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Dist. 29, Art. 1, Q. 2

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 29

Textus Latinus
p. 510

QUAESTIO II. Utrum hoc nomen principium, si sumitur essentialiter et notionaliter, dicatur univoce, an aequivoce.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum nomen principium, cum accipiatur essentialiter et notionaliter, dicatur univoce, vel aequivoce. Et quod univoce, videtur.

1. Basilius1 dicit, quod Filio Dei accipere cum creaturis est commune, sed habere per essentiam proprium. Si igitur commune est accipere: ergo et dare; et si hoc, cum penes hoc accipiatur ratio principii respectu Filii et respectu creaturae, videtur, quod dicatur univoce.

2. Item, sic differt principium essentialiter dictum et notionaliter, sicut sapientia et sapientia genita; sed non dicitur aequivoce sapientia sic et sic: ergo etc.

3. Item, nihil dicitur multipliciter2 ex hoc, quod dicitur de genere et de specie, sive ex hoc, quod habet unum suppositum et plura — quia multiplicitas respicit significationes diversas, non supposita — sed principium essentialiter dictum est in plus et pluribus convenit quam notionaliter et convenit eisdem ipsis: ergo non dicitur multipliciter, sed univoce.

4. Item, quod non dicatur analogice, videtur, quia ubi est analogia, ibi est prius et posterius; sed in divinis non est prius et posterius: ergo nec analogia. — Et iterum videtur, quod nec aequivoce, quia ubi est aequivocatio, ibi est diversitas significationis; sed persona et essentia non sunt diversa: ergo non potest accipi aequivoce.

Sed contra:

1. Quod dicatur multipliciter, videtur primo per Magistrum in littera3, qui dicit, quod hoc nomen principium multiplicem facit intelligentiam: ergo dicitur multipliciter.

2. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione, quia isti actus generare, spirare, creare sunt ipsius principii, secundum quod differenter accipitur; sed non est unam communem rationem invenire ad istos actus: ergo nec ad principium, quod dicit respectum sic differentem.

3. Item, regula est Philosophi4, quod si aliquid in una sui acceptione habet unum oppositum et in alia aliud, dicitur multipliciter; sed principium essentialiter dicitur respectu creati, et notionaliter respectu increati: ergo multipliciter sic et sic.

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4. Item, principium essentialiter dictum dicitur temporaliter, notionaliter dictum aeternaliter; sed nihil est commune univocum aeterno et temporali: ergo etc.

CONCLUSIO. Nomen principii, essentialiter et notionaliter dictum, accipitur nec univoce nec aequivoce, sed analogice.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod nomen accipi differenter in divinis potest esse tripliciter: aut quantum ad suppositum, aut quantum ad significatum, aut quantum ad connotatum. Primo modo accipitur differenter hoc nomen Deus, cum dicitur: «Deus est Trinitas», et «Deus generat», quia in prima stat pro natura, in secunda pro persona; et illud non inducit aliquam multiplicitatem5. — Alio modo contingit terminum differenter accipi quantum ad significatum, secundum quod ipse terminus in una sui acceptione significat essentiam, in alia personam, sicut hoc nomen pater, prout Deus dicitur pater Filii, et prout dicitur pater noster; et hoc inducit aequivocationem, quia est diversitas significationis non in re ipsa, sed in significando. — Tertio modo contingit differenter accipi ratione connotati, ut puta hoc nomen principium, dictum essentialiter, connotat effectum creatum6, dictum personaliter, nihil connotat creatum; et illud inducit multiplicitatem secundum analogiam, non secundum aequivocationem: secundum analogiam quidem, quia accipitur pro diversis sive diversa importat, quae non habent nisi unitatem7 proportionis, et ideo necessario oportet, quod incidat ibi analogia; sed non aequivocatio, quia aequivocatio habet plures institutiones et de novo accipitur pro qualibet, sicut patet in hoc nomine canis.

Sed non sic se habet hoc nomen principium. Nam principium de sua impositione impositum est ab actu producendi, non creandi nec generandi. Unde sicut producere de productione Filii et creaturae non dicitur aequivoce, sed analogice, ita et hoc nomen principium secundum has tres comparationes accipitur differenter.

