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Dist. 7, Art. 1, Q. 2

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 7

Textus Latinus
p. 138

Quaestio II

Utrum potentia generandi sit in Filio.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum potentia generandi sit in Filio; et quod sic, videtur auctoritatibus et rationibus.

1. Primo sic: Hilarius nono de Trinitate1 dicit: «Filius habet in se naturaliter naturam gignentem»: ergo natura in Filio est nata generare.

2. Item, Augustinus in libro contra Maximinum2: «Neque enim non potuit Filius generare», sed duae negationes aequivalent uni affirmationi: ergo potuit generare.

3. Item, rationibus ostenditur sic: plus ordinatur generare ad generandi potentiam, quam ad potentiam spirandi: sed Pater generans Filium communicat ei3 potentiam spirandi: ergo multo fortius potentiam generandi.

4. Item, Filius est expressissima imago Patris: ergo tantum imitatur Patrem, quod non potest cogitari similior; sed si Filius cogitatur ut generans, magis cogitatur imitari: ergo si imitatur amplius, quam possit quis cogitare, ergo et in actu generandi.

5. Item, per simile videtur sic: maior communicatio et diffusio est in luce aeterna quam in luce creata; sed lux creata dat splendori potentiam producendi alium, et4 sic procedendo; et si esset infinitae virtutis, produceret infinitos splendores: ergo etc.

6. Item, in generatione carnali pater non dicitur perfectum filium generare, nisi det ei potentiam generandi: ergo pari ratione, immo multo fortius5, non erit Filius perfectus, nisi habeat potentiam ad id, ad quod Pater potest; ergo ad generandum. Aut si non est ita in divinis, tunc ego quaero rationem, quare de perfectione generationis aeternae non sic est communicatio potentiae generandi, sicut in generatione creata.

Sed contra:

1. Augustinus contra Maximinum6 dicit, «quod non oportuit Filium generare»; sed si non fuit opportunum, nec conveniens; sed omne inconveniens in Deo est impossibile7: ergo impossibile fuit, Filium generare: ergo Filius non potest generare; ergo non habet potentiam generandi, quia omni potentia est potens ille qui habet eam: ergo etc.

2. Item, Anselmus in Proslogio8: «Qui potest quod sibi non convenit, quanto magis illud potest, tanto magis adversitas et perversitas possunt in eum»: ergo cum Filio non conveniat generare, si posset, potentia illa esset in eo miseria; sed nullam habet miseriam: ergo nec potentiam generandi.

3. Item, ratione probatur hoc idem sic9: omne illud, in quo aliqua duo necessario distinguuntur, si necessario convenit uni, impossibile est unquam convenire alii, sicut patet: si Petrus et Ioannes necessario differunt in albedine, et albedo convenit Petro, impossibile est, quod Ioanni conveniat; sed Pater et Filius sunt personaliter distincti, ita quod necesse est esse distinctos, et non est dare in quo

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distinguantur10 nisi in hoc, quod ille est generans, iste genitus: ergo cum generare conveniat Patri, impossibile est, quod conveniat Filio: ergo Filius non potest generare: ergo non habet potentiam generandi.

4. Item, generatio Filii a Patre similis est expresse ipsi11 generationi verbi a mente; sed verbum genitum non habet potentiam generandi aliud verbum, immo oportet, quod omne verbum immediate sit a mente: ergo si recte simile est Verbum increatum, non habet potentiam generandi, sed generandi potentia est in solo Patre.

5. Item, fiat argumentatio Augustini12 ducens ad impossibile. Si Filius habet potentiam sive posse generandi, ponatur quod generet; quaero de secundo similiter; et si non est stare in primo, oportet ponere infinitos filios, quia qua ratione non statur in primo, ergo nec in aliquo: ergo si est stare — quia hoc13 repugnat divinae completioni — sed qua ratione statur in aliquo, statur in primo: ergo primus non habet potentiam generandi.

