Bonaventure

DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

DUB. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo de hoc quod dicitur, quod Pater¹ est principium totius deitatis. Quaeritur ergo, pro quo stat ibi hoc nomen principium. Non enim potest stare pro essentia nec pro persona, quia utrumque dicit, quantum est de se, absolutum. Aut ergo stat pro paternitate, et hoc falsum, quia non est pater Spiritus sancti: nec pro spiratione, quia spiratio non est respectu Filii: nec communiter ad utrumque, quia nihil habent commune nisi essentiam; nec pro innascibilitate, quia innascibilitas non dicit respectum ad personam, sed privationem respectus: ergo omni modo² est falsa.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod sensus locutionis hic est: Pater est principium totius deitatis, id est omnium personarum in deitate; et est distributio accommoda³, sicut cum dicitur: caelum continet omnia, se scilicet excepto. — Si autem quaeratur, pro quo stat hoc nomen principium; dicendum, quod stat pro paternitate simul et spiratione, quia per paternitatem est principium Filii, per spirationem principium Spiritus sancti, et per utrumque principium utriusque. — Quod ergo obiicitur, quod non habent commune; dicendum, quod⁴ non conveniunt in notione unica convenientia formali; tamen conveniunt convenientia originali in eadem persona et eiusdem personae proprietate. Quia enim persona Patris a nullo est, ut dicitur in littera⁵, ideo omni modo productionis producit, et ideo est principium totius deitatis. Unde idem importatur nomine principii, cum dicitur principium deitatis intellectu principali, quod importatur nomine innascibilitatis⁶ quantum ad intellectum consequentem. Et ex hoc verbo et ex hac ratione verbi confirmationem recipit ista positio quae dicit, quod innascibilitas dicit in Patre plenitudinem fontalitatis sive fontalem plenitudinem, licet ex consequenti intellectu⁷.

DUB. II.

Item quaeritur de huiusmodi circumlocutionibus, qualiter accipiatur ibi hoc nomen principium, cum dicitur: principium sine principio, principium de principio. Aut enim accipitur essentialiter, aut personaliter: non personaliter, ut videtur, quia Spiritus sanctus dicitur esse principium de principio, et principium non convenit ei nisi temporaliter. — Praeterea, sicut dicit Magister distinctione vigesima septima⁸, non potest dici hoc de illo nisi quantum ad nomina substantialia: ergo principium non potest accipi notionaliter. — Et iterum, pro qua notione acciperetur⁹, cum dicitur Filius principium de principio? quia non pro filiatione, quia hoc convenit Spiritui sancto, scilicet esse principium de principio; non pro communi spiratione, quia communis spiratio convenit Patri, cui non convenit esse principium de principio. — Si tu dicas, quod accipitur essentialiter; contra: essentia non est personae principium nec dicit respectum ad personam: ergo cum principium dicat respectum ad personam, non potest accipi essentialiter, et ita nullo modo.

Respondeo: Posset dici, quod hoc nomen principium accipitur in comparatione ad creaturam, et trahitur ad personas per praepositiones additas, sicut si dicatur: Deus de Deo, et Deus non de Deo, et consimilia; et sic cessant obiectiones. — Aliter potest dici¹⁰, quod hoc nomen principium non est impositum ad significandum respectum essentialem vel personalem, quantum est de se, sed indifferenter se habet ad utrumque, et eius acceptio determinatur per adiunctum. Quando ergo dicitur de Patre, stat pro notione paternitatis et spirationis communiter, et arctatur per proprietatem innascibilitatis per hoc, quod dicitur non de principio. Similiter in Filio stat pro communi spiratione cum filiatione, quae importatur per hoc, quod dicitur de principio. De Spiritu vero sancto dicendum, quod stat essentialiter tantum et arctatur ad personam per hoc, quod dicitur de utroque.