Concedo ergo, quod ibi est multiplicitas quaedam, quamvis non sit multiplicitas simpliciter, sicut aequivocationis proprie dictae; et concedendae sunt rationes ad hoc, quia non concludunt, quod sit ibi aequivocatio vera. Tamen illud verbum Philosophi8 intelligitur, quando nomen habet diversa opposita quae non uniuntur in aliquo, nec univoce nec analogice, quod sit illi termino oppositum, sed primo et per se opponuntur. Non sic autem est in proposito, quia principium non dicitur primo ad Filium vel ad creaturam, sed ad hoc9 quod est productum sive principiatum; quod quidem dicitur de Filio et de creatura, quamvis non univoce, sed analogice.

Ad oppositum:

1. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Basilio, dicendum, quod Basilius accipit commune pro analogo, quod est medium inter pure aequivocum et univocum.

2. 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de sapientia et sapientia nata, dicendum, quod non est simile, quia ibi non est diversificatio nisi solum quantum ad suppositum, hic autem est quantum ad connotatum. — Et per hoc patet sequens.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur ultimo, quod non cadit prius ibi etc.; dicendum, quod quamvis non cadat ibi prius et posterius in se, cadit tamen respectu effectus, quia in comparatione ad effectum accipitur analogia. — Quod autem dicitur10, quod non est ibi diversitas; dicendum, quod verum est in re; tamen in significando et intelligendo aliud est intelligere essentiam, aliud intelligere personam, ita et dicere, ac per hoc et significare. Et ideo, quamvis non sit diversitas a parte rei absolutae, nihilominus potest esse a parte significationis.

Scholion

I. Quando principium dicitur essentialiter, ipsi respondet actus creandi; quando dicitur personaliter, actus generandi; quando vero notionaliter, actus spirandi. Hinc oritur quaestio, utrum hoc nomen in istis relationibus sumatur univoce, vel aequivoce. Prima assertio, scil. quod dicatur univoce, nititur tribus prioribus argumentis ad oppos., sed evertitur quatuor argg. in fundam., quibus probatur, quod principium in Deo dicitur multipliciter. Cum autem, ut patet ex fine respons., duplex sit multiplicitas significationis, scilicet multiplicitas simpliciter i. e. aequivocatio, et multiplicitas secundum analogiam, iterum quaeritur, quae species multiplicis significationis hic obtineat, et de hoc fere in tota respons. agitur. Solutio huius quaestionis dependet tum a triplici distinctione in principio respons. posita (quam habet etiam S. Thom., hic a. 2.), tum a differentia inter aequivoca et analoga. Haec nomina conveniunt in eo, quod significant rationes diversas in pluribus, sed differunt in hoc, quod aequivoca ad plura et rationes omnino diversas significanda instituta sunt, ut canis dicitur de animali domestico, de quodam pisce, de sidere; analoga autem significant quidem rationes diversas, sed ita ut in similitudine vel proportione conveniant (cfr. supra d. 1. a. 3. q. 1, Scholion).

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Potest tamen quaedam aequivocatio esse etiam in eadem re sub distincta tamen et diversa ratione significata, cuius rei exemplum adducitur (in corp.) quoad nomen patris in locutionibus: Deus pater Filii, Deus pater noster.

II. Argum. 3. in fundam. sumtum ex Aristotele exponitur per quandam restrictionem in fine corp. — Solutio ad 3. non datur explicite, quia principia posita in solut. ad 2. sufficiunt. Maior enim in 3. obiect. est vera; minor autem falsa. Non enim ex hac ratione, quod principium, essentialiter sumtum, est in tribus personis, notionaliter sumtum, in duobus, personaliter vero, in uno, argui potest, verbum principium non sumi univoce; sed hoc sequitur ex alia ratione, scil. quia in primo dicto connotatur creatura, in aliis vero non. Hac differentia connotationis importatur multiplicitas significationis, non autem aequivocationis, sed analogiae.

