← Back to Distinction 10

Dist. 10, Art. 1, Q. 2

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 10

Textus Latinus
p. 192

Quaestio II

Utrum in divinis ponenda sit persona procedens per modum amoris sive caritatis.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum in divinis sit necesse ponere personam procedentem per modum amoris sive caritatis. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Non est1 perfecta cognitio sine dilectione, ergo nec perfectum verbum sine amore: ergo nec perfecta emanatio verbi sine emanatione amoris: ergo necesse est ponere emanationem per modum amoris: ergo etc.

2. Item, amor est donum, in quo omnia2 alia dona donantur; nihil enim proprie donatur nisi ex amore: si ergo persona procedit per modum liberalitatis, cum ipsa procedat non per aliud, sed per se; ergo per modum amoris sive caritatis.

3. Item, omnis et summa perfectio pluralitatis est in unitate, ergo et distinctionis in unione; sed inter omnes uniones, quae sunt inter distantes, summa et iucundissima est unio caritatis; si ergo est ibi distinctio, est unio; et si unio, est caritatis emanatio.

4. Item, Spiritus sanctus, in nobis existens et habitans, facit nos similes illi summae Trinitati, sicut dicit Dominus, Ioannis decimo septimo3: «Ut sint unum, sicut et nos»; sed Spiritus sanctus, in nobis existens, producit primo amorem caritatis, ad Romanos quinto4: «Caritas Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris etc.». Ergo necesse est, in illa summa Trinitate reperiri per prius emanationem caritatis.

Sed contra:

1. Personae divinae sunt hypostases perfectae, ut Pater et Filius; nullus autem amor dicit hypostasim, sed eius proprietatem sive habitum: ergo nulla persona in divinis procedit per modum amoris.

2. Item, amor est eius in quo requiescit affectus: ergo semper accipitur ut in alium tendens; sed omnis persona est in se perfecte ens et distincta: ergo nulla persona procedit per modum amoris.

3. Item, non ob aliud ponitur in divinis emanatio per modum amoris, nisi quia Pater amat Filium: cum ergo Filius amet Spiritum sanctum, pari ratione erit ponere ulteriorem personam emanantem per modum amoris, et sic in infinitum; et5 hoc est inconveniens: ergo etc.

4. Item, cum in natura intellectuali ex parte potentiae motivae sit accipere irascibilem, quae respicit honorem, sicut concupiscibilem, quae respicit amorem6; quaestio est, quare in divinis non accipitur persona secundum actum irascibilis, sicut secundum actum concupiscibilis?

5. Item, cum sint aliae affectiones in anima, ut gaudium, spes et huiusmodi, quare solum per modum amoris procedit persona in divinis? Si tu dicas, quod amor non tenet rationem affectionis, tunc obiicio, quia sicut amor divinus7 non est affectio, ita nec gaudium.

6. Item, cum sint alii habitus in anima importantes complementum, cuiusmodi sunt scilicet dona Spiritus sancti, ut intelligentia8 et sapientia; quare magis procedit persona per modum amoris, quam per modum alterius habitus? quod si non alius, nec iste debet poni, ut videtur.

Conclusio. Spiritus sanctus per modum amoris procedit, quia procedit per modum voluntatis et liberalitatis.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod, sicut probatum est supra9, necesse est aliquam personam in divinis procedere per modum liberalitatis, et illam dicimus Spiritum sanctum. Hanc autem necesse est procedere per modum amoris; quia, si ponatur in divinis emanatio10 per modum voluntatis, necesse est, quod inter omnes sit prima et nobilissima. Emanatio autem per modum amoris est huiusmodi, quod patet, si respiciamus in anima. Affectio enim amoris est prima inter omnes affectiones et radix omnium aliarum, sicut ostendit Augustinus in pluribus locis, maxime in decimo quarto de Civitate Dei11.

p. 193

Et ista affectio nobilissima est inter omnes, quoniam plus tenet de ratione liberalitatis. Unde hoc est donum, in quo omnia alia dona donantur, et in quo consistunt omnes deliciae substantiae intellectualis. Unde nihil in creaturis est considerare ita deliciosum, sicut amorem mutuum; et sine amore nullae sunt deliciae12. Propter hoc dicit Philosophus13, quod amicitia aut est beatitudo, aut non sine beatitudine. Si ergo emanatio est per modum liberalitatis in divinis, necesse fuit esse14 primam et summam; et sic necesse fuit esse per modum amoris.

