← Back to Distinction 8

Dist. 8, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 2

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 8

Textus Latinus
p. 168

Quaestio II. Utrum summa simplicitas soli Deo conveniat.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum simplicitas sit Dei [proprium]. Et quod sic, videtur hoc modo.

1. Nulla creatura est actus purus, quia in omni creatura, ut dicit Boethius1, differt quo est et quod est; ergo in omni creatura est actus cum possibili; sed omnis talis habet in se multiformitatem et caret simplicitate: ergo etc.

2. Item, omnis creatura habet esse finitum et limitatum: ergo habet esse arctatum2; sed ubicumque est esse limitatum, est ibi aliquid quod contrahit, et aliquid quod contrahitur, et in omni tali est compositio et differentia: ergo omnis creatura est composita: ergo nulla simplex.

3. Item, omnis creatura habet esse datum aliunde, ergo habet esse aliunde acceptum, ergo nulla creatura est suum esse, ergo in omni creatura est dependentia sive differentia; sed nullum tale simpliciter simplex: ergo etc.

4. Item, omne, quod est post primam unitatem, deficit ab illa, ergo statim cadit in dualitatem, sicut dicit Dionysius3, quod post monadem dyas est: sed omnis creatura est a prima unitate: ergo omnis creatura est ab illa deficiens: ergo etc.

Contra:

1. «Ab uno non procedit nisi unum»4 et a vero non procedit nisi verum; sed unitas et simplicitas eandem rationem habent in Deo: ergo sicut ab uno unum, ita a simplici simplex.

2. Item, videtur specialiter, quod simplicitas sit in creaturis, quia simplex est quod non habet partem; sed punctus non habet partem, quia ita definitur: punctus est, cuius pars non est5: ergo etc.

3. Item, omne illud, ante quod non est aliud, est simplex; quia si compositum est, necessario habet ante se aliud; sed ens est primum, sicut dicit auctor de Causis6: «Prima rerum creatarum est esse»: ergo etc.

4. Item, omne illud est simplex, in quo stat resolutio; sed resolutio stat in principiis, quae sunt materia et forma, quia materia ulterius non resolvitur, cum sit status in causis, alioquin esset ire in infinitum7: ergo cum resolutio stet in creato, aliquid creatum est simplex. Si tu dicas, quod principia non habent omnimodam simplicitatem, quia quamvis non componantur ex aliis, tamen componuntur aliis; contra: hoc non videtur facere contra simplicitatem, quod componatur alii. Nam quod aliquid non sit componibile alii, non facit aliquam simplicitatem, cum ista proprietas8 sit in individuis completis, quae maxime sunt composita: ergo hoc quod dico componibile aliis, non tollit ab eis simplicitatem, et sic etc.

p. 169
Conclusio. Deum solum esse summe simplicem, duplici modo probatur.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod simplicitas essentiae privat compositionem et privat essentialem differentiam sive multiplicitatem. Unde simplex est, quod non habet compositionem partium nec multiplicitatem actionum9 sive formarum. In solo autem Deo est privatio compositionis et differentiae sive multiplicitatis: ideo simplicitas in solo Deo est essentialiter.

Unde notandum, quod multiplex est compositio. Una compositio est ex partibus essentialibus; et haec est in omnibus per se entibus10; alia est ex partibus integrantibus; et haec est in omnibus corporibus; tertia est ex partibus dissimilibus sive repugnantibus; et haec est in omnibus animatis et viventibus. Unde in omni substantia per se ente, quae proprie11 dicitur creatura, est compositio, quia omnis creatura aut est corporalis, aut spiritualis, aut composita ex utroque.

Similiter est considerare triplicem differentiam in creaturis. Prima est substantiae, virtutis et operationis12, sive substantiae et accidentis; secunda est differentia suppositi et essentiae; tertia est differentia entis et esse13. Prima differentia est rei, prout est agens; secunda, prout est ens in genere; tertia, prout est ens in se. Prima differentia est in omni subiecto, quoniam omne14 subiectum habet esse mixtum; ideo non agit ex se toto, et ideo differt in eo quo agit et quod agit, et actio sive subiectum et proprietas15. Secunda differentia est in omni individuo, quia omne individuum habet esse limitatum; et ideo in aliquo convenit, in aliquo differt cum alio, et ideo in omni individuo differt essentia et suppositum; multiplicatur enim essentia in suppositis. Tertia differentia est in omni creato et concreato16: quia enim omne, quod est praeter Deum, accipit esse aliunde, sive principium sit, sive principiatum: ideo nihil est suum esse, sicut lux non est suum lucere.

