Dist. 29, Art. 1, Q. 1
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 29
ARTICULUS I. De principio quantum ad multiplicitatem.
QUAESTIO I. Utrum nomen principium in divinis personaliter sive notionaliter accipi possit.
Quod autem accipiatur notionaliter, ostenditur sic.
1. Augustinus quinto de Trinitate1: « Pater ad Filium principium est, quia genuit eum »: ergo idem importatur nomine principii, quod nomine generationis: ergo tenetur personaliter sive notionaliter.
2. Item, hoc videtur ratione, quia ubicumque est vera2 ratio emanationis et originis, ibi est vera ratio principii; sed in divinis vere et proprie est ratio emanationis: ergo ibi vere et proprie est ratio principii.
Contra:
1. Principium et primum sunt idem3: ergo ubi cadit ratio principii est dicere primum, et ubi est dicere primum est dicere prius — quia superlativum praesupponit comparativum — ubi et prius, ibi posterius: ergo a primo, ubi est ratio principii, ibi est ratio posterioris. Sed in divinis nullo modo recipitur, quod una persona sit posterior altera4: ergo nullo modo persona est principium personae.
2. Item, in creaturis idem est principium et initium, sicut patet per Philosophum5, ergo ubi non recipitur initium, nec principium; sed omnes personae in divinis sunt sine initio, ergo et sine principio: ergo principium non dicit respectum personae ad personam: ergo non accipitur personaliter sive notionaliter.
3. Item, idem est causa et principium re, differens ratione, quia principium dicitur quantum ad fieri, causa quantum ad esse6: ergo si maioris nobilitatis est esse quam fieri, proprius debet ibi accipi ratio causae quam principii; sed non recipitur, quod una persona sit causa, et alia sit effectus: ergo nec debet ibi recipi intentio principii.
4. Item, Deus est alpha et omega, principium et finis7, et utrumque est aequalis nobilitatis; sed intentio finis ita dicitur de Deo essentialiter, quod nullo modo personaliter — Deus enim est ita finis creaturae, quod non est finis personae — ergo similiter videtur, quod ita sit principium creaturae, quod nullo modo sit principium personae.
CONCLUSIO. Ratio principii recipitur in divinis, praecipue quoad personam Patris, non autem ratio nec causae et effectus, nec prioris et posterioris, nec initii et initiati, nec finis et eius quod est ad finem.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod in divinis est vera origo sive emanatio, et non tantum vera, sed etiam completissima. Ad hoc autem, quod sit perfectissima8, necesse est, quod emanans habeat cum producente aequalitatem omnimodam ac unitatem in substantia, quia nihil potest aequari Deo nisi Deus. Si ergo emanatio et origo debet9 exprimi convenienter et catholice, debent recipi nomina dicentia originis veritatem, et non recipi nomina importantia imperfectionem vel diversitatem vel inaequalitatem.
Quoniam ergo principium et principiatum dicunt originis veritatem, ideo utrumque recipitur in divinis, maxime autem intentio principii. Sed quoniam posterius dicit imperfectionem, et initium similiter, quia dicit imperfectam durationem, scilicet inceptionem; et intentio causae importat diversitatem, quia causa est, cuius esse sequitur aliud10; et intentio finis inaequalitatem, quia finis melior est his quae sunt ad finem: ideo nec intentio prioris et posterioris, nec initii et initiati, nec causae et effectus, nec finis et eius quod est ad finem, recipitur in persona respectu personae. Sed intentio producentis et producti, quia possibile est, quod productus sit summe perfectus et11 aequetur producenti, ideo recipitur in divinis, similiter et intentio principii.
Ad opposita:
1. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ad principium sequitur prius, et ad hoc posterius; dicendum, quod, sicut dicitur secundum Hilarium12, « Pater maior est Filio, nec tamen Filius minor » — quia sonat in imperfectionem hoc quod est minor, ideo, quamvis recipiatur, quod Pater sit prior Filio, quia iste est ab illo, non e converso, non tamen recipitur, quod iste sit posterior. Attamen nec ratio prioris omnino recipitur proprie; quia cum in divinis sit ordo et origo, proprie est origo, et minus proprie ordo, nec est nisi solum ratione originis13. Quoniam ergo principium principaliter importat originem, et prius ordinem; ideo simpliciter recipitur intentio principii, intentio vero prioris minus proprie et cum determinatione; intentio autem principii, prout privat anterius, propriissime recipitur in Deo, maxime quantum ad personam Patris. Et ideo non sequitur, quod ita proprie dicatur prius, quod tantum dicit respectum ad posterius.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de initio, dicendum, quod initium uno modo accipitur large ad principium essendi et durandi; alio modo proprie ad principium durandi, ut illud dicatur habere initium, quod incipit esse. Primo modo potest accipi in divinis, et sic accipit Hilarius in littera14; secundo vero modo non potest, et sic non aequivalet principio.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de causa, quod idem est quod principium; dicendum quod in creaturis idem est principium et causa; et hoc est, quia productum differt a producente, et ideo potest dici effectus eius, et istud potest dici causa; et in idem concurrit intentio causae et principii, et similiter nomen; sed non ita in divinis, quia ibi potest esse unius substantiae producens cum producto. Ideo non valet illud.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de fine, iam patet responsio, quia finis, quantum est de se, dicit excessum bonitatis respectu eius quod est ad finem, non sic principium respectu eius quod est ex illo; et ideo Deus non potest esse finis nisi creaturae15 inaequalis, potest tamen esse et est principium personae omnino aequalis. Et ideo una persona non est finis alterius, est tamen principium.