Ad argumenta pro parte contra:

Ad 1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod amor nominat habitum, non substantiam; dicendum, quod hoc est in amore ratione eius quod nominat, et sic non dicit substantiam; vel ratione eius circa quod ponitur; et quia ponitur in Deo, in quo nullum accidens, sed totum15 substantia est, ideo non dicit habitum vel proprietatem, sed magis substantiam; et cum dicat egressum, dicit hypostasim sive personam. Simile dicendum est de Verbo16.

Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod amor caritatis semper in alium tendit, et ita procedit in alium et non stat in se; dicendum, quod procedere in alium est dupliciter: aut quia aliud respicit ut obiectum, aut quia in aliud tendit et recipitur. Primo modo bene convenit personae in divinis, quia bene convenit habere respectum ad aliam personam; unde Spiritus sanctus est amor, quo Pater amat Filium. Si autem dicatur tendere secundo modo, sic non habet locum in proposito, quia, quando ego amo alium, amor non exit a me, ita ut recipiatur in alio, sed tantum a voluntate procedit, et quia est accidens, ideo non recedit, sed in voluntate subsistit. In divinis vero, quia hypostasis est, ideo in se subsistit.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod similiter Filius amans Spiritum sanctum produceret aliam personam; dicendum, quod hoc non tantum facit, quod Pater et Filius producant aliam personam, quia17 est amor, quo se amant, sed etiam, quia in eis voluntas est fecundissima. Ratio huius dicetur infra18, et illa non est in Spiritu sancto. Nihilominus tamen potest dici, quod status est in primo amore. Nam primo amore producto, cum ille se ipso amet19 et ametur, non oportet, alium amorem produci sive aliam personam per modum amoris.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod quaeritur, quare non est emanatio quantum ad actum irascibilis? quidam respondent, quod haec vis non habet locum in substantia pure spirituali; tamen supposito, quod sit in substantia intellectuali, adhuc actus eius non competit productioni personae, tum quia naturaliter sequitur actum concupiscibilis; «ira enim est vindex laesae concupiscentiae», ut dicit Damascenus20; tum etiam, quia actus eius consistit aut respectu superioris, et hoc non potest esse ubi nihil est superius; aut respectu inferioris, et hoc similiter non, quia nulla est inferioritas ibi; respectu paris similiter non potest esse in Deo, quia sic est cum quadam disconvenientia et victoriosa repulsione21; in personis autem divinis summam unionem et convenientiam esse necesse est. Et si tu obiicias, quod non omnis actus irascibilis est respectu disconvenientis, quod patet in spe, et quia in Beatis habebit irascibilis actum; dicendum, quod vel consistit respectu disconvenientis vincendi, vel respectu ardui aggrediendi, et ita vel gradum vel disconvenientiam dicit; sed neutrum potest esse in divinis personis.

Ad 5–6. Ad illud quod obiicitur de aliis affectibus et habitibus, iam patet responsio. Quia amor est affectus intimus et primus et nobilissimus, quia origo omnium aliorum, ideo complectitur in se totam nobilitatem emanationis per modum liberalitatis: ideo nulla persona debuit emanare per modum alterius habitus, cum talis modus non sit principalis.

Scholion

I. Amor seu caritas in divinis accipitur tripliciter: essentialiter, et sic est illa complacentia, qua quaelibet persona diligit se et duas alias personas; notionaliter, et sic est ipsa spiratio activa sive concordia in spirando, qua Pater et Filius spirant Spiritum sanctum; personaliter, et sic est ipsa persona procedens, i. e. Spiritus sanctus (cfr. infra a. 2. q. 1.). Et notandum, quod Spiritus sanctus non procedit ut id quod datur per amorem, sed ut amor datus sive productus.