Si ergo dicatur simplicitas per privationem compositionis, sic proprium est solius Dei in ratione substantiae, quia nulla alia substantia est, quae non habet compositionem ex possibili et actuali saltem.

Si autem simplicitas dicat privationem essentialis differentiae et dependentiae, ita quod in essentia nulla sit diversitas nec dependentia17, est proprium Dei in ratione entis, quia nullum aliud ens est, in quo non cadat aliqua diversitas vel dependentia.

Concedendum ergo est, quod simplicitas est Dei proprium, ut visum est. Creaturae autem compositae sunt nec vere simplices, quia habent esse mixtum ex actu et potentia, quia habent esse limitatum, et ita in genere et specie per additionem contractum, quia habent esse aliunde datum, quia habent esse post Deum unum, a quo deficiunt; et ita cadunt in compositionem.

Aliter potest dici18 et brevius20, quod simplex dicitur per privationem compositionis19. Sed notandum, quod compositio dicitur dupliciter: uno modo alicuius ex aliquibus; alio modo, qua21 aliquid dicitur componi alii. Si ergo simplicitas privet compositionem ex aliis, sic convenit etiam creatis, utpote primis principiis22, quae non componuntur ex aliis. Si autem privet compositionem cum aliis et ex aliis, sic solius Dei est. Omnis enim creatura aut est ens per se et in se23, et ita composita ex aliis; aut est ens cum alio et in alio; et ita alii composita. Et iterum omne creatum aut est principium; et ita componibile alii; aut principiatum; et sic compositum ex aliis; et sic accipitur simplicitas, prout est rei proprietas, per privationem, videlicet utriusque compositionis.

Ad argumenta pro parte affirmativa et opposita:

Ad 1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod ab uno non est nisi unum etc.; dicendum, quod simplex non est conditio generalis entis sicut unum. Nam

p. 170

simplicitas dicit modum unitatis nobilissimum, quem Deus nulli communicat creaturae; quia creatura non potest recipere, cum esse eius sit limitatum, sit24 mixtum, sit etiam esse dependens et aliunde datum.

Ad 2, 3, 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de simplicitate puncti et entis et principii, dicendum, quod ibi est simplicitas per privationem compositionis ex aliis, non autem prout simplicitas dicit indifferentiam omnimodam. In omnibus enim, ut dictum est, cadit aliqua differentia et dependentia: quamvis enim non sint composita, tamen eorum esse dependet a composito, sive compositione.

Unde bene concedendum est illud quod ultimo dicebatur, quod illud derogat simplicitati rei, quod sit alteri componibilis, in quantum simplicitas privat multiplicitatem et differentiam in re simplici, quamvis non deroget, in quantum privat25 compositionem ex aliis. Omnis enim dependentia facit ipsum quod dependet a summa simplicitate et indifferentia recedere. Solus autem Deus est independens. Omnia autem alia sunt dependentia, sive comparatione ad principia, ex quibus sunt, sive unum principium componens complicetur ad aliud, sive esse dependens26 comparatione ad Deum sive ab ipso Deo. Nihil autem, quod dependet, est sua dependentia: ideo nihil tale est summe simplex, quia omne simplicissimum est absolutissimum27.

Scholion

I. In responsione dicitur, quod compositio ex partibus essentialibus, scil. materia et forma, est «in omnibus per se entibus». His verbis S. Bonav. tangit illam opinionem, quod etiam in Angelis sit aliquo modo spiritualis materia et forma. Hic modus loquendi et ante et post S. Thomam in scholis fuit receptus et approbatus; nunc vero est obsoletus, immo multis immerito est lapis offensionis. Quo sensu haec locutio ab ipso S. Bonav., Alex. Hal. et aliis multis intellecta sit, alibi dicetur; cfr. interim II. Sent. d. 3. p. I. a. I. q. 1., et d. 17. a. 1. q. 2. — Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 61. m. 1; ibid. q. 20. m. 2. § 1.

II. Duae exhibentur quaestionis solutiones. In prima enumerantur quinque genera compositionis; aliud sextum genus, quod est ex genere et differentia, infra (q. 4. huius dist.) specialiter explicatur. — Secundum modum dicendi S. Doctor declarat veriorem, cui consentit S. Thom., S. I. q. 3. a. 7. et 8.

