Bonaventure

QUAESTIO II. Utrum Pater et Filius possint dici unus spirator, vel etiam idem principium.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum istae sint concedendae: Pater et Filius sunt unus spirator, vel: sunt idem principium Spiritus sancti. Et quod haec sit concedenda: sunt unus spirator, videtur:

1. Quia Pater et Filius non sunt unum principium, nisi quia spirant unica spiratione: ergo cum hoc nomen spirator importet ipsam spirationem, Pater et Filius sunt unus spirator.

2. Item, quia Pater et Filius unica creatione creant, non tantum dicuntur unum principium creaturae, sed etiam unus creator: ergo cum similiter unica spiratione spirent, sunt unus spirator.

3. Item, quod sint idem principium, videtur, quia unitas non multiplicata facit identitatem omnimodam; sed Pater et Filius sunt unum principium Spiritus sancti, ita quod unitas principii nullo modo multiplicatur in illis¹: ergo sunt idem principium.

4. Item, haec est vera: Pater et Filius eadem spiratione spirant; sed idem importatur hoc nomine principium, quod hoc nomine spiratio: ergo ab aequipollenti, Pater et Filius [sunt]³ idem principium.

Contra:

1. Spirator et qui spirat aequipollent: ergo si est unus spirator, ergo unus est² et qui spirat. Sed haec est falsa: unus spirat, quia non unus, sed duo sunt qui spirant: ergo etc.

2. Item, spirator importat ipsam spirationem in concretione ad suppositum: aut ergo illud est essentia, aut persona. Non essentia, ergo persona: ergo si Pater et Filius sunt unus spirator, sunt una persona vel hypostasis.

3. Item, quod non sit concedenda, quod sint idem principium, videtur. Si enim sunt idem principium, sunt idem; sed haec est falsa, quod Pater et Filius sunt idem: ergo et prima est falsa. Quod autem sequatur, manifestum est; bene enim sequitur: sunt idem animal, ergo idem. Quod iterum haec sit falsa: sunt idem, patet, quia sunt distincti, ergo non sunt idem.

4. Item, hoc quod est idem est pronomen relativum: ergo cum pronomen certam designet personam, et relativum sit notans identitatem in eo, pro quo refert⁴, significat identitatem in supposito; sed illud non est essentia, sed persona: ergo significat, quod sint eadem persona; quod cum sit falsum, restat, quod illa locutio est falsa.

CONCLUSIO. Non sunt approbandae locutiones, nec quod Pater et Filius sint unus spirator, nec quod sint idem principium Spiritus sancti, licet sint unum principium eius.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod haec locutio: Pater et Filius sunt unum principium Spiritus sancti, simpliciter recipitur; haec autem: Pater et Filius sunt unus spirator, non recipitur; et haec similiter non admittitur: Pater et Filius sunt idem principium. Quamvis enim videantur aequipollere illi, non tamen aequipollent. Differenti enim modo in his locutionibus spirationis notio significatur.

Propter quod notandum, quod notio potest significari dupliciter, scilicet in abstractione et in concretione: in abstractione, ut si dicatur spiratio; in concretione, ut si dicatur principium vel spirator. In concretione autem potest significari vel in comparatione ad subiectum in ratione suppositi, vel in comparatione ad subiectum in ratione activi, vel utroque modo.

Significatur igitur notio spirationis in concretione in comparatione⁵ ad subiectum in ratione suppositi per hoc nomen spirator, quod est nomen verbale. Et quia suppositum huius notionis est persona et non una persona, sed duae, ideo dicimus duos⁶ spiratores, non unum. Nec est simile de hoc quod est creator: quia, cum sit nomen essentiale, significat in concretione ad subiectum, quod est substantia — et illud est unum in tribus — sed notio ad personam, quae de se est multiplicata⁷, non est una in duabus.

