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Dist. 25, Art. 2, Q. 1

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 25

Textus Latinus
p. 441

ARTICULUS II. De communitate nominis persona.

Secundo quaeritur de secundo articulo, scilicet de communitate huius nominis persona. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. Primo quaeritur, utrum hoc nomen persona sit vere commune personis increatis. Secundo, utrum sit commune univocum personis creatis et increatis.

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QUAESTIO I. Utrum nomen persona sit commune personis increatis.

Quod autem sit vere commune personis increatis, ostenditur:

1. Per Augustinum septimo de Trinitate1: «Ideo, inquit, dicuntur tres personae, quia commune est eis quod est persona»; sed constat, quod ad plurificationem non sufficit communitas nominis solum: ergo vere est commune secundum rem.

2. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione, quia omne nomen, quod recipit supra se signum distributivum, est vere commune ad illa, in quae distribuitur2; sed tale est hoc nomen persona: ergo est commune ad tres. Dicitur enim convenienter: quaelibet persona refertur.

3. Item, omne quod secundum idem nomen et secundum eandem rationem dicitur de pluribus, est vere commune ad illa; sed persona est huiusmodi, quia secundum idem nomen3 et eandem rationem, scilicet praeassignatam, dicitur de tribus: ergo etc.

4. Item, cum dico: Pater est persona, hoc nomen persona praedicatur, aut ergo tanquam ens de ratione Patris, aut tanquam accidentale4. Constat quod non tanquam accidentale: ergo tanquam ens de ratione Patris. Aut ergo dicit totum quod est Pater, aut non; si totum, ergo sicut pater praedicatur de solo Patre, ita et persona; quod falsum est. Ergo non dicit totum, ergo in plus est hoc quod est persona quam pater, et in plus5, quod est de ratione Patris, et similiter de ratione Filii: ergo est vere commune.

Contra:

1. Omne commune ad aliqua, quod numeratur in illis, est vere universale ad illa, maxime si non dicitur accidentaliter de illis. Hoc patet, quia Augustinus dicebat supra, distinctione decima nona6, quod non ob aliud essentia non est universale, nisi quod non numeratur in singularibus. Si ergo persona est commune ad tres, et ulterius numeratur sive plurificatur in illis: ergo est universale, ergo in divinis est ponere universale; quod est contra praedeterminata et contra Augustinum7, qui vult, quod in divinis non sit universale nec particulare.

2. Item, nihil est commune, quod de sui ratione et nomine privat communitatem; sed persona dicit individuum sive incommunicabile de ratione sui nominis: ergo etc.

3. Item, omne quod dicitur secundum substantiam et est commune, dicitur secundum substantiam communem; sed nihil quod dicitur secundum substantiam communem, plurificatur: ergo persona non plurificatur. Sed constat quod plurificatur, et tamen dicitur secundum substantiam: ergo non dicit quid commune.

4. Item, si dicit quid commune, aut nominis tantum, aut nominis et rationis tantum, aut nominis et rationis et rei. Si tantum nominis: ergo est aequivocum8, ergo non est commune. Si tantum nominis et rationis, ita quod nihil est commune in re: ergo est vanitas solum. Si vero nominis et rationis et rei; sed communitas realis, ut vult Damascenus9, non est nisi communitas substantiae et naturae, et haec nullo modo plurificatur: ergo hoc nomen persona nullo modo potest esse commune.

Conclusio. Nomen personae est commune personis increatis, sed alia communitate quam ea, qua essentia ipsis est communis.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod persona absque dubio est communis tribus, et essentia communis; sed tamen alius modus communitatis est in essentia et persona. Et huius signum est, quia plurificatur persona, non essentia.

Differentia autem harum10 communitatum differenter accipitur a diversis. (Opinio 1.) Quidam enim dicunt, scilicet secundum positionem, et secundum privationem: secundum positionem, ut animal est11 commune ad hominem et asinum; secundum privatio-

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nem vero, ut non-animal est commune ad lapidem et ad lignum. Et dicunt, quod communitas secundum positionem est in natura et essentia et in nomine hoc significante; communitas vero secundum privationem est in persona, quia dicitur persona quasi incommunicabilis, id est secundum privationem communitatis.