III. Celebris est distinctio inter quod est et quo est, sive inter essentiam et existentiam. Sumta est haec distinctio ex Boethii libro de Hebdomad., vel potius ex commentario, quem Gilbertus Porretanus in hoc opusculum scripsit. Deus quidem est et sua essentia et suum esse, ut dicit sententia communis, sed in creatura esse (existentia) non est id quod existit, sed quo essentia existit. Haec distinctio ab omnibus admittitur, sed de natura eiusdem fuit et est controversia. Nominales volunt, hanc distinctionem esse solius rationis; pluralitas Thomistarum, eam esse realem; Scot. vero (II. Sent. d. 1. q. 2. et d. 3. q. 3.) tenet hic suam distinctionem formalem. Seraphicus Doctor in his duabus quaestionibus naturam huius distinctionis explicite non determinat, tamen verba eius valde conveniunt cum verbis S. Thomae. Trigosus (S. q. 3. a. 2. dub. 4.) putat, S. Bonaventuram docere realem distinctionem inter esse et essentiam creaturae, sed non tanquam inter duas res, sed sicut inter rem et actum sive modum eiusdem; insuper ipsum S. Thomam et etiam Scotum in eandem fere sententiam convenire asserit. Cfr. circa hanc controversiam Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 12. m. 2. 3. — Richard. a Med., Quodl. 1. q. 8. — Ægid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 2. — Dionys. Chart., hic q. 7, ubi retractat id quod prius pro distinctione reali in sensu multorum Thomistarum scripserat; Henr. Gand., S. a. 28. q. 4. — Durand., hic q. 2.

IV. Tangitur in hac et sequenti quaestione alia celebris controversia de distinctione, quae est in Deo inter essentiam et attributa et inter ipsa attributa, utrum scil. haec sit solummodo rationis ratiocinantis, ut dicunt Nominales, an sit formalis in sensu Scoti (hic q. 4.), an virtualis sive fundamentalis, ut vult S. Thom. (I. Sent. d. 2. q. unic. a. 2. 3; S. I. q. 13. a. 4.). Sententiae Angelici S. Bonav. quoad distinctionem inter essentiam divinam et attributa absoluta omnino consentit. Distinctionem enim virtualem in sensu S. Thom. ipse egregie explicat infra d. 45. a. 2. q. 1. in corp.; cfr. etiam d. 22. a. 1. q. 2. in corp. et ad 3; d. 27. p. I. a. 1. q. 3; d. 34. q. 2. in corp.; d. 35. q. 2. in corp.; d. 7. q. 4, et in hac nostra dist. p. I. q. 1; p. II. q. 1. et. 2. — Etiam in illa quaestione connexa, utrum distinctio virtualis iam sufficiat ad verificanda contradictoria de eadem re, S. Bonav. videtur stare potius a parte scholae S. Thomae, quae hoc affirmat, quam Scoti, quae hoc negat. Dicit enim S. Bonav. (infra d. 34. a. 1. q. 1. ad 5.), quod «quantulacumque differentia rationis sufficit ad affirmationem et negationem», quod notandum pro doctrina de SS. Trinitate. Cfr. etiam d. 8. a. 1. q. 1. ad 1; d. 19. p. II. a. 1. q. 2. ad 4; d. 28. a. 1. q. 1. in corp.; d. 35. a. 1. q. 3; d. 43. q. 1. ad 3.

Alia vero quaestio est de distinctione inter relationes et essentiam divinam, quam S. Doctor expressis verbis affirmat esse maiorem quam illam, quae est inter attributa absoluta et essentiam, et inter attributa haec ad invicem, eamque tanquam tertium divisionis membrum et medium exhibet, dum agit de triplici divisione eorum, quae tantum ratione differant; vide infra d. 26. q. 1. ad 2. et 3, et d. 22. q. 4. Haec secunda species a Seraphico distincta, ut vult Bruliffer, dedit occasionem Scoto suam excogitandi distinctionem formalem. De sententia S. Bonaventurae cfr. d. 13. q. 3. et Scholion ad d. 26. q. 1.

Circa distinctionem virtualem cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 52. m. 1, et q. 56. m. 7. a. 2. — B. Albert., S. p. I. d. 3. a. 4, et hic a. 3. i. 5. — Petr. a Tar., I. Sent. d. 2. q. 1. a. 2. 3. — Richard. a Med., I. Sent. d. 2. a. 1. — Ægid. R., I. Sent. d. 2. 1. princ. q. 2. 3. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 31; et Quodl. 5. q. 1. — Durand., d. 2. q. 2. et 3. — Dionys. Carth., I. Sent. d. 2. q. 2.

V. In conclusione principali conveniunt omnes: Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 5. m. 3; p. II. q. 12. per totam. — Scot., hic q. 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 5. a. 1. et 2.; S. 1. q. 3. a. 7. 8. — B. Albert., hic a. 4. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 6. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 2. — Ægid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 7. — Biel, hic q. 7. dub. 3.

