Dist. 25, Art. 1, Q. 1
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 25
ARTICULUS I. De quidditate nominis persona.
QUAESTIO I. Utrum nomen persona in divinis dicatur secundum substantiam, an secundum relationem.
Et quod persona dicatur secundum substantiam, videtur:
1. Ex verbis Augustini septimo de Trinitate1: «Idem est Deo esse et personam esse». Et iterum: «Cum dicimus personam Patris, non aliud dicimus quam substantiam Patris»: ergo persona nihil aliud dicit quam substantiam, ergo persona dicitur secundum substantiam.
2. Item, Anselmus in fine Monologii2: «Quot sunt personae, tot sunt substantiae»: ergo nomen personae dicitur secundum substantiam.
3. Item, Hugo de sancto Victore in libro de Sacramentis, in prima parte libri secundi3: «Unum solum nomen est substantiale, quod de singulis dicitur singulariter, in summa tamen non dicitur singulariter, sed pluraliter pronuntiatur, ut persona»: ergo hoc nomen persona est nomen substantiale.
4. Item, Boethius in libro de Duabus naturis et una persona Christi4 personam definiens dicit, quod «est rationalis naturae individua substantia»; sed si substantia praedicatur in recto, et non per accidens, sed secundum se: tunc ergo persona dicit substantiam secundum omnes doctores.
5. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione, et hoc per divisionem. Boethius5 enim venando definitionem personae dicit, quod aut est substantia, aut accidens; et dicit, quod non est accidens: ergo substantia. Si igitur persona in his inferioribus dicit substantiam et quid per se existens: ergo et in Deo.
6. Item, hoc videtur per eius absolutionem, quoniam omne nomen, quod dicitur ad se, dicit substantiam in divinis, quia tale non secundum relationem dicitur; sed hoc nomen persona est huiusmodi. Hoc patet; et Augustinus dicit septimo de Trinitate6: «Ad se quippe dicitur persona, ut bonus et magnus»: ergo etc.
7. Item, hoc videtur per Ecclesiae responsionem: quia omne nomen, quod convenienter respondetur ad quaestionem factam per quid, indicat substantiam, quia quid quaerit substantiam7; sed hoc nomen persona ab Ecclesia haereticis responsum est quaerentibus, quid tres, sicut dicit8 Augustinus et Magister: ergo indicat substantiam.
8. Item, hoc videtur relationis abstractione. Intelligamus, quod nulla relatio sit in divinis, et quod in una sola hypostasi sit divina natura, sicut intelligunt gentiles; tunc constat9, quod adhuc est intelligere naturam intellectualem et habentem illam: ergo et personam et naturam: ergo si, circumscripta omni relatione, salvus est intellectus personae, persona non dicitur secundum relationem. Et dicitur secundum relationem vel secundum substantiam: ergo dicitur secundum substantiam.
Contra:
1. Boethius in libro de Trinitate10, in fine: «Si personae divisae sunt, necesse est vocabulum, quod ex personis trahit originem, ad substantiam non pertinere». Si ergo quae trahunt originem a personis non pertinent ad substantiam, multo fortius nec nomen personae.
2. Item, Richardus de sancto Victore11 dicit, quod «persona idem est, quod per se existens, iuxta quendam singularis existentiae modum naturae rationalis»; sed singularis modus existentiae est relatio in divinis: ergo etc.
3. Item, ratione videtur, quia omne nomen quod recipit multitudinem vel plurificationem, pertinet ad relationem, quia secundum omnes substantia semper remanet indivisa. Et Boethius12 dicit, quod «substantia continet unitatem, relatio multiplicat trinitatem»: si ergo nomen personae est multiplicabile, patet quod dicitur secundum relationem.
4. Item, omne nomen de se importans distinctionem dicitur secundum relationem; sed nomen personae de se importat distinctionem, quia persona est hypostasis proprietate distincta; et Boethius13 dicit, quod «est individua», et individuatio non est aliud quam distinctio: ergo etc.
Conclusio. Persona in divinis dicitur tum secundum substantiam, tum secundum relationem; de generali intellectu dicitur principalius secundum substantiam quam secundum relationem; de speciali vero intellectu dicitur in Deo secundum relationem.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod aliqui voluerunt solvere distinguendo significationem personae secundum diversitatem numeri, ut in singulari diceretur secundum substantiam, in plurali secundum relationem14. (Opinio quorundam.) — Sed haec solutio neque valet in se, neque ad propositum. (Non probatur.) In se quidem non valet, quia omne plurale geminat suum singulare15, ergo non mutat significationem. Ad propositum non valet, quia dicitur in singulari: alia persona Patris, alia Filii, quod dici non posset, si esset terminus substantialis, cum non sit alia substantia Patris, alia Filii.
Alii voluerunt solvere per distinctionem significationis secundum diversa tempora, videlicet, quod ante responsionem Ecclesiae diceretur substantialiter et secundum substantiam, post responsionem diceretur secundum relationem. (Opinio aliorum.) — Sed haec solutio in se non valet nec ad propositum. (Improbatur.) In se non valet, quia Ecclesia aliqua ratione respondit16 magis illud nomen quam aliud substantiale; et tunc non imposuit significationem: ergo responsio Ecclesiae nihil facit ad mutationem significationis. Ad propositum non valet, quia secundum significationem, quam habet post responsionem Ecclesiae, loquuntur doctores, et currunt rationes ad utramque partem.