II. Quaestio in solut. ad 4[?] tacta, utrum vis irascibilis habeat locum in substantia spirituali, resolvitur quoad Deum a S. Bonaventura (I. Sent. d. 45. dub. 10.) cum sententia communi sic: «Vis irascibilis et ira non recipitur in Deo nisi transsumtive». Quoad Angelos et appetitum rationalem animae humanae Henr. Gand. (Quodl. 8. q. 15.) affirmat, in appetitu rationali distinguendam esse vim irascibilem et concupiscibilem; sed ipsius argumenta a Scot. (III. Sent. d. 26. q. unic.) impugnantur. Etiam S. Thom. (S. I. q. 59. a. 4.) illam distinctionem Henr. Gand. non admittit, nec Richardus (II. Sent. d. 24. a. 2. q. 3.); etiam Petr. a Tar. (III. Sent. d. 26. a. 7.) hanc negativam sententiam reputat probabiliorem. Propriam suam sententiam Scot. explicat alibi (III. Sent. d. 34. q. unic.), admittendo aliquam distinctionem ex parte obiecti, cui consentiunt S. Bonav. (II. Sent. d. 25. p. I. q. 6. ad 2, et d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 1; III. Sent. d. 33. a. 1. q. 3.) et Alex. Hal. (S. p. II. q. 29. m. 3.).

III. Ipsa quaestio non ab omnibus antiquis explicite tractatur. Cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 43. m. 3. a. 2. — Scot., hic q. unic., et infra d. 32. q. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1; S. I. q. 37. a. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 2. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 61. q. 5.

---

English Translation
p. 192

Question II

Whether a person proceeding by way of love or charity is to be posited in God.

Secondly it is asked, whether it is necessary to posit in God a person proceeding by way of love or charity. And that this is so seems clear:

1. There is no1 perfect cognition without love, therefore no perfect word without love: therefore no perfect emanation of the word without an emanation of love: therefore it is necessary to posit an emanation by way of love: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, love is the gift in which all2 other gifts are given; for nothing is properly given except out of love: if therefore a person proceeds by way of liberality, since it itself proceeds not through another but through itself; therefore by way of love or charity.

3. Likewise, every supreme perfection of plurality is in unity, therefore also of distinction in union; but among all unions which are between things distant, the supreme and most delightful is the union of charity; if therefore there is distinction there, there is union; and if union, there is an emanation of charity.

4. Likewise, the Holy Spirit, existing and dwelling in us, makes us like that supreme Trinity, as the Lord says in John, chapter seventeen3: "That they may be one, just as we are one"; but the Holy Spirit, existing in us, first produces the love of charity, Romans, chapter five4: "The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts", etc. Therefore it is necessary that in that supreme Trinity an emanation of charity be found prior.

On the contrary:

1. The divine persons are perfect hypostases, as the Father and the Son; but no love names a hypostasis, but rather its property or habit: therefore no person in God proceeds by way of love.

2. Likewise, love is of that in which the affection comes to rest: therefore it is always taken as tending toward another; but every person is in itself perfectly being and distinct: therefore no person proceeds by way of love.

3. Likewise, an emanation by way of love is posited in God for no other reason than that the Father loves the Son: since therefore the Son loves the Holy Spirit, by parallel reasoning one would have to posit a further person emanating by way of love, and so on to infinity; and5 this is incongruous: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, since in intellectual nature, on the side of the motive power, one is to take the irascible — which regards honor — as well as the concupiscible, which regards love6; the question is, why in God a person is not taken according to the act of the irascible, just as according to the act of the concupiscible?

5. Likewise, since there are other affections in the soul, such as joy, hope, and the like, why does a person proceed in God only by way of love? If you say that love does not have the character of an affection, then I object that, just as divine7 love is not an affection, neither is joy.

6. Likewise, since there are other habits in the soul which bring completion — such as, namely, the gifts of the Holy Spirit, like understanding8 and wisdom — why does a person proceed rather by way of love than by way of some other habit? But if no other does, neither should this one be posited, as it seems.

Conclusion. The Holy Spirit proceeds by way of love, because He proceeds by way of will and liberality.

I respond: It must be said that, as has been proved above9, it is necessary that some person in God proceed by way of liberality, and Him we call the Holy Spirit. But this person must proceed by way of love; for, if there is posited in God an emanation10 by way of will, it is necessary that among all emanations it be the first and most noble. And an emanation by way of love is of this sort, as is clear if we look at the soul. For the affection of love is first among all affections, and the root of all the others, as Augustine shows in many places, especially in On the City of God book fourteen11.

p. 193

And this affection is the most noble of all, since it has more of the character of liberality. Hence it is the gift in which all other gifts are given, and in which consist all the delights of the intellectual substance. Hence nothing in creatures is to be considered as delightful as mutual love; and without love there are no delights12. On account of this the Philosopher13 says that friendship is either beatitude or not without beatitude. If therefore the emanation in God is by way of liberality, it had to be14 the first and supreme; and so it had to be by way of love.

