Dist. 25, Dubia
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 25
DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.
DUB. I.
In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de hoc quod dicit Magister: Dicimus, quod tres personae sunt, id est tres subsistentiae; quia contrarium dicit Boethius in libro de Duabus naturis et una persona Christi1, assignans differentiam inter subsistere et substare, quia «subsistit illud quod non indiget alio ut sit; substat vero quod subiectum aliis, ut esse valeant, subministrat»4. Videtur ergo, quod subsistere sit idem quod esse, et subsistentia idem quod essentia: ergo nullo modo potest dici, quod sint plures subsistentiae.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod Boethius accipit ibi hoc nomen subsistentia secundum Marcum Tullium2, prout accipit significationem ab actu sistendi5 sive per se standi; et sic tantum una est subsistentia. Sed nunc doctores sacrae Scripturae accipiunt prout magis importat respectum ad proprietatem, cui subsistentia est; et sic plurificatur. Ratio3 autem huius est communis usus. Quia accipiunt substantiam pro natura rei; ideo pro supposito magis voluerunt accipere subsistentiam.
DUB. II.
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod tres personas esse unam essentiam vel eiusdem essentiae dicimus, non ex eadem essentia. Videtur enim falsum, quia Pater generat Filium de sua substantia et spirat Spiritum sanctum: ergo videtur, quod omnes personae sint de eadem substantia.
Item quaeritur: quare non conceditur ista, quod personae sunt ex eadem essentia, sicut conceditur ista, quod sunt eiusdem essentiae? Et videtur, quod debeat concedi, quia ex dicit in divinis habitudinem originis, et similiter genitivus originem importat. Si tu dicas, quod propter transitiones, quia
praepositiones sunt transitivae6 — ita et obliqui casus sunt transitivi. Praeterea, haec recipitur: personae sunt in eadem essentia, et tamen hoc quod dico in est praepositio.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod quando7 aliquid comparatur ad aliud ut informans sive denominans, non ponitur propter hoc diversitas sive distinctio unius ad alterum; sic enim comparatur deitas ad Deum. Alio modo comparatur alterum sicut principium ad principiatum; et tunc de necessitate importatur distinctio. Quoniam igitur haec praepositio ex importat habitudinem causae vel saltem principii, ideo de necessitate dicit distinctionem inter extrema: et ideo haec non potest esse vera, quod personae sint ex eadem essentia. Sed quia genitivus non tantum construitur in ratione principii, immo ex declaratione essentiae, cum dicitur: mulier egregiae formae, ut dicit Priscianus8; ideo cum genitivo haec est vera: tres personae sunt eiusdem essentiae.
DUB. III.
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Tres res, et accipit hoc ab Augustino in primo libro de Doctrina christiana9. Videtur enim male dicere, dicendo tres res, quia res est nomen absolutum et generale: ergo videtur, quod si aliquid dicat in divinis, quod dicat essentiam sive substantiam: ergo sicut nullo modo recipitur tres essentiae, ita nullo modo debet recipi tres res. Et si tu dicas, quod recipitur10 tres entes; hoc non est simile, quia ens est participium, et ita trahit numerum aliunde et non numeratur secundum formam propriam entitatis; res autem est nomen substantivum. Si tu dicas, quod res nominat mihi formam a parte animae, vel istud nomen impositum est a parte animae; hoc nihil est, quia illa sunt nomina intentionum, et res dividitur contra intentionem.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod unaquaeque11 res potest considerari tripliciter: aut secundum proprietates, quas habet in propria natura; aut secundum modum, per quem fit apud animam; aut secundum proprietatem consequentem, quae inest ei ab actibus animae, qui sunt subiicere et praedicare, componere et dividere12. Secundum ergo hanc triplicem acceptionem contingit rem tripliciter nominari. Uno modo per nomen, quod indicat existentiam a parte suae naturae, sicut dicitur album et nigrum et huiusmodi. Alio modo, secundum quod anima accipit; et sic, quia anima omnia accipit13 per modum entis, nominat hoc modo res. Unde omne illud res dicitur, quod anima cogitat ut existens in natura. Alio modo contingit nominare per intentiones secundas, sicut dicitur genus, species, subiectum, praedicatum.