Et propterea est intelligendum, quod persona dicitur rationalis naturae suppositum proprietate distinctum, secundum omnes, qui intelligunt eius significationem specialem; sed suppositum rationalis naturae constat esse substantiam, proprietatem distinguentem constat esse relationem. (Sententia.) Cum ergo persona utrumque importet, scilicet suppositum et proprietatem, necesse est dici secundum substantiam et secundum relationem. Et cum dicatur secundum substantiam et secundum relationem, principalius dicitur secundum substantiam, quantum est de generali et primo nominis intellectu. Persona enim dicit suppositum certum substantiae, sive in Deo, sive in creaturis. Et huic consonat ipse17 modus dicendi a parte nominis.
Sed quantum est ex speciali et ultimo nominis intellectu, quia dicit suppositum distinctum proprietate, quae est relatio, dicitur in Deo secundum relationem. Et hinc est, quod Sancti et doctores dicunt, nomen personae secundum substantiam dici, licet etiam secundum relationem dicatur.
Sed obiiciet aliquis: cum isti modi, scilicet dici secundum substantiam, et dici secundum relationem, dividant nomina divina18 ex opposito, ut videtur; aut non poterunt inveniri in eodem, aut illud nomen implicat in se opposita. — Et propterea intelligendum, quod, sicut dicit Richardus de sancto Victore19, dici secundum substantiam est dupliciter: aut indicando substantiam secundum naturam communem, et sic dicitur homo secundum substantiam; aut indicando substantiam ut suppositum certum, ut quidam homo. Primo modo dicere substantiam est dicere quid, secundo modo est dicere aliquem. Dico ergo, quod nomen essentiae vel substantiae dicitur secundum substantiam, quia indicat naturam communem; sed persona dicitur secundum substantiam, quia indicat suppositum certum et distinctum. Natura autem communis non multiplicatur nec refertur; et ideo quod dicit substantiam secundum naturam communem, ita dicitur ad se, quod nullo modo potest dici secundum relationem; et hoc quidem modo dividitur ex opposito. Suppositum autem sive hypostasis natum est plurificari et ad aliud comparari et ita referri. Et quod sic dicitur secundum substantiam, nihil impedit ratione relationis superadditae dici secundum relationem; et hoc vult dicere Richardus de sancto Victore.
Patet ergo responsio ad obiecta omnia secundum utramque partem. Concedendum est enim, nomen personae secundum substantiam dici, ut explicatum est, sicut dicunt Sancti et rationes probant; ita enim intelligunt dici secundum substantiam. Concedendum est nihilominus, dici secundum relationem, licet non ita principaliter, sicut probant rationes sequentes, quoniam multitudo relationum plurificat ipsam personam.
(Solutio ad 7.) 7. Ad illud tamen quod obiicitur, quod respondetur ad quaestionem factam per quid, quia ex hoc20 posset concludi, quod non tantum dicit substantiam ut suppositum, sed etiam ut naturam communem: dicendum, quod quid aliquando quaerit essentiam supposito, quid est quod per nomen dicitur, ut: quid est homo? Et quod respondetur ad hanc quaestionem indicat substantiam pure et essentiam, quando est quaestio de substantia. Aliquando, supposita voce indeterminate, quaerit, quid per nomen dicitur, sicut si dicatur: Brunellus currit, et quaeratur: quid Brunellus? utrum scilicet homo, vel asinus. Aliquando, supposita quidditate et significatione, quaerit de eo, respectu cuius dicitur nomen dependens, ut si dicatur: albi currunt, et21 quaeratur, quid albi? potest responderi: homines, vel asini. Et hoc modo quaesierunt haeretici: quid tres? Quia beatus Ioannes dixerat in prima Canonica, capitulo quinto22: Tres sunt qui testimonium dant etc., quaesierunt: quid tres? — cum sit adiectivum sine substantivo; et tunc magis quaerit suppositum quam essentiam — et ideo suppositum est responsum, et hoc per nomen persona. Unde, Spiritu sancto suggerente, peroptime et nobiliter et catholice, sicut dicit Richardus23, respondit Ecclesia; et valde bene et instinctu Spiritus sancti, sicut dicit Richardus, magis respondit hoc nomen quam aliud.
(Quaestio incidens.) Sed tunc posset quaeri: quare haereticus non quaesivit per hoc interrogativum qui? et videtur quod debuisset. Si enim quaerebat de supposito, et qui quaerit de supposito; debuit quaerere: qui tres?
(Solutio.) Et ad hoc est responsio, quod qui quaerit de supposito certo, sive reali; et de illo non quaerebant, quia in eadem auctoritate subditur24: Pater, Verbum et Spiritus sanctus; sed quaerebant de supposito, respectu cuius hoc quod est tres significatur in adiacentia: et ideo magis quaesierunt: quid tres, quam qui tres. Sic enim oportuit unico nomine respondere, et ipsi hoc quaerebant.
8. Ad ultimum argumentum, quia non recte procedit, patebit melius infra25 responsio. Tamen haec potest dici, quod, etsi intellectus personae possit abstrahi ab hac proprietate determinate, tamen de suo generali26 intellectu, claudit intellectum proprietatis; et quia in divinis proprietas est relatio, ideo intellectu27 claudit relationem. Unde sicut haec persona in divinis, quae est Pater, non potest abstrahi a paternitate, quae est relatio personalis, salva sua personalitate; sic nec persona a relationis intellectu in generali. Et sic patet, quod non sequitur, quod dicatur secundum substantiam tantum.