(Opinio 2.) Alii dicunt, quod duplex est communitas: quaedam secundum unitatem naturae absolutae, quaedam secundum similitudinem habitudinis comparatae. Communitas secundum unitatem naturae absolutae est humanitas12 respectu Petri et Pauli, quia una natura universalis reperitur in utrisque. Communitas vero secundum similitudinem habitudinis relatae est illa quae attenditur in consimili comparatione13, sicut modus regendi communis est nautae ad regendam navem, et doctoris ad regendas scholas, quia uterque debet esse non sorte, sed arte peritus. Et primus quidem modus attenditur in essentia, secundus vero attenditur in persona. Nam persona dicitur quasi proprietate distincta; et ita dicit habitudinem ad proprietatem, quae consimilis est in qualibet personarum. Non14 dicit, quantum est de se, unam formam naturalem nisi in obliquo; sed essentia vel substantia dicit formam et naturam absolutam, in qua communicant.

(Opinio 3.) Alii dicunt tertio modo, quod duplex est communitas, rei scilicet et rationis: rei, sicut universale ad singularia, rationis vero, sicut aliqua intentio accepta ab anima secundum consimilem modum accipiendi; et sic hoc nomen individuum est commune secundum rationem ad Petrum et Paulum. Primo modo dicunt essentiam esse communem; secundo modo dicunt esse communem personam, quia hoc dicit persona in divinis, quod individuum in creaturis.

(Iudicium auctoris.) Omnes autem isti modi dicendi, si diligentius attendamus, convenientes sunt, et sumti sunt ex significatione huius nominis quod est persona, sive ex distinctione15. Persona enim dicit incommunicabile secundum rationem; et hoc dicit privationem communitatis. Persona ulterius, quia incommunicabilitatem habet ratione eius quod subest proprietati distinguenti, dicit habitudinem ad proprietatem, sicut per nomen hypostasis. Rursus, ex his habetur, quod persona ponit circa suppositum, de quo dicitur, intentionem subiiciendi, et non praedicandi de pluribus. Et ita patet, quod de ratione sui nominis importat privationem communitatis, similitudinem habitudinis16 et intentionem rationis. Et quia communitas eius accipitur secundum rationem nominis, ideo importat communitatem secundum privationem, et proportionem sive analogiam, et rationem. — Tamen inter omnes hos modos medius magis accedit ad naturam rei, quia revera privatio illa in persona magis est positio quam privatio. Et rursus, nominis intentio fundamentum et radicem habet in re.

Concedendae17 ergo sunt rationes, quod persona dicit commune in divinis.

(Solutio oppositorum.) 1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod plurificatur; iam patet responsio: quia universale dicit communitatem secundum positionem et secundum unitatem naturae et secundum rem, non solum secundum rationem; et quoniam persona hoc modo non importat communitatem, ideo non est universale. — (Alia ratio.) Nihilominus tamen ratio non valet, quia universale plurificatur, ita quod vere numeratur propter veram additionem, per quam contrahitur ad individuum; sed haec persona non addit supra personam, quoniam, ut praedictum est18, non est distinctio in divinis per additionem, sed per originem: ideo persona nec vere numeratur, nec trahitur in partem illo modo, quo universale.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod privat communitatem; dicendum, quod illud quod privat communitatem, non est commune secundum illam communitatem, quam privat; sed persona privat communitatem rei, sed non communitatem rationis; et secundum illam non est communis, sed secundum communitatem rationis.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod est commune et dicitur secundum substantiam, dicitur secundum substantiam19 communem; dicendum, quod hic est accidens, sicut hic: iste est albus, et est monachus, ergo est albus monachus; quia aliam rationem denominandi importat iste terminus albus in praemissa et in conclusione. Sic recte dicendum de hoc ter-

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mino commune, quia prius secundum habitudinem, secundo secundum naturae unitatem accipitur.

4. Quod quaeritur: aut est communitas rei, aut rationis, aut nominis; dicendum, quod omnibus his modis; sed communitas realis duplex est, sicut visum est, scilicet secundum naturae unitatem20, et secundum similem habitudinem; et primo modo loquitur Damascenus, et ideo patent cetera.