III. Inter auctores anliquos non est dissensio quoad responsionem ipsam. Sed plurimi Scotistae secundum doctrinam Scoti (I. Sent. d. 8. q. 3. n. 12.) non concedunt propositionem Seraphici (ad 1.), quod analogum sit medium inter pure univocum et aequivocum; quam differentiam opinionum Brulifer in concordiam redigit dicens, S. Bonaventuram loqui de univoco, in quo eadem ratio aequaliter participatur ab illis quibus nomen est commune, Scotus vero de eo quo eadem ratio inaequaliter participatur. Mastrius autem (Philosophia ad mentem Scoti, tom. I. disp. 2. q. 5. a. 3.) docet, quod «analogum, formaliter sumtum, ita mediat inter univocum et aequivocum, ut nunquam cum altero coincidat; ai materialiter sumtum, semper cum alterutro coincidit».

IV. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 70. m. I. — Thom., S. hic q. 1. a. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. unica, n. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic 2. princ. q. I. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2. — Biel, hic q. unica.

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English Translation
p. 510

QUESTION II. Whether this name "principle," if it is taken essentially and notionally, is said univocally or equivocally.

Secondly it is asked whether the name principle, when it is taken essentially and notionally, is said univocally or equivocally. And that [it is said] univocally seems [to be the case].

1. Basil1 says that for the Son of God to receive is common with creatures, but to have by essence is proper. If, therefore, to receive is common, so also is to give; and if so, since the account of principle in regard to the Son and in regard to the creature is taken in respect of this, it seems that it is said univocally.

2. Likewise, principle said essentially differs from [principle] said notionally as wisdom differs from begotten wisdom; but wisdom is not said equivocally in this way and that: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, nothing is said in many ways2 from the fact that it is said of a genus and of a species, or from the fact that it has one supposit and many — because manifoldness regards diverse significations, not supposits — but principle said essentially extends further and agrees with more things than [when said] notionally, and agrees with the very same things: therefore it is not said in many ways, but univocally.

4. Likewise, that it is not said analogically seems [to be the case], because where there is analogy, there is prior and posterior; but in divine things there is no prior and posterior: therefore neither analogy. — And again it seems that [it is] not [said] equivocally either, because where there is equivocation, there is diversity of signification; but person and essence are not diverse: therefore it cannot be taken equivocally.

On the contrary:

1. That it is said in many ways is seen first from the Master in the littera3, who says that this name principle produces a manifold understanding: therefore it is said in many ways.

2. Likewise, this same [point] is seen by reason, because these acts — to generate, to spirate, to create — belong to the principle itself, according as it is taken differently; but it is not [possible] to find one common account for these acts: therefore neither for principle, which names a respect so different.

3. Likewise, it is a rule of the Philosopher4 that if something in one of its acceptations has one opposite and in another another, it is said in many ways; but principle is said essentially with respect to the created, and notionally with respect to the uncreated: therefore [it is said] in many ways, in this and that [acceptation].

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4. Likewise, principle said essentially is said temporally, said notionally [is said] eternally; but nothing is univocally common to the eternal and the temporal: therefore etc.

CONCLUSION. The name "principle," said essentially and notionally, is taken neither univocally nor equivocally, but analogically.

I respond: It must be said that a name's being taken differently in divine things can be in three ways: either as to the supposit, or as to what is signified, or as to what is connoted. In the first way the name God is taken differently when it is said «God is the Trinity» and «God generates», because in the first it stands for the nature, in the second for the person; and that does not introduce any manifoldness5. — In another way it happens that a term is taken differently as to what is signified, according as the term itself in one of its acceptations signifies the essence, in another a person, as this name father, insofar as God is called the Father of the Son, and insofar as he is called our Father; and this introduces equivocation, because there is a diversity of signification not in the thing itself, but in the signifying. — In a third way it happens that [a term] is taken differently by reason of what is connoted, as for instance this name principle: said essentially, it connotes a created effect6; said personally, it connotes nothing created; and that introduces manifoldness according to analogy, not according to equivocation: according to analogy indeed, since it is taken for diverse [things] or imports diverse [things] which have only the unity7 of proportion, and therefore it is necessary that analogy fall in there; but not equivocation, since equivocation has many institutings and is taken anew for each, as is plain in this name dog.