I. Supra, d. 23. a. 1. q. 1, iam nonnulla de etymologia et significatione termini persona dicta sunt. Hic speciales de eadem re quaestiones solvuntur, et non pauca de ipsa ratione personae ponuntur. Non inutile esse putamus, iis quae supra in Scholio ad d. 23. a. 1. q. 3. de conceptu huius termini dicta sunt, haec addere.
1. In respons. legitur, «quod persona dicitur rationalis naturae suppositum proprietate distinctum». Haec definitio, saepius a Seraphico repetita, sumta est ex Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 36. m. 3. De Angelis S. Bonav., II. Sent. d. 3. p. I. a. 2. q. 2. dicit: «Quemadmodum individualis discretio est existentia formae naturalis in materia, sic personalis discretio est existentia naturae nobilis et supereminentis in supposito»; et ibid. q. 3: «Individuatio igitur in creatura consurgit ex duplici principio; personalis autem discretio dicit singularitatem et dignitatem. In quantum dicit singularitatem, hoc dicit ex ipsa coniunctione principiorum ex quibus resultat ipsum quod est; secundum dignitatem dicit principaliter rationem formae». Attendendum etiam est, quod iuxta Seraphicum substantiae spirituales altiorem gradum in genere substantiae et subsistentiae obtinent quam corporales. Nam II. Sent. d. 3. p. I. a. 1. q. 2. in corp. ait: «Et quoniam quod pure est in genere substantiae plus participat de natura per se stantis et independentis, quod autem plus accedit ad naturam accidentium magis elongatur: hinc est, quod substantiae spirituales per prius et verius sunt substantiae, deinde corpora superiora, postremo corpora inferiora». Cfr. III. Sent. d. 1. a. 1, et ibid. d. 5. passim, sed praecipue a. 2. q. 2. ad 1, ubi S. Doctor, totam suam de hac re doctrinam in epitomen colligens, dicit, quod «individuum in notificatione personae tripliciter importat distinctionem, videlicet singularitatis, incommunicabilitatis et supereminentis dignitatis», quae membra divisionis deinde accuratius explicantur.
2. Fides orthodoxa de Trinitate et Incarnatione docet, faciendam esse aliquam distinctionem tum in Deo, tum in creaturis intellectualibus inter personam et naturam. Loquendo de personis creatis, talis esse debet haec distinctio, quod in Christo completa esse possit singularis natura humana, quin habeat personam humanam; ex quo patet, personalitatem sive subsistentiam non pertinere ad praedicatum constitutivum naturae. In hoc etiam omnes doctores conveniunt, ipsam importare aliquem ultimum actum, substantiam perficientem vel terminantem, quo ipsa redditur omnino incommunicabilis. Quid autem praecise sit illud, quod persona addat super naturam, utrum aliquid reale, an ens rationis; utrum res, an modus; utrum quid positivum, an negativum, haec quaestio et doctores et scholas magnopere divisit. Duae opiniones extremae communiter reprobantur, scilicet et opinio, quae tribuitur Durando, quod illud additum nihil sit nisi ens rationis, et opposita Caietani, quod ipsum naturae addat entitatem absolutam, realiter a natura distinctam. Scotus probabile esse putat, rationem formalem personae consistere in privatione duplicis communicabilitatis, scilicet ut quod est et ut quo est (cfr. hic in quaest. sequente ad 3.), quae tamen connotat realitatem positivam, super quam istae negationes fundantur. Scotum autem etiam aliam sententiam probabilem aestimare, patet ex ipsius verbis (III. Sent. d. 1. q. 1.) et testimoniis plurium Scotistarum, ut Lycheti, Rada (controv. 22. a. 2.), Mastrii et aliorum. Communior sententia, cui favent S. Bonaventura et S. Thomas, asserit, personam addere super naturam aliquid positivum, quod a natura distinguitur non ut res a re, sed ut modus substantialis (Bonav., I. Sent. d. 34. q. 1. in corp. circa finem). S. Bonav. (hic a. 2. q. 1. in corp.) respectu opinionis a Scoto approbatae explicite dicit: «Quia privatio illa in persona magis est positio quam privatio» (cfr. ibid. q. 2. ad. 3, a. 1. q. 2; III. Sent. d. 10. a. 1. q. 2; et de persona in Deo I. Sent. d. 34. a. 1. q. 1.). Utramque sententiam longiore discursu in concordiam redigere conatur Hauzeur (Collatio tom. II. col. 267–277).
II. Prima huius distinctionis quaestio duas partes habet. In prima parte problema, in titulo quaestionis indicatum, reiectis duabus falsis solutionibus, resolvitur in eo sensu, quod persona utrumque importat, i. e. suppositum (sive substantiam primam) et relationem. Sed quid principalius? Respondet S. Bonav. cum eadem distinctione, qua utitur S. Thom. (S. I. q. 29. a. 4.), scilicet quod persona accepta in generali et primo intellectu huius nominis (S. Thomas: «in communi») principalius dicit substantiam, in speciali vero, ut haec persona divina, significat relationem.