Quoniam igitur hoc nomen res dicit quasi medium inter nomen, quod dicit pure formam naturae, et nomen quod dicit formam intentionis; ideo non tantum essentiae convenit, sed etiam personis; et ideo tres res dicimus tres personas, non sic tres essentias; et huic significationi alludit ipsum nomen. Res enim dicitur a reor, reris, quod dicit actum a parte animae; et alio modo res venit ab hoc quod est ratus, quod dicit stabilitatem a parte naturae; et sic res dicit stabilitatem sive ratitudinem ex parte entitatis. Et sic patent obiecta, quia uno modo est nomen naturae, alio modo est nomen rationis14.
DUB. IV.
Item quaeritur de hoc verbo Hieronymi: Non est prorsus aliquis in Trinitate gradus. Videtur enim dicere contra illud quod dicit Augustinus nono Confessionum15: «Pater et Filius non differunt substantia, sed causa et gradu». — Item, in divinis est subsistentia16, ergo ibi est sub; sed sub dicitur relative
ad superius: ergo ibi est sub et super, ergo inferius et superius, ergo et gradus. — Item ubicumque auctoritas et subauctoritas, ibi est gradus; sed haec est in Patre et Filio: ergo etc.
Respondeo: Dicendum, sicut dicit Glossa17, Exodi: «Non ascendes per gradus ad altare etc. Per gradus ascendit ad altare, qui dicit Patrem maiorem Filio, et Filium Spiritu sancto, sicut dicit Arius». Unde cum gradus de ratione sui nominis tollat personarum aequalitatem, ideo bene dicit Hieronymus, quod non est prorsus in divinitate gradus; nihilominus ponitur ordo. Differunt enim gradus et ordo, sicut punctus et unitas. Nam punctus est substantia posita; ideo solum est in corporalibus. Unitas est substantia non habens positionem18; ideo est in spiritualibus. Sic gradus dicit superpositionem vel est loci, vel dignitatis. Ordo vero dicit habitudinem ad principium sine superpositione19.
Ad illud ergo quod dicit Augustinus, dicendum, quod improprie loquitur in utroque verbo, et causa sumitur ibi pro principio, gradus vero sumitur pro ordine.
Ad illud quod obiicitur de sub, dicendum, quod sub in divinis non dicit inferioritatem, sed solum habitudinem secundum rationem intelligendi. — Ad illud quod obiicitur de auctoritate, dicendum, quod verum est, secundum quod auctoritas sonat in rationem dominii, quod ponit gradum; sed sic non est in divinis, sed solum, prout sonat in rationem principii; et hoc ponit ordinem in cognoscendo20.
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DOUBTS ON THE MASTER'S TEXT.
Doubt I.
In this part there are doubts concerning the littera, and first it is asked about what the Master says: We say that there are three persons, that is, three subsistences; because the contrary is said by Boethius in the book On the Two Natures and One Person of Christ1, assigning a difference between to subsist and to substand, since «that subsists which does not need another in order to be; but that substands which, being a subject for others so that they may be able to be, supplies [the support]»4. It seems therefore that to subsist is the same as to be, and subsistence the same as essence: therefore in no way can it be said that there are several subsistences.
I respond: It must be said that Boethius takes the name subsistentia there according to Marcus Tullius2, inasmuch as it takes its signification from the act of standing or of standing by itself5; and so there is only one subsistence. But now the doctors of sacred Scripture take it inasmuch as it more imports a respect to property, to which the subsistence belongs; and so it is multiplied. The reason3 for this is the common usage. Because they take substance for the nature of the thing; therefore for the supposit they preferred more to take subsistence.
Doubt II.
Likewise it is asked about what he says, that we say that the three persons are one essence or of the same essence, [but] not from the same essence. For it seems false, because the Father generates the Son from his own substance and spirates the Holy Spirit: therefore it seems that all the persons are from the same substance.
Likewise it is asked: why is this not conceded, that the persons are from the same essence, just as this is conceded, that they are of the same essence? And it seems that it ought to be conceded, because ex (from) in the divine [things] expresses the relation of origin, and likewise the genitive imports origin. If you say that [it is] on account of transitions, since
prepositions are transitive6 — so also the oblique cases are transitive. Furthermore, this [proposition] is received: the persons are in the same essence, and yet this which I say in is a preposition.