I. Agitur hic de principio producente, quod secundum sententiam communem in divinis tripliciter accipi potest (cfr. quaest. seq.), scilicet essentialiter, ut tres personae sunt principium creaturae, personaliter, quia solus Pater est principium Filii, notionaliter, quia Pater et Filius spirant Spiritum S. Hic quaeritur tantum de secunda ac tertia acceptione huius termini. — Purificato conceptu principii ab omni imperfectione, diversitate, vel inaequalitate (de quo vide supra d. 20, a. 1, q. 2, ad 2), vocabulo principium uti possumus etiam quoad emanationes ad intra, immo non recusat S. Doctor cum Patribus Graecis etiam « intentionem principiati » admittere. De hoc dicit Angelicus (S. I, q. 33, a. 1, ad 2): « Sed hoc non est in usu doctorum nostrorum ». — Quod non recipiatur ratio prioris et posterioris (d. 12, q. 1), nec initii et initiati, nec finis et medii, nec causae et causati, insinuatur hic in corp. et accuratius in solut. oppositorum. Quoad solut. ad 1. cfr. S. Thom., loc. cit. ad 3. — In solut. ad 3. tangitur antiqua quaedam differentia inter Latinos et Graecos. Latini, ut errorem Arii etiam in verbis excluderent, respuebant nomen causae respectu ad terminos emanationum ad intra. Graeci autem, iuxta axioma Aristotelis, quod in 3. ad oppos. citatur (αἱ ἀρχαὶ καὶ αἰτίαι), idem dicunt significare principium et causa. Etiam Graecorum modus loquendi a Florentino (Decret. unionis Graecorum) approbatus est.
II. Alex. Hal., S. p. I, q. 70, m. 1, 3. — Scot., de hac et seq. q. in utroque Scripto hic q. unica. — S. Thom., hic q. 1, a. 1; S. I, q. 33, a. 1. — B. Albert., de hac et seq. q. hic a. 1; S. p. I, tr. 9, q. 41, m. 1, a. 1, 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. unica, a. 1. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 1. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 32, q. 2, n. 10, 11; q. 3, n. 5; a. 54, q. 6; a. 55, n. 5. — Durand., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1.
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ARTICLE I. On the principle with respect to multiplicity.
QUESTION I. Whether the name "principle" in divine [things] can be taken personally or notionally.
That it is taken notionally is shown thus.
1. Augustine in book five On the Trinity1: "The Father is the principle to the Son, since he begot him": therefore the same is imported by the name principle as by the name generation: therefore it is held personally or notionally.
2. Likewise, the same is seen by reason, since wherever there is a true2 account of emanation and origin, there is a true account of a principle; but in divine [things] there is truly and properly an account of emanation: therefore there truly and properly is the account of a principle.
On the contrary:
1. Principle and first are the same3: therefore wherever the account of principle falls, one must say first, and wherever one must say first, one must say prior — since the superlative presupposes the comparative — and where [there is] prior, there [is] posterior: therefore from first, where there is the account of a principle, there is the account of posterior. But in divine [things] it is in no way admitted that one person is posterior to another4: therefore in no way is a person the principle of a person.
2. Likewise, in creatures principle and beginning are the same, as is plain through the Philosopher5, therefore where beginning is not admitted, neither [is] principle; but all persons in divine [things] are without beginning, therefore also without principle: therefore principle does not express a relation of person to person: therefore it is not taken personally or notionally.
3. Likewise, cause and principle are the same in reality, differing in account, since principle is said with respect to becoming, cause with respect to being6: therefore if being is of greater nobility than becoming, the account of cause ought to be received there more properly than that of principle; but it is not admitted that one person is cause and another effect: therefore neither ought the notion of principle to be received there.
4. Likewise, God is alpha and omega, principle and end7, and each is of equal nobility; but the notion of end is said of God essentially in such a way that in no way [is it said] personally — for God is the end of the creature in such a way that he is not the end of [a divine] person — therefore similarly it seems that he is the principle of the creature in such a way that he is in no way the principle of [a divine] person.
