Bonaventure — Opera Omnia

Dist. 10, Art. 1, Q. 2

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 10

Textus Latinus

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Quaestio II.

Utrum in divinis ponenda sit persona procedens per modum amoris sive caritatis.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum in divinis sit necesse ponere personam procedentem per modum amoris sive caritatis. Et quod sic, videtur.

Fundamenta.

1. Non est¹ perfecta cognitio sine dilectione, ergo nec perfectum verbum sine amore: ergo nec perfecta emanatio verbi sine emanatione amoris: ergo necesse est ponere emanationem per modum amoris: ergo etc.

2. Item, amor est donum, in quo omnia² alia dona donantur; nihil enim proprie donatur nisi ex amore: si ergo persona procedit per modum liberalitatis, cum ipsa procedat non per aliud, sed per se; ergo per modum amoris sive caritatis.

3. Item, omnis et summa perfectio pluralitatis est in unitate, ergo et distinctionis in unione; sed inter omnes uniones, quae sunt inter distantes, summa et iucundissima est unio caritatis; si ergo est ibi distinctio, est unio; et si unio, est caritatis emanatio.

4. Item, Spiritus sanctus, in nobis existens et habitans, facit nos similes illi summae Trinitati, sicut dicit Dominus, Ioannis decimo septimo³: «Ut sint unum, sicut et nos»; sed Spiritus sanctus, in nobis existens, producit primo amorem caritatis, ad Romanos quinto⁴: «Caritas Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris etc.». Ergo necesse est, in illa summa Trinitate reperiri per prius emanationem caritatis.

Sed contra:

Ad oppositum.

1. Personae divinae sunt hypostases perfectae, ut Pater et Filius; nullus autem amor dicit hypostasim, sed eius proprietatem sive habitum: ergo nulla persona in divinis procedit per modum amoris.

2. Item, amor est eius in quo requiescit affectus: ergo semper accipitur ut in alium tendens; sed omnis persona est in se perfecte ens et distincta: ergo nulla persona procedit per modum amoris.

3. Item, non ob aliud ponitur in divinis emanatio per modum amoris, nisi quia Pater amat Filium: cum ergo Filius amet Spiritum sanctum, pari ratione erit ponere ulteriorem personam emanantem per modum amoris, et⁵ sic in infinitum; et hoc est inconveniens: ergo etc.

4. Item, cum in natura intellectuali ex parte potentiae motivae sit accipere irascibilem, quae respicit honorem, sicut concupiscibilem, quae respicit amorem⁶, quaestio est, quare in divinis non accipitur persona secundum actum irascibilis, sicut secundum actum concupiscibilis?

5. Item, cum sint aliae affectiones in anima, ut gaudium, spes et huiusmodi, quare solum per modum amoris procedit persona in divinis? Si tu dicas, quod amor non tenet rationem affectionis, tunc obiicio, quia sicut amor divinus⁷ non est affectio, ita nec gaudium.

6. Item, cum sint alii habitus in anima importantes complementum, cuiusmodi sunt scilicet dona Spiritus sancti, ut intelligentia⁸ et sapientia; quare magis procedit persona per modum amoris, quam per modum alterius habitus? quod si non alius, nec iste debet poni, ut videtur.

Conclusio.

Spiritus sanctus per modum amoris procedit, quia procedit per modum voluntatis et liberalitatis.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod, sicut probatum est supra⁹, necesse est aliquam personam in divinis procedere per modum liberalitatis, et illam dicimus Spiritum sanctum. Hanc autem necesse est procedere per modum amoris; quia, si ponatur in divinis emanatio¹⁰ per modum voluntatis, necesse est, quod inter omnes sit prima et nobilissima. Emanatio autem per modum amoris est huiusmodi, quod patet, si respiciamus in anima. Affectio enim amoris est prima inter omnes affectiones et radix omnium aliarum, sicut ostendit Augustinus in pluribus locis, maxime in decimo quarto de Civitate Dei¹¹. Et ista affectio nobilissima est inter omnes, quoniam plus

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tenet de ratione liberalitatis. Unde hoc est donum, in quo omnia alia dona donantur, et in quo consistunt omnes deliciae substantiae intellectualis. Unde nihil in creaturis est considerare ita deliciosum, sicut amorem mutuum; et sine amore nullae sunt deliciae¹². Propter hoc dicit Philosophus¹³, quod amicitia aut est beatitudo, aut non sine beatitudine. Si ergo emanatio est per modum liberalitatis in divinis, necesse fuit esse¹⁴ primam et summam; et sic necesse fuit esse per modum amoris.