6. Item, fiat argumentatio Richardi14: si generaret Filius alium filium: ergo cum filius genitus magis attineat patri quam avo, secundum hoc non esset ibi summa et aequalis connexio: ergo nec summa et aequalis dilectio15: ergo nec perfecta beatitudo: quae omnia tanquam summe impossibilia respuit pia fides.

Conclusio

Pater potentiam generandi non communicat Filio, quod duabus rationibus probatur.

Respondeo: Opinio aliquorum est, quod in Filio est potentia generandi, sed non generat. Hoc autem non est, quia non potest, sed quia non convenit ei16. Et ponunt simile in creaturarum productione sive creatione. Deus potest infinitas creaturas producere; sed quod non producit, hoc non est ex impotentia, sed quia non convenit ei; sic et in proposito.

Sed contra: Ponatur tunc, quod illa potentia, quae est in Filio ad generandum, ducatur in actum; constat quod Filius generabit Deum aeternum: ergo aliquid poterit17 incipere habere esse et esse aeternum; hoc autem est impossibile et non intelligibile.

Propterea18 dicendum, quod Pater non communicat Filio posse generare propter duo. Unum est, quia non potest, aliud, quia non debet.

Ratio autem, quare non potest, haec est: quia fecunditas ad generandum est in Patre, quia principium, et ideo principium, quia primum. Impossibile autem est, quod primum19 communicet alii primitatem. Nam hic est oppositio in adiecto, quod persona producta sit prima. Quia ergo fecunditas ad generandum ex primitate Patri inerat, ideo non potest eam communicare Filio; et hanc credo propriam esse rationem huius, sicut infra patebit distinctione vigesima septima20, ubi agetur, quare Pater generat.

Similiter non debet communicare, quoniam21 in emanatione divinarum personarum debet attendi originalis distinctio et plenissima communicatio: originalis distinctio, quia necesse est, ea quae communicant in natura distingui vel per materiam22, vel per originem. Per materiam distingui personas est impossibile; quia ubi est talis modus distinguendi, est compositio et variatio et formae multiplicatio, quae omnia Deo repugnant, qui est simplex et invariabilis et vere unum. Et ideo necesse est distingui per originem sive habitudinem: ergo per generare et generari: ergo si Filius potest generare, potest etiam non distingui. Si tu dicas, quod adhuc est distinctio, quia unus tantum Pater, alius tantum Filius, alius Pater et Filius; tunc ego oppono tibi, quod secundus filius posset generare eadem ratione, qua primus; et tunc duo essent, quorum uterque esset pater et filius.

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Similiter propter plenissimam communicationem non debet communicare, quia multiplicatio suppositorum secundum similem modum egrediendi non est nisi aut propter defectum durationis, sicut dictum est23, in generabilibus et corruptibilibus, ut per successivam generationem perpetuetur esse, aut propter defectum perfectae actionis, ut fiat per plures, quod non potest per unum. Sicut sunt factae24 plures stellae, quia non sufficeret una ad hoc quod faciunt omnes, sic etiam plures Angeli et plures animae ad implendam illam civitatem et manifestandam Dei bonitatem, quam nec una anima nec unus Angelus poterat sufficienter manifestare. Cum ergo in Filio Dei sit plenissima communicatio, quia totam infinitatem suam dat sibi Pater, non fuit conveniens, quod communicaret Filio illam potentiam: et ideo fuit impossibile, quia inconveniens quodlibet in divinis est impossibile25.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium per auctoritatem Hilarii, quod Filius habet in se naturam gignentem; dicendum, quod verbum illud est improprium, et ex verbis impropriis non est arguendum, sed magis eorum improprietas exponenda, ut Magister superius exposuit. Est enim sensus: habet in se naturam gignentem, id est naturam Patris.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod neque26 non potuit; dicendum, quod Magister bene exponit, id est, non fuit ex hoc impotens. Unde secundum artem distinguendum est, quando dicitur, Filius non potuit generare: quia non potest teneri privative; et tunc est sensus, non potuit, id est, impotens fuit; et tunc negatur potentia et relinquitur aptitudo, sicut de truncato dicitur, quod non potest gradi, quia aptus natus est ad gradiendum et non potest gradi27: hoc modo non potest dici de Filio, quia non habet ad hoc aptitudinem; et in hoc sensu loquitur Augustinus. Alio modo non posse tenetur negative; et in hoc sensu concedendum est, quod Filius non potuit generare.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Pater communicat Filio potentiam spirativam: patet responsio: quia cum Filius generetur, non potest habere primitatem respectu generationis; sed cum non spiretur, est inspirabilis: et ideo potuit habere primitatem et fecunditatem respectu illius; et sic patet quod28 non valet ratio.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Filius est expressissima imago etc.; dicendum, quod ideo29 Filius dicitur expressissima imago, quia repraesentat in omnibus, in quibus imago nata est repraesentare; sed imago sic nata est repraesentare, ut tamen ipsa non sit imaginatum; alioquin non esset imago. Si autem Filius repraesentaret in actu generandi, iam esset Pater: et ideo nec intelligibile nec possibile est, Filium generare sive in generatione Patrem imitari.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur de luce et splendore, dicendum, quod non est simile, quia lux non perfecte se multiplicat in primo splendore: ideo in pluribus facit quod non potest in uno.

