Bonaventure — Opera Omnia

Dist. 25, Art. 1, Q. 2

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 25

Textus Latinus

p. 439

QUAESTIO II. Utrum recte a Boethio definita sit persona, quod sit rationalis naturae individua substantia, et utrum haec ratio conveniat divinis personis.

Secundo quaeritur de hoc nomine persona, quid sit secundum definitionem; et definit eam Boethius¹ sic: «Persona est rationalis naturae individua substantia». Et quod ista definitio sit conveniens divinae personae, ostenditur:

1. Per intentionem auctoris, quia Boethius intendit agere de persona Christi; constat autem, personam Christi esse increatam: ergo intendit assignare rationem personae divinae sive increatae.

2. Item, quod haec sit ratio personae² in divinis, videtur: nam in Deo constat ponendum esse suppositum incommunicabile, et hoc suppositum est substantia divina, et hoc etiam est rationalis naturae; et non convenit ei, nisi de quo dicitur persona: ergo est eius ratio, ut videtur.

Contra:

1. Omnis definitio dicit aggregationem, cum constet ex pluribus³, alioquin esset ibi nugatio; in simplici autem nulla est aggregatio: ergo nullum simplex est definibile. Sed persona in divinis est omnino simplex: ergo etc. Si dicas, secundum quod dicunt aliqui, quod quamvis sit simplex secundum rem, tamen non est simplex secundum rationem; contra: aut illi rationi respondet aliquid in re, aut nihil; si aliquid: ergo aliqua compositio est in re; si nihil: ergo ratio omnino vana est. Sed propter rationem vanam non est aliquid definiendum: ergo etc.

2. Item, ratione suarum partium non videtur convenire divinae personae. Nam rationale est differentia animalis: ergo cui non convenit esse animal, non convenit natura rationalis. Sed animal non convenit Deo, cum sit species corporis: ergo nec hoc quod est rationale.

3. Item, videtur quod substantia non dicatur in recto de persona, quia, multiplicato definito, necesse est multiplicari⁴ definitionem et partes definitionis: ergo si persona est substantia, cum sint plures personae, ergo plures substantiae. — Si tu dicas, quod substantia stat ibi pro hypostasi; contra: hypostasis dicitur substantia individua, sicut dicit Boethius⁵: ergo sicut est nugatio, si diceretur: homo rationalis, sic et in praedicta notificatione. — Quaeritur ergo, utrum hoc nomen substantia stet pro communi, vel pro hypostasi⁶.

4. Item, videtur non esse convertibilis. Nam anima hominis est naturae rationalis substantia individua: ergo etc. — Ultimo quaeritur, cum assignentur diversae definitiones de persona, quomodo differunt.

Conclusio. Definitio illa Boethii est bona et conveniens divinis personis.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod, sicut patet ex intentione auctoris, haec definitio personae convenit et assignatur divinae personae.

1. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod simplex non est definibile; dicunt aliqui, quod dupliciter est aliquid definire. Uno modo in recto et per differentiam dicentem positionem, ut cum dicitur: homo est animal rationale, mortale; et hoc modo verum est, quod definitio dicit aggregationem et compositionem, et hoc modo solum⁷ aggregatum est definibile. Alio modo contingit aliquid definire in obliquo et per differentiam dicentem privationem, ut cum dicitur: simitas est curvitas nasi; et tunc non significatur, substantiam rei aggregari ex diversis, quoniam quod ponitur in obliquo non intrat essentiam de necessitate. Ulterius, differentia privans non ponit aliquam compositionem sive appositionem; et talis est dicta

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ratio. Nam hoc quod rationalis naturae⁸ cadit in obliquo, et haec differentia individua non ponit, sed privat. — Sed haec responsio non potest stare. Primum quidem, quia quod definitur per obliquum, aut definitur sicut accidens per substantiam, aut sicut per rem eiusdem generis; sed sive sic, sive sic, est ibi additio. Nam definitiones accidentium, sicut dicit Philosophus⁹, sunt ex additamento. Similiter, si per rem eiusdem generis; tunc ergo intrat essentiam et non dicit totam, cum sit pars definitionis: ergo necesse est, illud quod apponitur, aliquid addere secundum rem, et ita sive in recto, sive in obliquo necesse est dicere aggregationem.