To the arguments on the contrary side:

To 1. To that which is objected, that love names a habit, not a substance; it must be said that this is so in love either by reason of what it names — and so it does not signify substance — or by reason of that about which it is set; and because it is set in God, in whom there is no accident, but the whole15 is substance, it does not therefore signify a habit or property, but rather substance; and since it expresses a going forth, it signifies a hypostasis or person. The same is to be said of the Word16.

To 2. To that which is objected, that the love of charity always tends toward another, and so proceeds into another and does not stand in itself; it must be said that to proceed into another is twofold: either because it regards another as object, or because it tends into another and is received there. In the first manner this fits well with a person in God, because it fits well to have a relation to another person; whence the Holy Spirit is the love by which the Father loves the Son. But if it is said to tend in the second manner, this has no place in the present case, because, when I love another, the love does not go out from me so as to be received in the other, but only proceeds from the will, and because it is an accident, it does not depart, but subsists in the will. In God, however, since it is a hypostasis, it subsists in itself.

To 3. To that which is objected, that similarly the Son loving the Holy Spirit would produce another person; it must be said that this is not the only thing that brings it about that the Father and the Son produce another person, namely that17 this is the love by which they love each other, but also that in them the will is most fruitful. The reason for this will be given below18, and that reason is not in the Holy Spirit. Nevertheless it can also be said that there is a stand in the first love. For once the first love has been produced, since by it itself He loves19 and is loved, it is not necessary that another love be produced, or another person by way of love.

To 4. To that which is asked, why there is no emanation as regards the act of the irascible: some respond that this power has no place in a purely spiritual substance; nevertheless, supposing it is in an intellectual substance, even so its act does not befit the production of a person. First, because it naturally follows the act of the concupiscible — for "anger is the avenger of injured desire", as Damascene20 says; second, because its act consists either with respect to a superior, and this cannot be where nothing is superior; or with respect to an inferior, and likewise not, because there is no inferiority there; with respect to an equal, likewise it cannot be in God, because thus it is with a certain non-conformity and victorious repulsion21; but in the divine persons there must be the supreme union and conformity. And if you object that not every act of the irascible is with respect to a non-conforming object, as is clear in hope, and because in the Blessed the irascible will have its act; it must be said that it consists either with respect to a non-conforming object to be conquered, or with respect to a difficult object to be undertaken, and so it expresses either a degree or a non-conformity; but neither can be in the divine persons.

To 5–6. To that which is objected concerning the other affections and habits, the response is now clear. Since love is the inmost and first and most noble affection — because the source of all the others — therefore it embraces in itself the whole nobility of emanation by way of liberality: therefore no person had to emanate by way of any other habit, since such a manner is not principal.

Scholion

I. Love or charity is taken in God in three ways: essentially, and so it is that complacency by which any person loves himself and the two other persons; notionally, and so it is the active spiration itself or concord in spirating, by which the Father and the Son spirate the Holy Spirit; personally, and so it is the proceeding person itself, that is, the Holy Spirit (cf. below a. 2, q. 1). And it must be noted that the Holy Spirit does not proceed as that which is given through love, but as the love given or produced.

II. The question touched in the solution to objection 4[?], whether the irascible power has a place in a spiritual substance, is resolved as regards God by St. Bonaventure (I Sent. d. 45, dub. 10) with the common opinion thus: "The irascible power and anger are not received in God except by transumption." As regards the angels and the rational appetite of the human soul, Henry of Ghent (Quodlibet 8, q. 15) affirms that in the rational appetite the irascible and concupiscible powers must be distinguished; but his arguments are attacked by Scotus (III Sent. d. 26, q. unica). Even St. Thomas (S. I, q. 59, a. 4) does not admit the distinction of Henry of Ghent, nor does Richard (II Sent. d. 24, a. 2, q. 3); even Petrus a Tarantasia (III Sent. d. 26, a. 7) reckons this negative opinion the more probable. Scotus explains his own opinion elsewhere (III Sent. d. 34, q. unica), admitting some distinction on the side of the object, and with this St. Bonaventure agrees (II Sent. d. 25, p. I, q. 6, ad 2, and d. 24, p. I, a. 2, q. 1; III Sent. d. 33, a. 1, q. 3) and Alexander of Hales (Summa p. II, q. 29, m. 3).