6. Similiter et in filio carnali30 intelligendum; unde unus pater generat plures filios. Haec tamen ratio non est principalis, sed illa quae dicta est supra31, quia in his inferioribus non est fecunditas per rationem primitatis, sed per rationem perfectionis. In Deo autem, quia est perfectissimum et primum, non tantum est per naturam perfectionis; quia tunc in omnibus personis esset, et status32 esse non posset; sed per rationem primitatis. Item rationes istae non procedunt per simile, immo magis per dissimile.

Scholion

I. Haec quaestio intime cohaeret cum praecedenti. In respons. dicitur: personas distingui per originem sive habitudinem. Hoc non disiunctive intelligi debet, sed sic: per originem cum relationibus inde resultantibus; cfr. infra d. 26 q. 3 et Scholion. — In solut. ad 2 verba: «et tunc negatur potentia et relinquitur aptitudo» etc. facile intelliguntur, si attenditur, quod oratio cum negatione privativa exponitur per duas propositiones, quarum una negat actum, altera ponit subiectum ex natura sua aptum ad actum. Si igitur verba: Filius non potuit, sumuntur privative, i. e. ut impotens, tunc supponitur primo, quod ex natura sua sit ad hoc aptus, et deinde asseritur, quod hoc non potest. Cfr. S. Thom. et Richard., hic circa lit.

II. Cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. I q. 51 m. 3 a. 2. — Scot., Report., hic q. 2 (ubi expressis bis solutionem Seraphici approbat). — S. Thom., hic q. 2 a. 1; S. I q. 42 a. 6 ad 3. — B. Albert., hic a. 5. 10. 11. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 1. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic 1 princ. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 54 q. 8 etc. — Durand., hic q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1.

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English Translation

Question II

Whether the power of begetting is in the Son.

Second it is asked whether the power of begetting is in the Son; and that it is, seems evident by authorities and by reasons.

1. First thus: Hilary in the ninth book On the Trinity1 says: «The Son has in Himself naturally a generating nature»: therefore the nature in the Son is naturally suited to generate.

2. Likewise, Augustine in the book Against Maximinus2: «For not that the Son could not generate»; but two negations equal one affirmation: therefore He could generate.

3. Likewise, by reasons it is shown thus: to generate is more ordered to the power of generating than to the power of spirating; but the Father, by generating the Son, communicates to Him3 the power of spirating: therefore much more strongly the power of generating.

4. Likewise, the Son is the most express image of the Father: therefore He imitates the Father so perfectly that no greater likeness can be conceived; but if the Son is conceived as generating, He is conceived as imitating still more: therefore if He imitates more than can be conceived, then also in the act of generating.