---

English Translation
p. 168

Question II. Whether supreme simplicity belongs to God alone.

Secondly it is asked, whether simplicity is proper to God. And that it is so, is seen in this way.

1. No creature is pure act, because in every creature, as Boethius says1, that by which it is (quo est) differs from that which is (quod est); therefore in every creature there is act together with the possible; but everything of this sort has in itself multiformity and lacks simplicity: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, every creature has finite and limited being: therefore it has a constrained being2; but wherever there is limited being, there is there something that contracts and something that is contracted, and in everything of this sort there is composition and difference: therefore every creature is composed: therefore none is simple.

3. Likewise, every creature has being given from elsewhere, therefore it has being received from elsewhere, therefore no creature is its own being, therefore in every creature there is dependence or difference; but nothing of this sort is simply simple: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, everything that is after the first unity falls short of it, therefore it falls forthwith into duality, as Dionysius says3, that after the monad there is the dyad: but every creature is from the first unity: therefore every creature falls short of it: therefore etc.

On the contrary:

1. «From one there proceeds only one»4 and from the true there proceeds only the true; but unity and simplicity have the same account in God: therefore just as from one [comes] one, so from the simple [comes] the simple.

2. Likewise, it seems especially that simplicity is in creatures, because the simple is that which has no part; but the point has no part, since it is so defined: a point is that of which there is no part5: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, every thing before which there is no other is simple; for if it is composite, it necessarily has another before it; but being is first, as the author of [the book] On Causes says6: «The first of created things is being»: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, everything is simple in which resolution comes to a halt; but resolution halts in principles, which are matter and form, because matter is not further resolved, since it is the terminus among causes, otherwise one would have to proceed to infinity7: therefore since resolution halts in the created, something created is simple. If you say that the principles do not have simplicity in every mode, because, although they are not composed from others, yet they are composed with others; on the contrary: this does not seem to militate against simplicity, that something is composed with another. For that something not be composable with another does not make for any simplicity, since this property8 belongs to complete individuals, which are most of all composite: therefore this which I call composable-with-others does not take simplicity away from them, and so on.

p. 169
Conclusion. That God alone is supremely simple is proved in a twofold way.

I respond: It must be said that simplicity of essence negates composition and negates essential difference or multiplicity. Hence the simple is that which has neither composition of parts nor multiplicity of actions9 or of forms. But in God alone is there negation of composition and of difference or of multiplicity: therefore simplicity is essentially in God alone.

Hence it should be noted that composition is manifold. One composition is from essential parts; and this is in all beings per se10; another is from integral parts; and this is in all bodies; the third is from dissimilar or contrary parts; and this is in all animate and living things. Hence in every substance that is a being per se, which properly11 is called a creature, there is composition, since every creature is either bodily, or spiritual, or composed of both.

Similarly, a threefold difference is to be considered in creatures. The first is of substance, power, and operation12, or of substance and accident; the second is the difference of supposit and essence; the third is the difference of being (ens) and to-be (esse)13. The first difference belongs to a thing insofar as it is an agent; the second, insofar as it is a being in a genus; the third, insofar as it is a being in itself. The first difference is in every subject, since every14 subject has a mixed being; therefore it does not act by its whole self, and therefore there differ in it that by which it acts and that which acts, and the action or subject and property15. The second difference is in every individual, because every individual has a limited being; and therefore it agrees with another in something and differs from another in something, and therefore in every individual essence and supposit differ; for essence is multiplied in supposits. The third difference is in everything created and con-created16: for because everything that is besides God receives its being from elsewhere, whether it be a principle or be principled: therefore nothing is its own being, just as light is not its own act-of-shining.

If, therefore, simplicity be spoken of by way of negation of composition, then it is proper to God alone in the order of substance, because there is no other substance which does not have composition out of the possible and the actual at least.

If, however, simplicity speaks the negation of essential difference and of dependence, so that in the essence there be no diversity nor dependence17, it is proper to God in the order of being, because there is no other being in which some diversity or dependence does not fall.

It must therefore be conceded that simplicity is proper to God, as has been seen. Creatures, however, are composed and not truly simple, because they have a being mixed of act and potency, because they have a limited being, and so contracted by addition into genus and species, because they have a being given from elsewhere, because they have a being after the one God, from whom they fall short; and thus they fall into composition.

