Dist. 29, Art. 2, Q. 1
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 29
ARTICULUS II. De principio quantum ad unitatem.
Consequenter est quaestio de secundo articulo, scilicet de unitate huius nominis principium, et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. Primo quaeritur, utrum Pater et Filius possint dici unum principium Spiritus sancti. Secundo utrum possint dici unus spirator vel idem principium Spiritus sancti.
QUAESTIO I. Utrum Pater et Filius dici possint unum principium Spiritus sancti.
Quod autem possint dici unum principium Spiritus sancti, videtur.
1. In littera dicitur: « Fatendum est, Patrem et Filium unum esse principium Spiritus sancti ».
2. Item, ratione videtur, quia unius principiati unum est principium in uno genere; sed Spiritus sanctus unus est: ergo habet unum principium. Ergo si immediate et perfecte est a Patre et Filio1, sunt ergo Pater et Filius unum principium.
3. Item, Pater et Filius spirant: aut ergo una potentia, aut duabus. Constat quod una, quia cum una est in eis essentia, est et una potentia: ergo cum tres2 dicantur esse principium ratione potentiae, et una sit potentia in Patre et Filio, patet etc.
4. Item, sicut tres personae unica creatione creant, ita duae unica spiratione spirant; sed tres, quia unica creatione creant, sunt unum principium creaturae: ergo duae unum principium Spiritus sancti.
Contra:
1. Cum dicitur: sunt unum principium Spiritus sancti, aut unum dicit unitatem essentiae, aut unitatem personae, aut notionis. Non essentiae, quia tunc Spiritus sanctus esset principium Spiritus sancti; non personae, quia tunc Pater et Filius essent una persona: ergo notionis. Sed contra: si Pater et Filius propter unitatem notionis dicuntur unum principium, ergo ab oppositis, Pater propter pluralitatem notionis potest dici plura principia.
2. Item, si Pater est principium Spiritus sancti, et Filius principium3, et hoc principium non est illud: ergo sunt duo principia.
3. Item, Pater et Filius sunt unum principium, ergo unum principium est Pater et Filius: et si hoc, ergo Pater est Filius.
4. Item, si unum sunt principium: aut unum, quod est Pater, aut unum, quod non est Pater. Si unum, quod est Pater: ergo Pater et Filius sunt
Pater. Si unum, quod non est Pater: ergo4 principium Spiritus sancti non est Pater: ergo Pater non est principium Spiritus sancti.
CONCLUSIO. Pater et Filius recte dicuntur unum principium Spiritus sancti, quo significatur unitas notionis, in comparatione tamen ad unitatem essentiae et potentiae spirativae.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod omnes istam concedunt: Pater et Filius sunt unum principium Spiritus sancti, quoniam Augustinus5 istam proponit et dicit; sed in modo intelligendi diversificantur.
Nam quidam dicunt, quod hoc nomen principium non dicit ibi essentiam nec notionem nec personam, sed dicit convenientiam duarum personarum in unica notione. Et dicunt, quod sicut hoc nomen trinus specialiter est impositum ad insinuandam trinitatem suppositorum, ut conveniunt in unitate naturae; sic in proposito dicunt se habere. — Sed cum non sit facile huiusmodi positionem sive translationem ex virtute vocabuli accipere, haec positio nullam dignoscitur habere firmitatem.
Et ideo fuerunt alii, qui dixerunt, quod hoc nomen principium importat notionem in adiacentia, et est nomen adiective retentum; et ideo hoc adiectivum nominis numerale, quod est unum, cadit a ratione nominis et tenetur adverbialiter, ut sit sensus: Pater et Filius sunt unum principium, id est, uno modo producunt sive spirant Spiritum sanctum. — Sed quoniam hoc nomen principium de sua impositione est nomen substantivum, ut patet, non videtur adhuc positio ista rationabilis.
