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Dist. 7, Art. 1, Q. 4

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 7

Textus Latinus
p. 142

Quaestio IV

Utrum posse generari et posse creari sint univocum posse.

Ultimo quaeritur, utrum posse generari et posse creari sint1 univocum posse. Et quod non, videtur:

1. Quia quamvis idem sit generare et creare quantum ad principale significatum, aliud tamen est generari et creari, sicut Creator et creatura: ergo cum non habeant2 esse univocum creatura et Creator: ergo etc.

2. Item, creatio dicit egressum et mutationem, generatio vero omnem excludit mutationem: ergo cum posse creari importet potentiam transmutandi, posse generari non, cum potentiae differant in sua generalitate in potentia transmutandi3, et in hac non conveniunt: ergo in nulla.

3. Item, omne distribuit terminum pro omnibus, quae univocantur vel analogantur in illo4; sed cum dico omnipotens, non fit distributio pro illo, quod potest generare, quia tunc Filius non esset omnipotens: ergo manifestum est, quod utrumque posse nec est univocum nec analogum; alioquin omnipotentia non convenit Filio.

Sed contra:

1. Res est commune ad fruibile et utibile: ergo cum aequalis ambitus vel maioris sit possibile quam res, et non sit maior differentia inter generatum et creatum5 quam inter fruibile et utibile, pari ratione possibile sive posse est commune ad utrumque.

2. Item, in aeternis non potest esse multiplicitas

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nec diversitas: ergo cum posse creari et posse generari ab aeterno ante conditionem creaturae fuerint, ergo non6 habent multiplicationem in ipsa potentia.

3. Item, cum dico: creatura potest creari, nihil dico7 creatum; quia illud vere dicitur de eo quod omnino nihil est, sicut de anima antichristi: ergo solum dico potentiam agentis; sed potentia Dei est unica, non habens aliquam multiplicitatem: ergo eius posse univocum est ad posse creari et posse generari.

Conclusio

Posse generari et posse creari quoad principale significatum re idem sunt et univoce dicuntur, quoad connotatum vero analogice.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod cum dico posse creari et posse generari, dico principale significatum et dico connotatum. Quantum ad principale significatum, dico, quod posse creari idem dicit re, quod posse creare, differens solum8 modo loquendi vel dicendi: quia quod dicitur per modum actionis per posse creare, dicit posse creari per modum passionis. Quantum vero ad connotatum dicit effectum in creatura.

Quando9 ergo comparantur posse creari et posse generari, si comparentur ratione principalis significati, dico, quod non tantum est univocum, immo etiam unicum, ut visum est10, aliter tamen et aliter intellectum et enuntiatum, sicut posse generare et posse creare. Si autem ratione connotati comparentur, sic concedo, quod est analogum, sicut hoc nomen res ad fruibilia et utibilia. Quamvis enim Creator et creatura non habeant commune univocum, habent tamen analogum.

Notandum tamen, quod duplex est analogia: quaedam per reductionem ad unitatem naturae secundum prius et posterius; et haec potest esse11 comparando creaturam ad creaturam, et in hac signum12 distribuit pro omnibus contentis, nisi sit distributio restricta ex additione, vel ex usu sive modo loquendi, sicut dicitur distributio accommoda13, ut si dicatur: caelum tegit omnia. Alia est analogia per reductionem ad unitatem similitudinis proportionalis, non naturae; et quod sic analogatur non est inter alia, sed super alia14. Unde distributio proprie pro illo non distribuit, nisi sit extensa. Unde Deus non est ens inter omnia, sed super omnia.

Et hinc est, quod omnipotens non distribuit pro potentia generandi proprie accepta distributione, nisi fiat quaedam extensio, et ex illa per consequens fiat quaedam appropriatio circa suppositum. Unde proprie omnipotens convenit tribus, quia non distribuit15 pro potentia generandi; appropriate autem, secundum quod fit ampliatio ex parte signi, solius est Patris.

Ex his patent omnia obiecta; procedunt enim per diversas vias, ut patet intuenti.

Scholion

I. Ut subtilis haec quaestio, quae a paucis antiquis Scholasticis tractatur, recte intelligatur, attendendum est, quo sensu S. Doctor accipiat locutionem: posse creari. Non sumitur in sensu passivae potentiae, quae est ex parte creaturae, sed in sensu activae potentiae, quae est in Deo, ut patet ex ult. arg. Ratio huius modi loquendi explicatur infra d. 42. q. 1., ubi S. Doctor inter alia haec habet (ad 2.): «mundum creari, quamvis dicat potentiam per modum passionis, tamen secundum rem non dicit nisi potentiam activam, quia ante mundi creationem nihil est nisi potentia activa.» Item (ad 1.): «Possibile potest dici denominative a potentia passiva vel activa; et quia in Deo proprie est potentia activa, ideo dicitur possibile simpliciter secundum quod ab illa denominatur, non secundum quod a passiva». Hanc sententiam probat in corp. Cfr. etiam Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 20. m. 2. et 3, et S. Thom., I. Sent. d. 42. q. 2. a. 2. Certe res creabilis ante suam creationem nihil omnino est nec habet, ergo nec potentiam passivam; unde solummodo denominatione extrinseca i. e. cum respectu ad primam causam, attribuitur ipsi posse creari.