In secunda parte solvitur obiectio, quod modi praedicandi secundum substantiam et relationem ita sint oppositi, ut non sint compossibiles in eodem subiecto. Responsio eruitur ex distinctione Aristotelica inter substantiam primam («suppositum certum») et secundam («essentiam»). Ex verbis S. Doctoris minime sequitur (quod nonnulli ei voluerunt impingere), personas divinas constitui per absolutas realitates. Constanter enim docet Seraphicus, quod in intellectu suppositi divini clauditur intellectus proprietatis, quae in divinis est relatio. Etiamsi igitur persona dicat substantiam primam in recto, tamen connotat relationem (cfr. solut. ad 1. et ult.). — Notandum autem, quod sicut substantia in duplici sensu accipitur, sic etiam relatio: vel enim, quatenus est relatio actu referens, vel ut est relatio subsistens, sive per modum hypostasis (S. Thom., S. I. q. 29. a. 4.). Si accipitur primo modo, relatio in ratione personae manifeste importatur tantum in obliquo; si autem accipitur secundo modo, recte dicitur cum S. Thoma (ibid.), quod persona in Deo significat relationem in recto et essentiam in obliquo. Hac supposita distinctione, explicatur diversus modus de hac re loquendi apud ipsum S. Thomam (De potent. q. 9. a. 4.) et S. Bonaventuram.
Obiect. 7. eodem modo solvitur a S. Thoma (loc. cit. Summae ad 2.).
III. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 36. m. 2. — Scot., hic q. unica; Report. hic q. 1. — S. Thom., I. Sent. d. 23. q. 1. a. 3; S. I. q. 3. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 53. q. 1. 2. — Durand., I. Sent. q. 29. a. 4. — B. Albert., I. Sent. d. 23. a. 2; S. p. I. tr. 10. q. 44. m. 1. — Petr. a Tar., I. Sent. d. 23. q. 1. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1. — Aegid. R., I. Sent. d. 23. q. 1. a. 1. — Dionys. Carth., I. Sent. d. 23. q. 2. — Biel, hic q. unica.
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ARTICLE I. On the quiddity of the name "person."
Question I. Whether the name "person" in the divine is said according to substance or according to relation.
And that "person" is said according to substance is shown thus:
1. From the words of Augustine in the seventh [book] On the Trinity1: «It is the same for God to be and to be a person». And again: «When we say the person of the Father, we say nothing other than the substance of the Father»: therefore "person" says nothing other than substance, therefore "person" is said according to substance.
2. Likewise, Anselm at the end of the Monologion2: «As many as are the persons, so many are the substances»: therefore the name "person" is said according to substance.
3. Likewise, Hugh of St. Victor in his book On the Sacraments, in the first part of the second book3: «The only substantial name there is, which is said of singulars singularly but in the sum total is not said singularly but is pronounced plurally, is persona»: therefore this name persona is a substantial name.
4. Likewise, Boethius in the book On the Two Natures and One Person of Christ4, defining "person," says that «it is an individual substance of rational nature»; but if "substance" is predicated in the direct case [in recto], and not by accident but according to itself: then therefore "person" expresses substance according to all the doctors.
5. Likewise, this same thing seems [to follow] by reason, and this through division. For Boethius5, hunting out the definition of "person," says that it is either a substance or an accident; and he says that it is not an accident: therefore a substance. If therefore "person" in these lower things expresses substance and a "what" existing through itself: therefore also in God.
6. Likewise, this is shown through its absolute character, since every name which is said of itself [ad se] expresses substance in the divine, because such a name is not said according to relation; but this name "person" is of this kind. This is plain; and Augustine says in the seventh [book] On the Trinity6: «For "person" is said of itself, like good and great»: therefore etc.
7. Likewise, this is shown through the response of the Church: because every name which is conveniently given in answer to a question made through what [per quid] indicates substance, since what asks for substance7; but this name "person" was given by the Church in answer to the heretics asking what are the three?, as Augustine and the Master8 say: therefore it indicates substance.
8. Likewise, this is shown by the abstraction of relation. Let us understand that there is no relation in the divine, and that the divine nature is in one sole hypostasis, as the gentiles understand; then it is plain9 that there is still to be understood an intellectual nature and one having that [nature]: therefore both a person and a nature: therefore if, with all relation circumscribed, the understanding of "person" is preserved, "person" is not said according to relation. And it is said either according to relation or according to substance: therefore it is said according to substance.
On the contrary:
1. Boethius in the book On the Trinity10, at the end: «If the persons are divided, it is necessary that the term which draws its origin from the persons does not pertain to substance». If therefore those things which draw their origin from the persons do not pertain to substance, much more so does not the name "person."
2. Likewise, Richard of St. Victor11 says that «"person" is the same as that which exists through itself, according to a certain singular mode of existence of rational nature»; but the singular mode of existence in the divine is relation: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, it is shown by reason, since every name which receives multitude or plurification pertains to relation, because according to all [doctors] substance always remains undivided. And Boethius12 says that «substance contains unity, [and] relation multiplies the trinity»: if therefore the name "person" is multipliable, it is plain that it is said according to relation.
4. Likewise, every name importing distinction of itself is said according to relation; but the name "person" of itself imports distinction, since "person" is a hypostasis distinct by a property; and Boethius13 says that «it is individual», and individuation is nothing other than distinction: therefore etc.
Conclusion. "Person" in the divine is said both according to substance and according to relation; in its general understanding it is said more principally according to substance than according to relation; but in its special understanding it is said in God according to relation.
I respond: It must be said that some have wished to resolve [this] by distinguishing the signification of "person" according to diversity of number, so that in the singular it would be said according to substance, in the plural according to relation14. (Opinion of certain ones.) — But this solution is valid neither in itself nor for the matter at hand. (Not proved.) In itself it is not valid, because every plural doubles its singular15, therefore it does not change its signification. For the matter at hand it is not valid, because it is said in the singular: the person of the Father is one, [the person] of the Son is another, which could not be said if it were a substantial term, since the substance of the Father is not one, [the substance] of the Son another.
