectio emanationis et perfectio voluntatis, qua existente13 liberalissima, non potest non producere personam; sicut natura, existente fecundissima, non potest non producere personam; et haec est ratio propria huius emanationis.

Ad argumenta in oppositum:

1. Ad illud quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod creaturae emanant per modum liberalitatis; dicendum, quod per modum liberalitatis emanare est dupliciter: aut sicut volitum, aut sicut ratio volendi, sive aut sicut donatum14, aut sicut ratio donandi. Primo modo emanant creaturae, quae sunt extra; secundo modo emanat tertia in Trinitate persona, quia ratio volendi et donandi est intrinseca perfectissimae voluntati.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod voluntas non est15 principium assimilans nec necessario emanans; dicendum, quod voluntas sive liberalitas dupliciter est principium: uno modo distinctum in natura, et sic non assimilat in substantia; alio modo concomitante16 natura, et sic in substantia assimilat. Quoniam igitur persona sic procedit per modum liberalitatis, ut tamen concomitetur natura: ideo similis in substantia, quamvis ipse modus procedendi non sit per modum similis; et sic patet illud.

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3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quare non procedit aliqua persona per modum rationis; dicendum, quod omnis modus procedendi nobilis ad istos duos reducitur: quia omne agens aut agit naturaliter, aut per voluntatem: — agens enim per violentiam, aut per fortunam est agens imperfectum, et modus producendi minus nobilis17 — unde ratio non distinguitur contra naturam et voluntatem quantum ad modum agendi: et ideo non est persona tali modo procedens.

Sed tamen hoc non videtur plene solvere, quia nos distinguimus in his creaturis egressum per modum liberalitatis ab egressu per modum artis. Et18 propterea dicendum, quod processus per modum liberalitatis est dupliciter, aut sicut ratio liberalitatis sive ipsa liberalitas, aut sicut liberaliter factum; similiter et in arte, aut sicut ipsa ars sive ratio artificiandi, aut sicut artificiatum; et primo modo potest cadere in divina persona, secundo modo non. Et primo modo procedit Filius, qui est «Verbum et ars plena omnium rationum viventium»19. Sed iste modus emanandi non distinguitur a modo emanandi per modum naturae, quia emanat ut omnino similis et per modum similitudinis perfectae. Alius autem modus non potest esse20, quia duas personas necesse est communicare in eadem natura, et quia necesse est, quod omnis modus emanandi, qui est in divinis, sit per modum naturae principaliter, vel illa concomitante21. Unde cum processus per modum voluntatis possit esse intrinsecus, sicut procedit amor ab amante: per modum vero artis semper est extrinsecus, inquantum huiusmodi: ideo impossibile est, quod cadat in Deo respectu personae, sed cadit solum respectu creaturae.

4. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur: si est ponere tertiam personam ob communicationem, pari ratione et quartam: dicendum, quod omnis ratio et natura22 concordat, quod non fiat per plures quod potest sufficientissime fieri per unum; alioquin est ibi superfluum23. Si ergo mutua dilectio non potest esse minus quam ad unum, et communicatio illius mutuae non minus quam ad unum, et in uno est mutua dilectio, et in altero mutuae dilectionis communicatio perfectissime, cum uterque24 accipiat totum infinite; patet quod non est ultra procedere, sed ibi est stare. Unde ipsa eadem ratio, quae ponit personarum pluralitatem, aufert infinitatem et ponit trinitatem.

Scholion

I. Spiritus sanctus habet nomen Doni, et quidem Doni, in quo omnia donantur (cfr. infra d. 18. per totam). Quidquid autem donatur, datur per modum liberalitatis. Quo sensu Seraphicus hic accipiat hanc locutionem, explicatione indigere videtur. Liberalitas praeter specialem virtutem moralem implicito etiam importat rationem liberalis seu voluntatis, ut declaratur in solut. ad 3. Cum igitur duplex sit modus emanandi in Deo, scil. per modum naturae et per modum voluntatis, et processio Spiritus sancti sit per modum voluntatis, illa intrinseca perfectio divinae voluntatis, quae se diffundit et exprimit in processione Spiritus sancti, ut Doni omnium donorum, a Sancto vocatur liberalitas. Insuper notandum, quod voluntas in Deo potest accipi vel quatenus secundum nostrum modum intelligendi distinguitur ut potentia contra naturam, vel quatenus concomitatur ipsam naturam eamque communicat in ratione obiecti summe amabilis. In primo sensu voluntas est principium fecundum in productione rerum creatarum, non vero in productione Spiritus sancti; in secundo vero sensu est principium Spiritus sancti. Unde patet quod dicit ad 1. 2; intelligitur etiam quod supra d. 6. q. 2. dictum est de differentia inter productionem Filii et Spiritus sancti. Filius enim procedit a Patre per modum naturae, concomitante voluntate; et quia per modum naturae procedit, procedit ut omnino similis Patri et perfecta ipsius imago (cfr. infra d. 31. a. 1. q. 2.). Spiritus sanctus vero producitur per modum voluntatis, concomitante natura, similis quidem, immo idem omnino in natura, tamen sic, quod vi processionis ratio imaginis completius sit in Filio.