Et propter hoc dicendum aliter, quod haec ratio, intellecta de persona creata, est notificatio dicens aggregationem. In Deo autem non dicit aggregationem secundum rem, sed secundum intelligendi rationem; quae tamen non est vana, eo quod omnia, quae dicuntur in ratione personae, inveniuntur in Deo, licet non per diversitatem. — Et hoc quidem potest intelligi sic. In creaturis specificatio per additionem complentem est¹⁰, individuatio per additionem sive appositionem contrahentem. Et ideo, cum dicitur substantia individua, individuum realiter addit supra substantiam, unde¹¹ et substantia individua supra naturam; et ideo necesse est, esse compositam personam in creatura. Sed in Deo est individuatio vel distinctio per solam originem. Et quia persona oritur se ipsa, ideo nulla est ibi omnino¹² additio, sed plurificatio, et per plurificationem distinctio et individuatio; et ideo nec individua addit supra substantiam, nec substantia supra naturam. Ideo vere dicitur¹³ et vera est ratio intelligendi; et notificatio ista convenit personae divinae, nec significatur in ea aliqua compositio; unde tenet rationem cuiusdam notificationis et cadit a ratione definitionis, quia nec Deus nec divina persona est definibilis, est tamen cognoscibilis et notificabilis.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de differentiis positis, sive de membris, dicendum, quod rationale dicitur uno modo, quod habet potentiam discernendi bonum a malo, verum a falso — et sic Deo et creaturae convenit; alio modo, quod habet potentiam discernendi per inquisitionem et collationem et discursum — et hoc est animae coniunctae carni. Et sic differentia talis primo modo ponitur in definitione, sed secundo modo obiicit.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod substantia individua dicitur in recto; dicendum, quod numeratur, sicut persona. Nam, sicut dicit Anselmus¹⁴, plures substantiae sunt individuae, sicut plures personae.

Ad illud quod quaeritur, utrum hoc nomen substantia stet pro communi aut pro hypostasi, consuevit tripliciter responderi.

Primo modo sic, quod substantia stet pro communi. Et si tu obiicias, quod illa non individuatur; dicunt, quod differentia adveniens respicit substantiam ratione suppositi, non ratione formae, ut patet, cum dicitur: animal individuum. — Sed haec responsio non videtur conveniens, quia¹⁵ hoc nomen substantia, secundum quod stat pro communi, non supponit personam. Unde haec est falsa: essentia generat; et haec: substantia generat.

Secundo modo dicitur, quod substantia ibi tantum valet quantum hypostasis; nec est nugatio. Nam individuatio attenditur in persona quantum ad triplicem incommunicabilitatem¹⁶, scilicet per praedicationem, et haec convenit hypostasi; et per compositionem, quia non est alteri componibilis; et per unionem, prout aliquid unitur digniori. Et ita differentia individua dicit istas duas incommunicabilitates¹⁷. Unde patet, quod non est ibi nugatio: patet

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etiam, quod definitio est convertibilis. Per istam duplicem incommunicabilitatem excluditur anima hominis, quae est alii componibilis, et humana natura in Christo, quae est unita digniori. — Sed tamen, licet illud rationabiliter sit dictum, adhuc restat quaestio de hypostasi, quia hypostasis est substantia individua. Quaeritur similiter, quomodo ibi accipiatur substantia, et non potest accipi pro communi, nec pro hypostasi.

Et propter hoc dicitur tertio, quod hoc nomen substantia stat ibi, secundum quod substantia dividitur in substantiam primam et secundam, et ita in quadam communitate ad substantiam universalem et particularem; et illud colligunt ex verbis Boethii, quando venatur definitionem personae per praedictam divisionem substantiae, ut ibi patet. Unde hoc nomen individua coarctat illam indifferentiam illius nominis, ut stet pro substantia prima; et sic non est ibi nugatio nec substantiae communis individuatio.

4. Ad illud quod ultimo quaeritur de assignatione definitionum, dicendum, quod persona definitur a Boethio sic: persona est rationalis naturae individua substantia; a Richardo sic: persona est intellectualis naturae incommunicabilis existentia. Definitur etiam alio modo sic: persona est existens per se solum iuxta singularem quendam rationalis existentiae modum. A magistris definitur sic: persona est hypostasis distincta proprietate ad nobilitatem pertinente. — Et notanda est differentia harum definitionum: quia Boethius et magistri definiunt personam, secundum quod communiter dicitur in Deo et in creaturis; sed Boethius magis considerat rationem rei, magistri vero adhuc rationem translationis. Definitiones vero Richardi sunt personae, prout est in divinis praecipue; sed una est propria assignatio, alia vero definitionis Boethii expositio sive correctio. — Posset tamen dici, quod omnes idem dicunt, differunt tamen secundum modum dicendi; quia definitio Boethii fuit data et videbatur improprietatem sonare; ideo posuit Richardus aliam magis per propria verba; et sic usque ad quartam.