III. This question is not explicitly treated by all the ancients. Cf. Alex. Hal., Summa p. I, q. 43, m. 3, a. 2. — Scotus, here q. unica, and below d. 32, q. 1. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 1; S. I, q. 37, a. 1. — Bl. Albert, here a. 2. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. 1, a. 2. — Richard. a Med., here a. 1, q. 2. — Henr. Gand., Summa a. 61, q. 5.

---

Apparatus Criticus
  1. Mss. et ed. 1 postulantibus, expunximus hic a Vat. additum enim. Mox post cognitio cod. W addit boni. — Cfr. de hoc argumento August., IX. de Trin. c. 10. n. 15., ubi et ait: Verbum est... cum amore notitia.
    On the testimony of the manuscripts and ed. 1, we have here expunged enim, which the Vatican edition added. Shortly after, after cognitio, codex W adds boni. — Cf. on this argument Augustine, De Trinitate IX, c. 10, n. 15, where he says: "Verbum est... cum amore notitia" (a word is knowledge with love).
  2. Ex multis mss. et ed. 1 adiecimus omnia. — Plura de hac propositione vide infra d. 18. q. 1.
    From many manuscripts and ed. 1 we have added omnia. — On this proposition see further below d. 18, q. 1.
  3. Vers. 22.
    Verse 22 (John 17:22).
  4. Vers. 5[?]. — Mox cod. V communicationem loco emanationem.
    Verse 5[?] (Romans 5:5; OCR appears to read "3", but the cited Caritas Dei diffusa est is Romans 5:5). — Shortly after, codex V reads communicationem in place of emanationem.
  5. Ed. 1 sed pro et.
    Ed. 1 reads sed for et.
  6. Praestamus lectionem distinctiorem antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 pro lectione Vat. et cod. cc sic concupiscibilis amorem. Haec motivae potentiae divisio, a Scholasticis recepta, occurrit in Nemesii Episc. Emeseni libro de Natura hominis c. 16. et seqq.; ac in Gregorii Nysseni libro de Anima et resurrectione, et in Epistola eiusdem canonica ad S. Letoium; ac Ioan. Damasc., II. de Fide orthod. c. 22, ubi et passiones seu affectiones animae enumerantur. Vide et Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 11. et 53. (c. 9. seq.); de Motu animal. c. 3. (c. 6.); II. Ethic. c. 5, et I. Magn. Moral. c. 8. (c. 7. et 8.).
    We prefer the more distinct reading of the older manuscripts and ed. 1 over the reading of the Vatican edition and codex cc, sic concupiscibilis amorem. This division of the motive power, received among the Scholastics, occurs in Nemesius, Bishop of Emesa, On the Nature of Man, c. 16 ff.; in Gregory of Nyssa, On the Soul and the Resurrection, and in his canonical Letter to St. Letoius; and in John of Damascus, On the Orthodox Faith II, c. 22, where the passions or affections of the soul are likewise enumerated. See also Aristotle, On the Soul III, text 11 and 53 (c. 9 ff.); On the Movement of Animals c. 3 (c. 6); Ethics II, c. 5; and Magna Moralia I, c. 8 (c. 7 and 8).
  7. Codd. V Y in divinis.
    Codices V and Y read in divinis.
  8. Ed. 1 intellectus. Paulo infra post si non codd. T V addunt est.
    Ed. 1 reads intellectus. Slightly later, after si non, codices T and V add est.
  9. Quaest. praeced.
    The preceding question.
  10. Codd. RT et ed. 1 processio.
    Codices R, T, and ed. 1 read processio.
  11. Cap. 7-9. Mss. et omnes edd. falso citant XIV. de Trin. — Paulo ante ex plurimis mss. et ed. 1 substituimus ostendit loco dicit. Mox post Unde cod. Y haec pro hoc.
    Chapters 7–9. The manuscripts and all editions falsely cite De Trinitate XIV. — Slightly earlier, on the testimony of many manuscripts and ed. 1, we have substituted ostendit for dicit. Shortly after, following Unde, codex Y reads haec for hoc.
  12. Cfr. supra d. 1. a. 2. q. 1.
    Cf. above d. 1, a. 2, q. 1.