CONCLUSION. The account of "principle" is admitted in divine [things], chiefly with respect to the person of the Father, but not the account of cause and effect, nor of prior and posterior, nor of beginning and what-is-begun, nor of end and that-which-is-toward-the-end.
I respond: It must be said that in divine [things] there is a true origin or emanation, and not only true but also most complete. For it to be most perfect8, it is necessary that the emanating [person] have with the producer an equality in every mode and unity in substance, since nothing can be equal to God except God. If therefore emanation and origin must9 be expressed fittingly and catholicly, names that express the truth of origin must be admitted, and names that import imperfection or diversity or inequality must not be admitted.
Since therefore principle and that-which-is-from-the-principle express the truth of origin, both are admitted in divine [things], but most of all the notion of principle. But since posterior expresses imperfection, and beginning likewise, since it expresses an imperfect duration, namely an inception; and the notion of cause imports diversity, since a cause is that whose being follows another10; and the notion of end [imports] inequality, since the end is better than those things which are toward the end: therefore neither the notion of prior and posterior, nor of beginning and what-is-begun, nor of cause and effect, nor of end and that-which-is-toward-the-end, is admitted in [a divine] person with respect to [a divine] person. But the notion of producer and produced, since it is possible that the produced be supremely perfect and11 be equal to the producer, is therefore admitted in divine [things], and likewise the notion of principle.
To the opposing arguments:
1. To that which is objected, that prior follows upon principle, and posterior upon prior; it must be said that, as it is said according to Hilary12, "the Father is greater than the Son, yet the Son is not less" — since less sounds [as something] toward imperfection, therefore, although it is admitted that the Father is prior to the Son, since the latter is from the former, not conversely, yet it is not admitted that the latter is posterior. However, neither is the account of prior admitted altogether properly; since although in divine [things] there is order and origin, properly there is origin, and less properly order, and [order] is only by reason of origin13. Since therefore principle principally imports origin, and prior [imports] order; therefore the notion of principle is admitted simply, but the notion of prior less properly and with qualification; and the notion of principle, insofar as it privates anteriority, is most properly admitted in God, especially with respect to the person of the Father. And therefore it does not follow that prior is said so properly that it expresses only a relation to posterior.
2. To that which is objected concerning beginning, it must be said that beginning is taken in one mode broadly for the principle of being and of enduring; in another mode properly for the principle of enduring, so that that is said to have a beginning which begins to be. In the first mode it can be taken in divine [things], and thus Hilary takes it in the littera14; but in the second mode it cannot, and thus it is not equivalent to principle.
3. To that which is objected concerning cause, that it is the same as principle; it must be said that in creatures principle and cause are the same; and this is because the produced [thing] differs from the producer, and therefore can be called its effect, and that [other] can be called cause; and the notion of cause and of principle coincide in the same [thing], and likewise the name; but not so in divine [things], since there the producer can be of one substance with the produced. Therefore that [argument] does not hold.
4. To that which is objected concerning end, the response is already plain, since the end, of itself, expresses an excess of goodness with respect to that which is toward the end; not so the principle with respect to that which is from it; and therefore God cannot be the end except of an unequal creature15, yet he can be and is the principle of an altogether equal person. And therefore one person is not the end of another, yet it is the principle.
I. Here the question concerns the producing principle, which according to the common opinion can be taken in divine [things] in three ways (cf. the following question), namely essentially, as the three persons are the principle of the creature; personally, since the Father alone is the principle of the Son; notionally, since the Father and the Son spirate the Holy Spirit. Here it is asked only of the second and third acceptance of this term. — With the concept of principle purified of all imperfection, diversity, or inequality (on which see above d. 20, a. 1, q. 2, ad 2), we can use the word principle even with respect to the emanations ad intra; indeed, the Holy Doctor does not refuse, with the Greek Fathers, to admit even "the notion of that-which-is-from-a-principle". Of this the Angelic [Doctor] says (Summa I, q. 33, a. 1, ad 2): "But this is not in the usage of our doctors". — That the account of prior and posterior is not admitted (d. 12, q. 1), nor of beginning and what-is-begun, nor of end and means, nor of cause and what-is-caused, is suggested here in the body and more accurately in the solution to the opposing arguments. As to the solution to argument 1, cf. St. Thomas, loc. cit. ad 3. — In the solution to argument 3 a certain ancient difference between the Latins and the Greeks is touched upon. The Latins, in order to exclude the error of Arius even in words, rejected the name cause with respect to the termini of the ad intra emanations. The Greeks, however, following the axiom of Aristotle which is cited in argument 3 ad oppositum (αἱ ἀρχαὶ καὶ αἰτίαι), say that principle and cause signify the same. Even the Greeks' manner of speaking was approved by the [Council of] Florence (Decree of Union of the Greeks).