Et ideo fuerunt tertii, qui dixerunt, quod hoc nomen principium, quantum est de se, stat pro essentia et contingit ipsum per additionem trahi ad personam. Et cum dicitur: Pater est principium Filii, trahitur ad personam Patris; quando vero dicitur: Pater et Filius sunt unum principium Spiritus sancti, stat pro essentia vel natura, in quantum tamen est in duabus personis. Et illud videtur consonare Anselmo6 dicenti, quod « Pater et Filius spirant, in quantum uterque idem Deus ». Et dicunt, quod unum dicit unitatem circa hunc terminum principium non personae, sed essentiae vel naturae, ut est in duabus personis. — Sed quoniam Augustinus7 videtur dicere, quod principium, dictum de Patre et Filio, dicat notionem communem; similiter Magister dicit ultimo capitulo, quod dicit unitatem notionis; et principium importat notionem8, et essentia non refertur: ideo nec iste modus est adhuc omnino conveniens, licet sit aliis probabilior.
Et ideo est quartus modus dicendi, quod hoc nomen principium stat pro notione, non tamen9 in comparatione ad suppositum, sed ad naturam et vim spirativam; et unum importat unitatem circa ipsum, secundum quod competit eius acceptioni.
Et hoc patet sic: cum enim Pater et Filius spirent Spiritum sanctum, in quantum unus Deus improcessibilis; et in quantum unus Deus, sit in eis voluntatis unitas; in quantum improcessibilis, sit voluntatis fecunditas; et in quantum unus Deus improcessibilis, sit in eis voluntatis una fecunditas10, et una fecunditas dicat unitatem principii, quae est in duabus personis. — Sed quoniam Augustinus videtur dicere, quod principium, dictum de Patre et Filio, dicat notionem communem; et unum dicit unitatem circa principium; dicendum, quod sine distinctione concedendum est, quod Pater et Filius sunt unum principium Spiritus sancti.
1. Et ad illud quod quaeritur, quam unitatem dicat hoc unum quod est unum circa principium; dicendum, quod cum hoc nomen principium de pluribus simul dicatur, non potest stare pro persona; et cum iterum dicat respectum ad personam, non potest stare pro essentia: ergo necesse est, quod stet pro notione. Cum ergo dicitur: Pater et Filius sunt unum principium, unum dicit unitatem notionis, in comparatione tamen ad unitatem naturae et vis spirativae, sicut patebit in alio problemate11 et patet etiam ex praedictis.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur postmodum, quod hoc principium non est illud, demonstrato Patre et Filio; responderi potest dupliciter. Primo quidem, quod non potest dici hoc et illud, quia per regulam non cadit distinctio, nisi ubi est ex diversis causis unio12. Quoniam igitur unio omnimoda est in nomine principii, ita quod non multiplicatur, ideo non est ibi dicere hoc et illud. — Aliter potest dici, quod cum dicitur hoc et illud, aut demonstrat formam, aut suppositum, aut utrumque: si formam, falsa est; si suppositum vel utrumque, vera est ratione suppositi13; et ideo non sequitur, quod duo, quia forma non multiplicatur. Similiter potest argui in hoc nomine Deus.
3. Ad duo sequentia respondent quidam, quod hoc nomen principium non potest subiici, nec ad ipsum potest fieri relatio, quia tenetur adiective14. — Sed illud nihil est, quia nomen est substantivum, ergo potest subiici et praedicari et ad ipsum relatio fieri15. — Et si dicant, quod ad hoc inventum est illud; nihil est, quia non potest probari. Et iterum, inventio debet habere rationem; et nos videmus, quod potest fieri relatio, ut si dicatur: In principio erat Verbum16, in quo principio erat Spiritus, quia non in alio erat, sed in eodem. Potest etiam subiici: quia si Pater est principium Spiritus sancti, a simplici conversa, principium Spiritus sancti est Pater.
Propter hoc aliter respondendum, quia, cum dicitur unum principium, unum dicit unitatem notionis, quae communis est duobus; et quia unitatem dicit communem, ideo est hic consequens17: unum principium Spiritus sancti est Filius et Pater: ergo Filius est Pater, sicut hic: unus Deus est Pater et Filius: ergo Pater est Filius.