Ad argumenta in oppositum:

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod amor nominat habitum, non substantiam; dicendum, quod loqui de amore est ratione eius quod nominat, et sic non dicit substantiam; vel ratione eius circa quod ponitur; et quia ponitur in Deo, in quo nullum accidens, sed totum¹⁵ substantia est, ideo non dicit habitum vel proprietatem, sed magis substantiam; et cum dicat egressum, dicit hypostasim sive personam. Simile dicendum est de Verbo¹⁶.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod amor caritatis semper in alium tendit, et ita procedit in alium et non stat in se; dicendum, quod procedere in alium est dupliciter: aut quia aliud respicit ut obiectum, aut quia in aliud tendit et recipitur. Primo modo bene convenit personae in divinis, quia bene convenit habere respectum ad aliam personam; unde Spiritus sanctus est amor, quo Pater amat Filium. Si autem dicatur tendere secundo modo, sic non habet locum in proposito, quia, quando ego amo alium, amor non exit a me, ita ut recipiatur in alio, sed tantum a voluntate procedit, et quia est accidens, ideo non recedit, sed in voluntate subsistit. In divinis vero, quia hypostasis est, ideo in se subsistit.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod similiter Filius amans Spiritum sanctum produceret aliam personam; dicendum, quod hoc non tantum facit, quod Pater et Filius producant aliam personam, quia¹⁷ est amor, quo se amant, sed etiam, quia in eis voluntas est fecundissima. Ratio huius dicetur infra¹⁸, et illa non est in Spiritu sancto. Nihilominus tamen potest dici, quod status est in primo amore. Nam primo amore producto, cum ille se ipso amet¹⁹ et ametur, non oportet, alium amorem produci sive aliam personam per modum amoris.

4. Ad illud quod quaeritur, quare non est emanatio quantum ad actum irascibilis? quidam respondent, quod haec vis non habet locum in substantia pure spirituali; tamen supposito, quod sit in substantia intellectuali, adhuc actus eius non competit productioni personae, tum quia naturaliter sequitur actum concupiscibilis; «ira enim est vindex laesae concupiscentiae», ut dicit Damascenus²⁰; tum etiam, quia actus eius consistit aut respectu superioris, et hoc non potest esse ubi nihil est superius; aut respectu inferioris, et hoc similiter non, quia nulla est inferioritas ibi; respectu paris similiter non potest esse in Deo, quia sic est cum quadam disconvenientia et victoriosa repulsione²¹; in personis autem divinis summam unionem et convenientiam esse necesse est. Et si tu obiicias, quod non omnis actus irascibilis est respectu disconvenientis, quod patet in spe, et quia in Beatis habebit irascibilis actum; dicendum, quod vel consistit respectu disconvenientis vincendi, vel respectu ardui aggrediendi, et ita vel gradum vel disconvenientiam dicit; sed neutrum potest esse in divinis personis.

5, 6. Ad illud quod obiicitur de aliis affectibus et habitibus, iam patet responsio. Quia amor est affectus intimus et primus et nobilissimus, quia origo omnium aliorum, ideo complectitur in se totam nobilitatem emanationis per modum liberalitatis: ideo nulla persona debuit emanare per modum alterius habitus, cum talis modus non sit principalis.

Scholion

I. Amor seu caritas in divinis accipitur tripliciter: essentialiter, et sic est illa complacentia, qua quaelibet persona diligit se et duas alias personas; notionaliter, et sic est ipsa spiratio activa sive concordia in spirando, qua Pater et Filius spirant Spiritum sanctum; personaliter, et sic est ipsa persona procedens i. e. Spiritus sanctus (cfr. infra a. 2. q. 1.). Et notandum, quod Spiritus sanctus non procedit ut id quod datur per amorem, sed ut amor datus sive productus.