I respond: It must be said that when7 something is compared to another as informing or denominating, on this account a diversity or distinction of one to the other is not posited; for thus is divinity compared to God. In another way one is compared to the other as principle to that which proceeds from a principle; and then of necessity a distinction is imported. Since therefore this preposition ex imports a relation of cause or at least of principle, therefore of necessity it states a distinction between the extremes: and therefore this cannot be true, that the persons are from the same essence. But because the genitive is not only construed in the relation of principle, but also from the declaration of essence, when it is said: a woman of remarkable form, as Priscian says8; therefore with the genitive this is true: the three persons are of the same essence.
Doubt III.
Likewise it is asked about what he says: Three things, and he takes this from Augustine in the first book On Christian Doctrine9. For it seems that he speaks ill in saying three things (tres res), because res is an absolute and general name: therefore it seems that if it says anything in the divine [things], it says the essence or substance: therefore just as in no way is three essences received, so in no way ought three things to be received. And if you say that three beings (tres entes) is received10, this is not similar, because ens (being) is a participle, and so it draws its number from elsewhere and is not numbered according to its own form of entity; res however is a substantive name. If you say that res names for me a form on the part of the soul, or that this name is imposed on the part of the soul; this is nothing, because those are names of intentions, and res is divided against intention.
I respond: It must be said that each11 thing can be considered in three ways: either according to the properties which it has in its proper nature; or according to the mode by which it comes-to-be in the soul; or according to the consequent property which is in it from the acts of the soul, which are subjecting and predicating, composing and dividing12. According therefore to this triple acceptation it happens that a thing is named in three ways. In one way, by a name which indicates existence on the part of its own nature, just as it is called white and black and the like. In another way, according to what the soul receives; and so, because the soul receives13 all [things] through the mode of being, it names a thing in this way. Whence everything is called res (thing) which the soul thinks of as existing in nature. In another way it happens to name through second intentions, just as it is called genus, species, subject, predicate.
Since therefore this name res says as it were a middle [term] between the name which says purely the form of nature, and the name which says the form of intention; therefore it suits not only the essence, but also the persons; and therefore we say three things [meaning] three persons, not so [as we say] three essences; and the name itself alludes to this signification. For res is said from reor, reris (I think, you think), which says an act on the part of the soul; and in another way res comes from this which is ratus (settled, determined), which says stability on the part of nature; and so res says stability or determinacy on the part of entity. And so the objections are clear, since in one way it is a name of nature, in another way a name of reason14.
Doubt IV.
Likewise it is asked about this saying of Jerome: There is in the Trinity no degree (gradus) at all. For he seems to say [something] against what Augustine says in the ninth [book] of the Confessions15: «The Father and the Son do not differ in substance, but in cause and degree». — Likewise, in the divine [things] there is subsistentia16 (sub-stance), therefore there is sub (under); but sub is said relatively
to superius (above): therefore there is sub and super there, therefore inferior and superior, therefore also degree. — Likewise, wherever there is authority and sub-authority, there is degree; but this is in the Father and Son: therefore etc.
I respond: It must be said, as the Gloss says17, on Exodus: «Thou shalt not ascend by steps to the altar etc. He ascends to the altar by steps who says that the Father is greater than the Son, and the Son [greater] than the Holy Spirit, as Arius says». Whence since gradus (degree) by the very meaning of its name takes away the equality of the persons, therefore Jerome rightly says that there is no degree at all in the divinity; nevertheless order is posited. For gradus and ordo differ as point and unity. For point is a posited substance; therefore it is only in corporeal [things]. Unity is a substance not having position18; therefore it is in spiritual [things]. Thus gradus says a superposition either of place or of dignity. But ordo says a relation to a principle without superposition19.
To that, therefore, which Augustine says, it must be said that he speaks improperly in both words, and cause is taken there for principle, and degree is taken for order.
To that which is objected concerning sub, it must be said that sub in the divine [things] does not state inferiority, but only a relation according to the manner of understanding. — To that which is objected concerning authority, it must be said that it is true insofar as authority sounds in the meaning of dominion, which posits a degree; but thus it is not in the divine [things], but only insofar as it sounds in the meaning of principle; and this posits an order in cognition20.
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- Codd. aa bb cc cum ed. 1 antonomastice, non omnino perperam, quia antonomasia est figura, quae fit, quoties pro nomine proprio substituitur eius epitheton.Codices aa bb cc with edition 1 [read] antonomastice (by antonomasia), not entirely incorrectly, because antonomasia is the figure which occurs whenever in place of a proper noun its epithet is substituted.