4. Ad ultimum quod obiicitur: aut unum, quod est Pater etc.; dicendum, quod quia unum dicit communem spirationem, ut est in pluribus, ideo non contingit dividere: aut unum quod est Pater, aut unum quod non est Pater — ut si dicatur: omnis homo est animal; aut animal quod est album, aut animal quod non est album, neutrum est dare18, quia animal communiter stat pro animali albo et non albo, ita quod pro utroque simul reddit locutionem veram. Similiter in proposito, principium stat pro principio, quod est Pater, et quod est Filius; et ideo non licet ibi dividere et descendere, immo est ibi figura dictionis ex mutatione suppositionis19.
I. De hac quaestione Ecclesia postea definitiones ad fidem spectantes proposuit. Nam Concilium Lugdunense II. dicit, quod « Spiritus S. aeternaliter ex Patre et Filio, non tanquam ex duobus principiis, sed tanquam ex uno principio, non duabus spirationibus, sed unica spiratione procedit »; et Florentinum (Decret. unionis Graecor.) decrevit, quod Spiritus S. « ex utroque (Patre et Filio) tanquam ab uno principio et unica spiratione procedit ». — Doctor eandem quaestionem iam supra d. 11. q. 2. tractavit; hic autem eam reassumit, praecipue ut difficultatem quandam (arg. 1. ad opposit.) solvat, nec non accuratius explicet, quo sensu hic unum principium intelligendum sit. De hoc sensu dissentiebant theologi illius aetatis; unde hic ponuntur quatuor sententiae.
II. Quarta opinio, a S. Doctore recepta, consistit in duabus propositionibus. Prima est: principium hic stat pro notione, attamen in comparatione ad naturam et vim spirativam, sive ad principium quo spirationis et remotum, quod est natura, et proximum, quod est potentia spirandi. Secunda est: unum hic importat unitatem notionis in comparatione ad vim spirativam. Unde secundum S. Bonaventuram principium hic importat duo, scilicet tam notionem (spiratio activa), quam potentiam spirandi. Huic consentit Scotus, qui tamen putat, quod principaliter potentiam spirandi importet ac connotetur notio sive spiratio activa; sed Seraphicus potius principaliter significari ipsam notionem affirmat. Nec dissentit S. Thomas (S. I. q. 36. a. 4. ad 1.) dicens, quod Spiritus S. procedit a Patre et Filio, in quantum sunt unum in virtute spirativa, quae quodammodo significat naturam cum proprietate. Ceterum circa potentiam spirandi eadem rodit difficultas et opinionum varietas quam supra (d. 7. q. 1.) observavimus circa potentiam generandi, scil. utrum importet aliquid absolutum, vel relativum. Eandem mediam sententiam, quam in d. 7. Seraphico vindicavimus, etiam quoad potentiam spirandi ab eodem teneri, satis patet ex ultima propositione in solut. ad 1, et ex respons. ad quaest. seq., praesertim ex verbis: « Ideo dicimus: Pater et Filius sunt » etc.
III. In arg. ad opposit. post verba Sed contra, profertur 1. argumentum, quod militat contra sententiam S. Doctoris; quod tamen non hic solvitur, sed in quaest. seq. (in corp.) a verbis: « Hinc est, quod Pater » etc. (cfr. etiam S. Thom., loc. cit. ad 2.). — Ad 2. opposit. duplex datur solutio: prima eruitur ex generali quadam regula ibi tradita; secunda ex hoc principio, quod in divinis ex pluralitate suppositorum non sequitur pluralitas formae. Exemplum est, quod deitas (forma) non multiplicatur, licet sit in tribus personis. Similiter potest esse una fecunditas producendi sive una notio in persona Patris et Filii. Et simili modo hoc arg. ad opposit. solvitur ex illo principio, quod ex unitate formae in Deo non sequitur unitas personarum. — Solut. ad 4. eodem modo fit a S. Thom., loc. cit. ad 4.