  13. Libr. IX. Ethic. c. 9, ubi conversa probatur, quod scil. beatitudo non sit sine amicitia. — In seqq. locis probatur amicitiam coniunctam esse iucunditati: VIII. Ethic. c. 1; II. Magn. Moral. c. 12. (c. 11.) et VII. Moral. Eudem. c. 2. seqq.; ac I. Rhet. c. de Iucundis.
    Ethics IX, c. 9, where the converse is proved — namely, that beatitude is not without friendship. — In the following passages it is proved that friendship is joined to pleasure: Ethics VIII, c. 1; Magna Moralia II, c. 12 (c. 11); Eudemian Ethics VII, c. 2 ff.; and Rhetoric I, the chapter on Pleasant Things.
  14. Cod. O necesse est eam esse. Mox, consentientibus mss. et ed. 1, post fuit adiecimus esse.
    Codex O reads necesse est eam esse. Shortly after, with the manuscripts and ed. 1 in agreement, we have added esse after fuit.
  15. Plurimi codd. cum ed. 1 non ita bene tota. Vat. hic contra antiquiores codd. et ed. 1 repetit in Deo.
    Most codices with ed. 1 read, less satisfactorily, tota. The Vatican edition here, against the older codices and ed. 1, repeats in Deo.
  16. In Vat. hic additur quamvis enim verbum in nobis sit accidens, est tamen substantia in Deo, sed obest auctoritas mss. et ed. 1.
    The Vatican edition here adds: "although the word in us is an accident, it is nevertheless substance in God"; but the authority of the manuscripts and ed. 1 stands against this.
  17. Supple: haec persona. Praeferimus hanc lectionem, in qua et convenit maior pars codd. ut ILORSTUWXY etc., dum Vat. hic quae loco quia, et mox quia pro quo habet; ceteri autem codd. vel consentiunt lectioni Vat. totaliter, vel tantum partialiter; sic cod. K cum ed. 1 quae est amor, quo.
    Supply: haec persona. We prefer this reading, with which the majority of the codices agree (ILORSTUWXY etc.), whereas the Vatican edition here has quae in place of quia, and shortly after has quia for quo; the remaining codices either agree with the Vatican reading entirely, or only partially; thus codex K with ed. 1 reads quae est amor, quo.
  18. Dist. 11. q. 2. et d. 13. q. 3. — Mox post status plurimorum mss. et ed. 1 fide substituimus est pro sit.
    Distinction 11, q. 2, and d. 13, q. 3. — Shortly after, on the authority of most manuscripts and ed. 1, we have substituted est for sit after status.
  19. Vat. cum cod. cc addit alium, quod deest in antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1. Mox multi codd. ut ACFGHIKLRSUVWXY etc. illum loco alium.
    The Vatican edition with codex cc adds alium, which is missing in the older manuscripts and ed. 1. Shortly after, many codices (ACFGHIKLRSUVWXY etc.) read illum in place of alium.
  20. Libr. II. de Fide orthod. c. 16: «Est porro Ira rationis satelles, vindex cupiditatis».
    On the Orthodox Faith II, c. 16: "Anger, moreover, is the attendant of reason, the avenger of desire."
  21. Vat. praecedentia exhibet ita: nulla est inferioritas in persona producta respectu Patris, non similiter potest esse in Deo respectu disconvenientis, quia sic est cum quadam disconvenientia in victoriosa repulsione; quae lectio interpolata et distorta castigatur auctoritate mss., qui quoad lectionis substantiam omnes inter se consentiunt et cum ed. 1.
    The Vatican edition presents the preceding text thus: "there is no inferiority in the person produced with respect to the Father; it cannot likewise be in God with respect to the non-conformable, because thus it is with a certain non-conformity in victorious repulsion"; this interpolated and distorted reading is corrected on the authority of the manuscripts, which as to the substance of the reading all agree among themselves and with ed. 1. ---
← Dist. 10, Art. 1, Q. 1Dist. 10, Art. 1, Q. 3→