Significatur etiam notio in comparatione ad subiectum in ratione activi, ut per hoc nomen prin-

cipium, quod dicit originem. Et quoniam subiectum agit per virtutem, et virtus respicit naturam, cum in Patre et Filio sit una natura et una virtus non multiplicata: per hoc nomen principium significatur notio spirationis ut nullo modo multiplicata. Ideo dicimus: Pater et Filius sunt unum principium Spiritus sancti, ut unum dicat unitatem notionis et vis spirativae et naturae in spirantibus. Hinc est, quod Pater non dicitur⁸ plura principia, etsi plures habeat notiones, quia non habet secundum diversas vires et naturas.

Significatur etiam notio in comparatione ad subiectum ut in ratione suppositi et activi, cum dicitur idem principium, quoniam pronomen idem, quod certam desiderat personam significare, respicit suppositum; et principium, sicut dictum est, respicit ipsum ut activum. Et quoniam suppositum non est idem nec unum, ideo haec est falsa: Pater et Filius sunt idem principium.

Haec igitur est vera: Pater et Filius sunt unum principium; haec autem est falsa: sunt unus spirator; haec iterum falsa: sunt idem principium Spiritus sancti. Et ratio horum omnium patet ex praedictis.

Solutio oppositorum.

Ad 1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur, quod sunt unum principium, quia unica spiratione spirant; dicendum, quod haec non est tota ratio; sed haec est tota ratio, quia unica spiratione et unica virtute et in unitate naturae spirant eundem; et principium hoc modo importat illam notionem: et ideo sunt unum principium. Non sic autem significatur illa notio per hoc nomen spirator, quod est nomen verbale et descendit a verbo, quod concernit suppositum personale. Spirator enim dicitur ille qui spirat, et iste est persona.

Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de creatione, iam patet responsio, quia creatio non tantum habet una virtute fieri, sed etiam habet unum suppositum⁹, et ipsum est substantia — Pater enim non creat tanquam proprium subiectum, sed ipsa substantia divina, quae una est — sed suppositum spirationis non potest esse substantia, sed persona: ideo non dicitur, quod Pater et Filius sunt unus spirator.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod identitas est unitas non multiplicata; dicendum, quod illud non sufficit, nisi sit talis unitas, quod nec multiplicetur nec compatiatur secum pluralitatem suppositorum, quam excludit identitas. Et quia unitas principii compatitur pluralitatem personarum, ideo patet illud.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod eadem spiratione spirant; dicendum, quod non sequitur ex hoc, quod sint unus spirator; quamvis enim eadem sit notio, tamen suppositum non est idem. Et cum dicitur idem principium, notatur identitas in utroque; cum dicitur eadem spiratione, notatur identitas in altero: ideo haec non sequitur ex illa, nec una infert alteram.

QUESTION II. Whether the Father and the Son can be called one spirator, or also the same principle.

Secondly it is asked whether these [propositions] are to be granted: the Father and the Son are one spirator, or they are the same principle of the Holy Spirit. And that this is to be granted — they are one spirator — it seems:

1. Because the Father and the Son are not one principle, except because they spirate by a single spiration: therefore, since this name spirator signifies the spiration itself, the Father and the Son are one spirator.

2. Likewise, because the Father and the Son create by a single creation, they are called not only one principle of the creature, but also one creator: therefore since they likewise spirate by a single spiration, they are one spirator.

3. Likewise, that they are the same principle, it seems, because unity not multiplied makes identity in every way; but the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit, in such a way that the unity of the principle is in no way multiplied in them¹: therefore they are the same principle.

4. Likewise, this is true: the Father and the Son spirate by the same spiration; but the same is signified by this name principle as by this name spiration: therefore by an equipollent [argument], the Father and the Son [are]³ the same principle.

On the contrary:

1. Spirator and he who spirates are equipollent: therefore if there is one spirator, then one is² also he who spirates. But this is false: one spirates, since not one but two are those who spirate: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, spirator signifies the spiration itself in concretion to a supposit: therefore that [supposit] is either an essence, or a person. Not an essence, therefore a person: therefore if the Father and the Son are one spirator, they are one person or hypostasis.