II. Argumentum ultimum in fundam., quod ab emanatione creaturarum deducitur, approbatur etiam ab Alex. Hal., S. Thom. (hic in Comment.), Richard. aliisque, sed ab Aegid. (hic) immerito impugnatur, de quo videsis Dionys. Carth. (hic q. 1. circa med.).

III. De ipsa quaestione Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 43. m. 1. qui, ut dicit hic Dionys. Carth., «de his plenissime scribit, immo quod iam ex multis doctoribus est inductum, ipse pene totum solus in scripto suo expressit, multaque alia, quae aliorum nullus conscripsisse videtur». — Scot., hic q. unic. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1. seq. — B. Albert., 1. Sent. d. 13. a. 1; de hac et seqq. qq. S. p. I. tr. 7. q. 31. m. 2. — Petr. a Tar., de hac quaest. et seq. hic q. 1. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 1. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 61. q. 10. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seq. hic q. 1. — Biel, hic q. 2. concl. 3.

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English Translation

Question I. Whether a person proceeding by way of liberality is to be posited in God.

Concerning the first point, that it is necessary to posit a person proceeding by way of liberality, is shown in this way.

1. A mutual love is more perfect than a reflexive one1, and a mutual love communicated is even more perfect than one not communicated, because such a love — namely2 one not communicated — seems to savor of a libidinous love: therefore if in God there is the highest love and the highest delight and beatitude, there is not there a person who is not loved mutually, but [a person] to whom mutual love is communicated3; but the communication of mutual love is by liberality: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, in things below us a twofold noble manner of proceeding4 is found, namely by way of nature and by way of will: in the first manner the Son emanates from the Father, in the second manner a gift [emanates] from a giver; but everything which is of nobility in a creature is to be attributed to God: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, in God one must posit nature and will, and just as fecundity perfects nature, so the highest liberality perfects will; but nature, perfected by fecundity, produces — a person produces another person: therefore by parallel reasoning, when will is perfected by liberality, a person produces5 another person: and so etc.

4. Likewise, all creatures proceed from God by knowledge and will; but before the production of creatures one had to posit in God an emanation of the Word from eternity, in which the Father disposed all things to be done6: therefore by parallel reasoning it was necessary that a person emanate, in whom He would will and give all things; but such a person proceeds by way of liberality: therefore etc.

On the contrary: 1. The manner of proceeding or going forth7 in creatures with respect to God and in [the divine] persons is not similar; for creatures are extrinsic, but the persons are one in essence; but the going forth of creatures from God is by way of liberality: therefore one is not to posit a person to proceed in this manner.

2. Likewise, what goes forth by way of will from something is not assimilated to the producer in substance, nor equated [with it], nor produced necessarily; but a person, if it proceeds in God, is similar in substance and equal in power and not able to be otherwise: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, in things below us not only are these noble principles found — namely nature and will — but also reason or that which works through art8: therefore if two persons are posited as proceeding by these two manners, a third must be posited which proceeds by the third manner; but that [third one] is not posited9: therefore neither will any [person] be posited by way of will by parallel reasoning.

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4. Likewise, the more love is communicated to many, the more perfect it is, because every good when brought into common possession shines forth more beautifully: therefore one is not only to posit a third person, to whom love is communicated by the second10, but also a fourth, to whom love is communicated by the third; and so on to infinity; but this is impossible in God, as has been shown above11: therefore one must stop at the first producing person: therefore there is no person proceeding by way of liberality.

Conclusion.

In God by way of liberality there proceeds a third person, who is called the Gift.

I respond: It must be said that, as has been proved12, in God one must posit a third person proceeding by way of liberality, who is called the Gift. And the reason for this is the perfection of love, the perfection of emanation, and the perfection of will, which, since it exists13 as most liberal, cannot but produce a person; just as nature, since it exists as most fecund, cannot but produce a person; and this is the proper reason of this emanation.