Otherwise it can be said18 and more briefly20, that the simple is so called by way of negation of composition19. But it must be noted that composition is spoken of in two ways: in one way, of some thing out of certain [components]; in another way, by which21 some thing is said to be composed with another. If, therefore, simplicity negate composition out of others, then it pertains also to created things, namely to first principles22, which are not composed out of others. If, however, it negate composition both with others and out of others, then it belongs to God alone. For every creature either is a being per se and in itself23, and thus is composed out of others; or is a being with another and in another, and thus is composed with another. And again every created thing either is a principle, and thus composable with another; or is principled, and thus composed out of others; and so simplicity is taken, insofar as it is a property of a thing, by way of negation, namely of either kind of composition.

Replies to the arguments and to the opposing arguments:

To 1. To what is objected, that from one there is only one etc., it must be said that simple is not a general condition of being as one is. For

p. 170

simplicity bespeaks the most noble mode of unity, which God communicates to no creature; because the creature cannot receive [it], since its being is limited, is24 mixed, is also a being dependent and given from elsewhere.

To 2, 3, 4. To what is objected concerning the simplicity of the point, of being, and of a principle, it must be said that there is there simplicity by way of negation of composition out of others, but not insofar as simplicity bespeaks an utterly all-round indifference. For in all those, as has been said, some difference and dependence falls: for although they are not composed, yet their being depends on a composite, or on composition.

Hence what was said last must rightly be conceded, that what derogates from the simplicity of a thing is that it be composable with another, inasmuch as simplicity negates multiplicity and difference in the simple thing, although it does not derogate inasmuch as it negates25 composition out of others. For every dependence makes the very thing that depends to recede from supreme simplicity and indifference. But God alone is independent. All other things, however, are dependent — whether by comparison to the principles from which they are, or whether one composing principle be folded together with another, or whether [as] a dependent being26 by comparison to God or [as flowing] from God himself. But nothing that depends is its own dependence: therefore nothing of that sort is supremely simple, because everything most simple is most absolute27.

Scholion

I. In the response it is said that the composition out of essential parts, namely matter and form, is «in all beings per se». By these words St. Bonaventure touches on that opinion, that even in the Angels there is in some way spiritual matter and form. This way of speaking, both before and after St. Thomas, was received and approved in the schools; but now it is obsolete, indeed for many it is undeservedly a stone of offense. In what sense this expression was understood by St. Bonaventure himself, Alexander of Hales, and many others, will be said elsewhere; cf. meanwhile II Sent. d. 3 p. I a. I q. 1, and d. 17 a. 1 q. 2. — Alex. Hal., Summa p. II q. 61 m. 1; ibid. q. 20 m. 2 § 1.

II. Two solutions of the question are presented. In the first, five genera of composition are enumerated; another, sixth, genus — which is from genus and difference — is specially explained below (q. 4 of this distinction). — The second way of speaking the Holy Doctor declares more true, with which St. Thomas agrees, Summa I q. 3 a. 7 and 8.

III. Famous is the distinction between quod est and quo est, that is, between essence and existence. This distinction is taken from Boethius' book de Hebdomad., or rather from the commentary which Gilbert of Poitiers wrote on that little work. God indeed is both his own essence and his own being, as the common sentence holds; but in the creature being (existence) is not that which exists, but that by which the essence exists. This distinction is admitted by all, but concerning its nature there has been and is controversy. The Nominalists hold this distinction to be one of reason only; the majority of the Thomists, that it is real; Scotus indeed (II Sent. d. 1 q. 2 and d. 3 q. 3) here holds his own formal distinction. The Seraphic Doctor in these two questions does not explicitly determine the nature of this distinction, yet his words agree very well with the words of St. Thomas. Trigosus (Summa q. 3 a. 2 dub. 4) thinks that St. Bonaventure teaches a real distinction between being and essence in the creature, but not as between two things, but as between a thing and an act or a mode of the same; further, he asserts that St. Thomas himself and also Scotus come to almost the same view. Cf. concerning this controversy Alex. Hal., Summa p. II q. 12 m. 2, 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, Quodl. 1 q. 8. — Aegidius Romanus, here princ. 1 q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 7, where he retracts what he had earlier written for the real distinction in the sense of many Thomists; Henry of Ghent, Summa a. 28 q. 4. — Durandus, here q. 2.

