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Dist. 2, Art. 2, Q. 2

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 2

Textus Latinus
p. 46

Quaestio II. Utrum Christus assumserit animam rationalem.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum Christus assumserit animam rationalem. Et quod sic, videtur.

Fundamenta.

1. Matthaei vigesimo sexto1: Tristis est anima mea usque ad mortem; sed si non haberet animam rationalem, non tristaretur: ergo etc.

2. Item, in symbolo Athanasii: « Perfectus Deus, perfectus homo, ex anima rationali et humana carne subsistens »: ergo etc.

3. Item, Christus mortuus fuit; sed mors illa non fuit per separationem divinitatis a carne: ergo fuit per separationem animae a carne: ergo habuit animam2.

4. Item, Christus descendit ad inferos et tertia die resurrexit a mortuis: aut ergo ratione animae, aut ratione corporis, aut ratione divinitatis. Ratione carnis non, quia illa remansit in sepulcro; ratione divinitatis non, quia illa non potest mutare locum: ergo ratione animae: ergo etc.

Ad oppositum.

Sed contra: 1. Ioannis primo3: Verbum caro factum est; ibi Ioannes sufficienter exprimit mysterium incarnationis: ergo nihil addendum est: ergo videtur, quod solam carnem assumsit.

2. Item, unio divinae naturae ad humanam dicitur incarnatio; sed denominatio semper debet fieri a digniori4; et cum anima dignior sit carne, et incarnatio non dicatur animatio, sed potius incarnatio: ergo videtur, quod anima non sit assumta a Verbo.

3. Item, unio respicit peccati originem; sed originale habet ortum a carne5: ergo videtur, quod Filio Dei carnem suffecerit assumere ad humani generis reparationem.

4. Item, « natura non facit per plura quod potest facere per pauciora6 »; sed in Christo divina persona potens erat in actum intelligendi et amandi et vivificandi, cum ipse Filius Dei non careat voluntate nec intelligentia nec vita: ergo videtur, quod Christus non habuerit rationalem animam.

Conclusio

Christus assumsit veram animam cum suis potentiis vegetabili, sensibili et rationali.

Triplex assertio.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod circa hoc fuit triplex modus dicendi, et duplex fuit haereticus, et tertius catholicus.

Opinio 1, haeretica.

Quidam namque dixerunt, sicut Eunomius7, quod Filius Dei assumsit carnem sine anima, quia divinitas erat ei in loco animae; et cum Verbum Dei vivificaret ipsam carnem, non indigebat alio spiritu vivificante.

p. 47

Reprobatur.

— Sed cum divina natura nullo modo possit esse forma perfectiva corporis, quia Deus nullius est forma perfectiva sive constitutiva; nullo etiam modo possit habere passiones tristitiae et doloris: impossibile est hoc dicere, quod Christus vixerit vita creata et dolores et mortem senserit, et non habuerit animam8.

Opinio 2, haeretica.

Et ideo fuit alius modus dicendi, quod Christus animam habuit, sed animam non quamcumque, sed solum animam vivificantem et sensificantem, cuiusmodi est anima sensibilis; anima autem rationali non indiguit, quia ad ceteros actus partis intellectivae sufficiebat virtus personae increatae9.

Reprobatur.

— Sed iste error adhuc pessimus est, quia si Christus animam rationalem non habuit, animam rationalem a peccato non redemit. — Et iterum, si animam rationalem non habuit, verus homo non fuit, quia non habuit hominis complementum. Et hoc dicere absque dubio est erroneum10.

Sententia catholica et conclusio.

Et ideo est tertius modus dicendi verus et catholicus, quod Christus assumsit verum corpus et veram animam cum suis potentiis vegetabili, sensibili et rationali.

Ratio.

— Et ratio huius est, quia Christus assumsit humanam naturam, ut esset mediator Dei et hominum. Et quia perfectus mediator, ideo perfectus Deus et perfectus homo; et quia perfectus homo non est, nisi habeat corpus cum omnibus membris et animam cum omnibus potentiis: ideo omnia haec assumsit. Rursus, quia perfectus mediator fuit, ideo perfectus comprehensor fuit et perfectus viator, perfectus in contemplatione et perfectus in actione, perfectus in operatione et perfectus in passione. Et ad omnia haec sequitur, quod habuit veram substantiam animae. — Unde concedendae sunt rationes hoc ostendentes.