Scholion

I. Quaestio haec orta est ex difficultate satis subtili, qua ratione nomen personae possit esse commune tribus personis divinis. Patet enim, illud non esse commune communitate rei, sicut essentia est communis illis tribus personis; non potest etiam esse illis commune per modum universalis, cum in Deo non sit ratio universalis. — S. Bonav. tres refert solutiones probabiles, secundam autem praefert. Magis explicatur eius sententia in seq. quaestione his verbis: «Dicitur (persona) secundum comparationem rerum eiusdem naturae, ideo analogice et aequaliter, et ideo quodam modo univoce». — S. Thomas (loc. infra cit.) eligit et bene explicat tertiam solutionem, contra quam arguit Scotus, dicendo, quod nihil positum in definitione sit ens rationis. Fallacia accidentis in solut. ad 3. in hoc consistit, quod, ratione nominis21, terminus commune accipitur in maiori secundum similitudinem habitudinis (iuxta secundam solutionem); in minori vero absolute secundum unitatem naturae.

II. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 56. m. 4. a. 2. — Scot., de hac et seq. q. Report. hic q. 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3; S. I. q. 30. a. 4. — B. Albert., hic a. 3; S. p. I. tr. 10. q. 44. m. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 3. — Aegid. R., hic I. princ. q. 1. 2. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 53. q. 7. — Durand., hic q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., I. Sent. d. 23. q. 2. — Biel, de hac et seq. q. hic q. unica.

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English Translation

ARTICLE II. On the commonness of the name "person."

Secondly inquiry is made concerning the second article, namely concerning the commonness of this name persona. And about this two things are asked. First it is asked whether this name persona is truly common to the uncreated persons. Secondly, whether it is a univocal common [name] for created and uncreated persons.

QUESTION I. Whether the name "person" is common to the uncreated persons.

That it is truly common to the uncreated persons is shown thus:

1. Through Augustine in the seventh [book] On the Trinity1: «Therefore, he says, three persons are spoken of, because that which is person is common to them»; but it is established that for plurification the commonness of name alone does not suffice: therefore it is truly common according to the thing itself.

2. Likewise, this same thing is shown by reason, since every name which receives upon itself a distributive sign is truly common to those into which it is distributed2; but such is this name persona: therefore it is common to the three. For it is fittingly said: every person is referred.

3. Likewise, every [name] which is said of many according to the same name and according to the same account is truly common to them; but persona is of this kind, since according to the same name3 and the same account, namely the previously assigned one, it is said of the three: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, when I say: the Father is a person, this name persona is predicated either as a being belonging to the account of the Father, or as something accidental4. It is established that not as accidental: therefore as a being belonging to the account of the Father. Either, then, it expresses the whole of what the Father is, or not; if the whole, then just as father is predicated of the Father alone, so also person; which is false. Therefore it does not express the whole, therefore in plus [extending further] is that which is person than father, and in plus5, that which is of the account of the Father, and likewise of the account of the Son: therefore it is truly common.

On the contrary:

1. Every common [name] for some things, which is numbered in them, is truly universal for them, especially if it is not said accidentally of them. This is plain, since Augustine said above, in the nineteenth distinction6, that essence is not universal for no other reason than that it is not numbered in the singulars. If therefore person is common to the three, and further is numbered or plurified in them: therefore it is universal, therefore in the divine one must posit a universal; which is against what has been determined and against Augustine7, who holds that in the divine there is neither universal nor particular.

2. Likewise, nothing is common which from its own account and name removes commonness; but persona expresses the individual or the incommunicable from the account of its name: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, every [name] which is said according to substance and is common is said according to a common substance; but nothing which is said according to a common substance is plurified: therefore persona is not plurified. But it is established that it is plurified, and yet it is said according to substance: therefore it does not express something common.

4. Likewise, if it expresses something common, [it does so] either of name only, or of name and account only, or of name and account and thing. If of name only: therefore it is equivocal8, therefore it is not common. If [only] of name and account, such that nothing is common in the thing: therefore it is sheer emptiness. But if of name and account and thing; yet real commonness, as Damascene9 holds, is nothing other than commonness of substance and nature, and this is in no way plurified: therefore this name persona can in no way be common.

Conclusion. The name "person" is common to the uncreated persons, but by another commonness than that by which the essence is common to them.