IV. In this and in the following question another famous controversy is touched on, concerning the distinction which is in God between essence and the attributes and among the attributes themselves — whether, namely, this is only of reasoning reason (rationis ratiocinantis), as the Nominalists say; or whether it is formal in the sense of Scotus (here q. 4); or whether it is virtual or fundamental, as St. Thomas holds (I Sent. d. 2 q. unica a. 2, 3; Summa I q. 13 a. 4). St. Bonaventure consents entirely to the view of the Angelic Doctor concerning the distinction between the divine essence and the absolute attributes. For he excellently explains the virtual distinction in St. Thomas's sense below at d. 45 a. 2 q. 1 in corp.; cf. also d. 22 a. 1 q. 2 in corp. and ad 3; d. 27 p. I a. 1 q. 3; d. 34 q. 2 in corp.; d. 35 q. 2 in corp.; d. 7 q. 4, and in this our distinction p. I q. 1; p. II q. 1 and 2. — Also in that connected question, whether the virtual distinction by itself suffices to verify contradictories of the same thing, St. Bonaventure seems rather to stand on the side of the school of St. Thomas, which affirms this, than on Scotus's side, which denies it. For St. Bonaventure says (below d. 34 a. 1 q. 1 ad 5) that «however small a difference of reason suffices for affirmation and negation», which is to be noted for the doctrine on the Holy Trinity. Cf. also d. 8 a. 1 q. 1 ad 1; d. 19 p. II a. 1 q. 2 ad 4; d. 28 a. 1 q. 1 in corp.; d. 35 a. 1 q. 3; d. 43 q. 1 ad 3.

Another question, however, is concerning the distinction between the relations and the divine essence, which the Holy Doctor expressly affirms to be greater than that which is between the absolute attributes and the essence, and between the attributes among themselves; and he presents it as the third member and the middle of the division, while treating of the threefold division of those things which differ only by reason; see below d. 26 q. 1 ad 2 and 3, and d. 22 q. 4. This second species, distinguished by the Seraphic Doctor, as Bruliffer holds, gave occasion to Scotus to devise his formal distinction. On the view of St. Bonaventure cf. d. 13 q. 3 and the Scholion to d. 26 q. 1.

Concerning the virtual distinction cf. Alex. Hal., Summa p. I q. 52 m. 1, and q. 56 m. 7 a. 2. — B. Albert, Summa p. I d. 3 a. 4, and here a. 3 i. 5. — Petrus a Tarantasia, I Sent. d. 2 q. 1 a. 2, 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, I Sent. d. 2 a. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, I Sent. d. 2 princ. 1 q. 2, 3. — Henry of Ghent, Summa a. 31; and Quodl. 5 q. 1. — Durandus, d. 2 q. 2 and 3. — Dionysius the Carthusian, I Sent. d. 2 q. 2.

V. In the principal conclusion all agree: Alex. Hal., Summa p. I q. 5 m. 3; p. II q. 12 throughout. — Scotus, here q. 2. — St. Thomas, here q. 5 a. 1 and 2; Summa 1 q. 3 a. 7, 8. — B. Albert, here a. 4. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. 6 a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 3 q. 2. — Aegidius Romanus, here 2 princ. q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 7. — Biel, here q. 7 dub. 3.