But this name principle is not so. For principle is, by its imposition, imposed from the act of producing, not of creating nor of generating. Hence, just as to produce is not said equivocally of the production of the Son and of the creature, but analogically, so this name principle is taken differently according to these three comparisons.

I grant, therefore, that there is a certain manifoldness there, although it is not manifoldness without qualification, as of equivocation properly so called; and the reasons [given] for this are to be granted, since they do not conclude that there is true equivocation there. Nevertheless that statement of the Philosopher8 is to be understood [thus]: when a name has diverse opposites which are not united in anything, neither univocally nor analogically, [in such a way] that [the unity] would be opposed to the term [itself], but [where they are] opposed primarily and per se. But it is not so in the present case, since principle is not said primarily of the Son or of the creature, but of that9 which is produced or principiated; which indeed is said of the Son and of the creature, although not univocally, but analogically.

To the opposite [arguments]:

1. To that which is objected from Basil, it must be said that Basil takes common for analogical, which is a middle between purely equivocal and univocal.

2. 3. To that which is objected concerning wisdom and begotten wisdom, it must be said that there is no parallel, since there [the diversification] is only as to the supposit, but here it is as to what is connoted. — And by this the next [objection] is plain.

4. To that which is objected last, that prior and posterior do not occur there etc.; it must be said that, although prior and posterior do not occur there in itself, they do occur with respect to the effect, since analogy is taken in comparison to the effect. — As for what is said10, that there is no diversity there; it must be said that this is true in the thing; yet in signifying and understanding, [the act of] understanding the essence is one thing, [and the act of] understanding the person is another, and so likewise of speaking, and through this also of signifying. And therefore, although there is no diversity on the side of the absolute reality, nonetheless there can be [diversity] on the side of signification.

Scholion

I. When principle is said essentially, the act of creating corresponds to it; when it is said personally, the act of generating; but when notionally, the act of spirating. From this arises the question whether this name is taken in these relations univocally or equivocally. The first assertion, namely that it is said univocally, rests on the three earlier arguments to the opposite, but is overturned by the four arguments in the body, by which it is proved that principle in God is said in many ways. But since, as is plain from the end of the response, the manifoldness of signification is twofold — namely manifoldness without qualification, i.e. equivocation, and manifoldness according to analogy — it is asked again, which species of manifold signification obtains here, and almost the entire response is concerned with this. The solution of this question depends both on the threefold distinction set down at the beginning of the response (which St. Thomas also has, here a. 2), and on the difference between equivocals and analogicals. These names agree in this, that they signify diverse accounts in many [things], but they differ in this, that equivocals are instituted to signify many [things] and accounts altogether diverse, as dog is said of a domestic animal, of a certain fish, of a star; whereas analogicals signify indeed diverse accounts, but in such a way that they agree in likeness or proportion (cf. above d. 1, a. 3, q. 1, Scholion).

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There can however be a certain equivocation also in the same thing under a distinct and diverse account [in which it is] signified, an example of which is adduced (in the body) regarding the name father in the locutions: God [the] Father of the Son, God our Father.

II. Argument 3 in the body, drawn from Aristotle, is explained by a certain restriction at the end of the response. — A solution to [argument] 3 is not given explicitly, since the principles set down in the solution to [argument] 2 suffice. For the major in the third objection is true; but the minor is false. For from this account — that principle, taken essentially, is in three persons, taken notionally in two, but taken personally in one — it cannot be argued that the word principle is not taken univocally; rather this follows from another reason, namely that in the first usage a creature is connoted, but not in the others. By this difference of connotation a manifoldness of signification is imported — not, however, of equivocation, but of analogy.