Solutio oppositorum.

1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur de verbo Ioannis, dicendum, quod illud dictum est per synecdochen, et caro accipitur ibi pro tota natura humana. — Et si tu quaeras, quare ipse usus est illa synecdochica locutione? dicendum, quod hoc ideo fecit, Notandum. quia natura assumta nobis est notior ex parte substantiae corporalis quam spiritualis. Et ideo, quia cognitio nostra incipit ab his quae sunt nobis magis nota11, mysterium unionis humanae naturae cum divina magis descripsit ex parte carnis. — Alia etiam ratio potest reddi: Alia ratio. quia in assumtione carnis clauditur assumtio animae rationalis. Si enim12 assumsit quod minus ad assumtionem erat idoneum et magis ab assumente distabat, multo magis assumsit illud quod magis erat idoneum et magis conveniebat.

2. Et per hoc patet responsio ad sequens, quare incarnatio potius dicitur quam animatio; fit enim denominatio a parte notiori et ab ea parte, in qua magis implicatur ratio totius. — Et quod dicitur, quod denominatio debet fieri a digniori; dicendum, quod hoc verum est, nisi alia ratio interveniat.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod unio ordinatur contra peccati originem; dicendum, quod si13 origo peccati sit a carne tanquam a deferente et sua infectione animam inficiente; nunquam tamen est in carne nisi ab anima, nec traductio carnis ex carne est nisi per virtutem animae; et ideo curatio non tantum debebat respicere carnem, sed et animam, immo principalius animam quam carnem. Et propterea non suffecit assumere solam carnem.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod persona Verbi sufficit ad vivificandum et regenerandum carnem per intellectum et voluntatem; dicendum, quod etsi personae Verbi conveniat vivificare per modum efficientis, non tamen convenit vivificare per modum formae perficientis, et hoc ratione summae perfectionis, quae est in Deo, propter quam non potest esse alicuius pars constitutiva14; Notandum. et ideo secundum humanam naturam Christus formam creatam habuit completivam15, et sic certissime credendum est, Christum assumsisse et veram carnem et veram animam rationalem16.

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English Translation

Question II. Whether Christ assumed a rational soul.

Secondly it is asked whether Christ assumed a rational soul. And that he did seems so.

Arguments.

1. Matthew, chapter twenty-six1: My soul is sorrowful even unto death; but if he did not have a rational soul, he would not be made sorrowful: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, in the Symbol of Athanasius: « Perfect God, perfect man, subsisting from a rational soul and human flesh »: therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, Christ died; but that death was not through the separation of the divinity from the flesh: therefore it was through the separation of the soul from the flesh: therefore he had a soul2.

4. Likewise, Christ descended to the dead and on the third day rose from the dead: therefore either by reason of the soul, or by reason of the body, or by reason of the divinity. Not by reason of the flesh, because that remained in the tomb; not by reason of the divinity, because that cannot change place: therefore by reason of the soul: therefore, etc.

On the contrary.

But on the contrary: 1. John, chapter one3: The Word was made flesh; there John sufficiently expresses the mystery of the incarnation: therefore nothing is to be added: therefore it seems that he assumed flesh alone.

2. Likewise, the union of the divine nature with the human is called incarnation; but denomination ought always to be made from the more worthy4; and since the soul is more worthy than the flesh, and the incarnation is not called animation, but rather incarnation: therefore it seems that the soul was not assumed by the Word.

3. Likewise, the union regards the origin of sin; but the original [sin] has its origin from the flesh5: therefore it seems that it sufficed for the Son of God to assume flesh for the reparation of the human race.

4. Likewise, « nature does not do through many things what it can do through fewer6 »; but in Christ the divine person was able for the act of understanding and loving and giving life, since the Son of God himself lacks neither will nor intelligence nor life: therefore it seems that Christ did not have a rational soul.

Conclusio

Christ assumed a true soul with its powers, vegetative, sensitive, and rational.

Threefold assertion.