Others have wished to resolve [it] by a distinction of signification according to different times, namely that before the response of the Church it would be said substantially and according to substance, [but] after the response it would be said according to relation. (Opinion of others.) — But this solution is not valid in itself nor for the matter at hand. (Disproved.) In itself it is not valid, because the Church for some reason gave16 that name [as response] rather than another substantial one; and then it did not impose the signification: therefore the response of the Church does nothing for the change of signification. For the matter at hand it is not valid, because the doctors speak according to the signification which it has after the response of the Church, and the reasonings on either side proceed.
And therefore it must be understood that "person" is said [to be] a supposit of rational nature distinct by a property, according to all who understand its special signification; but it is established that the supposit of rational nature is substance, [and] it is established that the distinguishing property is relation. (The author's view.) Since therefore "person" imports both, namely the supposit and the property, it must be said both according to substance and according to relation. And while it is said according to substance and according to relation, it is said more principally according to substance, as far as concerns the general and primary understanding of the name. For "person" expresses a definite supposit of substance, whether in God or in creatures. And to this corresponds the very17 mode of speaking on the side of the name.
But as far as concerns the special and ultimate understanding of the name, since it expresses a supposit distinct by a property, which is relation, it is said in God according to relation. And hence it is that the Saints and doctors say that the name "person" is said according to substance, although it is also said according to relation.
But someone will object: since these modes, namely being said according to substance and being said according to relation, divide the divine names18 oppositionally, as it seems; either they will not be able to be found in the same [name], or that name implies opposites in itself. — And therefore it must be understood that, as Richard of St. Victor19 says, being said according to substance is twofold: either by indicating substance according to the common nature, and thus man is said according to substance; or by indicating substance as a definite supposit, like a certain man. In the first mode, to express substance is to express a what; in the second mode it is to express a someone. I say therefore that the name of essence or substance is said according to substance, because it indicates the common nature; but "person" is said according to substance because it indicates a definite and distinct supposit. The common nature, however, is not multiplied nor referred; and therefore that which expresses substance according to the common nature is so said of itself [ad se] that it can in no way be said according to relation; and in this mode indeed it is divided oppositionally. But the supposit or hypostasis is by nature plurified and compared to another and so referred. And what is so said according to substance, nothing prevents [it] from being said according to relation by reason of a superadded relation; and this is what Richard of St. Victor wishes to say.
The response, then, is plain to all the objections on either side. For it must be conceded that the name "person" is said according to substance, as has been explained, as the Saints say and the reasons prove; for thus they understand "to be said according to substance." Nevertheless it must be conceded that it is said according to relation, although not so principally, as the following reasonings prove, since the multitude of relations plurifies the person itself.
(Solution to 7.) 7. To that, however, which is objected, that it is given in answer to a question made through what, since from this20 it could be concluded that it expresses substance not only as supposit but also as common nature: it must be said that what sometimes asks for the essence with a supposit assumed, what is that which is said by the name?, as: what is man? And what is given in answer to this question indicates substance purely and essence, when it is a question concerning substance. Sometimes, with the term assumed indeterminately, it asks what is said by the name?, as if it be said: Brunellus is running, and one asks: what [is] Brunellus?, namely whether man or ass. Sometimes, with the quiddity and signification assumed, it asks concerning that with respect to which the dependent name is said, as if it be said: the white things are running, and21 it be asked, what [are] the white things? — one can answer: men, or asses. And in this mode the heretics asked: what [are] the three? Because the blessed John had said in the first Canonical [letter], chapter five22: There are three who give testimony etc., they asked: what [are] the three? — since it is an adjective without a substantive; and then it asks for the supposit more than for the essence — and therefore the supposit was the answer, and this through the name "person." Whence, the Holy Spirit prompting, the Church responded most excellently and nobly and catholically, as Richard23 says; and very well and by the prompting of the Holy Spirit, as Richard says, it answered with this name rather than with another.
(Incidental question.) But then it could be asked: why did the heretic not ask through this interrogative who? and it seems that he ought to have. For if he was asking concerning the supposit, and who asks concerning the supposit, he ought to have asked: who [are] the three?
(Solution.) And to this the response is that who asks concerning a definite or real supposit; and concerning that they were not asking, because in the same authority is added24: the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit; but they were asking concerning the supposit with respect to which this which is three is signified in adjacency: and therefore they asked rather what [are] the three than who [are] the three. For thus it was fitting to answer with a single name, and they were asking this.
8. To the last argument, since it does not proceed rightly, the response will appear better below25. Yet this can be said, that, even if the understanding of "person" can be abstracted from this property determinately, nevertheless from its general26 understanding it includes the understanding of property; and since in the divine the property is relation, therefore [in this] understanding27 it includes relation. Whence just as this person in the divine, which is the Father, cannot be abstracted from paternity, which is the personal relation, with its personality preserved; so neither [can] "person" [be abstracted] from the understanding of relation in general. And thus it is plain that it does not follow that it is said according to substance only.
I. Above, d. 23, a. 1, q. 1, some things have already been said about the etymology and signification of the term persona. Here special questions on the same matter are resolved, and not a few things are set down concerning the very ratio of person. We think it not useless to add these things to those which were said above in the Scholion to d. 23, a. 1, q. 3 concerning the concept of this term.