- Ed. 1 subiicit etiam.Edition 1 [reads] subiicit etiam (subjoins also).
- Cod. G sola analogia.Codex G [reads] sola analogia (analogy alone).
- Cap. 3: Subsistit enim quod ipsum accidentibus, ut possit esse, non indiget; substat autem id quod aliis accidentibus subiectum quoddam, ut esse valeant, subministrat. — Paulo infra post verba subsistere sit idem quod ex mss. restauravimus verba a Vat. omissa: esse et subsistentia idem quod.Chapter 3: For that subsists which does not itself need accidents in order to be; but that substands which supplies a kind of subject for other accidents, so that they may be able to be. — A little below, after the words subsistere sit idem quod, we have restored from the manuscripts the words omitted by the Vatican [edition]: esse et subsistentia idem quod.
- Vide supra pag. 412, nota 7. — Proxime post Vat., suffragante cod. cc, secundum actum subsistendi pro ab actu sistendi.See above page 412, note 7. — Just after, the Vatican [edition], with the support of codex cc, [reads] secundum actum subsistendi (according to the act of subsisting) in place of ab actu sistendi (from the act of standing).
- Cfr. supra d. 5. a. 1. q. 2. arg. 1. ad opp., et solutio huius argumenti.Cf. above d. 5, a. 1, q. 2, arg. 1, ad oppositum, and the solution of this argument.
- Vat. sola aliquando, et mox post denominans addit et tamen. — Paulo inferius cod. sic vero pro sic enim.The Vatican [edition] alone [reads] aliquando (sometimes), and soon after denominans adds et tamen (and yet). — A little below, the codex [reads] sic vero (thus indeed) in place of sic enim (for thus).
- Sic vetustiores codd. cum ed. 1; Vat. cum cod. cc comparatur aliquid ad aliud.Thus the older codices with edition 1; the Vatican [edition] with codex cc [reads] comparatur aliquid ad aliud (something is compared to another).
- Libr. XVIII. Grammat. c. 1. Cfr. etiam supra d. 3. p. II. dub. 3; et Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 56. m. 7. a. 3. ad 1; nec non B. Albert., hic a. 5; et S. Thom., hic circa lit.Book 18 of the Grammar, c. 1. Cf. also above d. 3, p. II, dub. 3; and Alexander of Hales, Summa p. I, q. 56, m. 7, a. 3, ad 1; as well as Bl. Albert, here a. 5; and St. Thomas, here near the littera.
- Cap. 5. n. 5.Chapter 5, n. 5.
- Vat. cum cod. cc omittit verba quod recipitur, substituit pro vocula hoc, quae proxime sequitur, hic, et paulo inferius mutat propriam in propriae.The Vatican [edition] with codex cc omits the words quod recipitur, substitutes for the little word hoc, which immediately follows, hic, and a little below changes propriam into propriae.
- In Vat. et cod. cc supprimitur unaquaeque.In the Vatican [edition] and in codex cc [the word] unaquaeque (each) is suppressed.
- Notamus, quod rei primo et tertio modo consideratae respondet conceptus, qui a Scholasticis prima intentio et secunda intentio vocabatur, a modernis autem idea realis et logica nuncupatur. Prima igitur intentio est conceptus, quo intellectui repraesentatur res, prout est in se, sive secundum proprietates, quae ei conveniunt, nulla habita ratione operationis intellectus, v. g. homo, prout est animal rationale. Secunda autem intentio est conceptus, quo intellectui repraesentatur res, non prout est in se, sed sub proprietatibus ei ab intellectu attributis, v. g. homo, quatenus est species, vel quatenus est subiectum in propositione. Medius modus, quo res considerari potest iuxta S. Bonaventuram, scil. per quem fit res apud animam, complectitur generales conditiones, quae actum intellectus concomitantur, v. g. quod intellectus cognoscat rem per modum abstractionis, universalitatis, entis etc. — Paulo superius pro consequentem Vat. cum cod. cc communem, refragantibus vetustioribus codd., nec non repugnante Scholasticorum modo loquendi.We note that to the res considered in the first and third ways there corresponds the concept which by the Scholastics was called prima intentio (first intention) and secunda intentio (second intention), but by the moderns is termed real idea and logical idea. The first intention, then, is the concept by which there is represented to the intellect a thing inasmuch as it is in itself, or according to the properties which suit it, with no account being taken of the operation of the intellect — e. g. man, inasmuch as he is a rational animal. The second intention is the concept by which there is represented to the intellect a thing not inasmuch as it is in itself, but under the properties attributed to it by the intellect — e. g. man, insofar as he is a species, or insofar as he is a subject in a proposition. The middle way, in which a thing can be considered according to St. Bonaventure, namely that by which the thing comes-to-be in the soul, comprehends the general conditions which accompany the act of the intellect — e. g. that the intellect cognizes the thing by way of abstraction, of universality, of being, etc. — A little above, in place of consequentem (consequent), the Vatican [edition] with codex cc [reads] communem (common), against the older codices, and against the manner of speaking of the Scholastics.