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II. Quaestio in solut. ad 4. tacta, utrum vis irascibilis habeat locum in substantia spirituali, resolvitur quoad Deum a S. Bonaventura (I. Sent. d. 45. dub. 10.) cum sententia communi sic: «Vis irascibilis et ira non recipitur in Deo nisi transsumtive». Quoad Angelos et appetitum rationalem animae humanae Henr. Gand. (Quodl. 8. q. 15.) affirmat, in appetitu rationali distinguendam esse vim irascibilem et concupiscibilem; sed ipsius argumenta a Scot. (III. Sent. d. 26. q. unic.) impugnantur. Etiam S. Thom. (S. 1. q. 59. a. 4.) illam distinctionem Henr. Gand. non admittit, nec Richardus (II. Sent. d. 24. a. 2. q. 3.); etiam Petr. a Tar. (III. Sent. d. 26. a. 7.) hanc negativam sententiam reputat probabiliorem. Propriam suam sententiam Scot. explicat alibi (III. Sent. d. 34. q. unic.), admittendo aliquam distinctionem ex parte obiecti, cui consentiunt S. Bonav. (II. Sent. d. 25. p. I. q. 6. ad 2, et d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 1; III. Sent. d. 33. a. 1. q. 3.) et Alex. Hal. (S. p. II. q. 29. m. 3.).

III. Ipsa quaestio non ab omnibus antiquis explicite tractatur. Cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 43. m. 3. a. 2. — Scot., hic q. unic., et infra d. 32. q. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1; S. I. q. 37. a. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 2. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 61. q. 5.

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English Translation

Question II.

Whether a person proceeding by way of love or charity is to be posited in God.

Second, the question is whether in God it is necessary to posit a person proceeding by way of love or charity. And that it is so, seems to follow.

Foundations.

1. There is no¹ perfect knowledge without love, therefore no perfect word without love either; therefore no perfect emanation of the word without an emanation of love; therefore it is necessary to posit an emanation by way of love: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, love is the gift in which all² other gifts are given; for nothing is properly given except out of love: if therefore a person proceeds by way of liberality, since that person proceeds not through another but through itself, therefore [it proceeds] by way of love or charity.

3. Likewise, every and the highest perfection of plurality is in unity, therefore also that of distinction is in union; but among all the unions which exist between distinct things, the highest and most delightful is the union of charity; if therefore there is distinction there, there is union; and if union, there is an emanation of charity.

4. Likewise, the Holy Spirit, existing and dwelling in us, makes us like that highest Trinity, as the Lord says, in John seventeen³: «That they may be one, as we also [are]»; but the Holy Spirit, existing in us, produces first the love of charity, to the Romans five⁴: «The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts etc.». Therefore it is necessary that in that highest Trinity an emanation of charity be found first.

On the contrary:

To the opposite.

1. The divine persons are perfect hypostases, as the Father and the Son; but no love expresses a hypostasis, but rather its property or habit: therefore no person in God proceeds by way of love.

2. Likewise, love belongs to that in which the affection comes to rest: therefore it is always taken as tending toward another; but every person is in itself perfectly a being and distinct: therefore no person proceeds by way of love.

3. Likewise, an emanation by way of love is posited in God for no other reason than that the Father loves the Son: since therefore the Son loves the Holy Spirit, by the same reasoning a further person emanating by way of love will have to be posited, and⁵ so on to infinity; and this is unfitting: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, since in intellectual nature, on the side of the motive power, one must admit the irascible, which has regard to honor, just as the concupiscible, which has regard to love⁶, the question arises, why in God is a person not taken according to the act of the irascible, as according to the act of the concupiscible?

5. Likewise, since there are other affections in the soul, such as joy, hope, and the like, why is it only by way of love that a person proceeds in God? If you say that love does not have the character of an affection, then I object, because just as divine love⁷ is not an affection, neither is joy.

6. Likewise, since there are other habits in the soul carrying completion, of which kind namely are the gifts of the Holy Spirit, such as understanding⁸ and wisdom; why does a person proceed by way of love rather than by way of some other habit? but if not another, neither ought this one to be posited, so it seems.

Conclusion.

The Holy Spirit proceeds by way of love, because it proceeds by way of will and liberality.