5. Likewise, by analogy it seems thus: greater communication and diffusion is in the eternal Light than in created light; but created light gives to its splendor the power of producing another, and4 so on; and if it were of infinite power, it would produce infinite splendors: therefore, etc.

6. Likewise, in carnal generation a father is not said to generate a perfect son unless he gives him the power of generating: therefore by parity of reason — indeed much more strongly5 — the Son will not be perfect unless He has the power for that which the Father can [do]; therefore for generating. Or if it is not so in divine things, then I ask the reason why concerning the perfection of eternal generation there is not such a communication of the power of generating as in created generation.

On the contrary:

1. Augustine Against Maximinus6 says, «that it was not fitting that the Son should generate»; but if it was not opportune, then not fitting either; but every unfitting thing in God is impossible7: therefore it was impossible that the Son should generate: therefore the Son cannot generate; therefore He does not have the power of generating, because that one is powerful by every power who has it: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, Anselm in the Proslogion8: «He who can [do] what is not fitting for him — the more he can [do] it, the more adversity and perversity prevail against him»: therefore since generating is not fitting for the Son, if He could [generate], that power would be in Him a misery; but He has no misery: therefore neither the power of generating.

3. Likewise, by reason the same is proved thus9: everything in which any two are necessarily distinguished, if it necessarily belongs to one, it is impossible that it ever belong to the other, as is plain: if Peter and John necessarily differ in whiteness, and whiteness belongs to Peter, it is impossible that it belong to John; but the Father and the Son are personally distinct, so that they must necessarily be distinct, and there is nothing to give in which

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they are distinguished10 except in this, that the one is generating, the other generated: therefore since generating belongs to the Father, it is impossible that it belong to the Son: therefore the Son cannot generate: therefore He does not have the power of generating.

4. Likewise, the generation of the Son by the Father is similar in expression to the very11 generation of a word from the mind; but a generated word does not have the power of generating another word — rather every word must be immediately from the mind: therefore if the uncreated Word is rightly similar [to it], He does not have the power of generating, but the power of generating is in the Father alone.

5. Likewise, let the Augustinian argument12 be made leading to the impossible. If the Son has a power or ability for generating, suppose that He generates; I ask similarly of the second; and if there is no stopping at the first, infinite sons must be posited, because by the same reason that there is no stopping at the first, there is no stopping anywhere: therefore if there is a stop — because this13 is repugnant to divine completion — but by the same reason that there is a stopping anywhere, there is a stopping at the first: therefore the first does not have the power of generating.

6. Likewise, let Richard's argument14 be made: if the Son were to generate another son: then since a begotten son belongs more to his father than to his grandfather, accordingly there would not there be the supreme and equal connection: therefore neither supreme and equal love15: therefore neither perfect beatitude — all of which, as supremely impossible things, pious faith rejects.

Conclusion

The Father does not communicate the power of begetting to the Son, which is proved by two reasons.

I respond: The opinion of some is that the power of begetting is in the Son, but that He does not generate. This, however, is not because He cannot, but because it is not fitting for Him16. And they posit a similar case in the production of creatures or in creation: God can produce infinite creatures; but that He does not produce [them] is not from impotence, but because it is not fitting for Him; so also in the matter at hand.

But on the contrary: Suppose, then, that the power that is in the Son for generating is brought into act; it is plain that the Son will generate an eternal God: therefore something will be able17 to begin to have being and to be eternal; but this is impossible and unintelligible.

Therefore18 it must be said that the Father does not communicate to the Son to be able to generate, for two reasons. One is that He cannot, the other, that He ought not.

The reason, then, why He cannot is this: because fruitfulness for generating is in the Father because [He is] principle, and so [He is] principle because [He is] first. But it is impossible that the first19 communicate primacy to another. For it is a contradiction in terms that a produced person be first. Since therefore fruitfulness for generating was in the Father from primacy, He cannot communicate it to the Son; and I believe this to be the proper reason for it, as will appear below in the twenty-seventh distinction20, where it will be treated why the Father generates.