Scholion

I. Scotus (I. Sent. d. 23. q. unic.) definitionem Boethii hic positam reprobat eique aliam Richardi substituit, quod «persona est intellectualis naturae incommunicabilis existentia». Haec tamen, ut dicit S. Bonav. (ad 1.), est «definitionis Boethii expositio sive correctio». Cum aliqua expositione definitio Boethii communiter recipitur, et eodem modo explicatur ab Angelico et Seraphico. In specie explicatione indigent vocabula substantia et individua, de quo vide solut. ad 3. De primo vocabulo S. Doctor cum S. Thoma (S. I. q. 29. a. 1. ad 2.) asserit, quod accipitur «nec praecise pro substantia prima (hypostasi), nec pro substantia secunda («pro communi», id est essentia), sed accipitur communiter, prout dividitur per primam et secundam» (S. Thom. loc. cit.). — Vocabulum individua non potest hic significare singulare; tunc enim sequeretur, quod humana Christi natura esset persona humana, quod est haeresis; et insuper, quod anima separata esset persona, quod communiter non approbatur. Dicendum igitur, quod individua stat pro incommunicabilis.

Notanda sunt ultima verba solutionis ad 1. — Ultima obiectio ideo non est soluta, quia ex dictis iam manifestum est, quod individua ibi dicitur pro incommunicabilis.

II. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 56. m. 3. — Scot., in utroque Scripto I. Sent. d. 23. q. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. I. a. I; S. I. q. 29. a. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. I; S. p. I. tr. 10. q. 44. m. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. I. a. I. — Richard. Med., a. hic a. I. q. 2. 3. — Aegid. R., hic I. princ. q. 3. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 33. q. I. — Durand., I. Sent. d. 23. q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., I. Sent. d. 23. q. 2. — Biel, I. Sent. d. 23. q. I.

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English Translation

Question II. Whether person is rightly defined by Boethius as «an individual substance of rational nature», and whether this account fits the divine persons.

In the second place inquiry is made concerning this name person, what it is according to definition; and Boethius¹ defines it thus: «Person is an individual substance of rational nature». And that this definition is fitting for the divine person is shown:

1. By the intention of the author, since Boethius intends to treat of the person of Christ; but it is established that the person of Christ is uncreated: therefore he intends to assign the account of the divine or uncreated person.

2. Likewise, that this is the account of person² in the divine, is shown thus: for in God it is established that there must be posited an incommunicable supposit, and this supposit is the divine substance, and this is also of rational nature; and it [the account] does not fit anything except that of which person is said: therefore it is its account, as it seems.

On the contrary:

1. Every definition expresses an aggregation, since it consists of several [parts]³, otherwise there would be empty repetition there; but in what is simple there is no aggregation: therefore nothing simple is definable. But person in the divine is altogether simple: therefore etc. If you say, according to what some say, that although it is simple in reality, yet it is not simple in account; on the contrary: either to that account something corresponds in reality, or nothing; if something: therefore there is some composition in reality; if nothing: therefore the account is altogether empty. But on account of an empty account nothing is to be defined: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, by reason of its parts it does not seem to fit the divine person. For rational is the differentia of animal: therefore for that to which it does not fit to be an animal, rational nature does not fit. But animal does not fit God, since it is a species of body: therefore neither does this which is rational.

3. Likewise, it seems that substance is not said in the direct case of person, because, the defined being multiplied, the definition and the parts of the definition must be multiplied⁴: therefore if person is a substance, since there are several persons, therefore [there will be] several substances. — If you say that substance there stands for hypostasis; on the contrary: hypostasis is called an individual substance, as Boethius⁵ says: therefore just as it is empty repetition if one were to say rational man, so also in the aforesaid notification. — It is asked therefore, whether this name substance stands for the common [nature] or for hypostasis⁶.

4. Likewise, it seems not to be convertible. For the soul of man is an individual substance of rational nature: therefore etc. — Lastly inquiry is made, since diverse definitions of person are assigned, how they differ.

Conclusion. That definition of Boethius is good and fitting for the divine persons.

I respond: It must be said that, as is plain from the intention of the author, this definition of person is fitting and is assigned to the divine person.