I respond: It must be said that, as has been proved above⁹, it is necessary that some person in God proceed by way of liberality, and that one we call the Holy Spirit. But this person must necessarily proceed by way of love; because, if there is posited in God an emanation¹⁰ by way of will, it is necessary that among all [emanations] it be the first and most noble. Now an emanation by way of love is of this kind, which is clear if we look at the soul. For the affection of love is the first among all affections and the root of all the others, as Augustine shows in many places, especially in the fourteenth [book] On the City of God¹¹. And this affection is the most noble among all, because it

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holds more of the character of liberality. Hence this is the gift in which all other gifts are given, and in which consist all the delights of the intellectual substance. Hence nothing in creatures is to be considered so delightful as mutual love; and without love there are no delights¹². On account of this the Philosopher says¹³ that friendship either is beatitude, or is not without beatitude. If therefore the emanation is by way of liberality in God, it had to be¹⁴ the first and highest; and thus it had to be by way of love.

To the arguments on the contrary:

1. To that which is objected, that love names a habit, not a substance; it must be said that to speak of love is either by reason of what it names, and thus it does not signify a substance; or by reason of that about which it is set; and because it is set in God, in whom there is no accident, but everything¹⁵ is substance, therefore it does not signify a habit or property, but rather a substance; and since it expresses an issuing-forth, it signifies a hypostasis or person. The like must be said of the Word¹⁶.

2. To that which is objected, that the love of charity always tends toward another, and so proceeds into another and does not remain in itself; it must be said that to proceed into another is twofold: either because it has regard to another as object, or because it tends into another and is received [there]. In the first way it well befits a person in God, since it well befits [a person] to have regard to another person; hence the Holy Spirit is the love by which the Father loves the Son. But if it be said to tend in the second way, that has no place in the present case; because, when I love another, love does not go out from me so as to be received in the other, but proceeds only from the will, and because it is an accident, therefore it does not depart but subsists in the will. But in God, because it is a hypostasis, it therefore subsists in itself.

3. To that which is objected, that likewise the Son loving the Holy Spirit would produce another person; it must be said that this is not the sole [reason] which brings it about that the Father and the Son produce another person, namely that¹⁷ there is love by which they love one another, but also that in them the will is most fecund. The reason for this will be stated below¹⁸, and that [reason] is not in the Holy Spirit. Nevertheless it can be said that there is a stop in the first love. For, the first love having been produced, since it by its very self loves¹⁹ and is loved, there is no need that another love be produced or another person by way of love.

4. To that which is asked, why there is not an emanation as regards the act of the irascible: some answer that this power has no place in a purely spiritual substance; nevertheless, supposing it to be in an intellectual substance, still its act does not befit the production of a person: both because it naturally follows the act of the concupiscible — «for anger is the avenger of injured desire», as Damascene says²⁰ — and also because its act consists either with respect to a superior, and this cannot be where there is nothing superior; or with respect to an inferior, and this likewise not, because there is no inferiority there; with respect to an equal it likewise cannot be in God, because thus it is with a certain disagreement and victorious repulsion²¹; whereas in the divine persons the highest union and agreement must necessarily exist. And if you object that not every act of the irascible is with respect to something disagreeable, which is clear in hope, and because in the Blessed the irascible will have its act; it must be said that either it consists with respect to a disagreeable thing to be conquered, or with respect to something arduous to be undertaken, and thus it expresses either a degree or a disagreement; but neither can be in the divine persons.

5, 6. To that which is objected concerning other affections and habits, the response is already clear. Because love is the inmost and first and most noble affection, since it is the origin of all the others, therefore it embraces in itself the whole nobility of emanation by way of liberality: therefore no person had to emanate by way of another habit, since such a way is not the principal one.

Scholion

I. Love or charity in God is taken in three ways: essentially, and thus it is that complacency by which any person loves itself and the two other persons; notionally, and thus it is the active spiration itself or the concord in spirating, by which the Father and the Son spirate the Holy Spirit; personally, and thus it is the proceeding person itself, i.e., the Holy Spirit (cf. below a. 2. q. 1.). And it is to be noted that the Holy Spirit does not proceed as that which is given through love, but as love given or produced.