To the arguments to the contrary:

1. To that which is objected to the contrary, that creatures emanate by way of liberality; it must be said that to emanate by way of liberality is twofold: either as something willed, or as the ground of willing — that is, either as something given14, or as the ground of giving. In the first manner creatures emanate, which are outside; in the second manner the third person in the Trinity emanates, because the ground of willing and of giving is intrinsic to a most perfect will.

2. To that which is objected, that the will is not15 an assimilating principle nor one necessarily emanating; it must be said that the will or liberality is a principle in two ways: in one way as distinct in nature, and so it does not assimilate in substance; in another way as concomitant with16 nature, and so it assimilates in substance. Since therefore a person so proceeds by way of liberality that nature nevertheless accompanies [it]: therefore [the person is] similar in substance, although the manner of proceeding itself is not by way of one similar; and so this is clear.

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3. To that which is objected, why some person does not proceed by way of reason; it must be said that every noble manner of proceeding is reduced to those two: because every agent either acts naturally, or by will: — for an agent [acting] by violence or by chance is an imperfect agent, and the manner of producing less noble17 — whence reason is not distinguished against nature and will as to the manner of acting: and therefore there is no person proceeding by such a manner.

But yet this does not seem fully to resolve [the question], because we distinguish in these creatures a going forth by way of liberality from a going forth by way of art. And18 therefore it must be said that the procession by way of liberality is twofold, either as the ground of liberality or liberality itself, or as that done liberally; likewise also in art, either as art itself or the ground of crafting, or as that crafted; and in the first manner it can fall upon a divine person, in the second manner not. And in the first manner the Son proceeds, who is "the Word and art full of all living reasons"19. But this manner of emanating is not distinguished from the manner of emanating by way of nature, because he emanates as wholly similar and by way of perfect likeness. But another manner cannot be20, because two persons must communicate in the same nature, and because it is necessary that every manner of emanating which is in God be principally by way of nature, or with that [nature] concomitant21. Whence since the procession by way of will can be intrinsic, just as love proceeds from the lover: but by way of art [the procession] is always extrinsic, inasmuch as it is of this kind: therefore it is impossible that it fall in God with respect to a person, but it falls only with respect to a creature.

4. To that which is objected last: if a third person is to be posited because of communication, then by parallel reasoning also a fourth: it must be said that every reason and nature22 agrees that what can be done most sufficiently by one should not be done by many; otherwise there is something superfluous23. If therefore mutual love cannot be of fewer than to one, and the communication of that mutual [love] not of fewer than to one, and in one there is mutual love, and in another the communication of mutual love most perfectly, since each24 receives the whole infinitely; it is clear that there is no further proceeding, but there [we are] to stop. Whence the very same reason which posits the plurality of persons removes infinity and posits trinity.

Scholion

I. The Holy Spirit has the name of Gift, and indeed of the Gift in which all things are given (cf. below d. 18. throughout). But whatever is given is given by way of liberality. In what sense the Seraphic Doctor here takes this expression seems to need explanation. Liberality, besides the special moral virtue, also implicitly imports the character of liberty — that is, of will — as is declared in the solution to the third [objection]. Since therefore the manner of emanating in God is twofold, namely by way of nature and by way of will, and the procession of the Holy Spirit is by way of will, that intrinsic perfection of the divine will, which diffuses itself and is expressed in the procession of the Holy Spirit, as the Gift of all gifts, is by the Saint called liberality. Moreover it is to be noted that the will in God can be taken either insofar as, according to our manner of understanding, it is distinguished as a power against nature, or insofar as it accompanies nature itself and communicates it in the character of a supremely lovable object. In the first sense the will is a fecund principle in the production of created things, but not in the production of the Holy Spirit; but in the second sense it is the principle of the Holy Spirit. Whence what he says to 1 [and] 2 is clear; and what was said above d. 6. q. 2. about the difference between the production of the Son and of the Holy Spirit is also understood. For the Son proceeds from the Father by way of nature, with will accompanying; and because he proceeds by way of nature, he proceeds as wholly similar to the Father and his perfect image (cf. below d. 31. a. 1. q. 2.). But the Holy Spirit is produced by way of will, with nature accompanying — similar indeed, nay wholly the same in nature, yet so that by force of the procession the character of image is more completely in the Son.

II. The last argument in the foundations, which is drawn from the emanation of creatures, is also approved by Alex. of Hales, S. Thomas (here in his Commentary), Richard, and others, but is undeservedly attacked by Aegidius (here), concerning which see Dionys. Carth. (here q. 1. about the middle).