1. To that, however, which is objected, that what is simple is not definable; some say that to define something is twofold. In one mode, in the direct case and through a differentia expressing position, as when it is said: man is a rational, mortal animal; and in this mode it is true that the definition expresses aggregation and composition, and in this mode only⁷ what is aggregated is definable. In another mode, it happens that something is defined in the oblique case and through a differentia expressing privation, as when it is said: snubness is curvature of the nose; and then it is not signified that the substance of the thing is aggregated from diverse [things], since what is placed in the oblique case does not necessarily enter into the essence. Further, a privative differentia does not posit any composition or apposition; and such is the account in question.

For this which is of rational nature⁸ falls in the oblique case, and this differentia individual does not posit but privates. — But this response cannot stand. First, indeed, because what is defined through the oblique [case] is either defined as accident through substance, or as through a thing of the same genus; but whether thus or thus, there is addition there. For the definitions of accidents, as the Philosopher⁹ says, are by way of addition. Likewise, if through a thing of the same genus; then therefore it enters into the essence and does not express the whole, since it is part of the definition: therefore it is necessary that what is added add something according to the thing, and so whether in the direct or in the oblique case it is necessary to express aggregation.

And on account of this it must be said otherwise, that this account, understood of created person, is a notification expressing aggregation. But in God it does not express aggregation according to the thing, but according to the mode of understanding; which nevertheless is not empty, because all things which are said in the account of person are found in God, although not by way of diversity. — And this indeed can be understood thus. In creatures specification is by completing addition¹⁰, individuation by contracting addition or apposition. And therefore, when it is said individual substance, individual really adds beyond substance, whence¹¹ also individual substance [adds] beyond nature; and therefore it is necessary that the person in a creature be composite. But in God individuation or distinction is by origin alone. And since the [divine] person arises from itself, therefore there is no addition there at all¹², but plurification, and through plurification distinction and individuation; and therefore neither does individual add beyond substance, nor substance beyond nature. Therefore truly it is said¹³ and it is a true account of understanding; and this notification fits the divine person, nor is any composition signified in it; whence it holds the account of a certain notification and falls short of the account of definition, since neither God nor the divine person is definable, yet [each] is knowable and notifiable.

2. To that which is objected concerning the differentiae set down, or concerning the members [of the definition], it must be said that rational is said in one way [of that] which has the power of discerning good from evil, true from false — and thus it fits both God and creature; in another way [of that] which has the power of discerning by inquiry and collation and discourse — and this belongs to the soul joined to flesh. And so such a differentia in the first mode is placed in the definition, but in the second mode the objection raises [its difficulty].

3. To that which is objected, that individual substance is said in the direct case; it must be said that it is numbered, just as person [is]. For, as Anselm¹⁴ says, there are many individual substances, just as there are many persons.

To that which is asked, whether this name substance stands for the common [nature] or for hypostasis, it has been customary to respond in three ways.

In the first way thus, that substance stands for the common. And if you object that that [common nature] is not individuated; they say that the supervening differentia regards substance by reason of the supposit, not by reason of the form, as is plain when it is said: individual animal. — But this response does not seem fitting, because¹⁵ this name substance, insofar as it stands for the common, does not supposit for [a] person. Whence this is false: the essence generates; and this: the substance generates.

In the second way it is said that substance there is worth as much as hypostasis; nor is there empty repetition. For individuation in person is regarded with respect to a threefold incommunicability¹⁶, namely by predication — and this fits the hypostasis; and by composition, since [the hypostasis] is not combinable with another; and by union, insofar as something is united to a more worthy [nature]. And thus the differentia individual expresses these two incommunicabilities¹⁷. Whence it is plain that there is no empty repetition there: it is plain

also that the definition is convertible. By this twofold incommunicability is excluded the soul of man, which is combinable with another, and the human nature in Christ, which is united to a more worthy [nature]. — But yet, although that has been reasonably said, there still remains the question concerning hypostasis, since hypostasis is individual substance. Likewise it is asked how substance is taken there, and it cannot be taken for the common [nature], nor for the hypostasis.

And on account of this it is said in a third way, that this name substance stands there in the way that substance is divided into first and second substance, and so in a certain commonness toward universal and particular substance; and they gather this from the words of Boethius, when he hunts the definition of person through the aforesaid division of substance, as is plain there. Whence this name individual contracts that indifference of that name, so that it stands for first substance; and thus there is neither empty repetition there nor individuation of common substance.