Respondeo: It must be said that concerning this there were three ways of speaking, and two were heretical, and the third catholic.

First opinion, heretical.

For some said, like Eunomius7, that the Son of God assumed flesh without a soul, because the divinity was to it in place of a soul; and since the Word of God gave life to that flesh, it did not need another life-giving spirit.

Refuted.

— But since the divine nature can in no way be a perfective form of the body, because God is the perfective or constitutive form of nothing; nor can it in any way have the passions of sorrow and grief: it is impossible to say this, that Christ lived a created life and felt griefs and death, and yet did not have a soul8.

Second opinion, heretical.

And so there was another way of speaking, that Christ had a soul, but not a soul of any kind, but only a soul giving life and giving sensation, of which kind is the sensitive soul; but he did not need a rational soul, because for the other acts of the intellective part the power of the uncreated person sufficed9.

Refuted.

— But this error is still worse, because if Christ did not have a rational soul, he did not redeem a rational soul from sin. — And again, if he did not have a rational soul, he was not a true man, because he did not have the completion of a man. And to say this is without doubt erroneous10.

The catholic position and conclusion.

And so there is a third way of speaking, true and catholic, that Christ assumed a true body and a true soul with its powers, vegetative, sensitive, and rational.

The reason.

— And the reason for this is that Christ assumed human nature, in order to be the mediator of God and men. And because [he was] a perfect mediator, therefore [he was] perfect God and perfect man; and because there is no perfect man unless he have a body with all its members and a soul with all its powers: therefore he assumed all these things. Again, because he was a perfect mediator, therefore he was a perfect comprehensor and a perfect wayfarer, perfect in contemplation and perfect in action, perfect in operation and perfect in suffering. And from all these things it follows that he had the true substance of a soul. — Hence the reasons demonstrating this are to be conceded.

Solution of the opposing arguments.

1. To that, therefore, which is objected first concerning the word of John, it must be said that this was said by synecdoche, and flesh is there taken for the whole human nature. — And if you ask why he used that synecdochic manner of speaking? it must be said that he did this Note. because the assumed nature is more known to us on the side of the bodily substance than of the spiritual. And therefore, because our knowledge begins from those things which are more known to us11, he described the mystery of the union of human nature with the divine more on the side of the flesh. — Another reason can also be given: Another reason. because in the assumption of the flesh is included the assumption of the rational soul. For if12 he assumed what was less suited to assumption and stood further from the one assuming, much more did he assume that which was more suited and more fitting.

2. And through this the response to what follows is clear, namely why it is called incarnation rather than animation; for the denomination is made from the more known part and from that part in which the formal character of the whole is more implicated. — And as to what is said, that the denomination ought to be made from the more worthy; it must be said that this is true, unless another reason intervenes.

3. To that which is objected, that the union is ordered against the origin of sin; it must be said that, if13 the origin of sin is from the flesh as from a bearer and infecting the soul by its infection; nevertheless it is never in the flesh except from the soul, nor is the derivation of flesh from flesh except through the power of the soul; and therefore the cure ought not to regard only the flesh, but also the soul, indeed the soul more principally than the flesh. And on this account it did not suffice to assume the flesh alone.