I respond: It must be said for understanding what has been set forth that persona without doubt is common to the three, and the essence [is] common; but nevertheless there is another mode of commonness in essence and in person. And the sign of this is that the person is plurified, [but] not the essence.

But the difference of these10 commonnesses is taken differently by different [authors]. (Opinion 1.) For some say [that there are two kinds of commonness], namely according to position and according to privation: according to position, as animal is11 common to man and ass; according to priva-

tion indeed, as non-animal is common to stone and to wood. And they say that commonness according to position is in nature and essence and in the name signifying this; but commonness according to privation is in person, since persona is said as it were [to mean] incommunicable, that is, according to a privation of commonness.

(Opinion 2.) Others say that commonness is twofold: one according to the unity of an absolute nature, another according to the likeness of a compared relation. Commonness according to the unity of an absolute nature is humanity12 with respect to Peter and Paul, since one universal nature is found in both. But commonness according to the likeness of a related relation is that which is observed in a similar comparison13, as the mode of governing is common to the sailor in steering a ship, and to the teacher in directing schools, since each ought to be skilled not by chance but by art. And the first mode indeed is observed in the essence, but the second is observed in the person. For persona is said as it were [to be] distinct by a property; and so it expresses a relation to a property, which is similar in any of the persons. It does not14, so far as it is in itself, express one natural form except obliquely; but essence or substance expresses a form and an absolute nature in which they communicate.

(Opinion 3.) Others say in a third way that commonness is twofold, namely of thing and of account: of thing, as the universal [is common] to the singulars; of account indeed, as some intention received by the soul according to a similar mode of receiving; and thus this name individual is common according to account to Peter and Paul. In the first mode they say the essence to be common; in the second mode they say the person to be common, since this persona expresses in the divine, what individual [expresses] in creatures.

(The author's judgment.) Now all these modes of speaking, if we attend more diligently, are convergent, and are taken from the signification of this name which is persona, or from distinction15. For persona expresses the incommunicable according to account; and this expresses a privation of commonness. Furthermore persona, since it has incommunicability by reason of that which underlies a distinguishing property, expresses a relation to a property, as does the name hypostasis. Again, from these things it is had that persona sets about the supposit, of which it is said, the intention of subjecting [it] and not of predicating it of many. And thus it is plain that from the account of its name it imports a privation of commonness, a likeness of relation16, and the intention of account [or: a notional intention]. And since its commonness is taken according to the account of the name, therefore it imports commonness according to privation, and proportion or analogy, and account. — Yet among all these modes the middle one approaches more closely to the nature of the thing, since in truth that privation in person is more a position than a privation. And again, the intention of the name has its foundation and root in the thing.

Therefore the reasonings17 are to be conceded, that persona expresses something common in the divine.

(Solution to the opposed [arguments].) 1. To that, then, which is objected, that it is plurified; the response is now plain: because the universal expresses commonness according to position and according to unity of nature and according to thing, not only according to account; and since persona in this mode does not import commonness, therefore it is not universal. — (Another reason.) Nevertheless the reason does not hold, since the universal is plurified in such a way that it is truly numbered on account of a true addition by which it is contracted to the individual; but this person does not add upon person, since, as has been said18 above, there is no distinction in the divine through addition, but through origin: therefore persona is neither truly numbered, nor drawn into [its] part in that mode in which the universal [is].

2. To that which is objected, that it removes commonness; it must be said that what removes commonness is not common according to that commonness which it removes; but persona removes commonness of thing, but not commonness of account; and according to that [commonness of thing] it is not common, but [it is common] according to commonness of account.

3. To that which is objected, that what is common and is said according to substance is said according to a common substance19; it must be said that here there is an accident [i.e. the fallacy of accident], as here: this man is white, and is a monk, therefore he is a white monk; since the term white imports another account of denomination in the premise and in the conclusion. So it must rightly be said of this term

common, since it is taken first according to relation, second according to unity of nature.

4. As to what is asked: whether it is commonness of thing, or of account, or of name; it must be said, by all these modes; but real commonness is twofold, as has been seen, namely according to unity of nature20, and according to similar relation; and in the first mode Damascene speaks, and so the rest are clear.