4. To that which is lastly asked concerning the assignation of definitions, it must be said that person is defined by Boethius thus: person is an individual substance of rational nature; by Richard thus: person is an incommunicable existence of intellectual nature. It is also defined in another way thus: person is something existing through itself alone according to a certain singular mode of rational existence. By the masters it is defined thus: person is a hypostasis distinct by a property pertaining to nobility. — And the difference of these definitions is to be noted: because Boethius and the masters define person according as it is said commonly in God and in creatures; but Boethius considers more the account of the thing, while the masters [consider] further the account of the transferred [signification]. But Richard's definitions are of person as it is in the divine especially; but one is the proper assignation, the other [is] the exposition or correction of Boethius's definition. — Yet it could be said that all say the same thing, [but] differ according to the manner of speaking; because Boethius's definition was given and seemed to sound an impropriety; therefore Richard set down another more by proper words; and so on up to the fourth.

Scholion

I. Scotus (I Sent. d. 23, q. unica) rejects the definition of Boethius set down here and substitutes for it another of Richard, namely that «person is an incommunicable existence of intellectual nature». This [definition], however, as St. Bonaventure says (ad 1), is «the exposition or correction of the definition of Boethius». With some exposition the definition of Boethius is commonly received, and is explained in the same way by the Angelic [Doctor] and the Seraphic [Doctor]. In particular, the words substance and individual require explanation, on which see solut. ad 3. On the first word the Holy Doctor with St. Thomas (Summa I, q. 29, a. 1, ad 2) asserts that it is taken «neither precisely for first substance (hypostasis), nor for second substance ('for the common,' that is, the essence), but is taken commonly, insofar as it is divided through first and second» (St. Thomas, loc. cit.). — The word individual cannot here signify singular; for then it would follow that the human nature of Christ would be a human person, which is heresy; and moreover, that the separated soul would be a person, which is not commonly approved. It must therefore be said that individual stands for incommunicable.

The last words of the solution to 1 are to be noted. — The last objection is therefore not [explicitly] resolved, since from what has been said it is already manifest that individual there is said for incommunicable.

II. Alex. Hal., Summa p. I, q. 56, m. 3. — Scot., in both Scripta I Sent. d. 23, q. 1. — St. Thomas, here q. I, a. I; Summa I, q. 29, a. 1. — Bl. Albert, here a. I; Summa p. I, tr. 10, q. 44, m. 2. — Petrus a Tar., here q. I, a. I. — Richard. Med., here a. I, q. 2, 3. — Aegidius Rom., here I, princ. q. 3. — Henr. Gand., Summa a. 33, q. I. — Durand., I Sent. d. 23, q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., I Sent. d. 23, q. 2. — Biel, I Sent. d. 23, q. I.