4. To that which is objected, that the person of the Word suffices to give life to and to regenerate the flesh through intellect and will; it must be said that, although it belongs to the person of the Word to give life by the mode of an efficient [cause], nevertheless it does not belong [to him] to give life by the mode of a perfecting form, and this by reason of the supreme perfection which is in God, on account of which he cannot be the constitutive part of anything14; Note. and therefore according to the human nature Christ had a created completive form15, and thus it is most certainly to be believed that Christ assumed both true flesh and a true rational soul16.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vers. 38. — De minori cfr. infra d. 15. a. 2. q. 2. et Fulgent., III. ad Trasim. c. 21.
    Verse 38. — On the minor [premise] cf. below, d. 15, a. 2, q. 2, and Fulgentius, To Trasimund III, c. 21.
  2. De hoc et seq. arg. cfr. Athanas., II. contra Apollinar. n. 15. seqq. — Cod. W voci animam praefigit rationalem.
    On this and the following argument cf. Athanasius, Against Apollinaris II, n. 15ff. — Codex W prefixes rationalem (rational) to the word animam (soul).
  3. Vers. 14. — Cfr. Fulgent., I. ad Trasim. c. 17.
    Verse 14. — Cf. Fulgentius, To Trasimund I, c. 17.
  4. Sive, ut Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 49. (c. 4.), ait: « a fine appellare omnia iustum est ». — Pro denominatio codd. A G K L N T V X aa bb determinatio, codd. P Q determinatio vel nominatio.
    Or, as Aristotle says, On the Soul II, text 49 (c. 4): « it is right to name all things from their end ». — For denominatio (denomination) codices A G K L N T V X aa bb [read] determinatio (determination); codices P Q [read] determinatio or nominatio (naming).
  5. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 31. a. 2. q. I. seqq. — Post originem Vat. adiicit vel peccatum originale.
    Cf. Sentences II, d. 31, a. 2, q. 1ff. — After originem (origin) the Vatican edition adds vel peccatum originale (or original sin).
  6. Cfr. supra pag. 42, nota 6. — Mox pro persona cod. G natura, codd. A aa et edd. 1, 2 potentia.
    Cf. above, p. 42, note 6. — Shortly after, for persona (person) codex G [reads] natura (nature), codices A aa and editions 1, 2 [read] potentia (power).
  7. Basil., contra Eunomium libri V, et Gregor. Nyss., II. contra Eunom. (ed. Migne, Patrol. Graec. tom. 45. col. 543) ipsum refutant. August., de Haeres. c. 49. de Arianis ait: In eo autem, quod Christum sine anima solam carnem suscepisse arbitrantur, minus noti sunt, nec adversus eos ab aliquo inveni de hac re aliquando fuisse certatum. Sed hoc verum esse, et Epiphanius [Haeres. c. 69. n. 19.] non tacuit, et ego ex eorum quibusdam scriptis et collocutionibus certissime comperi. Cfr. Enarrat. in Ps. 29. serm. 2. n. 2. seq., ubi et de seq. opinione agitur; de Ecclesiast. Dogmat. (inter opera August.) c. 2; Athanas., II. contra Apollinar. n. 3; Damasc., de Haeres. n. 69.
    Basil, Against Eunomius in five books, and Gregory of Nyssa, Against Eunomius II (ed. Migne, Patrologia Graeca tom. 45, col. 543), refute him. Augustine, On Heresies c. 49, says of the Arians: "But in this, that they suppose Christ to have taken on flesh alone without a soul, they are less known, nor have I found that anyone ever contended against them on this matter. But that this is true Epiphanius too [Heresies c. 69, n. 19] did not pass over in silence, and I myself have most certainly learned it from certain of their writings and conversations." Cf. Enarration on Psalm 29, sermon 2, n. 2f., where the following opinion too is treated; On Ecclesiastical Dogmas (among the works of Augustine) c. 2; Athanasius, Against Apollinaris II, n. 3; [John] Damascene, On Heresies n. 69.
  8. Gregor. Nyss., loc. cit. (col. 330) idem arg. habet. — Paulo ante pro vita creata cod. F vita increata, et subinde pro et mortem codd. E L P Q T V X etiam mortem, codd. F G H K Z bb et mortem etiam.
    Gregory of Nyssa, in the place cited (col. 330), has the same argument. — A little before, for vita creata (created life) codex F [reads] vita increata (uncreated life), and thereupon for et mortem (and death) codices E L P Q T V X [read] etiam mortem (death also), codices F G H K Z bb [read] et mortem etiam (and death also).