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II. The question touched in the solution to [argument] 4, whether the irascible power has place in a spiritual substance, is resolved as regards God by St. Bonaventure (I. Sent. d. 45. dub. 10.) with the common opinion thus: «The irascible power and anger are not received in God except by transumption». As regards Angels and the rational appetite of the human soul, Henry of Ghent (Quodl. 8. q. 15.) affirms that in the rational appetite the irascible and concupiscible powers are to be distinguished; but his arguments are impugned by Scotus (III. Sent. d. 26. q. unic.). St. Thomas (S. 1. q. 59. a. 4.) likewise does not admit that distinction of Henry of Ghent, nor does Richard (II. Sent. d. 24. a. 2. q. 3.); Peter of Tarentaise also (III. Sent. d. 26. a. 7.) considers this negative opinion the more probable. Scotus explains his own opinion elsewhere (III. Sent. d. 34. q. unic.), admitting some distinction on the side of the object, in which St. Bonaventure concurs (II. Sent. d. 25. p. I. q. 6. ad 2, and d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 1; III. Sent. d. 33. a. 1. q. 3.), as does Alexander of Hales (S. p. II. q. 29. m. 3.).

III. The question itself is not explicitly treated by all the ancients. Cf. Alexander of Hales, S. p. I. q. 43. m. 3. a. 2. — Scotus, here q. unic., and below d. 32. q. 1. — St. Thomas, here q. 1. a. 1; S. I. q. 37. a. 1. — Bl. Albert, here a. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1. a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1. q. 2. — Henry of Ghent, S. a. 61. q. 5.

