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Dist. 25, Art. 2, Q. 2

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 25

Textus Latinus
p. 444

QUAESTIO II. Utrum nomen personae, dictum de creatis et increatis personis, sit commune univocum.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum hoc nomen persona sit commune univocum creatis et increatis personis.

Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Quia eadem est ratio et idem nomen personae, secundum quod dicitur de his et de illis.

2. Item, hoc videtur, quia personae communitas est communitas consimilis habitudinis; sed consimilis habitudo, quae reperitur in Deo, reperitur et1 in creatura, quia sicut Pater est suppositum divinae naturae, ita Petrus humanae: ergo etc.

3. Item, complementum rationis personae consistit in incommunicabilitate; sed incommunicabilitas communis est personis divinis et creatis: ergo etc.

Contra:

1. (Fundamenta.) Deus et creaturae summe distant: ergo nihil habent commune, ergo nihil univocum.

2. Item, persona est substantia: ergo quae univocantur in persona univocantur in substantia. Sed Creator et creatura non univocantur in substantia, quia tunc Deus esset in genere2: ergo nec in persona.

3. Item, quae univocantur in aliquo aequaliter sunt in illo; sed nihil participat aequaliter creatura cum Deo: ergo hoc ipsum quod est persona, non dicitur univoce de Deo et creatura.

(Quaestio incidens.) 4. Quaeritur ergo, de quo per prius dicatur persona3; et videtur, quod per prius dicatur de creaturis, quia inde translatum est ad divina. Contra: natura intellectualis et substantia et distinctio per prius est in Deo quam in creaturis; et non sunt plura de ratione personae: ergo etc.

Conclusio. Nomen personae de creatis et increatis personis dicitur analogice, et quidem analogia secundum aequalitatem de divinis personis ad se comparatis, analogia vero longinqua de personis divinis simul et creatis.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod hoc nomen persona, sicut visum est prius4, non dicit nisi communitatem habitudinis, super quam fundatur communitas rationis. Quoniam ergo consimilis habitudo reperitur in personis creatis et in increatis, hinc est, quod hoc nomen persona non dicitur aequivoce, sed analogice. (Conclusio 1.)

Sed attendendum, (Distinctio.) quod communitas habitudinis potest esse per respectum ad res eiusdem generis; et tunc est univocatio et analogia secundum aequalitatem — ut Petrus est individuum et Paulus — et aequaliter eis convenit ratio individui. Potest etiam esse per comparationem ad res5 diversorum generum, ut Petrus et albedo Petri in hoc, quod est esse individuum, uniuntur; et per prius convenit ratio individui Petro quam eius albedini. Sic dicendum quod hoc nomen persona, dictum de personis di-

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vinis, quia dicitur secundum comparationem rerum eiusdem naturae, ideo analogice6 et aequaliter; et ideo quodam modo univoce; similiter, cum dicitur de personis creatis. (Conclusio 2.) Cum autem dicitur de personis creatis et increatis, dicitur per comparationem rerum diversarum naturarum, et ideo per prius et posterius. (Conclusio 3.) Et sic persona prius dicitur de personis creatis secundum nomen, sed secundum rem nominis per prius dicitur de personis increatis.

Et quod quaeritur, utrum persona sit commune personis creatis et increatis; dicendum, quod si dicitur commune univocum, non. Et rationes ad hoc concedendae sunt. (Conclusio 4.)

(Solutio oppositorum.) 1. Quod ergo obiicitur, quod eadem est ratio etc.; dicendum, quod non est eadem ratio nisi secundum analogiam; quia longe nobilius et aliter est natura intellectualis et hypostasis et distinctio et proprietas in Deo quam in creaturis.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod est habitudo consimilis; dicendum, quod non est similitudo aequalitatis; et propterea talis similitudo non facit univocationem, sed analogiam solum.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de incommunicabilitate, dicendum, quod non est pura privatio, immo importat distinctionem; et cum7 alia ratio distinguendi, distans multum ab ista, sit in Deo, et hoc non tantum secundum rem, immo etiam secundum rationem rectam, intellectus non attribuit Deo modum distinguendi, qui competit compositis. Ideo nec ratione univocum est, sed solum analogum8.