1. In the response it is read, «that "person" is said [to be] a supposit of rational nature distinct by a property». This definition, often repeated by the Seraphic [Doctor], is taken from Alexander of Hales, Summa p. I, q. 36, m. 3. On the Angels, St. Bonaventure, II Sent. d. 3, p. I, a. 2, q. 2, says: «Just as individual discreteness is the existence of natural form in matter, so personal discreteness is the existence of a noble and supereminent nature in a supposit»; and ibid. q. 3: «Individuation, then, in a creature arises from a twofold principle; but personal discretion expresses singularity and dignity. Insofar as it expresses singularity, it expresses this from the very conjunction of principles from which results that-which-is; according to dignity it expresses principally the account of the form». It must also be attended to that according to the Seraphic [Doctor] spiritual substances obtain a higher grade in the genus of substance and subsistence than do bodily ones. For in II Sent. d. 3, p. I, a. 1, q. 2, in corp. he says: «And since what is purely in the genus of substance participates more in the nature of that which stands through itself and is independent, while that which approaches more to the nature of accidents is more remote: hence it is that spiritual substances are by priority and more truly substances, then the higher bodies, lastly the lower bodies». Cf. III Sent. d. 1, a. 1, and ibid. d. 5 throughout, but especially a. 2, q. 2, ad 1, where the Holy Doctor, gathering his whole doctrine on this matter into an epitome, says that «the individual in the notification of "person" imports threefold distinction, namely of singularity, incommunicability, and supereminent dignity», which members of the division are then more accurately explained.
2. The orthodox faith concerning the Trinity and the Incarnation teaches that some distinction must be made, both in God and in intellectual creatures, between person and nature. Speaking of created persons, this distinction must be such that in Christ there can be a complete singular human nature without His having a human person; from which it is plain that personality or subsistence does not pertain to the constitutive predicate of nature. In this also all the doctors agree, that it [personality] imports some ultimate act, perfecting or terminating substance, by which it is rendered altogether incommunicable. But what precisely it is that "person" adds beyond nature — whether something real or a being of reason; whether thing or mode; whether something positive or negative — this question has greatly divided both doctors and schools. Two extreme opinions are commonly rejected, namely the opinion attributed to Durandus, that the addition is nothing but a being of reason, and the opposing opinion of Cajetan, that it adds to the nature an absolute entity, really distinct from the nature. Scotus thinks it probable that the formal account of person consists in the privation of a twofold communicability, namely as that which is and as that by which it is (cf. here in the following question, ad 3), which nevertheless connotes a positive reality upon which these negations are founded. That Scotus also esteemed another opinion probable is plain from his own words (III Sent. d. 1, q. 1) and from the testimonies of several Scotists, such as Lychetus, Rada (controv. 22, a. 2), Mastrius and others. The more common opinion, which St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas favor, asserts that "person" adds beyond nature something positive, which is distinguished from nature not as thing from thing, but as a substantial mode (Bonav., I Sent. d. 34, q. 1, in corp. near the end). St. Bonaventure (here a. 2, q. 1, in corp.), with regard to the opinion approved by Scotus, explicitly says: «Because that privation in person is more a position than a privation» (cf. ibid. q. 2, ad 3; a. 1, q. 2; III Sent. d. 10, a. 1, q. 2; and on person in God, I Sent. d. 34, a. 1, q. 1). To reduce both opinions into harmony in a longer discourse Hauzeur attempts (Collatio tom. II, col. 267–277).
II. The first question of this distinction has two parts. In the first part the problem indicated in the title of the question, two false solutions having been rejected, is resolved in this sense: that "person" imports both, i.e. supposit (or first substance) and relation. But which is more principal? St. Bonaventure replies with the same distinction which St. Thomas uses (Summa I, q. 29, a. 4), namely that "person" taken in the general and primary understanding of this name (St. Thomas: «in common») more principally expresses substance, but in the special [understanding], as this divine person, signifies relation.
In the second part is resolved an objection, that the modes of predicating according to substance and according to relation are so opposed that they are not compatible in the same subject. The response is drawn from the Aristotelian distinction between first substance («definite supposit») and second («essence»). From the words of the Holy Doctor it does not follow in the least (which some have wished to fasten upon him), that the divine persons are constituted by absolute realities. For the Seraphic [Doctor] constantly teaches that in the understanding of the divine supposit is included the understanding of the property, which in the divine is relation. Although therefore "person" expresses first substance in the direct case, nevertheless it connotes relation (cf. solut. ad 1 and last). — But it is to be noted that just as substance is taken in a twofold sense, so also relation: either, namely, insofar as it is a relation actually referring, or as it is a subsistent relation, or by the mode of a hypostasis (St. Thomas, Summa I, q. 29, a. 4). If it is taken in the first mode, relation in the account of person is manifestly imported only in the oblique [case]; but if it is taken in the second mode, it is rightly said with St. Thomas (ibid.) that "person" in God signifies relation in the direct case and essence in the oblique. With this distinction supposed, the diverse mode of speaking concerning this matter in St. Thomas himself (De potentia q. 9, a. 4) and St. Bonaventure is explained.
Objection 7 is solved in the same way by St. Thomas (loc. cit. of the Summa, ad 2).
III. Alex. Hal., Summa p. I, q. 36, m. 2. — Scotus, here q. unica; Reportata here q. 1. — St. Thomas, I Sent. d. 23, q. 1, a. 3; Summa I, q. 3. — Henry of Ghent, Summa a. 53, q. 1, 2. — Durandus, I Sent. q. 29, a. 4. — Bl. Albert, I Sent. d. 23, a. 2; Summa p. I, tr. 10, q. 44, m. 1. — Petrus a Tarantasia, I Sent. d. 23, q. 1, a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, I Sent. d. 23, q. 1, a. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, I Sent. d. 23, q. 2. — Biel, here q. unica.