II. Alexander of Hales, Summa p. I, q. 70, m. 1, 3. — Scotus, on this and the following question in both Scripta, here a unique question. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 1; Summa I, q. 33, a. 1. — Bl. Albert, on this and the following question, here a. 1; Summa p. I, tr. 9, q. 41, m. 1, a. 1, 2. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here a unique question, a. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, here 1. princ. q. 1. — Henry of Ghent, Summa a. 32, q. 2, n. 10, 11; q. 3, n. 5; a. 54, q. 6; a. 55, n. 5. — Durandus, on this and the following question, here q. 1. — Dionysius Carthusianus, here q. 1.
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- Plures codd. ut K S V W cum ed. 6 voci principium praefigunt unum.Several codices, such as K S V W, with ed. 6, prefix unum ("one") to the word principium.
- In Vat. et cod. cc deest vera.In the Vatican [edition] and codex cc the word vera ("true") is missing.
- Codd. aa bb addunt secundum Philosophum. — Verba Philosophi integra invenies supra pag. 215, nota 9. Cfr. et IV. Topic. c. 1, ubi: Principium est primum, et primum principium.Codices aa bb add secundum Philosophum ("according to the Philosopher"). — The Philosopher's full words you will find above on p. 215, note 9. Cf. also IV. Topics c. 1, where: "The principle is the first, and the first is the principle".
- Cod. Y sic: quia nulla persona est posterior altera.Cod. Y [reads] thus: "since no person is posterior to another".
- Cfr. V. Metaph. text. 1 seqq. (IV, c. 1).Cf. V. Metaph. text. 1 ff. (IV, c. 1).
- Cfr. Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 1 seq. (IV, c. 1). — Paulo inferius multi codd. prius pro proprius; lectio non praeferenda.Cf. Aristotle, V. Metaph. text. 1 ff. (IV, c. 1). — A little below, many codices [read] prius ("prior") for proprius ("more properly"); the reading is not to be preferred.
- Apoc. 22, 13: Ego sum Alpha et Omega, primus et novissimus, principium et finis. — Mox post ita finis creaturae, quod cod. Q pro non repetit nullo modo.Apoc. 22:13: "I am Alpha and Omega, the first and the last, the principle and the end". — Soon after ita finis creaturae ("so the end of the creature"), cod. Q in place of non repeats nullo modo ("in no way").
- Codd. P Q sic: completissima. Ut autem sit completissima, necesse est.Codices P Q [read] thus: "most complete. But for it to be most complete, it is necessary."
- Cod. bb debent.Cod. bb [reads] debent ("they ought").
- Cfr. supra pag. 120, nota 7. — De propositione subsequenti ait Aristot., III. Topic. c. 1: Finis iis quae sunt ad finem eligibilior videtur esse, et duorum eligibilius est quod propinquius est fini.Cf. above p. 120, note 7. — On the following proposition Aristotle says, III. Topics c. 1: "The end seems to be more eligible than those things which are toward the end, and of two [things] that which is closer to the end is more eligible".
- Codd. S W Y cum.Codices S W Y [read] cum ("with" / "since").
- Libr. IX. de Trin. n. 54 et 56. De quo verbo Hilarii cfr. d. XVI. c. 2. in lit. Magistri, et ibid. in Comment. dub. 4 et 5.Book IX. On the Trinity, n. 54 and 56. On this saying of Hilary cf. d. XVI, c. 2, in the littera of the Master, and in the same place in the Commentary, dub. 4 and 5.
- Cfr. supra d. 20, a. 2, q. 1, 2. — Aliquanto superius post posterior cod. K supplet illo, et multi codd. cum edd. ibi verbum sit ante vocem posterior omittunt. Mox Vat. cum aliquibus codd. proprias est origo pro proprie est origo, et subinde post nec codd. B P Q repetunt ordo, cui voci cod. B insuper adiungit ibi.Cf. above d. 20, a. 2, q. 1, 2. — A little above, after posterior, cod. K supplies illo ("[than] him"), and many codices with the printed editions there omit the verb sit ("be") before the word posterior. Soon the Vatican [edition] with some codices [reads] proprias est origo for proprie est origo ("origin is properly"), and shortly after, after nec, codd. B P Q repeat ordo ("order"), to which word cod. B further adds ibi ("there").
- Cap. 3. — Paulo ante multi codd. cum ed. I omittunt in divinis, pro quibus verbis cod. T substituit hic.Chapter 3. — A little before, many codices with ed. I omit in divinis ("in divine [things]"), in place of which words cod. T substitutes hic ("here").
- Pro creaturae cod. M respectu creaturae.In place of creaturae ("of the creature"), cod. M [reads] respectu creaturae ("with respect to the creature").