Scholion

I. This question has arisen from a sufficiently subtle difficulty, by what account the name persona can be common to the three divine persons. For it is plain that it is not common by commonness of thing, as the essence is common to those three persons; nor can it be common to them by mode of a universal, since in God there is no account of a universal. — St. Bonaventure cites three probable solutions, but prefers the second. His view is more fully explained in the following question, in these words: «[Persona] is said according to the comparison of things of the same nature, therefore analogously and equally, and so in a certain way univocally». — St. Thomas (loc. cited below) chooses and well explains the third solution, against which Scotus argues, saying that nothing posited in a definition is a being of reason. — The fallacy of accident in the solution to [arg.] 3 consists in this, that, by reason of the name21, the term common is taken in the major [premise] according to a likeness of relation (as in the second solution); but in the minor [premise] absolutely according to unity of nature.

II. Alex. Hal., Summa p. I, q. 56, m. 4, a. 2. — Scotus, on this and the following question, Reportata here q. 2. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 3; Summa I, q. 30, a. 4. — Bl. Albert, here a. 3; Summa p. I, tr. 10, q. 44, m. 1. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. 1, a. 3. — Aegidius Romanus, here I, princ. q. 1, 2. — Henry of Ghent, Summa a. 53, q. 7. — Durandus, here q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, I Sent. d. 23, q. 2. — Biel, on this and the following question, here q. unica.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Cap. 4. n. 8. — De principiis horum argumentorum vide supra d. 19. p. II. q. 2.
    Chapter 4, n. 8. — On the principles of these arguments see above d. 19, p. II, q. 2.
  2. Cfr. Petr. Hispan., Summul. tract. de Distributione, ubi signa distributiva dividuntur in distributiva substantiae v. g. omnis, nullus, et accidentium v. g. qualiscumque, quilibet. — Paulo superius Vat., favente cod. cc, pro signum exhibet nomen, et dein inferius post tres omittit ultimam huius argumenti propositionem.
    Cf. Peter of Spain, Summulae, treatise On Distribution, where distributive signs are divided into distributives of substance, e.g. omnis ("every"), nullus ("no"), and of accidents, e.g. qualiscumque ("of whatever sort"), quilibet ("any whatever"). — A little before, the Vatican [edition], with cod. cc supporting, for signum ("sign") exhibits nomen ("name"), and then below after tres ("three") omits the last proposition of this argument.
  3. In Vat. et solo cod. cc deest haec propositio: quia secundum idem etc.
    In the Vatican [edition] and only cod. cc this proposition is missing: quia secundum idem etc.
  4. Cod. bb adiungit sive extraneum.
    Cod. bb adds sive extraneum ("or extraneous").
  5. Intellige: et quidem in plus. De sensu verborum in plus est, vide supra pag. 318, nota 3.
    Understand: and indeed in plus [extending further]. On the sense of the words in plus est, see above p. 318, note 3.
  6. Lit. Magistri, c. 7. seqq.
    Littera of the Master, c. 7 ff.
  7. Libr. VII. de Trin. c. 6. n. 11, de quo vide supra lit. Magistri, d. XIX. c. 7. seqq., et ibid. in Comment. p. II. q. 2.
    Book VII On the Trinity, c. 6, n. 11, on which see above the littera of the Master, d. XIX, c. 7 ff., and ibid. in the Commentary, p. II, q. 2.
  8. Sic plerique codd.; Vat. cum cod. cc aequivocatio. Paulo inferius sola Vat. analogum pro vanitas solum.
    So most codices; the Vatican [edition] with cod. cc [reads] aequivocatio ("equivocation"). A little below, the Vatican alone [reads] analogum ("analogous") in place of vanitas solum ("sheer emptiness").
  9. Libr. I. de Fide orthod. c. 8. Cfr. etiam supra lit. Magistri, d. XIX. c. 9. — Paulo superius post si vero nominis codd. et ed. 1 omittunt et rationis, male.
    Book I On the Orthodox Faith, c. 8. Cf. also above the littera of the Master, d. XIX, c. 9. — A little above, after si vero nominis the codices and ed. 1 omit et rationis, wrongly.
  10. A Vat. abest harum, quod auctoritate complurium codd. ut G H M aa bb et ed. 1 restituimus.