III. Among the ancient authors there is no dissension as to the response itself. But very many Scotists, following the doctrine of Scotus (I Sent. d. 8, q. 3, n. 12), do not grant the proposition of the Seraphic [Doctor] (ad 1), that the analogical is a middle between the purely univocal and the equivocal; which difference of opinions Brulifer brings into concord by saying that St. Bonaventure speaks of the univocal in which the same account is participated equally by those to which the name is common, but Scotus of that in which the same account is participated unequally. But Mastrius (Philosophy according to the mind of Scotus, tom. I, disp. 2, q. 5, a. 3) teaches that «the analogical, formally taken, so mediates between univocal and equivocal that it never coincides with either; but materially taken, it always coincides with one or the other».

IV. Alex. Hal., Summa p. I, q. 70, m. I. — Thomas, Summa here q. 1, a. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. unica, n. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 2. — Aegidius Romanus, here 2. princip. q. I. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 2. — Biel, here q. unica.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Libr. II. contra Eunom. 23. seq., sed non ad verbum.
    Book II Against Eunomius, [c.] 23 ff., but not verbatim.
  2. Cfr. Aristot., I. Topic. 13. — Mox pro quia Vat. et hoc quia.
    Cf. Aristotle, I Topics [c.] 13. — Soon, in place of quia, the Vatican [edition reads] hoc quia.
  3. Cap. 1. — Post hoc argumentum in solo cod. duo alia interposita sunt, nempe: Item, principium creaturae est essentiale, principium Filii personale: ergo cum non sit idem univocum essentiae et personae, erit nomen principii aequivocum. — Item, nihil univocum Creatori et creaturae: ergo principiatum cum sit commune vocaliter Filio et Spiritui sancto et creaturis, ergo aequivocum. Sed si unum oppositorum dicitur multipliciter, et reliquum: ergo principium respectu horum dicetur aequivoce. Deinde in principio sequentis argumenti cod. post videtur omittit ratione, et iuste, quia duo argumenta in hoc codice interposita iam ex ratione petita erant.
    Chapter 1. — After this argument, in one codex alone, two others are inserted, namely: «Likewise, the principle of a creature is essential, the principle of the Son personal: therefore, since the univocal of essence and of person is not the same, the name "principle" will be equivocal.» — «Likewise, nothing [is] univocal to the Creator and to the creature: therefore, since the "principiated" is common in voice to the Son and to the Holy Spirit and to creatures, [it is] therefore equivocal. But if one of opposites is said in many ways, so also the other: therefore "principle" with respect to these will be said equivocally.» Then at the beginning of the following argument the codex, after videtur, omits ratione — and rightly so, since the two arguments inserted in this codex were already drawn from reason.
  4. Elicitur ex generali regula, quam Aristot., I. Topic. c. 13. ponit, his verbis: Primum quidem in contrario perspiciendum, si multipliciter dicitur, sive specie sive nomine dissonet. — In fine argumenti post ergo cod. M repetit dicitur.
    Drawn from a general rule which Aristotle, I Topics c. 13, sets down in these words: «The first thing to be examined in the contrary [is] whether it is said in many ways, whether it differs in species or in name». — At the end of the argument, after ergo, cod. M repeats dicitur.
  5. Id est, nec multiplicitatem simpliciter seu aequivocationem, nec multiplicitatem secundum analogiam.
    That is, neither manifoldness without qualification, i.e. equivocation, nor manifoldness according to analogy.
  6. Verbum creatum, etiam a Vat. et ed. 1 exhibitum, in plurimis codd. desideratur.
    The word creatum, exhibited also by the Vatican [edition] and ed. 1, is wanting in very many codices.
  7. Plures codd. ut K V W Y identitatem; incongrue.
    Several codices, such as K V W Y, [read] identitatem ("identity"); incongruously.
  8. Vide supra d. 7. q. 4.
    See above d. 7, q. 4.
  9. In Vat. et edd. 4, 5 deest hoc.
    In the Vatican [edition] and editions 4 and 5 the [word] hoc is missing.
  10. Codd. F I K S V Y et alii cum ed. 1 obiicitur.
    Codices F I K S V Y and others, with ed. 1, [read] obiicitur.
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