IV. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 70. m. 3. a. 3. 6. — Scot., de hac et seq. q. I. Sent. d. 12. q. 1; Report. ibid. q. 1. 2. — S. Thom., I. Sent. d. 11. q. 1. a. 3. 4; S. I. q. 36. a. 4. — B. Albert., hic a. 4; S. p. I. tr. 7. q. 31. m. 3. q. 1. incident. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. unica, a. 5. — Richard. a Med., I. Sent. d. 11. q. 3, et hic q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 3. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 60. q. 7. — Durand., hic q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., d. 11. q. 3, et hic q. 4.
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ARTICLE II. On the principle as to unity.
Next there is a question concerning the second article, namely on the unity of this name principle, and concerning this two questions are asked. First it is asked whether Father and Son can be called one principle of the Holy Spirit. Second, whether they can be called one spirator or the same principle of the Holy Spirit.
QUESTION I. Whether Father and Son can be called one principle of the Holy Spirit.
That they can be called one principle of the Holy Spirit, it appears.
1. In the littera it is said: "It must be confessed that the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit."
2. Likewise, by reason it appears, since of one thing-from-a-principle there is one principle in one genus; but the Holy Spirit is one: therefore he has one principle. Therefore if he is immediately and perfectly from the Father and the Son1, then the Father and the Son are one principle.
3. Likewise, the Father and the Son spirate: therefore either by one power, or by two. It is plain that [it is] by one, since since there is one essence in them, there is also one power: therefore since the three2 are said to be principle by reason of power, and there is one power in the Father and the Son, it is plain etc.
4. Likewise, just as the three persons by a single creation create, so two by a single spiration spirate; but the three, since by a single creation they create, are one principle of the creature: therefore the two [are] one principle of the Holy Spirit.
On the contrary:
1. When it is said: they are one principle of the Holy Spirit, either one expresses unity of essence, or unity of person, or of notion. Not of essence, since then the Holy Spirit would be principle of the Holy Spirit; not of person, since then the Father and the Son would be one person: therefore of notion. But on the contrary: if the Father and the Son, on account of unity of notion, are called one principle, then by opposites, the Father, on account of plurality of notion, can be called several principles.
2. Likewise, if the Father is principle of the Holy Spirit, and the Son [is] principle3, and this principle is not that one: therefore there are two principles.
3. Likewise, the Father and the Son are one principle, therefore the one principle is the Father and the Son: and if so, then the Father is the Son.
4. Likewise, if they are one principle: either one which is the Father, or one which is not the Father. If one which is the Father: then the Father and the Son are the Father. If one which is not the Father: therefore4 the principle of the Holy Spirit is not the Father: therefore the Father is not the principle of the Holy Spirit.
CONCLUSION. The Father and the Son are rightly called one principle of the Holy Spirit, by which is signified unity of notion, yet in comparison with the unity of essence and of the spirative power.
I respond: It must be said that all concede this: that the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit, since Augustine5 proposes and says it; but they differ in the mode of understanding.
For some say that this name principle there does not express essence, nor notion, nor person, but expresses the agreement of two persons in a single notion. And they say that just as this name threefold (trinus) is specially imposed to indicate the trinity of supposits insofar as they agree in unity of nature, so they say it is in the matter at hand. — But since it is not easy to grasp such a position or transferred sense from the force of the word, this position is recognized to have no firmness.
And so there were others, who said that this name principle imports a notion in adjacency, and is a name held adjectivally; and therefore this numeral adjective, one, falls away from the account of a noun and is held adverbially, so that the sense is: the Father and the Son are one principle, that is, in one mode they produce or spirate the Holy Spirit. — But since this name principle, by its imposition, is a substantive name, as is plain, this position does not yet seem reasonable.