Scholion

I. Ex solutione praecedentis quaestionis arguere quis posset, nomen personae esse commune univocum divinis et creatis personis, cum communitas similis habitudinis, quae inter divinas personas esse asseritur, etiam inter creatas et divinas personas statuenda esse videatur. Ipsa quaestio specificatur, dum S. Doctor distincte respondet tum comparando divinas personas inter se, tum creatas cum creatis, tum creatas cum divinis. — Et notandum, quod comparando creatas personas cum creatis, illud commune univocum non potest intelligi de generica vel specifica unitate, quam habent plura individua humana, sed de communitate in ratione singularitatis. Singulare autem in concreto differt a singulari, tamen, ut dicitur in corp., aequaliter eis convenit ratio individui. — De duplici analogia cfr. supra d. 1. a. 3. q. 1, et d. 7. q. 1. — Ad quaest. in 4. fundam. respondetur in 3. conclusione.

II. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 36. m. 4. a. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 2; de principiis solutionis cfr. S. I. q. 13. a. 6. et 10. — B. Albert., hic a. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 1. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 53. q. 3. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Biel, hic q. unica.

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English Translation

Question II. Whether the name "person", said of created and uncreated persons, is a univocal common term.

Secondly it is asked whether this name person is a univocal common term [applicable] to created and uncreated persons.

And that it is so, is shown thus:

1. Because there is the same account [ratio] and the same name "person" according as it is said of these and of those.

2. Likewise, this is shown because the commonality of "person" is a commonality of similar relation; but a similar relation, which is found in God, is found also1 in the creature, since just as the Father is a supposit of the divine nature, so Peter [is a supposit] of human [nature]: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, the completion of the account of person consists in incommunicability; but incommunicability is common to divine and created persons: therefore etc.

On the contrary:

1. (Foundations.) God and creatures are at the highest distance: therefore they have nothing in common, therefore nothing univocal.

2. Likewise, "person" is substance: therefore [those] which are univocally [predicated] in "person" are univocally [predicated] in substance. But Creator and creature are not univocally [predicated] in substance, because then God would be in a genus2: therefore neither in "person."

3. Likewise, [things] which are univocally [predicated] in something equally are in it; but the creature in no way participates equally with God: therefore the very thing that is person is not said univocally of God and creature.

(Incidental question.) 4. It is asked, then, of which it is said by priority — person3; and it seems that it is said by priority of creatures, since it has been transferred from there to the divine. On the contrary: intellectual nature and substance and distinction are by priority in God rather than in creatures; and there are not many things [pertaining] to the account of person: therefore etc.

Conclusion. The name "person" is said of created and uncreated persons analogically, and indeed by an analogy of equality of the divine persons compared to themselves, but by a remote analogy of the divine persons together with the created [ones].

I respond: It must be said that this name person, as has been seen previously4, expresses nothing other than a commonality of relation, upon which a commonality of account [ratio] is founded. Since therefore a similar relation is found in created and in uncreated persons, hence it is that this name person is not said equivocally, but analogically. (Conclusion 1.)

But it must be attended to (Distinction.) that a commonality of relation can be by reference to things of the same genus; and then there is univocation and analogy according to equality — as Peter is an individual and Paul [is an individual] — and the account of individual belongs to them equally. It can also be by comparison to things5 of diverse genera, as Peter and Peter's whiteness are united in this, that they are individuals; and the account of individual belongs by priority to Peter rather than to his whiteness. Thus it must be said that this name person, said of the divine

persons, since it is said by comparison of things of the same nature, [is said] therefore analogically6 and equally; and therefore in a certain way univocally; likewise, when it is said of created persons. (Conclusion 2.) But when it is said of created and uncreated persons, it is said by comparison of things of diverse natures, and therefore by priority and posteriority. (Conclusion 3.) And thus person is said by priority of created persons according to the name, but according to the reality [res] of the name it is said by priority of uncreated persons.