  9. August., de Haeres. c. 33: Apollinaristas Apollinaris instituit, qui de anima Christi a Catholica dissenserunt, dicentes sicut Ariani, Deum Christum carnem sine anima suscepisse. In qua quaestione testimoniis evangelicis victi, mentem, qua rationalis est anima hominis, defuisse animae Christi, sed pro hac ipsum Verbum in eo fuisse dixerunt.
    Augustine, On Heresies c. 33: "Apollinaris established the Apollinarists, who dissented from the Catholic [Church] concerning the soul of Christ, saying, like the Arians, that God-Christ took on flesh without a soul. On which question, overcome by the testimonies of the Gospels, they said that the mind, by which the soul of man is rational, was lacking to the soul of Christ, but that in its place the Word itself was in him."
  10. Cfr. Athanas., I. et II. contra Apollinar.; Gregor. Nyss., adversus Apollinar.; Ambros., de Incarnat. dominic. sacram. c. 7. n. 64. seqq. et Epist. 46. (alias 47. vel 8.); August., Epist. 187. (alias 37.) c. 2. n. 4; de Fide et symb. c. 4. n. 8; de Agone christian. c. 19. n. 21. Serm. 237. (alias 143. de Tempore) c. 4. n. 4. et contra Felician. Arian. (inter opera August., sed est Vigilii) c. 13. seqq.; Fulgent., I. ad Trasim. c. 10. seqq., ubi (c. 13. et 18.) et de tertio modo dicendi vero et catholico agitur. — Pro erroneum cod. K haereticum.
    Cf. Athanasius, Against Apollinaris I and II; Gregory of Nyssa, Against Apollinaris; Ambrose, On the Sacrament of the Lord's Incarnation c. 7, n. 64ff. and Letter 46 (otherwise 47 or 8); Augustine, Letter 187 (otherwise 37) c. 2, n. 4; On Faith and the Creed c. 4, n. 8; On the Christian Combat c. 19, n. 21; Sermon 237 (otherwise 143, On the Season) c. 4, n. 4, and Against Felician the Arian (among the works of Augustine, but it is Vigilius's) c. 13ff.; Fulgentius, To Trasimund I, c. 10ff., where (c. 13 and 18) the third, true and catholic, way of speaking is also treated. — For erroneum (erroneous) codex K [reads] haereticum (heretical).
  11. Vide tom. II. pag. 319, nota 3.
    See tom. II, p. 319, note 3.
  12. Secundum Aristot., I. Phys. text. 2. seqq., de quo cfr. tom. II. pag. 441, nota 1, et d. 39. a. 1. q. 2. — Hanc rationem exhibet August., de Agone christian. c. 21. n. 23, nec non Fulgent., I. ad Trasim. c. 17.
    According to Aristotle, Physics I, text 2ff., on which cf. tom. II, p. 441, note 1, and d. 39, a. 1, q. 2. — Augustine sets forth this reason, On the Christian Combat c. 21, n. 23, as does Fulgentius, To Trasimund I, c. 17.
  13. Codd. F G H (K a secunda manu) Z igitur. — Cfr. Damasc., III. de Fide orthod. c. 18.
    Codices F G H (K by a second hand) Z [read] igitur (therefore). — Cf. [John] Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith III, c. 18.
  14. Edd. etsi. Aliquantulum inferius pro curatio Vat. reparatio, edd. 1. 2 cum paucis codd. creatio. Mox pro sed et animam codd. sed animam, ac deinde pro suffecit codd. G H P Q bb sufficit. — De modo, quo peccatum originale per generationem carnalem propagatur, cfr. II. Sent. d. 31. a. 2. q. 1.
    The editions [read] etsi (although). Somewhat below, for curatio (cure) the Vatican edition [reads] reparatio (reparation), editions 1, 2 with a few codices [read] creatio (creation). Shortly after, for sed et animam (but also the soul) the codices [read] sed animam (but the soul), and then for suffecit (sufficed) codices G H P Q bb [read] sufficit (suffices). — On the manner in which original sin is propagated through carnal generation, cf. Sentences II, d. 31, a. 2, q. 1.
  15. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 2; d. 17. p. I. q. 1; II. Sent. d. 26. q. 2. — Circa initium solut. pro regenerandum Vat. et nonnulli codd. non bene regendum; circa finem solut. pro completivam [i. e. animam, quae dat esse specificum] cod. A minus bene completam.
    Cf. Sentences I, d. 8, p. II, q. 2; d. 17, p. I, q. 1; Sentences II, d. 26, q. 2. — Near the beginning of the solution, for regenerandum (to regenerate) the Vatican edition and several codices read, not well, regendum (to govern); near the end of the solution, for completivam [i.e. the soul, which gives specific being] codex A reads, less well, completam (completed).
  16. Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.
    See the scholion to the preceding question.
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