And so there were a third [group], who said that this name principle, of itself, stands for the essence, and it happens that it is drawn by addition to the person. And when it is said: the Father is the principle of the Son, it is drawn to the person of the Father; but when it is said: the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit, it stands for the essence or nature, yet insofar as it is in two persons. And this seems consonant with Anselm6, who says that "the Father and the Son spirate, insofar as each is the same God." And they say that one expresses unity around this term principle not of person, but of essence or nature, as it is in two persons. — But since Augustine7 seems to say that principle, said of the Father and the Son, expresses a common notion; similarly the Master says in the last chapter that it expresses unity of notion; and principle imports a notion8, and the essence is not referred [relationally]: therefore neither is this mode yet entirely fitting, although it is more probable than the others.
And so there is a fourth manner of speaking, that this name principle stands for a notion, yet not9 in comparison with a supposit, but with the nature and the spirative power; and one imports unity around it, according to what befits its acceptation.
And this is plain thus: for since the Father and the Son spirate the Holy Spirit insofar as [they are] one God who cannot proceed (improcessibilis); and insofar as [they are] one God, there is in them a unity of will; insofar as [they are] non-processible, there is a fecundity of will; and insofar as [they are] one non-processible God, there is in them one fecundity of will10, and one fecundity expresses unity of principle, which is in two persons. — But since Augustine seems to say that principle, said of the Father and the Son, expresses a common notion; and one expresses unity around principle; it must be said that without distinction it must be conceded that the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit.
1. And to that which is asked, what unity this one, which is "one around principle," expresses; it must be said that since this name principle is said of several at the same time, it cannot stand for a person; and since again it expresses respect to a person, it cannot stand for essence: therefore it is necessary that it stand for a notion. Therefore when it is said: the Father and the Son are one principle, one expresses unity of notion, yet in comparison with the unity of nature and of the spirative power, as will appear in another problem11, and is also plain from what has been said.
2. To that which is objected afterward, that this principle is not that one, when the Father and the Son are pointed out; one can respond in two ways. First indeed, that one cannot say this and that, since by the rule no distinction occurs except where there is union from diverse causes12. Since therefore the union is total in the name of principle, such that it is not multiplied, therefore one cannot say this and that there. — Otherwise it can be said that when this and that is said, either it points out form, or supposit, or both: if form, it is false; if supposit or both, it is true by reason of the supposit13; and therefore it does not follow that [there are] two, since the form is not multiplied. Similarly one can argue in this name God.
3. To the two following [arguments] some respond that this name principle cannot be a subject, nor can a relation be made to it, since it is held adjectivally14. — But that is nothing, since the name is substantive, therefore it can be subject and predicate, and a relation can be made to it15. — And if they say that it was invented for this; this is nothing, since it cannot be proved. And again, an invention must have a reason; and we see that a relation can be made, as if one says: In the principle was the Word16, in which principle was the Spirit, since he was not in another but in the same. It can also be a subject: since if the Father is principle of the Holy Spirit, by simple conversion, the principle of the Holy Spirit is the Father.
For this reason it must be answered otherwise, that, since one principle is said, one expresses unity of notion, which is common to two; and since it expresses a common unity, therefore it is here a [fallacy of] consequent17: the one principle of the Holy Spirit is the Son and the Father: therefore the Son is the Father, just as here: the one God is the Father and the Son: therefore the Father is the Son.
4. To the last [argument] which is objected: either one which is the Father, etc.; it must be said that since one expresses the common spiration, as it is in several, therefore one cannot divide: either one which is the Father, or one which is not the Father — as if one were to say: every man is animal; either an animal which is white, or an animal which is not white — neither is to be granted18, since animal stands commonly for a white animal and a non-white one, such that it renders the locution true for both at once. Similarly in the matter at hand, principle stands for a principle which is the Father, and which is the Son; and therefore one is not allowed to divide and descend there, but rather there is a figure of speech from a change of supposition19.