Likewise, He ought not to communicate, because21 in the emanation of the divine persons must be observed original distinction and most full communication: original distinction, because what communicate in nature must necessarily be distinguished either by matter22 or by origin. To be distinguished by matter is impossible for persons; because where there is such a mode of distinguishing, there is composition and variation and multiplication of form — all which are repugnant to God, who is simple and invariable and truly one. And therefore they must necessarily be distinguished by origin or by relation: therefore by generating and being generated: therefore if the Son can generate, He can also fail to be distinguished. If you say that there is still a distinction, because one is only Father, another only Son, another Father and Son; then I object to you that the second son could generate by the same reason as the first; and then there would be two, each of which would be a father and a son.

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Likewise, on account of the most full communication He ought not to communicate, because the multiplication of supposita according to a similar mode of issuing forth is only either on account of a defect of duration — as has been said23 — in generable and corruptible things, that being may be perpetuated through successive generation; or on account of a defect of perfect action, that there may be done through many what cannot be done through one. Just as many stars have been made24, because one would not suffice for what they all do, so also many Angels and many souls for filling that City and manifesting the goodness of God, which neither one soul nor one Angel was able sufficiently to manifest. Since therefore in the Son of God there is most full communication — because the Father gives to Him His whole infinity — it was not fitting that He should communicate to the Son that power: and therefore it was impossible, because whatever is unfitting in divine matters is impossible25.

1. To that, then, which is objected on the contrary through Hilary's authority — that the Son has in Himself a generating nature: it must be said that this expression is improper, and from improper expressions one must not argue, but rather their impropriety must be expounded, as the Master above expounded. The sense is: He has in Himself a generating nature — that is, the nature of the Father.

2. To that which is objected — that not26 that He could not: it must be said that the Master rightly explains it, that is, He was not on this account impotent. Hence according to the art [of grammar] a distinction must be made when it is said the Son could not generate: for not able can be taken privatively; and then the sense is, He could not — that is, He was impotent; and then the power is denied and aptitude is left, as is said of one maimed [of legs], that he cannot walk, because he is naturally suited to walking and yet cannot walk27: in this way it cannot be said of the Son, because He does not have the aptitude for this; and in this sense Augustine speaks. In another way not to be able is taken negatively; and in this sense it is to be conceded that the Son could not generate.

3. To that which is objected — that the Father communicates to the Son the spirative power: the response is plain: because, since the Son is generated, He cannot have primacy with respect to generation; but since He is not spirated, He is un-spiratable: and therefore He could have primacy and fruitfulness with respect to it; and thus it is plain that28 the reasoning does not hold.

4. To that which is objected — that the Son is the most express image, etc.: it must be said that the Son is therefore29 called the most express image because He represents in all things in which an image is naturally suited to represent; but an image is so suited to represent that it itself nevertheless is not the imaged; otherwise it would not be an image. But if the Son represented [the Father] in the act of generating, He would already be the Father: and therefore it is neither intelligible nor possible that the Son generate or imitate the Father in generating.

5. To that which is objected concerning light and splendor, it must be said that it is not similar, because light does not perfectly multiply itself in the first splendor: therefore in many it does what it cannot in one.

6. Likewise [the same is to be] understood in the case of the carnal son30; whence one father generates many sons. This reasoning, however, is not principal, but the one given above31 — because in these inferior things fruitfulness is not by reason of primacy, but by reason of perfection. In God, however, since He is most perfect and first, [fruitfulness] is not only by nature of perfection — because then it would be in all the persons, and a stop32 could not exist — but by reason of primacy. Likewise these reasonings do not proceed by similarity, but rather by dissimilarity.

Scholion

I. This question is intimately connected with the preceding one. In the response it is said: persons are distinguished by origin or relation. This must not be understood disjunctively, but thus: by origin together with the relations resulting therefrom; cf. below d. 26 q. 3 and Scholion. — In the solution to 2 the words: «and then the power is denied and the aptitude is left» etc. are easily understood, if attention is paid to the fact that a clause with a privative negation is unfolded into two propositions, of which one denies the act, the other posits the subject as by its nature apt for the act. If therefore the words: the Son could not, are taken privatively, i.e. as impotent, then it is first supposed that by its nature it is apt for this, and then it is asserted that it cannot [do] this. Cf. St. Thomas and Richard, here on this passage.

II. Cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa p. I q. 51 m. 3 a. 2. — Scotus, Reportata, here q. 2 (where he twice expressly approves the solution of the Seraphic Doctor). — St. Thomas, here q. 2 a. 1; Summa I q. 42 a. 6 ad 3. — Blessed Albert, here a. 5. 10. 11. — Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 1. 2. — Richard of Middleton, here q. 2. — Giles of Rome, here 1 princ. — Henry of Ghent, Summa a. 54 q. 8 etc. — Durandus, here q. 3. — Denys the Carthusian, here q. 1.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Num. 51: Neque rursum corporali insinuatione Patrem in Filio praedicamus, sed ex eo eiusdem generis genitam naturam naturaliter in se gignentem se habuisse naturam.
    No. 51: «Nor again do we preach the Father in the Son by bodily implantation, but [we say that] from Him [the Son] had the begotten nature of the same kind, naturally generating in Himself the [same] nature».
  2. Libr. II. c. 12. n. 3; vide supra lit. Magistri c. 1. circa medium; in quo textu aliqui codd. non pro neque, alii non volunt Filius non generare.
    Bk. II c. 12 n. 3; see above in the Master's text c. 1 around the middle; in which text some codices [read] non for neque, others non volunt Filius non generare.
  3. Supplevimus ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 ei, quod Vat. cum cod. cc minus bene omittit.
    We supplied ei from older manuscripts and ed. 1, which the Vatican edition with codex cc less well omits.
  4. Vat., refragantibus mss. et sex primis edd., omittit et.
    The Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and the first six editions, omits et.
  5. Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 fortiori, et paulo infra contra plurimos codd. et ed. I post ad id omittit ad. Mox pauci codd. ut Iff cum ed. I habet pro potest.
    The Vatican edition against the testimony of the manuscripts and ed. 1 [reads] fortiori, and a little below, against many codices and ed. I, omits ad after ad id. Soon a few codices such as Iff with ed. I [read] habet for potest.
  6. Libr. II. c. 12. n. 3; vide supra lit. Magistri c. 1. circa medium.
    Bk. II c. 12 n. 3; see above in the Master's text c. 1 around the middle.
  7. Cfr. d. 2. q. 1. ad 1.
    Cf. d. 2 q. 1 ad 1.
  8. Cap. 7: Nam qui haec potest, quod sibi non expedit, et quod non debet, potest, quae quanto magis potest, tanto magis adversitas et perversitas possunt in illum. — Sub nomine adversitas intelligitur hic non tribulatio (utpote quae sanctis est bonum), sed nocivum. — Vat. contra antiquos codd. et ed. 1 hoc potest pro illud potest.
    Ch. 7: «For he who can do these things — what is not expedient for him, and what he ought not to do — can them; the more he can do them, the more adversity and perversity prevail against him». — Under the name adversitas is here understood not tribulation (since this is a good for the saints) but what is harmful. — The Vatican edition against the ancient codices and ed. 1 [reads] hoc potest for illud potest.
  9. Confusam Vat. et cod. cc lectionem emendavimus ope aliorum codd. et ed. 1 ponendo sic loco sicut, et paulo infra sicut patet pro ut patet sic. Plures codd. aliqui loco aliqua.
    We emended the confused reading of the Vatican edition and codex cc with the help of other codices and ed. 1 by putting sic for sicut, and a little below sicut patet for ut patet sic. Several codices [read] aliqui for aliqua.
  10. Ex plurimis codd. et ed. 1 substituimus distinguantur pro distinguuntur.
    From many codices and ed. 1 we substituted distinguantur for distinguuntur.
  11. Vat. praeter fidem mss. et sex primarum edd. omittit ipsi.
    The Vatican edition against the testimony of the manuscripts and the first six editions omits ipsi.