---

Apparatus Criticus
  1. In libro de Hebdomad. et de Trin. c. 2. Vide supra d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 3. fundam. 3.
    Boethius, in the book de Hebdomadibus and de Trinitate c. 2. See above d. 3 p. II a. 1 q. 3 fundamentum 3.
  2. Cod. X contractum.
    Codex X reads contractum ("contracted").
  3. De Div. Nom. c. 1. et 13. — Mox lectio Vat. ergo pro sed corrigitur ex mss. et ed. 1.
    Dionysius, On the Divine Names c. 1 and 13. — Just after, the Vatican reading ergo in place of sed is corrected from the manuscripts and the first edition.
  4. Ita Avicenna, IX. Metaph. c. 2. seqq. Cfr. etiam Averroes, Comment. in XII. Metaph. text. 44. Allegatur etiam II. de Gener. et corrupt. text. 56. (c. 10.), ubi Aristot. ait: Idem enim et similiter se habens semper idem natum est facere.
    Thus Avicenna, IX Metaphysics c. 2 sqq. Cf. also Averroes, Commentary on XII Metaphysics text 44. It is also cited as II On Generation and Corruption text 56 (c. 10), where Aristotle says: For the same thing, holding itself in the same way, is by nature always apt to produce the same effect.
  5. Euclid., I. Geometriae, ubi iuxta translationem Boethii habetur: Punctus est, cuius pars nulla est.
    Euclid, Geometry I, where according to Boethius's translation one reads: A point is that of which there is no part.
  6. Propos. 4. — Mendum Vat., quae post causis habet sed primum, castigatur ope mss. et ed. 1.
    [Liber de Causis] prop. 4. — The Vatican error, which after causis has sed primum, is corrected with the help of the manuscripts and the first edition.
  7. Cfr. Aristot., II. Metaph. per totum (I. brevior.), ubi processus in infinitum in genere causarum reprobatur. De materia et forma, quatenus sunt principia, vide Aristot., I. Phys. text. 42. 82. (c. 5. 9.); et Gilbert. Porret., de Sex Princip. prop. I. — Cod. V abire loco ire.
    Cf. Aristotle, II Metaphysics throughout (the shorter [book] I), where the regress to infinity in the genus of causes is rejected. On matter and form, insofar as they are principles, see Aristotle, I Physics text 42, 82 (c. 5, 9); and Gilbert of Poitiers, On the Six Principles prop. 1. — Codex V reads abire in place of ire.
  8. Nempe: quod aliquid non sit componibile. — Paulo ante cod. cc componaiitur loco componatur, ubi supple: aliquid.
    Namely: that something not be composable. — A little earlier codex cc has componantur in place of componatur, where one should supply: aliquid.
  9. Ed. 1 accidentium, loco actionum, cum qua lectione concordant verba Magistri, hic c. 3. in initio, et explicatio ipsorum infra dub. 2. Pro lectione mss. allegari potest Alan. ab Insul. Regul. theolog., reg. 1, ubi praeter pluralitatem partium et proprietatum affert pluralitatem effectuum, quae attenditur in proprietatibus; sic albedo facit album, facit coloratum, facit qualem. Deus autem non est diversus effectibus variis, quia non est causa formalis. Utraque tamen lectio in idem recidit, ut patet ex iis, quae paulo infra habentur.
    The first edition reads accidentium in place of actionum, with which reading the words of the Master agree, here c. 3 at the beginning, and their explanation below at dub. 2. For the manuscript reading one may cite Alan of Lille, Theological Rules, reg. 1, where, besides the plurality of parts and of properties, he brings forward the plurality of effects, which is attended to in properties; thus whiteness makes white, makes colored, makes "such-and-so." God, however, is not diverse by various effects, since he is not a formal cause. Each reading, nevertheless, comes back to the same, as is clear from what is given just below.
  10. Sive substantiis, supple creatis. — Mox cod. W secunda loco alia.
    Or "in substances," supply: created. — Just after, codex W reads secunda in place of alia.
  11. Vat. cum cod. cc, obnitentibus aliis mss. et ed. 1, male omittit proprie.
    The Vatican edition with codex cc, against the other manuscripts and the first edition, wrongly omits proprie.
  12. Dionys., de Caelest. Hierarch. c. 11. Cfr. supra p. 79. Nota 5.
    Dionysius, On the Celestial Hierarchy c. 11. Cf. above p. 79, Note 5.
  13. Vide Boeth., de Trin. c. 2. seqq. et de Hebdomad.
    See Boethius, On the Trinity c. 2 sqq. and On the Hebdomads.
  14. Vat. falso et contra mss. necnon ed. 1 esse pro omne. — Boeth., de Trin. c. 2, ostendit, quod nullum simplex esse possit subiectum accidentium; cuius propositionis explicationem vide apud Alan. ab Insul. Regul. theolog., reg. 12.
    The Vatican edition falsely, and against the manuscripts and the first edition, has esse for omne. — Boethius, On the Trinity c. 2, shows that no simple [thing] can be the subject of accidents; for the explanation of this proposition see Alan of Lille, Theological Rules, reg. 12.
  15. Corrupta lectio Vat. sive subiecti proprietas resarcitur ope mss. et ed. 1.
    The corrupt Vatican reading sive subiecti proprietas is repaired with the help of the manuscripts and the first edition.
  16. Substantiae sive supposita dicuntur creari; accidentia et annexa, inter quae est ipsa creatio passive sumta, dicuntur concreari. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 1. p. I. a. 3. q. 2. — Mox fide antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 adiecimus enim.
    Substances or supposits are said to be created; accidents and what is annexed [to them] — among which is creation itself taken passively — are said to be con-created. Cf. II Sent. d. 1 p. I a. 3 q. 2. — Just after, on the faith of the older manuscripts and of the first edition, we have added enim.