I. Concerning this question the Church afterwards proposed definitions pertaining to the faith. For the Second Council of Lyons says that "the Holy Spirit eternally proceeds from the Father and the Son, not as from two principles, but as from one principle, not by two spirations, but by a single spiration"; and Florence (Decree of Union of the Greeks) decreed that the Holy Spirit "from both (the Father and the Son), as from one principle and by a single spiration, proceeds." — The Doctor already treated the same question above at d. 11. q. 2.; here, however, he reassumes it, especially in order to solve a certain difficulty (arg. 1. ad opposit.), and also more accurately to explain in what sense one principle is here to be understood. Concerning this sense the theologians of that age disagreed; whence here four opinions are set out.
II. The fourth opinion, received by the holy Doctor, consists in two propositions. The first is: principle here stands for a notion, yet in comparison with the nature and the spirative power, that is, with the principle by which (quo) of spiration, both remote — which is the nature — and proximate — which is the power of spirating. The second is: one here imports unity of notion in comparison with the spirative power. Whence according to St. Bonaventure principle here imports two things, namely both the notion (active spiration) and the power of spirating. With this Scotus agrees, who however thinks that it principally imports the power of spirating, and that the notion or active spiration is connoted; but the Seraphic [Doctor] rather affirms that the notion itself is principally signified. Nor does St. Thomas dissent (Summa I. q. 36. a. 4. ad 1.), saying that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son insofar as they are one in the spirative virtue, which somehow signifies nature with property. Moreover, concerning the power of spirating the same difficulty and variety of opinions gnaws, which we observed above (d. 7. q. 1.) concerning the power of generating, namely whether it imports something absolute or relative. That the same middle position, which we vindicated for the Seraphic [Doctor] in d. 7., is held by him also concerning the power of spirating, is sufficiently plain from the last proposition in the solut. ad 1, and from the response to the following question, especially from the words: "Therefore we say: the Father and the Son are" etc.
III. In the arg. ad opposit., after the words Sed contra, the 1st argument is brought forward, which militates against the opinion of the holy Doctor; this however is not solved here, but in the following question (in the body) from the words: "Hence it is, that the Father" etc. (cf. also St. Thomas, at the place cited, ad 2.). — To the 2nd ad opposit. a twofold solution is given: the first is drawn from a certain general rule there set forth; the second from this principle, that in divine [things] from a plurality of supposits there does not follow a plurality of form. The example is that the deity (form) is not multiplied, although it be in three persons. Similarly, there can be one fecundity of producing, or one notion, in the person of the Father and of the Son. And in a similar manner this argument ad opposit. is solved from that principle, that from the unity of form in God there does not follow unity of persons. — The solution to the 4th is made in the same manner by St. Thomas, at the place cited, ad 4.
IV. Alexander of Hales, Summa p. I. q. 70. m. 3. a. 3. 6. — Scotus, on this and the following [question], q. I., Sent. d. 12. q. 1; Report. ibid. q. 1. 2. — St. Thomas, I. Sent. d. 11. q. 1. a. 3. 4; Summa I. q. 36. a. 4. — Bl. Albert, here a. 4; Summa p. I. tr. 7. q. 31. m. 3. q. 1. incident. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. unica, a. 5. — Richard of Mediavilla, I. Sent. d. 11. q. 3, and here q. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, here 1. princ. q. 3. — Henry of Ghent, Summa a. 60. q. 7. — Durandus, here q. 2. — Dionysius Carthusianus, d. 11. q. 3, and here q. 4.
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- Cfr. d. 12. q. 2.Cf. d. 12. q. 2.
- Cod. T tres personae; cod. et ed. I res dicant.Cod. T [reads] tres personae ("three persons"); a [further] codex and ed. I [read] res dicant ("things may say").
- Supple cum codd. aa bb: Spiritus sancti.Supply with codices aa bb: Spiritus sancti ("of the Holy Spirit").
- Cod. interserit unum.A codex interpolates unum ("one").
- Vide hic in lit. Magistri, c. 3.See here in the littera of the Master, c. 3.