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- Cap. 6. n. 11. — Etiam textus subsequens invenitur ibid. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. et 2. — Vat. omittit primam conclusionem: ergo persona etc.Chapter 6, no. 11. — The text following is also found there. Cf. here the littera of the Master, c. 1 and 2. — The Vatican [edition] omits the first conclusion: therefore "person" etc.
- Cap. 78.Chapter 78.
- Cap. 4: Ad se quippe dicitur persona, non ad Filium vel ad Spiritum sanctum, sicut Deus et similia. Hoc enim solum nomen est, quod cum dicatur de singulis ad se, pluraliter non singulariter accipiatur in summa. Dicimus namque, quod Pater est persona, et Filius persona, et Spiritus sanctus persona. Pater tamen et Filius et Spiritus sanctus non una persona, sed tres.Chapter 4: For "person" is said of itself, not toward the Son or toward the Holy Spirit, as "God" and similar [names]. For this is the only name which, although it is said of singulars of itself, is received in the sum total plurally, not singularly. For we say that the Father is a person, and the Son a person, and the Holy Spirit a person. Yet the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are not one person, but three.
- Cap. 3. — Paulo inferius post in recto codd. H bb addunt et.Chapter 3. — A little below, after in recto codices H bb add et ("and").
- Loc. cit. c. 2: Investiganda igitur sunt haec inquirentibus hoc modo: quoniam praeter naturam non potest esse persona, quoniam quae naturae dicuntur, aliae substantiae sunt, aliae accidentes; et videmus, personam in accidentibus non posse constitui. Quis enim dicat, ullam albedinis vel nigredinis vel magnitudinis esse personam? Relinquitur ergo, ut personam in substantiis dici conveniat. — Immediate ante Vat. male et praeter fidem codd., excepto solo cod. cc, definitionem pro divisionem.Loc. cit. c. 2: These things therefore are to be investigated by inquirers in this manner: since besides nature there cannot be a person, [and] since of those things which are called natures, some are substances, others accidents; and we see that a person cannot be constituted among accidents. For who would say that there is any person of whiteness or blackness or magnitude? It remains therefore that "person" be fittingly said among substances. — Immediately before, the Vatican [edition], wrongly and against the faith of the codices (with the sole exception of cod. cc), [reads] definitionem in place of divisionem.
- Cap. 6. n. 11. — De maiori huius argumenti vide August., V. de Trin. c. 8. n. 9. Per absolutionem eius, intellige: quia habet esse absolutum, non relativum. — Paulo superius post tale cod. W addit nomen.Chapter 6, no. 11. — On the major of this argument, see Augustine, V On the Trinity c. 8, no. 9. Through its absolute character — understand: because it has absolute being, not relative. — A little before, after tale ("such") cod. W adds nomen ("name").
- Cfr. Aristot., II Poster. c. 1. seq.Cf. Aristotle, II Posterior [Analytics], c. 1 ff.
- Hic in lit. c. 2, ubi et verba Augustini indicantur.Here in the littera c. 2, where the words of Augustine are also indicated.
- Vat. cum solo cod. cc contingit.The Vatican [edition] with only cod. cc [reads] contingit ("it happens") [in place of constat].
- Melius in libro: «Utrum Pater et Filius ac Spiritus sanctus de divinitate substantialiter praedicentur», seu «de Praedicatione trium personarum», quem scripsit ad Ioannem, diaconum Ecclesiae Romanae. In ipso textu editio post divisae sunt adiungit: substantia vero indivisa; plures codd. ut IS ee H cum ed. 1 trahat pro trahit.Better [referenced] in the book «Whether the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are predicated of the divinity substantially», or «On the Predication of the Three Persons», which he wrote to John, deacon of the Roman Church. In the text itself the edition after divisae sunt ("they are divided") adds: substantia vero indivisa ("but the substance undivided"); many codices such as IS ee H with ed. 1 [read] trahat in place of trahit.
- Libr. IV. de Trin. c. 24: Fortassis erit planius et ad intelligentiam expeditius, si dicimus, quod persona sit existens per se solum iuxta singularem quendam rationalis existentiae modum. — Vat. cum cod. cc unde pro Item.Book IV On the Trinity, c. 24: Perhaps it will be plainer and more expeditious for understanding if we say that a person is that which exists through itself alone according to a certain singular mode of rational existence. — The Vatican [edition] with cod. cc [reads] unde ("whence") in place of Item ("likewise").
- Libr. de Trin. c. 6; in quo textu post relatio cod. bb cum antiquioribus edd. Boethii addit vero. — Paulo ante Vat. cum cod. cc omittit semper.Book On the Trinity, c. 6; in which text, after relatio cod. bb with the older editions of Boethius adds vero ("indeed"). — A little before, the Vatican [edition] with cod. cc omits semper ("always").