    From the Vatican [edition] harum ("of these") is missing, which by the authority of several codices such as G H M aa bb and ed. 1 we have restored.
  11. Vat. cum cod. cc dicitur animal esse.
    The Vatican [edition] with cod. cc [reads] dicitur animal esse ("animal is said to be").
  12. Aliqui codd. ut F G I R S V cum ed. 1 humanitatis.
    Some codices such as F G I R S V with ed. 1 [read] humanitatis (genitive).
  13. Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 operatione.
    The Vatican [edition], against the faith of the manuscripts and ed. 1, [reads] operatione ("by operation") [in place of comparatione].
  14. Vat. adiicit enim.
    The Vatican [edition] adds enim ("for").
  15. Cod. Y definitione; cod. T distinctione vel definitione.
    Cod. Y [reads] definitione ("by definition"); cod. T [reads] distinctione vel definitione ("by distinction or by definition").
  16. Auctoritate cod. T adiecimus verba similitudinem habitudinis, quae in Vat. desiderantur. Lectio nostra comprobatur et ex contextu (quia S. Doctor praecedentia summatim exhibet) et ex mutila lectione aliorum codd. importat privationem habitudinis.
    On the authority of cod. T we have added the words similitudinem habitudinis ("a likeness of relation"), which are missing in the Vatican [edition]. Our reading is confirmed both from the context (since the Holy Doctor summarily exhibits the preceding) and from the mutilated reading of other codices, importat privationem habitudinis ("it imports a privation of relation").
  17. Cod. V subiicit quae probant.
    Cod. V subjoins quae probant ("which prove [it]").
  18. Dist. 19. p. II. q. 2. — Paulo superius pro ita quod Vat. cum cod. cc ut, et subinde pro per quam exhibet propter quam. Demum Vat. pro verbis sed haec persona non addit supra personam substituit et hic persona non addit supra essentiam, cum qua lectione aliquo modo convenit lectio ed. 1: sed haec persona non addit supra naturam; at utraque lectio, etsi in se non sit falsa, tamen non est ad propositum, quia, ut ex obiectione liquet, non agitur de respectu, quem persona habet ad essentiam, sed de respectu, quem haec persona in particulari habet ad personam in communi sive in generali sumtam. Codd. recte habent personam pro essentiam, sed plurimi eorum non bene additur pro addit.
    Distinction 19, p. II, q. 2. — A little above, in place of ita quod the Vatican [edition] with cod. cc [reads] ut, and immediately after, in place of per quam it exhibits propter quam. Finally the Vatican, in place of the words sed haec persona non addit supra personam ("but this person does not add upon person"), substitutes et hic persona non addit supra essentiam ("and here person does not add upon essence"), with which reading the reading of ed. 1 in some manner agrees: sed haec persona non addit supra naturam ("but this person does not add upon nature"); but each reading, even if in itself it is not false, is nevertheless not to the point, since, as is plain from the objection, the matter at issue is not the relation which person has to essence, but the relation which this person in particular has to person taken in common or in general. The codices rightly have personam in place of essentiam, but most of them not well [read] additur in place of addit.
  19. Mutilam lectionem Vat., quae verba dicitur secundum substantiam omittit, ope mss. resarcimus, et iustissime, quia illa verba in obiectione habentur. — Vox accidens, quae proxime post occurrit, accipitur pro fallacia accidentis. — Paulo inferius Vat. cum cod. cc ergo aliam pro quia aliam.
    The mutilated reading of the Vatican [edition], which omits the words dicitur secundum substantiam ("is said according to substance"), we restore by means of the manuscripts, and most justly, since those words are had in the objection. — The word accidens, which occurs immediately after, is taken for fallacia accidentis ("the fallacy of accident"). — A little below, the Vatican with cod. cc [reads] ergo aliam ("therefore another") in place of quia aliam ("since another").
  20. A nostris codd. et ed. 1 abest et.
    From our codices and ed. 1 et ("and") is absent.
  21. Cfr. supra d. 6. p. II. q. 1.
    Cf. above d. 6, p. II, q. 1.
← Dist. 25, Art. 1, Q. 2Dist. 25, Art. 2, Q. 2→