III. On the question itself: Alex. of Hales, Summa p. I. q. 43. m. 1. who, as Dionys. Carth. says here, "writes most fully on these matters; nay rather, what has now been adduced from many doctors he has nearly all alone expressed in his writing, and many other things which none of the others seems to have written down". — Scotus, here q. unic. — S. Thomas, here q. 1. a. 1. seq. — B. Albert, I Sent. d. 13. a. 1; on this and the following questions Summa p. I. tr. 7. q. 31. m. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, on this question and the next, here q. 1. a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1. q. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, here 1. princ. q. 1. — Henry of Ghent, Summa a. 61. q. 10. — Dionys. Carth., on this and the following, here q. 1. — Biel, here q. 2. concl. 3.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Hoc est, quae ad ipsum diligentem reflectitur, sive qua aliquis diligit naturam propriam, dum dilectio mutua in alterum tendit, quae esse potest vel communicata vel non communicata (privata), prout aliqui ita mutuo se diligunt, quod etiam velint vel dilectum diligi ab aliis aliosque diligere, vel non. Vide Scot., III. Sent. d. 28. et Aristot., II. Magn. Moral. c. 17. (c. 13.). — Mox post adhuc mutua cod. M addit et.
    That is, [a love] which is reflected back upon the lover himself, or by which someone loves his own nature, whereas a mutual love tends toward another, which can be either communicated or not communicated (private), inasmuch as some so mutually love each other that they also wish either the beloved to be loved by others and themselves to love others, or not. See Scotus, III Sent. d. 28. and Aristotle, II Magna Moralia c. 17. (c. 13.). — Soon after adhuc mutua codex M adds et.
  2. Cod. A et ed. 1 addunt scilicet.
    Codex A and the first edition add scilicet.
  3. Vat., reluctantibus vetustioribus mss., repetit hic summa. Mox maiorem mss. partem ut aCDGKLORSUVWXYZ secuti, pro nec cui amor mutuus non communicetur substituimus sed cui amor mutuus communicetur, quo sententia Doctoris distinctior exprimitur, si supples post sed: est persona scil. Spiritus S. Vide infra q. 3, et a. 2. q. 2. Alii codd. ponunt loco sed vel et ut codd. FHPQT, vel ut cod. ff sive, vel ut cod. cc sed et, ed. 1 autem id est.
    The Vatican edition, against the older manuscripts, repeats here summa. Then, following the larger part of the manuscripts (aCDGKLORSUVWXYZ), in place of nec cui amor mutuus non communicetur we have substituted sed cui amor mutuus communicetur, by which the Doctor's meaning is more clearly expressed, if one supplies after sed: est persona, namely the Holy Spirit. See below q. 3, and a. 2. q. 2. Other codices put in place of sed either et (codd. FHPQT), or sive (cod. ff), or sed et (cod. cc); the first edition: autem id est.
  4. In Vat. et cod. cc, antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 renitentibus, producendi, sed minus cohaerenter cum subnexis. Mox cod. T procedit loco emanat.
    In the Vatican edition and codex cc, against the older manuscripts and the first edition, producendi [is read], but less coherently with what follows. Then codex T has procedit in place of emanat.
  5. Fide vetustiorum mss. et ed. 1 restituimus non apte omissum persona.
    On the authority of the older manuscripts and the first edition we have restored persona, which had been inappropriately omitted.
  6. August., Enarrat. in Psalm. 61. n. 18. seq. Vide infra d. 27. p. II. q. 2. — Paulo ante cod. O necesse fuit ponere pro ponere fuit.
    Augustine, Enarrationes in Psalmos 61. n. 18 ff. See below d. 27. p. II. q. 2. — A little before, codex O reads necesse fuit ponere in place of ponere fuit.
  7. Ita fere omnes codd. cum ed. 1, dum Vat. cum cod. cc solummodo ponit producendi omisso sive exeundi. Mox codd. aa bb post liberalitatis addunt vel voluntatis et cod. Y in fine argumenti ponit procedentem loco procedere.
    Thus nearly all the codices with the first edition, while the Vatican edition with codex cc puts only producendi, omitting sive exeundi. Then codices aa bb after liberalitatis add vel voluntatis, and codex Y at the end of the argument puts procedentem in place of procedere.
  8. Vide Aristot., IX. Metaph. text. 10. et XII. text. 13. (VIII. c. 5. et XI. c. 3.).
    See Aristotle, IX Metaph. text. 10. and XII text. 13. (VIII. c. 5. and XI. c. 3.).
