← Back to Distinction 7

Dist. 7, Art. 1, Q. 3

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 7

Textus Latinus
p. 141

Quaestio III

Utrum potentia generandi et potentia creandi sint unica potentia.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum posse generare et posse creare sit1 unicum posse; et quod non sit unicum, videtur:

1. Augustinus2: «Alio est Pater, alio est Deus»: ergo alio est generans, alio creans: sed potentia generandi est generans, potentia creandi est creans: ergo etc.

2. Item, potentiae distinguuntur per actus et actus per obiecta3; ergo si generatio terminatur ad Deum et creatio ad creaturam, et haec sunt omnino diversa: ergo etc.

3. Item, potentiae plurificantur per subiecta, quoniam in pluribus potentibus4 plures sunt potentiae; sed potentia creandi est in Filio sive posse creare, in eo autem non est posse generare: ergo non sunt unum posse.

4. Item, quaecumque sic se habent, quod unum potest intelligi, altero non intellecto, et e converso, illa non sunt unum; sed posse generare potest intelligi, circumscripta potentia creandi; et e converso posse creare, circumscripta potentia generandi5: ergo etc.

Contra:

1. Unius potentis omnino simplicis unicum tantum est posse; sed6 Pater est potens omnino simplex: ergo unicum tantum habet posse; sed habet posse generare et posse creare: ergo illa duo sunt unicum posse.

2. Item, si posse est aliud et aliud7, cum posse generare respiciat personam, posse creare naturam: ergo natura et persona sunt duo: ergo nec natura de persona, nec e converso dicitur, quod est omnino falsum.

3. Item, si est distinctio inter posse generare et posse creare: ergo est ibi ordo. Quaero igitur, quid sit prius8 secundum rationem intelligendi. Et quod potentia generandi, videtur, quia est respectu aeterni, et aeternum ante temporale. Sed contra: intellectus communis est ante intellectum proprii; sed potentia creandi dicit commune tribus, potentia generandi proprium Patris: ergo etc.

Conclusio

Potentia generandi et potentia creandi non secundum rem, sed solummodo secundum rationem intelligendi differunt.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod posse generare et posse creare est9 posse unicum, tamen dupliciter dictum. Unum enim esse est in re esse Patrem et esse Deum, differens autem secundum rationem intelligendi; quia hoc10 est absolutum, cum dico esse Deum, illud relatum, cum dico esse Patrem. Similiter et in posse est intelligendum. Unde sicut essentia et persona unum sunt in re, tamen est11 differentia rationis in intelligendo et in dicendo; similiter dicendum est de potentia generandi et creandi.

Et12 sicut est ibi differentia non re, sed secundum rationem, ita est ibi ordo secundum rationem intelligendi. Unde secundum diversas comparationes habent alium et alium ordinem. Comparando enim posse creare et posse generare ad illud cuius sunt; cum posse creare sit naturae, posse generare sit personae, et intellectus communis13 ante intellectum proprii; sic absque calumnia prior est secundum rationem intelligendi potentia creandi. Comparando autem ad illud ad quod terminatur; cum potentia creandi respiciat temporale, potentia vero generandi aeternum; prior est secundum rationem intelligendi potentia generandi quam potentia creandi: et sic patent obiecta de ordine.

Concedendae sunt ergo rationes ostendentes, quod non differunt posse generare et posse creare differentia secundum rem sive secundum essentiam.

1. Ad illud ergo14 quod obiicitur, quod alio est <!-- page 142 -->Deus, alio Pater; dicendum, quod Augustinus loquitur de alio et alio alietate rationis, et non rei. Et intelligitur alietas rationis per illum modum, quo supra dictum est distinctione quinta15, ubi quaeritur, utrum essentia generet.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod16 potentiae distinguuntur per actus etc.; dicendum, quod verum est hoc de illis actibus, qui habent completionem ab obiectis; sed non sunt sic actus divini. Unde quamvis creatura et Filius omnino differant, attamen generatio et creatio idem sunt, sicut essentia et persona. Deus enim in agendo non completur ab obiecto, quia se ipso agit.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod potentiae plurificantur per subiecta; dicendum, quod istud verum est de subiecto proprio; sed Filius non in quantum Filius est subiectum potentiae creandi, sed in quantum Deus. Et constat, quod natura divina non facit numerum cum Patre; ita nec potentia respiciens naturam cum potentia Patris.

4. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod unum potest intelligi sine altero et e converso; dicendum, quod aut loqueris quantum ad17 significatum, aut quantum ad connotatum. Si quantum ad connotatum, verum dicis, quod creatura potest intelligi, non intellecta persona Filii, et e converso. Si quantum ad principale significatum, dicis18 falsum; impossibile est enim, intelligi potentiam generandi sine potentia creandi, sicut impossibile est intelligere personam sine essentia.