  17. Aliqui codd. ut H T cum edd. 1, 4, 5 habeat.
    Some codices such as H, T, with editions 1, 4, 5, read habeat.
  18. Nonnulli codd. ut H I aa bb addunt sic.
    Several codices such as H, I, aa, bb add sic.
  19. Vide Boeth., de Unitate et Uno.
    See Boethius, On Unity and the One.
  20. Ex vetustioribus mss. et ed. 1 substituimus brevius loco verius, et paulo infra Sed pro Et.
    From the older manuscripts and from the first edition we have substituted brevius in place of verius, and a little below Sed for Et.
  21. Ita plurimi codd. ut A C F H K R S T U cc ee cum edd. 1, 2, 3; Vat. quo. Refertur qua ad compositio.
    Thus most codices, such as A C F H K R S T U cc ee, with editions 1, 2, 3; the Vatican reads quo. Qua refers back to compositio.
  22. Vat. cum cod. cc praeter fidem ceterorum et ed. 1 omittit minus bene principiis. Paulo ante plures codd. ut E F H I K Q X Z creaturis pro creatis.
    The Vatican with codex cc, against the trust of the others and the first edition, less well omits principiis. A little earlier several codices, such as E F H I K Q X Z, read creaturis in place of creatis.
  23. Id est substantia completa, cui opponitur accidens. — Paulo infra fide plurium mss. ut H T aa bb ee et ed. 1 post iterum posuimus omne loco esse; codd. aa bb habent omne.
    That is, a complete substance, to which accident is opposed. — A little below, on the faith of several manuscripts such as H, T, aa, bb, ee, and of the first edition, we have placed omne after iterum in place of esse; codices aa, bb read omne.
  24. Vat. absque auctoritate mss. et quinque primarum edd. et pro sit. Mox codd. A C G L O R S X aa bb habent sicut etiam pro sit etiam.
    The Vatican, without the authority of the manuscripts and of the five earliest editions, reads et for sit. Just after, codices A C G L O R S X aa bb read sicut etiam in place of sit etiam.
  25. Faventibus multis mss. et ed. 1, substituimus privat loco privet.
    With many manuscripts and the first edition in favor, we have substituted privat in place of privet.
  26. Ita codd. H K cum Vat., in qua lectione verba esse dependens referas ad subiectum omnia alia sunt; ceteri codd. cum ed. 1 ponunt omne dependens, sed minus congrue, etiamsi suppleas verbum est, ob mutationem subiecti; utraque lectio non caret difficultate grammaticali.
    Thus codices H, K with the Vatican, in which reading the words esse dependens are to be referred to the subject omnia alia sunt; the other codices with the first edition put omne dependens, but less congruously — even if you supply the verb est — because of the change of subject; each reading is not without grammatical difficulty.
  27. Libr. II. Sent. d. 3. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. in corp. Seraphicus ait: Omne dependens hoc ipso cadit in aliquam compositionem, quia differt quo est et quod est. — Explicationem huius accipe a B. Albert., S. p. I. tract. 4. q. 20. m. 2: In principiis etiam substantiae non potest esse simplicitas, quia licet ex aliis principiis substantiae non componantur, tamen aliud habent hoc quod sunt, et aliud quo principia substantiae sunt; hoc enim quod sunt, res quaedam et substantiae sunt, quia ex non substantiis non fit substantia, ut dicit Philosophus. Eo autem quo principia substantiae sunt, utrumque principiorum dependentiam habet ad alterum. Materia... ad formam ut ad actum, et forma ad materiam ut ad id in quo habet esse distinctum... Similiter dicendum est de componentibus. — Libr. I. Sent. d. 8. a. 24. ad hanc obiectionem: relatio creaturae ad Creatorem est quid extrinsecum, adeoque non facit creaturae compositionem, respondet: Dicendum, quod sola relatio ad causam efficientem non facit eis compositionem, sed hoc quod relinquitur in eis ex tali exitu in esse... ex hoc ipso, quod res exit in esse post nihil, remanet potentia tendendi in nihil, nisi contineatur ab alio.
    Book II Sent. d. 3 p. I a. 1 q. 1 in corp. The Seraphic [Doctor] says: Everything dependent by that very fact falls into some composition, because that-by-which-it-is and that-which-it-is differ in it. — For the explanation of this take B. Albert, Summa p. I tract. 4 q. 20 m. 2: In the principles even of substance simplicity cannot be, because, although they are not composed out of other principles of substance, yet they have one [thing] in that which they are, and another by which they are principles of substance; for that which they are, they are a certain reality and substances, since substance is not made from non-substances, as the Philosopher says. But by that by which they are principles of substance, each of the principles has a dependence on the other. Matter... [stands] to form as to its act, and form to matter as to that in which it has its distinct being... The like is to be said of [other] composing things. — Book I Sent. d. 8 a. 24, to this objection — the creature's relation to the Creator is something extrinsic, and thus does not constitute composition in the creature — he replies: It must be said that the relation alone to the efficient cause does not produce composition in them, but that which is left in them from such a going-forth into being... by this very fact, that a thing goes forth into being after nothing, there remains in it a potency of tending toward nothing, unless it is held back by another.
← Dist. 8, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 1Dist. 8, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 3→