DUB. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod Spiritus sanctus esse coepit principium creaturarum. Videtur enim dicere contra illud quod dictum est supra distinctione tertia¹¹: «Ex perpetuitate creaturarum intelligitur Conditor aeternus». Si ergo Spiritus sanctus est aeternus Conditor, ergo aeternaliter principium. — Item in hymno¹²: Aeterne rerum Conditor. — Item ab ratione videtur, quia res ab aeterno fuerunt in Deo; sed non nisi sicut in principio: ergo ab aeterno fuit principium.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod nomina, quae dicunt effectum in creatura, possunt illum dicere actu, vel habitu: si actu, ex tempore dicuntur; si habitu, possunt dici aeternaliter. Et quoniam principium potest sonare in actum, vel in habitum, ideo potest dici non solum temporaliter, immo etiam aeternaliter.

Sed quoniam usus magis accipit hoc nomen principium, prout dicitur in actu quam in habitu, ideo dicit Magister, quod dicitur temporaliter.

Quod obiicitur, quod dicitur Conditor aeternus; dicendum, quod haec¹³ locutio duplex est: tum ex parte eius quod est Conditor, quia potest dicere actum, vel habitum; tum ex parte eius quod est aeternus, quia potest teneri adiective, vel substantive. Et si aeternus teneatur substantive, sic non ponit aeternitatem circa conditionem, sed circa suppositum, et est locutio vera. Si adiective et Conditor tenetur habitualiter¹⁴, adhuc est locutio vera; si actualiter, tunc falsa. Sensus sunt manifesti. Nam uno modo sensus est: aeternus Conditor, id est aeternus, qui est Conditor. Alio modo aeternus Conditor, id est ab aeterno potens condere in tempore. Et tertio modo aeternus Conditor, quia aeternaliter condidit. Duobus primis sensibus est vera locutio, sed tertio sensu est falsa.

DUB. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod Pater ab aeterno principium est Filii; sed Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus non sunt principium nisi ex tempore: ergo secundum hoc, cum aeternum sit ante temporale, per prius dicitur principium notionaliter in divinis quam essentialiter. Sed contra: omne essentialiter dictum est communius; et quanto aliquid communius, tanto prius¹⁵: ergo per prius debet dici principium essentialiter quam notionaliter.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod dupliciter est loqui de hoc nomine principium: aut respectu subiecti, aut respectu termini. Si respectu subiecti¹⁶, sic cum intellectus essentiae sit ante intellectum personae, sic principium essentialiter dictum secundum rationem intelligendi praeit principium notionaliter dictum, sicut opponit. Si autem respectu termini, sic principium essentialiter dictum respicit quid diversum per essentiam, et ita¹⁷ creatum; principium vero notionaliter dictum respicit personam consubstantialem et increatam et aeternam; et ideo principium notionaliter dictum dicitur aeternaliter, et quantum ad hanc viam prius dicitur in Deo non solum quantum ad intellectum, sed etiam quantum ad rem. Et sic patet, de qua acceptione hoc nomen principium dicitur per prius secundum diversas comparationes¹⁸.

DUB. V.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod cum Filius se dixit principium, creatorem se voluit ostendere. Videtur enim falsum; quia ipse respondit ad quaestionem Pharisaeorum quaerentium: Tu quis es¹⁹? Sed quis quaerit de persona; sed principium, secundum quod pro creatore accipitur, tenetur essentialiter: ergo aut Dominus non respondit convenienter, aut principium non stat pro creatore ibi. — Si dicas, quod appropriatur Filio; contra: tam ratio creationis quam ratio principii appropriatur Patri²⁰: non ergo Filio.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod principium tenetur essentialiter ibi, sicut dicitur in littera²¹: sed tractum est ad personam Filii. — Sed quod obiicis, quod appropriatur Patri; dicendum, quod principium de ratione sui nominis non appropriatur Filio nisi per additionem; et sic in proposito, quia appropriatur per actum verbi. Non enim dixit simpliciter: ego principium, sed ego principium, qui et loquor vobis²².