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Apparatus Criticus

Mss. et ed. 1 postulantibus, expunximus hic a Vat. additum enim. Mox post cognitio eod. W addit boni. — Cfr. de hoc argumento August., IX. de Trin. c. 10. n. 15. ubi et ait: Verbum est... cum amore notitia.
The manuscripts and edition 1 [read] postulantibus; we have here expunged enim, added from the Vatican [edition]. Then after cognitio the same codex W adds boni. — Cf. on this argument Augustine, On the Trinity IX, c. 10, n. 15, where he also says: The word is... knowledge together with love.
Ex multis mss. et ed. 1. adiecimus omnia. — Plura de hac propositione vide infra d. 18. q. 1.
From many manuscripts and edition 1 we have added omnia. — On this proposition see further below, d. 18, q. 1.
Vers. 22.
Verse 22.
Vers. 3. — Mox cod. V communicationem loco emanationem.
Verse 3. — Then codex V [reads] communicationem in place of emanationem.
Ed. 1 sed pro et.
Edition 1 [reads] sed for et.
Praestituimus lectionem distinctiorem antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 pro lectione Vat. et cod. cc sic concupiscibilis amorem. Haec motivae potentiae divisio, a Scholasticis recepta, occurrit in Nemesii Episc. Emeseni libro de Natura hominis c. 16. et seqq.; ac in Gregorii Nysseni libro de Anima et resurrectione, et in Epistola eiusdem canonica ad S. Letoium; ac Ioan. Damasc., II. de Fide orthod. c. 22, ubi et passiones seu affectiones animae enumerantur. Vide et Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 41. et 53. (c. 9. seq.); de Motu animal. c. 3. (c. 6.); II. Ethic. c. 5, et I. Magn. Moral. c. 8. (c. 7. et 8.).
We have preferred the more distinct reading of the older manuscripts and edition 1 over the reading of the Vatican [edition] and codex cc, which reads thus: concupiscibilis amorem. This division of the motive power, received by the Scholastics, occurs in Nemesius bishop of Emesa, On the Nature of Man, c. 16 and following; and in Gregory of Nyssa's book On the Soul and Resurrection, and in his canonical letter to St. Letoius; and in John Damascene, II. On the Orthodox Faith, c. 22, where also the passions or affections of the soul are enumerated. See also Aristotle, III. On the Soul, text 41 and 53 (c. 9 sq.); On the Motion of Animals c. 3 (c. 6); II. Ethics c. 5, and I. Greater Morals c. 8 (c. 7 and 8).
Codd. V Y in divinis.
Codices V Y [read] in divinis.
Ed. 1 intellectus. Paulo infra post si non codd. T V addunt est.
Edition 1 [reads] intellectus. A little below, after si non, codices T V add est.
Quaest. praeced.
The preceding Question.
Codd. R T et ed. 1 processio.
Codices R T and edition 1 [read] processio.
Cap. 7-9. Mss. et omnes edd. falso citant XIV: de Trin. — Paulo ante ex plurimis mss. et ed. 1 substituimus ostendit loco dicit. Mox post Unde cod. Y haec pro hoc.
Cap. 7-9. The manuscripts and all editions wrongly cite XIV: On the Trinity. — A little before, from very many manuscripts and edition 1, we have substituted ostendit in place of dicit. Then after Unde codex Y [reads] haec for hoc.
Cfr. supra d. 1. a. 2. q. 1.
Cf. above d. 1, a. 2, q. 1.
Libr. IX. Ethic. c. 9, ubi conversa probatur, quod scil. beatitudo non sit sine amicitia. — In seqq. locis probatur amicitiam coniunctam esse iucunditati: VIII. Ethic. c. 1; II. Magn. Moral. c. 12. (c. 11.) et VII. Moral. Eudem. c. 2. seqq. ac I. Rhet. c. de Iucundis.
Book IX of the Ethics, c. 9, where the converse is proved, namely that beatitude is not without friendship. — In the following passages it is proved that friendship is conjoined with delight: VIII. Ethics c. 1; II. Greater Morals c. 12 (c. 11) and VII. Eudemian Morals c. 2 sqq., and I. Rhetoric, chapter On Things Delightful.
Cod. O necesse est eam esse. Mox, consentientibus mss. et ed. 1, post fuit adiecimus esse.
Codex O [reads] necesse est eam esse. Then, with the manuscripts and edition 1 agreeing, after fuit we have added esse.
Plurimi codd. cum ed. 1 non ita bene tota. Vat. hic contra antiquiores codd. et ed. 1 repetit in Deo.
Very many codices with edition 1, not so well, [read] tota. The Vatican [edition] here, against the older codices and edition 1, repeats in Deo.
In Vat. hic additur quamvis enim verbum in nobis sit accidens, est tamen substantia in Deo, sed obest auctoritas mss. et ed. 1.
In the Vatican [edition] there is here added for although the word in us is an accident, nevertheless in God it is a substance, but the authority of the manuscripts and of edition 1 stands against it.
Supple: haec persona. Praeferimus hanc lectionem, in qua et convenit maior pars codd. ut I L O R S T U W X Y etc., dum Vat. hic quae loco quia, et mox quia pro quo habet; ceteri autem codd. vel consentiunt lectioni Vat. totaliter, vel tantum partialiter; sic cod. K cum ed. 1 quae est amor, quo.
Supply: this person. We prefer this reading, in which also the greater part of the codices agree, such as I L O R S T U W X Y etc., whereas the Vatican [edition] here has quae in place of quia, and then quia for quo; the other codices either agree with the Vatican reading totally, or only partially; thus codex K with edition 1 [reads] quae est amor, quo.
Dist. 11. q. 2. et d. 13. q. 3. — Mox post status plurimorum mss. et ed. 1 fide substituimus est pro sit.
Distinction 11, q. 2 and d. 13, q. 3. — Then after status on the faith of very many manuscripts and edition 1 we have substituted est for sit.
Vat. cum cod. cc addit alium, quod deest in antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1. Mox multi codd. ut A C F G H I K L R S U V W X Y etc. illum loco alium.
The Vatican [edition] with codex cc adds alium, which is missing in the older manuscripts and edition 1. Then many codices, such as A C F G H I K L R S U V W X Y etc., [read] illum in place of alium.
Libr. II. de Fide orthod. c. 16: Est porro ira rationis satelles, vindex cupiditatis.
Book II On the Orthodox Faith, c. 16: Anger, moreover, is the attendant of reason, the avenger of desire.
Vat. praecedentia exhibet ita: nulla est inferioritas in persona producta respectu Patris, non similiter potest esse in Deo respectu disconvenientis, quia sic est cum quadam disconvenientia in victoriosa repulsione, quae lectio interpolata et distorta castigatur auctoritate mss., qui quoad lectionis substantiam omnes inter se consentiunt et cum ed. 1.
The Vatican [edition] presents the preceding thus: there is no inferiority in the produced person with respect to the Father; it cannot likewise be in God with respect to something disagreeable, because thus it is with a certain disagreement in victorious repulsion; this interpolated and distorted reading is corrected on the authority of the manuscripts, which as regards the substance of the reading all agree among themselves and with edition 1.

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