Scholion

I. De differentia inter essentiam et personam cfr. infra d. 33. q. 2. et Scholion. — Ad verba in solut. ad 3: «Verum est de subiecto proprio», notandum, quod distinguitur subiectum proximum et adaequatum alicuius potentiae et remotum. Subiectum proximum sive primarium potentiae divinae creativae est unicum, scil. essentia divina. Et axioma: potentiae plurificantur per subiecta, non oportet quod sit verum, quando agitur de subiecto remoto, quod est persona divina.

II. Hanc quaestionem alii antiqui Scholastici non nisi breviter tractant. Ipsam tangit S. Doctor infra d. 20. a. 1. q. 1. — Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 20. m. 1. et 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3; de Potentia q. 2. a. 6. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 1. — Aegid. R., de hac et seq. q. hic 1. princ. q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.

---

English Translation

Question III

Whether the power of begetting and the power of creating are one power.

Third it is asked whether to be able to beget and to be able to create is1 one being-able; and that it is not one, seems evident:

1. Augustine2: «He is Father by one [thing], God by another»: therefore by one He is generator, by another creator: but the power of begetting is generative, the power of creating is creative: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, powers are distinguished by their acts, and acts by their objects3; therefore if generation is terminated at God and creation at the creature, and these are altogether diverse: therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, powers are pluralized by subjects, since in many having power4 there are many powers; but the power of creating is in the Son — that is, to be able to create — yet in Him there is not to be able to beget: therefore they are not one being-able.

4. Likewise, whatever things are such that one can be understood without the other being understood, and conversely, those are not one; but to be able to beget can be understood when the power of creating is set aside, and conversely to be able to create when the power of begetting is set aside5: therefore, etc.

On the contrary:

1. Of one altogether simple having-power there is only one being-able; but6 the Father is altogether simple having-power: therefore He has only one being-able; but He has to be able to beget and to be able to create: therefore those two are one being-able.

2. Likewise, if being-able is one [thing] and another7, since to be able to beget regards person and to be able to create regards nature: therefore nature and person are two: therefore neither is the nature said of the person, nor conversely — which is altogether false.

3. Likewise, if there is a distinction between to be able to beget and to be able to create: then there is order there. I ask, therefore, what is prior8 according to the account of understanding. And that the power of begetting is, seems evident — because it is with respect to the eternal, and the eternal is prior to the temporal. But on the contrary: the understanding of the common is before the understanding of the proper; but the power of creating denotes what is common to the three, while the power of begetting denotes what is proper to the Father: therefore, etc.

Conclusion

The power of begetting and the power of creating differ not in reality but only according to the account of understanding.

I respond: It must be said that to be able to beget and to be able to create are9 one being-able, yet said in two ways. For to be Father and to be God are one being in reality, but differ according to the account of understanding — because this10 is absolute, when I say to be God; that is relative, when I say to be Father. Likewise it must also be understood in being-able. Hence as essence and person are one in reality, yet there is11 a difference of account in understanding and in speaking, so it must be said of the power of begetting and creating.

And12 just as there is there a difference not in reality but according to account, so there is also order according to the account of understanding. Hence according to diverse comparisons they have one and another order. For comparing to be able to create and to be able to beget to that to which they belong — since the power of creating belongs to nature, and the power of begetting to person, and the understanding of the common13 is before the understanding of the proper — thus without dispute the power of creating is prior according to the account of understanding. But comparing them to that at which they are terminated — since the power of creating regards the temporal, while the power of begetting regards the eternal — the power of begetting is prior according to the account of understanding to the power of creating; and so the objections concerning order are clear.

The arguments showing that to be able to beget and to be able to create do not differ by a difference according to reality or essence are therefore to be conceded.

1. To the objection, therefore14, that He is God by one, Father by another: it must be said that Augustine speaks of one and another with an otherness of account, and not of reality. And otherness of account is understood in that way which was said above in distinction five15, where it is asked whether the essence begets.

2. To the objection that16 powers are distinguished by their acts, etc.: it must be said that this is true of those acts which have their completion from their objects; but divine acts are not so. Hence although the creature and the Son altogether differ, nevertheless generation and creation are the same, just as essence and person. For God in acting is not completed by an object, since He acts by Himself.

3. To the objection that powers are pluralized by subjects: it must be said that this is true of the proper subject; but the Son, insofar as He is Son, is not the subject of the power of creating, but insofar as He is God. And it is plain that the divine nature does not make number with the Father; thus neither does the power regarding the nature with the power of the Father.

4. To the last objection, that one can be understood without the other and conversely: it must be said that you speak either as to17 what is signified or as to what is connoted. If as to what is connoted, you speak truly — that the creature can be understood without the person of the Son being understood, and conversely. If as to the principal signified, you speak18 falsely: for it is impossible to understand the power of begetting without the power of creating, just as it is impossible to understand person without essence.

Scholion

I. On the difference between essence and person, see below d. 33, q. 2, and the Scholion. — To the words in the reply to 3, «this is true of the proper subject», it should be noted that we distinguish a proximate and adequate subject of some power from a remote one. The proximate or primary subject of the divine creative power is one — namely the divine essence. And the axiom powers are pluralized by subjects need not be true when the matter concerns the remote subject, which is the divine person.