II. His suppositis, tres propositiones S. Doctoris sunt manifestae: 1. Posse creari et posse creare, licet differant grammaticaliter, non differunt in re, si attenditur principale significatum, quod est creatrix essentia divina. — 2. Posse creari et posse generari ratione principalis significati sunt univoca, immo unicum. «Nam ipsa divina substantia sub ratione, qua communicabilis est per generationem, est potentia, qua Filius potuit generari», Richard. (hic q. 3.). — 3. Posse generari et posse creari ratione connotati non habent aliquid commune nisi analogum, cum primum connotet Filium aeternum, secundum vero creaturam.

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III. Quoad analogiam in genere cfr. supra d. 1. dub. 5. et ibid. a. 3. q. 1. ad 1. ac Scholion. Duplicem analogiam distinguit textus: prima species est quae fit per reductionem ad unitatem naturae; secunda, per reductionem ad unitatem similitudinis proportionalis. Circa primam speciem haec notamus. In unoquoque genere rerum creatarum est unum, quod sic est mensura aliorum, ut unumquodque in tantum habeat perfectionem suae naturae, in quantum plus minusve ad hanc mensuram accedit. In prima hac specie analogiae «signum distributivum (v. g. omnis) distribuit pro omnibus contentis» i. e. applicat conceptum termini ad omnia et singula sub ipso comprehensa. Sed hoc non valet quoad secundam speciem. Secunda species sive analogia proportionalitatis declaratur in textu. Ex hoc principio S. Doctor deducit, quod potentia generandi in Deo non comprehendatur proprie sub omnipotentia (in corp. et dub. 1. 2.). Idem docent: Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 21. m. 1. a. 3. — Scot., Report., 1. Sent. d. 20. q. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 2. — Aegid. R., 1. Sent. d. 20. princ. 1. q. 1. et 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3. — Consentit etiam S. Thom. I. Sent. d. 20. q. 1. a. 1; S. 1. q. 42. a. 6. ad 3; tamen de Potentia q. 2. a. 5. aliter loquitur. Videtur autem, quod solus modus loquendi sit diversus.

IV. Quoad conclusionem cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 20. m. 1. et 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 4.

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English Translation

Question IV

Whether to-be-able-to-be-begotten and to-be-able-to-be-created are a univocal being-able.

Last it is asked whether to be able to be begotten and to be able to be created are a univocal being-able. And that they are not, seems evident:

1. Because although to beget and to create are the same as to the principal signified, to be begotten and to be created are nevertheless different, just as Creator and creature [are different]: therefore since2 creature and Creator do not have a univocal being: therefore etc.1

2. Likewise, creation expresses a coming-forth and a change; generation, however, excludes all change: therefore since to be able to be created imports a power of being-changed, and to be able to be begotten does not, since the powers differ in their general account in the power of being-changed3, and they do not agree in this: therefore [they agree] in nothing.

3. Likewise, every (omne) distributes a term for all things which are univocally or analogically [signified] in it4; but when I say omnipotent, no distribution is made for that which can beget, because then the Son would not be omnipotent: therefore it is manifest that the two beings-able are neither univocal nor analogical; otherwise omnipotence would not belong to the Son.

But on the contrary:

1. Thing (res) is common to the enjoyable and the useful: therefore since possible has equal or greater extension than thing, and there is not a greater difference between the begotten and the created5 than between the enjoyable and the useful, by parity of reason possible or being-able is common to both.

2. Likewise, in eternal things there can be no multiplicity nor diversity: therefore since to be able to be created and to be able to be begotten have existed from eternity before the establishment of the creature, therefore they do not6 have multiplication in the power itself.

3. Likewise, when I say: the creature can be created, I say nothing7 [is] created; for that is truly said of what is altogether nothing, as of the soul of the Antichrist: therefore I speak only of the agent's power; but the power of God is one, having no multiplicity: therefore His being-able is univocal to to be able to be created and to be able to be begotten.

Conclusion

To-be-able-to-be-begotten and to-be-able-to-be-created, as to the principal signified, are the same in reality and are said univocally; as to the connoted, however, [they are said] analogically.