And as to what is asked, whether person is common to created and uncreated persons; it must be said that if it is called a univocal common term, no. And the reasons for this must be conceded. (Conclusion 4.)

(Solution to the opposing arguments.) 1. To what is therefore objected, that there is the same ratio etc.; it must be said that there is not the same ratio except according to analogy; because intellectual nature and hypostasis and distinction and property are in God far more nobly and otherwise than in creatures.

2. To that which is objected, that there is a similar relation; it must be said that it is not a likeness of equality; and therefore such a likeness does not produce univocation, but analogy alone.

3. To that which is objected concerning incommunicability, it must be said that it is not a pure privation, but rather imports distinction; and since7 another account of distinguishing, distant much from this one, is in God — and this not only according to the thing, but rather also according to right reason — the intellect does not attribute to God a mode of distinguishing which belongs to composite [things]. Therefore neither by reason is it univocal, but only analogous8.

Scholion

I. From the solution of the preceding question someone could argue that the name person is a univocal common term [applicable] to divine and created persons, since the commonality of similar relation, which is asserted to exist between the divine persons, would seem to have to be established also between created and divine persons. The question itself is specified, since the Holy Doctor responds distinctly, both by comparing the divine persons among themselves, and the created [persons] with the created, and the created with the divine. — And it is to be noted that, in comparing created persons with created [ones], that "univocal common" cannot be understood concerning the generic or specific unity which several human individuals have, but concerning a commonality in the account of singularity. Singular [things] in the concrete differ from singular [things], yet, as is said in the corpus, the account of individual belongs to them equally. — On the twofold analogy cf. above d. 1, a. 3, q. 1, and d. 7, q. 1. — To the question in the 4th fundamentum it is responded in the 3rd conclusion.

II. Alex. Hal., Summa p. I, q. 36, m. 4, a. 1. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 2; on the principles of the solution cf. Summa I, q. 13, a. 6 and 10. — Bl. Albert, here a. 2. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. 1, a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2, q. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, here 2nd principium, q. 1. — Henry of Ghent, Summa a. 53, q. 3. — Durandus, here q. 1. — Biel, here q. unica.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. A multis codd. et ed. 1 abest et.
    From many codices and ed. 1 the word et ("also") is absent.
  2. Cfr. supra d. 8. p. II. q. 1.
    Cf. above d. 8, p. II, q. 1.
  3. Supple cum cod. G et ed. 1 de creaturis.
    Supply with cod. G and ed. 1 de creaturis ("of creatures").
  4. In quaest. praeced.
    In the preceding question.
  5. In multis codicibus desunt voces ad res; in ed. 1 legitur rerum pro ad res. — Mox post quod est cod. T omittit esse.
    In many codices the words ad res ("to things") are absent; in ed. 1 rerum ("of things") is read in place of ad res. — Soon after, after quod est cod. T omits esse.
  6. [?] — Apparatus entry not preserved in the OCR of pt2 for the p. 445 footer block. Body marker attaches to analogice in the second Conclusio (Sic dicendum quod hoc nomen persona, dictum de personis divinis ... ideo analogice et aequaliter).
    [?] — Apparatus entry not preserved in the OCR of pt2 for the p. 445 footer block. Body marker attaches to analogice ("analogically") in the second Conclusio.
  7. [?] — Apparatus entry not preserved in the OCR of pt2 for the p. 445 footer block. Body marker attaches to cum in the Solutio ad 3 (et cum alia ratio distinguendi).
    [?] — Apparatus entry not preserved in the OCR of pt2 for the p. 445 footer block. Body marker attaches to cum ("since") in the third solution.
  8. [?] — Apparatus entry not preserved in the OCR of pt2 for the p. 445 footer block. Body marker attaches to the closing analogum (Ideo nec ratione univocum est, sed solum analogum).
    [?] — Apparatus entry not preserved in the OCR of pt2 for the p. 445 footer block. Body marker attaches to the closing analogum ("analogous").
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