- Libr. de Process. Spir. S. c. 21: Sed nullus sensus capit, Spiritum sanctum esse Spiritum Patris aut Filii, secundum quod alter est Pater, alter Filius, sed secundum quod uterque unus idemque Deus est. Cfr. ibi c. 7, et Monolog. c. 54.Book On the Procession of the Holy Spirit, c. 21: "But no sense grasps that the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of the Father or of the Son according as one is the Father, the other the Son, but according as each is one and the same God." Cf. ibid. c. 7, and Monologion c. 54.
- Vide hic in lit. Magistri, c. 3.See here in the littera of the Master, c. 3.
- Vat. cum cod. cc relationem.The Vatican [edition] with cod. cc [reads] relationem ("a relation").
- Non pauci codd. antiqui ut A S T Z etc. cum ed. I tantum; quae lectio, licet difficilior, non est falsa.Not a few ancient codices, such as A S T Z, etc., with ed. I, [read] tantum ("only"); which reading, although more difficult, is not false.
- Hic codd. dissentiunt inter se, alii omittendo unus, alii in eis; Vat. omittit et unus et in eis; textum integrum bene exhibent codd. L M Z cum ed. I.Here the codices disagree among themselves, some omitting unus ("one"), others in eis ("in them"); the Vatican [edition] omits both unus and in eis; the integral text is well exhibited by codices L M Z with ed. I.
- Quaest. seq. — Mox a Vat. abest etiam.The following question. — Shortly afterwards etiam ("also") is absent from the Vatican [edition].
- Explicationem huius regulae vide supra d. 4. q. 2. in corp. Hinc patet, quod, sicut tres personae divinae uniuntur in nomine Deus, ita Pater et Filius in nomine principii. — Paulo inferius post ibi in Vat. et cod. cc desideratur dicere.For the explanation of this rule see above d. 4. q. 2. in the body. Hence it is plain that, just as the three divine persons are united in the name God, so the Father and the Son [are united] in the name of principle. — A little below, after ibi, in the Vatican [edition] and cod. cc dicere ("to say") is missing.
- Cod. T bene adiungit falsa ratione formae.Cod. T well adds falsa ratione formae ("false by reason of form").
- Ita et Alanus ab Insulis, libr. Theolog. Regul. regul. 51; Sed haec nulla videtur ratio. Quamvis enim est adiectivum significatione, tamen est substantivum voce, sicut hoc nomen dominus, hoc nomen auctor.So also Alan of Lille, book Theological Rules, regula 51; But this seems no reason. For although [principium] is adjectival in signification, yet it is substantive in voice, like this name lord (dominus), this name author (auctor).
- Pro et ad ipsum omnes codd. et edd. hic ponunt ad eum; etiam paulo superius codd. et ed. I nec ad eum pro nec ad ipsum, quod habent Vat. et aliae edd. Utrobique lectio ad eum mendum esse nobis visum est.For et ad ipsum ("and to it") all the codices and editions here put ad eum ("to him"); also a little above, the codices and ed. I [have] nec ad eum ("nor to him") for nec ad ipsum ("nor to it"), which the Vatican [edition] and other editions have. In both places the reading ad eum has appeared to us to be a mistake.
- Ioan. 1, 1. — Mox pro Potest etiam cod. T Potest praedicari ei.John 1:1. — Shortly afterwards, in place of Potest etiam ("It can also") cod. T [reads] Potest praedicari ei ("It can be predicated of it").
- Intellige: fallacia consequentis. — Pro hic cod. Q ibi.Understand: fallacy of the consequent. — For hic ("here") cod. Q [reads] ibi ("there").
- Vat. cum cod. cc dari; perperam.The Vatican [edition] with cod. cc [reads] dari ("to be granted" [passive]); erroneously.
- De terminis ad Logicam spectantibus, qui in hac solutione occurrunt, cfr. Scholion supra pag. 98, seq.On the terms pertaining to Logic which occur in this solution, cf. the Scholion above p. 98, et seq.