I respond: It must be said that when I say to be able to be created and to be able to be begotten, I speak of a principal signified and I speak of a connoted. As to the principal signified, I say that to be able to be created says the same in reality as to be able to create, differing only8 in the mode of speaking or saying: because what is said by way of action through to be able to create, to be able to be created says by way of passion. As to what is connoted, however, it says an effect in the creature.

When9, therefore, to be able to be created and to be able to be begotten are compared, if they are compared by reason of the principal signified, I say that it is not only univocal, but indeed one [thing], as has been seen10, yet understood and uttered in one way and another, as to be able to beget and to be able to create. But if they are compared by reason of the connoted, then I concede that it is analogical, like this name thing (res) for the enjoyable and the useful. For although Creator and creature do not have a common univocal [term], they nevertheless have an analogical one.

It should be noted, however, that analogy is twofold: one [is] by reduction to the unity of nature according to prior and posterior; and this can be11 by comparing creature to creature, and in this [analogy] the sign12 distributes for all the things contained, unless the distribution be restricted by addition, or by use or mode of speaking — as is called an accommodated distribution13 — as when it is said: the sky covers all things. The other is analogy by reduction to the unity of proportional likeness, not of nature; and what is so analogically related is not among others, but above others14. Hence a distribution does not properly distribute for it unless it be extended. Hence God is not a being among all things, but above all things.

And hence omnipotent does not distribute for the power of begetting, taken in the proper distributive sense, unless a certain extension is made — and from that, by consequence, a certain appropriation is made regarding the supposit. Hence properly omnipotent belongs to the three [persons], because it does not distribute15 for the power of begetting; appropriately, however, according as an extension is made on the side of the sign, [it belongs] to the Father alone.

From these [things] the responses to all the objections are clear; for they proceed by different paths, as is plain to one who looks.

Scholion

I. That this subtle question, which is treated by few of the older Scholastics, be rightly understood, attention must be paid to the sense in which the Holy Doctor takes the locution posse creari ("to be able to be created"). It is not taken in the sense of passive potency, which is on the side of the creature, but in the sense of active potency, which is in God — as is clear from the last argument. The ground of this mode of speaking is explained below at d. 42, q. 1, where the Holy Doctor among other things has this (ad 2): «for the world to be created, although it expresses potency by way of passion, nevertheless according to reality says nothing but active potency, because before the creation of the world there is nothing except active potency.» Likewise (ad 1): «Possible can be said denominatively from passive or active potency; and because in God it is properly active potency, therefore possible simply is said insofar as it is denominated from that, not insofar as [it is denominated] from passive [potency].» This sententia he proves in the corpus. Cf. also Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 20. m. 2 and 3, and St. Thomas, I Sent. d. 42. q. 2. a. 2. Certainly the createable thing before its creation is altogether nothing and has nothing, therefore neither passive potency; whence only by extrinsic denomination — i. e. with regard to the first cause — is posse creari attributed to it.

II. With these things supposed, three propositions of the Holy Doctor are manifest: 1. Posse creari and posse creare, though they differ grammatically, do not differ in reality, if the principal signified is regarded — which is the creating divine essence. — 2. Posse creari and posse generari by reason of the principal signified are univocal, indeed one [thing]. «For the divine substance itself, under the account by which it is communicable through generation, is the potency by which the Son could be begotten», Richard (here q. 3). — 3. Posse generari and posse creari by reason of the connoted have nothing in common except [what is] analogical, since the first connotes the eternal Son, but the second the creature.

III. On analogy in general, cf. above d. 1. dub. 5. and ibid. a. 3. q. 1. ad 1. and the Scholion. The text distinguishes a twofold analogy: the first species is that which is made by reduction to the unity of nature; the second, by reduction to the unity of proportional likeness. Concerning the first species we note this. In each genus of created things there is one [item] which is so the measure of the others that each one has perfection of its nature in the degree to which it more or less approaches this measure. In this first species of analogy «a distributive sign (e. g. every) distributes for all things contained» — i. e. applies the concept of the term to each and every thing comprehended under it. But this does not hold for the second species. The second species — analogy of proportionality — is declared in the text. From this principle the Holy Doctor deduces that the power of begetting in God is not properly comprehended under omnipotence (in the corpus and dubia 1 and 2). The same is taught by: Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 21. m. 1. a. 3. — Scotus, Report., 1 Sent. d. 20. q. 2. — Bl. Albert, here a. 3. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 3. a. 2. — Aegid. R., 1 Sent. d. 20. princ. 1. q. 1 and 2. — Dionys. Carth., here q. 3. — St. Thomas also agrees: I Sent. d. 20. q. 1. a. 1; S. 1. q. 42. a. 6 ad 3; nevertheless in de Potentia q. 2. a. 5 he speaks otherwise. It seems, however, that only the mode of speaking is different.