- Libr. de Duabus naturis et una persona Christi, c. 3. Vide supra arg. 1. ad opp. — De definitione personae immediate praemissa cfr. lit. Magistri, c. 3, et infra a. 1. q. 2. ad 1. — Paulo superius post sed aliqui codd. ut G K P Q aa bb inserunt hoc, et codd. aa bb post nomen adiiciunt scilicet; dein Vat. cum solo cod. cc post personae omittit de se.Book On the Two Natures and One Person of Christ, c. 3. See above arg. 1 ad oppositum. — On the definition of "person" immediately preceding, cf. the littera of the Master, c. 3, and below a. 1, q. 2, ad 1. — A little above, after sed some codices such as G K P Q aa bb insert hoc ("this"), and codices aa bb after nomen add scilicet ("namely"); then the Vatican [edition] with only cod. cc after personae omits de se ("of itself").
- Huius nec non et secundae sententiae, infra subsequentis, fuisse videtur Magister, hic c. 2. Cfr. S. Thom., de Potent. q. 9. a. 1.Of this view, and likewise of the second view following below, the Master here, c. 2, seems to have been [the source]. Cf. St. Thomas, On the Power [of God], q. 9, a. 1.
- Vide Priscian., V. Grammat. c. 9.See Priscian, V Grammar, c. 9.
- Vat. cum aliquibus codd. respondet; mox cod. R aliquod nomen substantiale pro aliud substantiale.The Vatican [edition] with some codices [reads] respondet ("responds") [in place of respondit ("responded")]; soon after, cod. R [reads] aliquod nomen substantiale ("some substantial name") in place of aliud substantiale ("another substantial [name]").
- Vat. cum solo cod. cc omittit ipse.The Vatican [edition] with only cod. cc omits ipse ("itself").
- Multi codd. ut A C F K L O T Y etc. cum antiquis edd. (exc. 1.) nomen divinum. Dein non pauci codd. cum ed. 1 exhibent potuerunt pro poterunt, omisso insuper primo aut.Many codices such as A C F K L O T Y etc. with the old editions (except ed. 1) [read] nomen divinum ("the divine name") [in place of nomina divina]. Then not a few codices with ed. 1 exhibit potuerunt in place of poterunt, with the first aut ("either") moreover omitted.
- Libr. IV. de Trin. c. 19, ubi dicit: Timentes itaque, ubi non est timor, recte timerent fateri, personas secundum substantiam dici, si persona simpliciter substantiale esse significaret, nec aliquid consignificaret. Significat autem, habentem substantiale esse ex aliqua singulari proprietate. Ideo ergo fidenter fatemur, personas in divinitate secundum substantiam dictas et substantiam significare, et plures ibi personas, non plures substantias esse; quia sunt ibi plures habentes unum et indifferens esse ex differenti proprietate. Unitas itaque ibi est iuxta modum essendi, pluralitas iuxta modum existendi; unitas essentiae, quia unum et indifferens esse; plures personae, quia plures existentiae.Book IV On the Trinity, c. 19, where he says: Fearing therefore where there is no fear, they would rightly fear to confess that the persons are said according to substance, if "person" simply signified substantial being, and did not co-signify anything else. But it does signify [a being] having substantial being from some singular property. Therefore we confidently confess that the persons in the divinity are said according to substance and signify substance, and [we confess] that there are several persons there, [but] not several substances; because there are there several [supposits] having one and indifferent being out of differing property. So unity there is according to the mode of being, plurality according to the mode of existence; unity of essence, because [one] one and indifferent being; many persons, because many existences.
- Vat., refragantibus codd. et ed. I, et ex hoc potest concludi.The Vatican [edition], with the codices and ed. I resisting, [reads] et ex hoc potest concludi ("and from this it can be concluded") [in place of quia ex hoc posset concludi].
- Vat. cum cod. cc non incongrue hic repetit si.The Vatican [edition] with cod. cc, not incongruously, here repeats si ("if").
- Vers. 7.Verse 7.
- Libr. IV. de Trin. c. 5. (quoad sensum), ubi et sequens textus exstat. — In primo textu cod. notabiliter pro nobiliter, et aliquot codd. cum Vat. hic et in secundo textu respondet pro respondit. — Paulo ante Vat. cum cod. cc et sic per hoc nomen pro et hoc per nomen.Book IV On the Trinity, c. 5 (as to sense), where the following text also stands. — In the first text a codex [reads] notabiliter ("notably") in place of nobiliter ("nobly"), and a few codices with the Vatican here and in the second text [read] respondet in place of respondit. — A little before, the Vatican with cod. cc [reads] et sic per hoc nomen ("and thus through this name") in place of et hoc per nomen ("and this through the name").
- Epist. I. Ioan. c. 5, 7. — Mox Vat. praeter fidem codd. et ed. 1 significat pro significatur.First Epistle of John, c. 5, [v.] 7. — Soon after, the Vatican [edition], against the faith of the codices and ed. 1, [reads] significat ("it signifies") in place of significatur ("it is signified").
- Dist. 27. p. I. q. 3. — Paulo ante Vat., paucis codd. suffragantibus, quod non recte procedat pro quia non recte procedit.Distinction 27, p. I, q. 3. — A little before, the Vatican [edition], with a few codices supporting, [reads] quod non recte procedat ("that it does not proceed rightly") in place of quia non recte procedit ("since it does not proceed rightly").
- Vat. speciali, refragantibus codd. nec non sex primis edd., insuper et repugnante contextu.The Vatican [edition] [reads] speciali ("special"), with the codices and the first six editions resisting, and moreover with the context conflicting.
- Codd. et edd. speciali. Sed ex contextu et doctrina in respons. explicata visum est nobis constare, ponendum esse in generali.The codices and editions [read] speciali ("special"). But from the context and the doctrine explained in the response, it has seemed to us evident that in generali ("in the general") must be put.