Bonaventure

## Commentarius in Distinctionem XXIX.

De proprietate non[^1] personali, quae est communis spiratio, significata per nomen principium.

Est praeterea aliud nomen, multiplicem notans relationem.

Divisio textus.

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation that follows. Each note is given first in Latin (`La.`), then in literal English (`En.`).

Supra egit Magister de proprietate non personali, quae est innascibilitas. Hic secundo agit de proprietate sive notione non personali, quae est communis spiratio, significata per hoc nomen principium. Et quoniam illud nomen non tantum notionaliter accipitur, immo etiam essentialiter, ideo distinguit primo huius nominis multiplicitatem, secundo manifestat huius nominis unitatem, secundum quod dicitur de Patre et Filio respectu Spiritus sancti, ostendens quod sunt unum principium² Spiritus sancti; et hoc ibi: Deinde in eodem libro continue.

Prima pars habet duas. In prima distinguit huius nominis multiplicitatem; in secunda vero membra suae distinctionis explanat ostendens per auctoritates, quod principium habet omnes illas acceptiones, et hoc ibi: Et Pater ab aeterno principium est Filii.

Deinde in eodem libro etc. Haec est secunda pars, in qua agit de hoc nomine principium specialiter, prout dicitur notionaliter et essentialiter. Et primo ostendit, quod Pater et Filius sunt unum principium Spiritus sancti; secundo, qua unitate sunt unum, scilicet unitate notionis, ultimo capitulo: Unum autem principium sunt etc., ubi ostendit, quod eadem notione sunt principium, et quod illa notio est spiratio.

Tractatio quaestionum.

Ad evidentiam³ eorum quae dicuntur in praesenti distinctione de hoc nomine principium, duo quaeruntur. Primo quaeritur de ipso quantum ad multiplicitatem. Secundo, quantum ad unitatem. Et quantum ad primum duo quaeruntur.

Primo, supposito quod hoc nomen principium accipiatur essentialiter, quaeritur, utrum possit accipi personaliter sive notionaliter.

Secundo, dato quod essentialiter et notionaliter, quaeritur, utrum de illis duobus modis accipiatur univoce, vel aequivoce.

Articulus I.

De principio quantum ad multiplicitatem.

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## Commentary on Distinction XXIX.

On the non[^1]-personal property, which is common spiration, signified by the name principle.

"There is, moreover, another name, denoting a manifold relation."

Division of the text.

Above, the Master treated of the non-personal property which is unbegottenness. Here, in the second place, he treats of the non-personal property or notion which is common spiration, signified by this name principle. And since this name is taken not only notionally but also essentially, therefore he first distinguishes the manifold meaning of this name; second, he sets forth the unity of this name, according as it is said of the Father and the Son with respect to the Holy Spirit, showing that they are one principle² of the Holy Spirit; and this there: "Then in the same book, continuing on."

The first part has two [subdivisions]. In the first he distinguishes the manifold meaning of this name; in the second, however, he explains the members of his distinction, showing through authorities that principle has all those meanings, and this there: "And the Father is from eternity the principle of the Son."

"Then in the same book etc." This is the second part, in which he treats of this name principle specifically, as it is said notionally and essentially. And first he shows that the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit; second, by what unity they are one, namely by unity of notion, in the last chapter: "And they are one principle etc.", where he shows that they are principle by the same notion, and that that notion is spiration.

Treatment of the questions.

For the understanding³ of the things said in the present distinction concerning this name principle, two [questions] are asked. First it is asked about the name itself with regard to its manifold meaning. Second, with regard to its unity. And concerning the first, two [questions] are asked.

First, supposing that this name principle is taken essentially, it is asked whether it can be taken personally or notionally.

Second, granted that [it is taken] both essentially and notionally, it is asked whether on those two modes it is taken univocally or equivocally.

Article I.

On the principle with regard to its manifold meaning.

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