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Apparatus Criticus

Libr. de Duabus naturis et una persona Christi, c. 3.
Book On the Two Natures and One Person of Christ, c. 3.
Adiecimus ex cod. W personae. — Paulo inferius cod. M cum ed. 1 individua pro divina; cod. T in marg. exhibet: hoc suppositum est idem quod substantia divina.
We have added personae ("of person") from cod. W. — A little below, cod. M with ed. 1 [reads] individua in place of divina; cod. T in the margin exhibits: this supposit is the same as the divine substance.
Secundum Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 33. et 43. (VI. c. 10. 12.), definitio est ratio (sermo) habens partes, quae sunt genus et differentia.
According to Aristotle, VII Metaphysics, text 33 and 43 (VI, c. 10, 12), a definition is a ratio (account) having parts, which are genus and differentia.
Vat. cum uno vel altero cod. multiplicare.
The Vatican [edition] with one or another codex [reads] multiplicare ("to multiply") [in place of multiplicari ("to be multiplied")].
Libr. de Duabus naturis et una persona Christi, c. 3.
Book On the Two Natures and One Person of Christ, c. 3.
Codd. cum ed. 1 omittunt hanc quaestionem, ad quam tamen infra in solutione ad 3. datur responsio; quare cum Vat. eam in textum recepimus.
The codices with ed. 1 omit this question, to which nevertheless below in the solution to 3 a response is given; for which reason with the Vatican [edition] we have received it into the text.
Vat., favente solo cod. cc, cum diversae sint definitiones sive assignentur de persona.
The Vatican [edition], with only cod. cc favoring, [reads] cum diversae sint definitiones sive assignentur de persona ("since there are diverse definitions or [they] are assigned of person").
In compluribus codd. desideratur naturae, et mox post vocem differentia ed. I addit quae est.
In several codices naturae ("of nature") is missing, and soon after, after the word differentia ed. I adds quae est ("which is").
Libr. VII. Metaph. text. 12. (VI. c. 4.). — Paulo superius aliqui codd. ut S T Z, per subiectum pro per substantiam. Inferius post totam cod. R adiungit rationem.
Book VII Metaphysics, text 12 (VI, c. 4). — A little above, some codices such as S T Z [read] per subiectum ("through the subject") in place of per substantiam ("through the substance"). Below, after totam ("the whole"), cod. R adds rationem ("the account").
Cod. Y: In creaturis specificatio fit per differentiam vel per additionem complentem.
Cod. Y: In creatures specification takes place through a differentia or through completing addition.
A cod. abest unde.
From a codex unde ("whence") is absent.
Vat. cum cod. cc, voci ideo praemisso et, omittit omnino. Immediate ante cod. O originem habet a se ipsa pro oritur se ipsa.
The Vatican [edition] with cod. cc, with et ("and") prefixed to the word ideo ("therefore"), omits [omnino ("at all")] altogether. Immediately before, cod. O [reads] habet a se ipsa ("has [its origin] from itself") in place of oritur se ipsa ("arises from itself") for originem.
Supple: definitio illa Boethii. — Mox vocula ista desideratur in plurimis mss. nec non in ed. I.
Supply: that definition of Boethius. — Soon after, the little word ista ("this") is missing in very many mss. and also in ed. I.
Monolog. c. 78: Quot personae, tot individuae sunt substantiae.
Monologion c. 78: As many as are the persons, so many are the individual substances.
Complures codd. ut G H T Z cum, et consequenter deinde supponat pro supponit.
Several codices such as G H T Z [read] cum ("when/since"), and consequently then supponat (subjunctive) in place of supponit (indicative).
Incommunicabilitas opponitur communicabilitati, quae duplex est, scilicet ut quod et ut quo. Per primam communicatur superius inferiori per identitatem et essentialiter, ut animal communicatur homini et praedicatur de homine. Communicabilitas ut quo fit per informationem, vel saltem ad modum formae. Haec est triplex, cui opponitur triplex incommunicabilitas. Prima fit per identitatem, ut natura communicatur suis suppositis et universale inferioribus; et tunc quod communicatur ut quo est etiam communicatum ut quod; unde est etiam praedicatio in primo modo dicendi, ut Petrus est homo. Secunda fit per compositionem in ratione formae et materiae, vel accidentis et subiecti. Hac communicatione id cui communicatur, non fit ipsum communicatum, sed aliquid tale, v. g. corpus, vivens etc. Tertia fit per unionem, ut natura humana Christi communicatur Verbo, ut ab illo sustentetur; quae unio non est proprie per informationem nisi secundum quandam analogiam. His tribus modis communicabilitatis respondet triplex incommunicabilitas; et his tribus modis persona est incommunicabilis. Cfr. S. Thom., hic q. I. a. 1. ad 7, et Scotus, III. Sent. d. I. q. 1. n. 9. et seqq. — Paulo infra pro alteri cod. S alii.
Incommunicability is opposed to communicability, which is twofold, namely as that which [ut quod] and as that by which [ut quo]. By the first, the superior is communicated to the inferior by identity and essentially, as animal is communicated to man and is predicated of man. Communicability as that by which takes place by information, or at least after the manner of form. This [latter] is threefold, to which is opposed a threefold incommunicability. The first takes place by identity, as a nature is communicated to its supposits and a universal to its inferiors; and then what is communicated as that by which is also communicated as that which; whence there is also predication in the first mode of saying, as Peter is man. The second takes place by composition in the account of form and matter, or of accident and subject. By this communication, that to which it is communicated does not become the very communicated [thing], but something such, e.g. body, living thing, etc. The third takes place by union, as the human nature of Christ is communicated to the Word, so as to be sustained by Him; which union is not properly by information except according to a certain analogy. To these three modes of communicability corresponds a threefold incommunicability; and in these three modes person is incommunicable. Cf. St. Thomas, here q. I, a. 1, ad 7, and Scotus, III Sent. d. I, q. 1, n. 9 and following. — A little below, in place of alteri ("to another") cod. S [reads] alii (synonymous "to another").
Scil. secundam et tertiam. — Vat. cum pluribus codd. hic et paulo infra incommunitates pro incommunicabilitates.
Namely the second and the third. — The Vatican [edition] with several codices here and a little below [reads] incommunitates in place of incommunicabilitates.

← Dist. 25, Art. 1, Q. 1 Dist. 25, Art. 2, Q. 1→