II. Other older Scholastics treat this question only briefly. The Holy Doctor touches it below at d. 20, a. 1, q. 1. — Alexander of Hales, Summa p. I, q. 20, mm. 1 and 2. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 3; de Potentia q. 2, a. 6. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3, a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here q. 1. — Giles of Rome, on this and the following question here, 1 princ. q. 3. — Denys the Carthusian, here q. 2.

---

Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vat. hic et paulo post praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 sint.
    The Vatican edition here and shortly after, against the witness of the manuscripts and ed. 1, reads sint.
  2. Libr. VII. de Trin. c. 1. et 6.; ac Serm. 1. in Psalm. 68. n. 5. — Vat. contra antiquiores codd. per Augustinum; ed. 1 dicere Augustinus.
    Book VII On the Trinity, c. 1 and 6; and Sermon 1 on Psalm 68, n. 5. — The Vatican edition, against the older codices, [introduces] per Augustinum ['through Augustine']; ed. 1 reads dicere Augustinus ['Augustine says'].
  3. Aristotelis verba hac de re vide supra q. 1. fundam. 2.
    For Aristotle's words on this point see above, q. 1, fundamentum 2.
  4. Ita antiquiores codd. cum ed. 1, sed Vat. cum cod. cc quia in pluribus subiectis.
    So the older codices with ed. 1; but the Vatican edition with codex cc reads quia in pluribus subiectis ['since in many subjects'].
  5. Mutilam lectionem Vat. et cod. cc, qui omittunt verba et e converso usque generandi, restauramus ope aliorum mss. et ed. 1.
    We restore — by the help of the other manuscripts and of ed. 1 — the mutilated reading of the Vatican edition and codex cc, which omit the words et e converso down to generandi.
  6. Adiecimus ex vetustioribus mss. et ed. 1 minus bene omissum sed.
    We have supplied, from the older manuscripts and ed. 1, the sed that had been less aptly omitted.
  7. Cod. bb satis bene si posse creare et posse generare est aliud et aliud posse.
    Codex bb, well enough, reads si posse creare et posse generare est aliud et aliud posse ['if to be able to create and to be able to beget is one being-able and another'].
  8. Plurimi codd. non ita bene nec cum subnexis cohaerenter principatus.
    Most codices read principatus — not so well and not coherent with what follows.
  9. Vat. contra mss. sunt. Mox post enim nonnulli codd. ut CRS omittunt esse.
    The Vatican edition, against the manuscripts, reads sunt. Shortly after, after enim, some codices such as CRS omit esse.
  10. Vat. contra fere omnes codd. et ed. 1 quod pro hoc, et paulo infra idem est loco illud.
    The Vatican edition, against almost all the codices and ed. 1, reads quod for hoc, and a little later idem est in place of illud.
  11. Codd. inter se non conveniunt; alii ut AFGHKMTV cum ed. 1 pro tamen est habent cum, alii cum Vat. exhibent textum nostrum, cod. R tamen differunt ratione. Mox post rationis nonnulli codd. ut ATX etc. cum ed. 1 addunt particulam et.
    The codices do not agree with one another: some, such as AFGHKMTV with ed. 1, have cum instead of tamen est; others, with the Vatican edition, show our text; codex R reads tamen differunt ratione. Shortly after, after rationis, some codices such as ATX etc. with ed. 1 add the particle et.
  12. Fide mss. et sex primarum edd. supplevimus Et. Mox pauci codd. ut HK post rationem habent intelligendi, ita.
    On the witness of the manuscripts and of the first six editions we have supplied Et. Shortly after, a few codices such as HK have, after rationem, intelligendi, ita.
  13. Faventibus plurimis codd. et ed. 1, expunximus hic additum est.
    With the support of most codices and ed. 1, we have expunged the est added here.
  14. Ex vetustioribus mss. et ed. 1 adiecimus ergo.
    From the older manuscripts and ed. 1 we have added ergo.
  15. Dist. 5. a. 2. q. 1.
    [See] d. 5, a. 2, q. 1.
  16. Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 omittit quod. — Proxime sequens propositio intelligitur de illis actibus, qui causantur aliquo modo ab obiectis, sicuti fit in intellectione nostra.
    The Vatican edition, against the witness of the manuscripts and ed. 1, omits quod. — The proposition immediately following is to be understood of those acts which are caused in some way by their objects, as happens in our act of understanding.
  17. Cod. Z propter subnexa non incongrue addit principale i. e. quod primo et per se significatur, exclusa omni connotatione.
    Codex Z, because of what follows, not inappropriately adds principale — that is, what is primarily and per se signified, with every connotation excluded.
  18. Antiquiores codd. ut AFGHKSW etc. vel omittunt dicis, quod tunc certe est supplendum, vel cum ed. 1 loco ipsius ponunt est.
    The older codices such as AFGHKSW etc. either omit dicis — which then certainly must be supplied — or, with ed. 1, put est in its place.
← Dist. 7, Art. 1, Q. 2Dist. 7, Art. 1, Q. 4→