DUB. VI.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod non est concedendum, quod Filius habet principium, cum et Filius sit principium de principio. Videtur enim debere concedi, quia omne relativum debet habere correlativum sibi respondens²³: ergo si Filius, cum dicitur principium de principio, dicitur relative, debet habere correlativum, quod est principium.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod habere principium est dupliciter: aut sicut correlativum, sicut filius dicitur habere patrem,

et sic Filius habet principium; aut sicut dispositionem sui, et sic dicitur habere principium quod incipit esse, et sic Filius non habet principium, quia non incipit. — Vel aliter: aliter est habere principium essendi et durandi; primo modo Filius habet principium, secundo modo non.

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DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the littera, and first concerning what is said: that the Father¹ is the principle of the whole godhead. It is asked, therefore, for what the name principle there stands. For it cannot stand for the essence nor for the person, since either of these states, of itself, what is absolute. Either, therefore, it stands for paternity — and this is false, because [the Father] is not father of the Holy Spirit: nor for spiration, because spiration is not in regard to the Son: nor commonly to both, because they have nothing in common except the essence; nor for unbegottenness, because unbegottenness does not state a relation to a person, but a privation of relation: therefore in every way² [the proposition] is false.

I respond: It must be said that the sense of the locution here is: the Father is the principle of the whole godhead, that is, of all persons in the godhead; and it is an accommodated distribution³, as when it is said: heaven contains all things, with itself, namely, excepted. — But if it be asked for what the name principle stands; it must be said that it stands for paternity together with spiration, because through paternity he is the principle of the Son, through spiration the principle of the Holy Spirit, and through both the principle of both. — As to what is objected, that they have nothing in common; it must be said that⁴ they do not agree in a single notion by formal agreement; yet they agree by an originative agreement in the same person and in a property of the same person. For since the person of the Father is from no one, as is said in the littera⁵, therefore he produces by every mode of production, and therefore is the principle of the whole godhead. Hence the same [reality] is conveyed by the name principle, when [the Father] is called principle of the godhead by the principal understanding, [as] is conveyed by the name unbegottenness⁶ as far as the consequent understanding. And from this word and from this account of the word that position receives confirmation which says that unbegottenness states in the Father the fullness of fontality or fontal fullness, although by a consequent understanding⁷.

Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about such circumlocutions: how the name principle is to be taken there, when it is said: principle without principle, principle from a principle. For either it is taken essentially, or personally: not personally, as it seems, because the Holy Spirit is said to be principle from a principle, and principle does not belong to him except temporally. — Furthermore, as the Master says in distinction twenty-seven⁸, this cannot be said of that except with regard to substantial names: therefore principle cannot be taken notionally. — And again, in what notion would it be taken⁹, when it is said the Son [is] principle from a principle? Because not for filiation, since this belongs to the Holy Spirit, namely, to be principle from a principle; not for common spiration, since common spiration belongs to the Father, to whom it does not belong to be principle from a principle. — If you say that it is taken essentially; on the contrary: the essence is not the principle of a person nor does it state a relation to a person: therefore since principle states a relation to a person, it cannot be taken essentially, and so in no way.

I respond: It could be said that the name principle is taken in comparison to the creature, and is drawn to the persons through added prepositions, as if it be said: God from God, and God not from God, and the like; and so the objections cease. — Otherwise it can be said¹⁰ that the name principle is not imposed to signify an essential or personal relation, as far as it is of itself, but is indifferently disposed toward either, and its acceptation is determined by what is adjoined. When therefore it is said of the Father, it stands for the notion of paternity and spiration commonly, and is restricted by the property of unbegottenness through the fact that it is said not from a principle. Similarly in the Son it stands for common spiration with filiation, which is conveyed through the fact that it is said from a principle. But concerning the Holy Spirit it must be said that it stands essentially only and is restricted to the person through the fact that it is said from both.

Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that the Holy Spirit began to be principle of creatures. For it seems to say [something] against what was said above in distinction three¹¹: «From the perpetuity of creatures the eternal Creator is understood». If therefore the Holy Spirit is the eternal Creator, then [he is] eternally principle. — Likewise in the hymn¹²: Eternal Creator of things. — Likewise it appears from reason, because things were from eternity in God; but only as in a principle: therefore from eternity he was principle.

I respond: It must be said that names which state an effect in a creature can state it either in act or in habit: if in act, they are said from time; if in habit, they can be said eternally. And since principle can sound either in act or in habit, therefore it can be said not only temporally, but even eternally.

But because usage takes this name principle more as said in act than in habit, therefore the Master says that it is said temporally.

As to what is objected, that he is called eternal Creator; it must be said that this¹³ locution is twofold: both on the part of Creator, because it can state an act or a habit; and on the part of eternal, because it can be taken adjectivally or substantively. And if eternal is taken substantively, then it does not posit eternity concerning the act of creating, but concerning the supposit, and the locution is true. If [it is taken] adjectivally and Creator is taken habitually¹⁴, it is still a true locution; if actually, then false. The senses are manifest. For in one way the sense is: eternal Creator, that is, the eternal one who is Creator. In another way eternal Creator, that is, from eternity able to create in time. And in a third way eternal Creator, because he created eternally. In the first two senses the locution is true, but in the third sense it is false.

Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that the Father from eternity is principle of the Son; but the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are not principle except from time: therefore according to this, since the eternal is before the temporal, principle is said in the divine [persons] notionally before [it is said] essentially. But on the contrary: every [name] said essentially is more common; and the more anything is common, the prior it is¹⁵: therefore principle ought to be said essentially before [it is said] notionally.

I respond: It must be said that one can speak of this name principle in two ways: either with regard to the subject, or with regard to the term. If with regard to the subject¹⁶, then since the understanding of essence is before the understanding of person, principle said essentially according to the order of understanding precedes principle said notionally, just as he opposes [it]. But if with regard to the term, then principle said essentially regards what is diverse by essence, and so¹⁷ [regards] a created [thing]; but principle said notionally regards a person consubstantial and uncreated and eternal; and therefore principle said notionally is said eternally, and according to this way it is said in God prior not only with regard to the understanding, but also with regard to the reality. And so it is plain in which acceptation this name principle is said priorly according to diverse comparisons¹⁸.

Doubt V.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that when the Son called himself principle, he wished to show himself the Creator. For it seems false; because he himself replied to the question of the Pharisees who were asking: Who are you¹⁹? But [the question] asks about the person; but principle, insofar as it is taken for Creator, is taken essentially: therefore either the Lord did not respond suitably, or principle does not stand for Creator there. — If you say that it is appropriated to the Son; on the contrary: both the account of creation and the account of principle are appropriated to the Father²⁰: therefore not to the Son.

I respond: It must be said that principle is taken essentially there, as is said in the littera²¹: but it has been drawn to the person of the Son. — But as to what you object, that it is appropriated to the Father; it must be said that principle by the account of its name is not appropriated to the Son except by addition; and so in the matter at hand, because it is appropriated through the act of speaking. For he did not say simply: I am the principle, but I am the principle who also speak to you²².

Doubt VI.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that it is not to be conceded that the Son has a principle, since the Son is also principle from a principle. For it seems that it ought to be conceded, because every relative ought to have a correlative corresponding to itself²³: therefore if the Son, when he is called principle from a principle, is said relatively, he ought to have a correlative, which is the principle.

I respond: It must be said that to have a principle is in two ways: either as a correlative, as the son is said to have a father, and so the Son has a principle; or as a disposition of itself, and so [a thing] is said to have a principle which begins to be, and so the Son does not have a principle, because he does not begin. — Or otherwise: it is one thing to have a principle of being and [another] of duration; in the first way the Son has a principle, in the second way not.

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