  12. Libr. II. contra Maximin. c. 12. n. 3; vide in lit. Magistri c. 1. circa medium. — Paulo infra plures codd. ut AFGHIKWY etc. cum ed. 1 quaeram loco quaero.
    Bk. II Against Maximinus c. 12 n. 3; see in the Master's text c. 1 around the middle. — A little below several codices such as AFGHIKWY etc. with ed. 1 [read] quaeram for quaero.
  13. Locus difficilis et fortasse corruptus. Subintellige: ponere infinitos filios, sive potius: non stare in aliquo; ideoque particula quia in hac sua positione non directam rationem, sed potius praesuppositionem respectu propositionis conditionalis si est stare indicat, quod hac meliore positione apparet: ergo — quia hoc repugnat divinae completioni — si est stare. — Cod. Z ergo necesse est stare. Paulo infra post completioni ex mss. et ed. 1 adiecimus sed.
    A difficult and perhaps corrupt passage. Understand: to posit infinite sons, or rather: not to stop at any [son]; and so the particle quia in this its position indicates not the direct reason but rather a presupposition with respect to the conditional proposition si est stare, as appears more clearly in this better arrangement: therefore — because this is repugnant to divine completion — if there is a stop. — Codex Z [reads] ergo necesse est stare. A little below, after completioni, we added sed from the manuscripts and ed. 1.
  14. Libr. V. de Trin. c. 10. seqq. et VI. c. 2. seqq. — Vat., obnitentibus mss. et ed. I, post Richardi addit ut et paulo infra praeter fidem antiquiorum codd. et ed. I nec non operum Richardi (VI. de Trin. c. 6.) loco patri quam avo ponit ad patrem quam alius.
    Bk. V On the Trinity c. 10 ff. and VI c. 2 ff. — The Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and ed. I, after Richardi adds ut; and a little below, against the testimony of older codices and ed. I, and indeed of Richard's own works (VI de Trin. c. 6), substitutes for patri quam avo the reading ad patrem quam alius.
  15. Sequimur cod. O, dum alii codd. et edd. legunt distinctio, quod nec contextui nec argumentationi Richardi correspondere videtur.
    We follow codex O, while other codices and editions read distinctio, which seems to correspond neither to the context nor to Richard's argumentation.
  16. Plerique codd. cum ed. 1 omittunt ei, quod tamen, sibi ipsis non constantes, paulo infra, ubi eadem propositio recurrit, apponunt. Mox ed. 1 cum uno alterove cod. producat loco producit.
    Most codices with ed. 1 omit ei, which however, inconsistently with themselves, they supply a little below where the same proposition recurs. Soon ed. 1 with one or another codex [reads] producat for producit.
  17. Vat. cum cod. cc poterat, sed obstant antiquiores mss. cum ed. I.
    The Vatican edition with codex cc [reads] poterat, but the older manuscripts with ed. I oppose [this].
  18. Substituimus Propterea loco Propter hoc fide antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1, aliqui tamen mss. deinde addunt vel hoc vel ad hoc. Mox auctoritate eorundem mss. et ed. 1 posse generare posuimus loco potentiam generandi.
    We substituted Propterea for Propter hoc on the testimony of older manuscripts and ed. 1, though some manuscripts then add vel hoc or ad hoc. Soon, on the authority of the same manuscripts and ed. 1, we put posse generare for potentiam generandi.
  19. Ita vetustiores codd. cum ed. 1 contra Vat. et cod. cc, qui habent principium pro primum, sed minus concinne. Mox codd. inter se dissident; alii enim ut FGHIK cc ee legunt nam haec est, alii ut PQ cum edd. 1, 5 nam hoc est, alii demum cum Vat. et ed. I nam hic est.
    So the older codices with ed. 1, against the Vatican edition and codex cc, which have principium for primum, but less aptly. Soon the codices disagree among themselves; for some, such as FGHIK cc ee, read nam haec est; others, such as PQ with edd. 1, 5, nam hoc est; others finally, with the Vatican edition and ed. I, nam hic est.