- Verba et sic, quia anima omnia accipit, a Vat. suppressa, auctoritate plurium codd. ut G H M O T Z bb et ed. 1 in textum recepimus.The words et sic, quia anima omnia accipit (and so, because the soul receives all [things]), suppressed by the Vatican [edition], we have received into the text on the authority of several codices such as G H M O T Z bb and edition 1.
- Cfr. supra d. 1. dub. 7; B. Albert., hic a. 6; S. Thom., hic a. 1.Cf. above d. 1, dub. 7; Bl. Albert, here a. 6; St. Thomas, here a. 1.
- Etsi codd. et edd. concordes allegant Librum 9. (vel 11.) Confessionum, verba tamen citata ibi non exstant, sed habentur in libro, qui quondam inter opera S. Augustini perperam recensebatur et inscribitur: Quaestiones ex utroque Testamento mixtim, q. 122: «Nihil differt a Patre Filius? Nihil plane differt in substantia, quia verus Filius est; differt autem in causalitatis gradu (alias: in causa vel gradu)». Tertullianus adv. Prax. c. 2. ait: «Tres autem non statu, sed gradu; nec substantia, sed forma; nec potestate, sed specie».Although the codices and editions concordantly allege Book 9 (or 11) of the Confessions, the words cited there nevertheless do not exist, but are had in the book which was once erroneously reckoned among the works of St. Augustine and is inscribed: Questions from both Testaments mixed, q. 122: «Does the Son in nothing differ from the Father? In substance plainly he differs in nothing, because he is a true Son; but he differs in the degree of causality (or: in cause or degree)». Tertullian, Against Praxeas c. 2, says: «But [they are] three not in status, but in degree; not in substance, but in form; not in power, but in species».
- Vers. 26. — Glossa apud Lyr. in hunc locum: Gradus in Trinitate non facies sicut Arius, qui maiorem Patrem, minorem Filium, minimum Spiritum sanctum docuit.Verse 26. — Gloss in [Nicholas of] Lyra at this place: Thou shalt not make a degree in the Trinity, like Arius, who taught the Father greater, the Son lesser, the Holy Spirit least.
- Aristot., I. Poster. c. 23. (c. 27.): «Unitas substantia est sine positione, punctum autem substantia posita». Simile habetur V. Metaph. text. 12. (IV. c. 6.). S. Bonav., II. Sent. d. 2. p. II. q. 3. fundam. 2. ait: «Punctus est substantia posita, ut dicit Philosophus, i. e. essentia habens positionem, in quo differt ab unitate».Aristotle, I. Posterior [Analytics], c. 23 (c. 27): «Unity is a substance without position, but a point is a posited substance». A similar [statement] is had in V. Metaph. text 12 (IV. c. 6). St. Bonaventure, II. Sent. d. 2, p. II, q. 3, fundam. 2, says: «A point is a posited substance, as the Philosopher says, i. e. an essence having position, wherein it differs from unity».
- Cfr. supra d. 20. a. 2. q. 1. 2. — Vat. cum cod. cc positione pro superpositione.Cf. above d. 20, a. 2, q. 1, 2. — The Vatican [edition] with codex cc [reads] positione (position) in place of superpositione (superposition).
- Cfr. supra d. 16. dub. 4. 5. — Hoc dubium solvit etiam S. Thom., hic circa lit.Cf. above d. 16, dub. 4, 5. — This doubt is also solved by St. Thomas, here near the littera.