3. Likewise, that the same principle is not to be granted, it seems. For if they are the same principle, they are the same; but this is false, that the Father and the Son are the same: therefore the first too is false. That [the inference] follows is plain; for it follows well: they are the same animal, therefore the same. Furthermore, that this is false — they are the same — is plain, since they are distinct, therefore they are not the same.

4. Likewise, that which is idem is a relative pronoun: therefore since a pronoun designates a definite person, and a relative is one which signifies identity in that for which it stands⁴, it signifies identity in the supposit; but that is not an essence, but a person: therefore it signifies that they are the same person; which since it is false, it remains that that locution is false.

CONCLUSION. The locutions are not to be approved, neither that the Father and the Son are one spirator, nor that they are the same principle of the Holy Spirit, although they are one principle of him.

I respond: It must be said that this locution: the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit, is simply received; this however: the Father and the Son are one spirator, is not received; and this likewise is not admitted: the Father and the Son are the same principle. For although they seem to be equipollent to that [first locution], nevertheless they are not equipollent. For in these locutions the notion of spiration is signified in a different way.

On account of which it must be noted that a notion can be signified in two ways, namely in abstraction and in concretion: in abstraction, as if one says spiration; in concretion, as if one says principle or spirator. In concretion, however, it can be signified either by comparison to a subject in the formal character of supposit, or by comparison to a subject in the formal character of [an] active [agent], or in both ways.

The notion of spiration is therefore signified in concretion in comparison⁵ to a subject in the formal character of supposit by this name spirator, which is a verbal noun. And because the supposit of this notion is a person, and not one person but two, therefore we say two⁶ spirators, not one. Nor is it the same with that which is creator: because, since it is an essential name, it signifies in concretion to a subject which is substance — and that is one in the three — but a notion to a person, which of itself is multiplied⁷, is not one in two.

The notion is also signified in comparison to a subject in the formal character of [an] active [agent], as by this name principle, which signifies origin. And since a subject acts through a power, and power has regard to nature, [and] since in the Father and the Son there is one nature and one power not multiplied: by this name principle the notion of spiration is signified as in no way multiplied. Therefore we say: the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit, so that one signifies the unity of the notion and of the spirative power and of nature in the spirators. Hence it is, that the Father is not called⁸ several principles, even if he have several notions, since he does not have [them] according to diverse powers and natures.

The notion is also signified in comparison to a subject as in the formal character both of supposit and of active [agent], when the same principle is said, since the pronoun idem, which requires a definite person to be signified, has regard to the supposit; and principle, as has been said, has regard to it as active. And since the supposit is neither the same nor one, therefore this is false: the Father and the Son are the same principle.

Therefore this is true: the Father and the Son are one principle; this however is false: they are one spirator; this again is false: they are the same principle of the Holy Spirit. And the reason for all these is plain from what has been said.

Solution of the opposites.

To 1. To that, then, which is first objected — that they are one principle because they spirate by a single spiration — it must be said that this is not the whole reason; but this is the whole reason: that by a single spiration and a single power and in unity of nature they spirate the same one; and principle in this way signifies that notion: and therefore they are one principle. The notion is not so signified, however, by this name spirator, which is a verbal noun and descends from a verb that involves a personal supposit. For spirator is said of him who spirates, and that one is a person.

To 2. To that which is objected concerning creation, the response is now plain, since creation does not only have to come about by one power, but also has one supposit⁹, and that is substance — for the Father does not create as a proper subject, but the divine substance itself, which is one — but the supposit of spiration cannot be a substance, but a person: therefore it is not said that the Father and the Son are one spirator.

To 3. To that which is objected, that identity is unity not multiplied; it must be said that this is not enough, unless it is such a unity as is not multiplied nor admits with itself a plurality of supposits, which identity excludes. And since the unity of the principle admits a plurality of persons, that [objection] is plain.

To 4. To that which is objected, that they spirate by the same spiration; it must be said that it does not follow from this that they are one spirator; for although the notion is the same, nevertheless the supposit is not the same. And when the same principle is said, identity is noted in both; when the same spiration is said, identity is noted in [only] the other: therefore this does not follow from that, nor does the one infer the other.