IV. As to the conclusion, cf. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 20. m. 1 and 2. — Bl. Albert, here a. 4.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Mss. plurimi cum sex primis edd. sit.
    Most manuscripts together with the first six editions [read] sit [singular] [for sint].
  2. Vat., obnitentibus multis codd. ut HISTWZ aa etc. et ed. 1, minus apte habeat.
    The Vatican edition, against many codices (such as HISTWZ aa etc.) and ed. 1, less aptly [reads] habeat [singular].
  3. Cfr. Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 17. et IX. text. 2. (IV. c. 12. et VIII. c. 1.), ubi species potentiae recensentur et pro genere earum proximo, in quo omnes conveniunt, assignatur, quod sint principium motus aut transmutationis.
    Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics V text 17 and IX text 2 (IV c. 12 and VIII c. 1), where the species of potency are reviewed, and for their proximate genus — in which all agree — it is assigned that they are a principle of motion or change.
  4. Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 31. (IV. c. 26): Quorum quidem non facit positio differentiam, omne dicitur. Cfr. Petr. Hispan., Summulae tract. de Distributione. — Mox antiquiores codd. cum ed. 1 generare; Vat. et cod. cc non bene generari. Agitur quidem de generatione passiva, sed argumentatio incipit a potentia activa, importata in voce omnipotens, et recte infertur, si potentia activa generandi non cadit proprie sub omnipotentia, tunc et generatio passiva non cadit sub omnia quae potest; ergo etc.
    Aristotle, Metaphysics V text 31 (IV c. 26): Of those things whose position makes no difference, "every" is said. Cf. Peter of Spain, Summulae, tract. On Distribution. — Just after, the older codices with ed. 1 [have] generare ("to beget"); the Vatican edition and codex cc, not well, [have] generari ("to be begotten"). The matter at issue is indeed passive generation, but the argumentation begins from active potency imported in the word omnipotent, and it is rightly inferred: if the active power of begetting does not properly fall under omnipotence, then passive generation likewise does not fall under all things which He can [do]; therefore etc.
  5. Fide vetustiorum mss. et ed. 1 substituimus creatum pro creaturam.
    On the trust of the older manuscripts and ed. 1, we have substituted creatum ("the created") for creaturam ("creature").
  6. Cod. W nec.
    Codex W [reads] nec [for non].
  7. Vat. cum cod. cc contra ceteros codd. et ed. 1 dicit; cod. I creaturam posse creari, nihil dico esse creatum. Paulo infra post sicut cod. M addit est.
    The Vatican edition with codex cc, against the other codices and ed. 1, [reads] dicit; codex I [has] the creature can be created, I say nothing is created. A little below, after sicut, codex M adds est.
  8. Fide mss. et ed. 1 expunximus hic additum in; aliqui codd. solo pro solum. Mox Vat., refragantibus mss. et ed. 1, dicitur per loco dicit.
    On the trust of the manuscripts and ed. 1, we have expunged here the added in; some codices [have] solo for solum. Just after, the Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and ed. 1, [has] dicitur per in place of dicit.
  9. Mendosa lectio Vat. Quo modo pro Quando castigatur ex mss. et ed. 1.
    The faulty reading of the Vatican edition, Quo modo ("In what way") for Quando ("When"), is corrected from the manuscripts and ed. 1.
  10. Paulo supra; vide etiam quaest. praeced.
    A little above; see also the preceding question.
  11. Vat. cum cod. cc praemittit est, quod tamen abest a ceteris mss. et ed. 1.
    The Vatican edition with codex cc prefixes est, which however is absent from the other manuscripts and ed. 1.
  12. Id est omne, quod ideo vocatur signum, quia per ipsum indicatur, quantum alius terminus valeat.
    That is, every — which is for this reason called a sign, because by it is indicated how far another term reaches.
  13. Vat. praeter fidem antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 accomodata, et paulo infra proportionis loco proportionalis. Pauci codd. regit pro tegit, sed incongrue et contra Petr. Hispan. Summulam tract. de Distributione. — Mox post naturae codd. aa bb addunt ut Creatoris ad creaturam.
    The Vatican edition, against the trust of the older manuscripts and ed. 1, [reads] accomodata, and a little below proportionis in place of proportionalis. A few codices [have] regit for tegit, but incongruously and against Peter of Spain, Summulae, tract. On Distribution. — Just after naturae, codices aa bb add as of Creator to creature.
  14. Ex vetustioribus mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus sed super alia, et paulo infra, consentientibus omnibus mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 6 adiecimus sed super omnia.
    From the older manuscripts and ed. 1 we have supplied but above others, and a little below, with all the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3, 6 agreeing, we have added but above all things.
  15. Cod. M X addunt proprie.
    Codices M [and] X add proprie ("properly").
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