  20. Parte I. a. 1. q. 2.
    Part I a. 1 q. 2.
  21. Faventibus mss. et ed. 1, substituimus quoniam pro quia. Cod. R post Similiter addit propter emanationem.
    With the manuscripts and ed. 1 favoring [this], we substituted quoniam for quia. Codex R after Similiter adds propter emanationem.
  22. Plurimi codd. cum ed. 1 hic et immediate infra naturam loco materiam, sed falso, ut ex contextu patet.
    Many codices with ed. 1, here and immediately below, [read] naturam for materiam, but wrongly, as is clear from the context.
  23. Dist. 5. a. 2. q. 1. — Vat. omittit dictum, sed obstant fere omnes codd. cum ed. I.
    Dist. 5 a. 2 q. 1. — The Vatican edition omits dictum, but nearly all the codices with ed. I oppose [this].
  24. Supple cum cod. Z fieri, vel lege cum nonnullis codd. ut ASTV et ed. 1 potest unum. Mox ope mss. vetustiorum et ed. 1 substituimus factae loco perfectae. Cod. M cum ed. 1 sic pro sicut.
    Supply with codex Z fieri, or read with some codices such as ASTV and ed. 1 potest unum. Soon, with the help of the older manuscripts and ed. 1, we substituted factae for perfectae. Codex M with ed. 1 [reads] sic for sicut.
  25. Vide supra d. 2. q. 1. ad 1. — Mox fide antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 substituimus ergo loco autem.
    See above d. 2 q. 1 ad 1. — Soon, on the testimony of the older manuscripts and ed. 1, we substituted ergo for autem.
  26. Adiecimus particulam neque, quae ex obiectione et contextu requiritur, pro qua cod. T ponit non; plurimi codd. particulam illam omittunt legentes quod non potuit, fortasse eo quod, sicut supra in obiectione notavimus, verba Augustini alio modo allegant, scil. non potuit Filius non generare; in qua lectione hic supplenda sunt verba non generare. Cod. T paulo infra post Filius habet non non potuit; sed duplex negatio hic non ita necessaria videtur, sicut paulo supra.
    We added the particle neque, which the objection and context require, for which codex T puts non; many codices omit that particle, reading quod non potuit, perhaps because, as we noted above in the objection, they allege Augustine's words in another way, viz. non potuit Filius non generare; in which reading the words non generare must be supplied here. Codex T a little below after Filius habet [reads] non non potuit; but the double negation here does not seem so necessary as a little above.
  27. Vat. cum cod. cc omittit verba quia aptus usque ad gradi, sed obstant antiquiores codd. cum ed. 1.
    The Vatican edition with codex cc omits the words quia aptus down to gradi, but the older codices with ed. 1 oppose [this].
  28. Nonnulli codd. ut bb ff cum ed. 1 quare.
    Some codices such as bb ff with ed. 1 [read] quare.
  29. Fide vetustiorum mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus ideo et loco est substituimus dicitur, ac paulo infra post sed expunximus tamen.
    On the testimony of the older manuscripts and ed. 1, we supplied ideo and substituted dicitur for est, and a little below after sed we deleted tamen.
  30. Antiquiores codd. cum ed. 1 omittunt carnales, quod Vat. cum cod. cc superflue addit.
    The older codices with ed. 1 omit carnales, which the Vatican edition with codex cc superfluously adds.
  31. Scil., prima in corp. huius quaestionis. — Mox post perfectionis codd. LO non male adiiciunt tantum.
    Namely, the first [reason] in the body of this question. — Soon after perfectionis codices LO not badly add tantum.
  32. Cod. K principiatus loco status. In fine responsionis codd. aa bb addunt quia lux et pater producunt diversum a se.
    Codex K [reads] principiatus for status. At the end of the response codices aa bb add quia lux et pater producunt diversum a se.
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