  9. Vat., plurimis mss. et ed. 1 refragantibus, ponitur.
    The Vatican edition, against very many manuscripts and the first edition, [reads] ponitur.
  10. Ed. 1 primae et secundae.
    The first edition: primae et secundae.
  11. Dist. 7. q. 2. fundam. penult., et d. 2. q. 3.
    Distinction 7. q. 2. penultimate fundamentum, and d. 2. q. 3.
  12. Hic in fundam. et d. 2. q. 4.
    Here in the fundamenta and d. 2. q. 4.
  13. Cod. U quia voluntate existente.
    Codex U: quia voluntate existente.
  14. Vat. cum cod. cc datum, sed contra antiquiores codd. et ed. 1, qui et omisso primo aut pro secundo ponunt sive; at grammatice non ita bene.
    The Vatican edition with codex cc reads datum, but against the older codices and the first edition, which, with the first aut omitted, put sive for the second; but grammatically not so well.
  15. Multi codd. ut ABDISTWZ etc. cum ed. 1 habet, sed cum subnexis minus cohaerenter.
    Many codices (e.g. ABDISTWZ) with the first edition [read] habet, but less coherently with what follows.
  16. Praeferimus lectionem plurium mss. ut RXY et ed. 1, qui loco cum communicante legunt concomitante, dum alii ut CLOTU habent comitante, alii ut FGHI etc. communicante. Hac de re vide supra d. 6. q. 2. et 3. Eadem lectionum diversitas reperitur paulo infra respectu verbi concomitetur, ubi Vat. etiam particulam tamen omittit.
    We prefer the reading of several manuscripts (e.g. RXY) and the first edition, which in place of cum communicante read concomitante, while others (e.g. CLOTU) have comitante, and others (e.g. FGHI etc.) communicante. On this matter see above d. 6. q. 2. and 3. The same diversity of readings is found a little below with respect to the word concomitetur, where the Vatican edition also omits the particle tamen.
  17. De agente per violentiam vide Aristot., III. Ethic. c. 1. et II. Magn. Moral. c. 8. et 9. (c. 7. et 8.). — De agente per fortunam cfr. XII. Metaph. text. 13. (XI. c. 3.). et II. Phys. text. 39. et seqq. (c. 4–6.).
    On an agent [acting] by violence see Aristotle, III Ethics c. 1. and II Magna Moralia c. 8. and 9. (c. 7. and 8.). — On an agent [acting] by chance cf. XII Metaph. text. 13. (XI. c. 3.) and II Physics text. 39. ff. (c. 4–6.).
  18. Supplevimus ex plurimis mss. et ed. 1 particulam Et.
    We have supplied the particle Et from very many manuscripts and the first edition.
  19. August., VI. de Trin. c. 10. n. 11. — Paulo infra cod. A consimilis loco similis.
    Augustine, VI De Trinitate c. 10. n. 11. — A little below, codex A reads consimilis in place of similis.
  20. Supple cum ed. 1: in divinis.
    Supply with the first edition: in divinis.
  21. Eodem modo, quo paulo superius, etiam hic lectionum occurrit varietas: Vat. cum pluribus codd. communicante, alii ut GTU comitante, alii ut HIIO XV aa bb ff cum ed. 1 exhibent lectionem nostram.
    In the same way as a little above, here too a variety of readings occurs: the Vatican edition with several codices [reads] communicante, others (e.g. GTU) comitante, others (e.g. HIIO XV aa bb ff) with the first edition exhibit our reading.
  22. Vide Aristot. et Averroem, I. Phys. text. 50. et 36. (c. 6.), et VIII. Topic. c. 1. (c. 9. circa finem), ubi respectu syllogismi dicitur: Est autem quoddam et idem ad syllogismos peccatum, quando ostenditur per longiora, quod contingit per breviora. — In hac propositione Vat. esset pro est. Paulo ante in cod. M post natura satis bene additur in hoc.
    See Aristotle and Averroes, I Physics text. 50. and 36. (c. 6.), and VIII Topics c. 1. (c. 9. near the end), where with respect to the syllogism it is said: There is moreover a certain identical fault with regard to syllogisms, when it is shown by longer means what could occur by shorter ones. — In this proposition the Vatican edition has esset for est. A little before, in codex M after natura there is rather aptly added in hoc.
  23. Vat. cum pluribus codd. perperam sic.
    The Vatican edition with several codices wrongly [reads] sic.
  24. Plurium mss. ut AFGHIKRU Y etc. et ed. 1 auctoritate pro utrumque substituimus uterque, quo sensus redditur clarior.
    On the authority of very many manuscripts (e.g. AFGHIKRU Y etc.) and the first edition we have substituted uterque for utrumque, by which the sense is rendered clearer.
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