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Dist. 8, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 3

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 8

Textus Latinus
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Quaestio III. Utrum anima rationalis sit tota in toto corpore, et tota in qualibet parte ipsius.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum anima rationalis sit in toto corpore, ita quod in qualibet parte. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Augustinus1 dicit, quod sicut Deus est in maiori mundo, sic anima in minori: sed Deus sic est in maiori, quod in qualibet parte totus: ergo anima sic est in minori, scilicet in corpore.

2. Item, quod dat esse toti et partibus unitur toti et partibus secundum essentiam, quia forma per sui essentiam dat esse, et hoc non nisi ei cui essentialiter unitur2; sed anima dat esse toti corpori et omnibus partibus: ergo etc.

3. Item, in oculo est videre, est sentire, est vivere3. Quaero ergo, utrum sint haec unus actus vel differentes. Non unus; hoc constat, quia, privato visu, adhuc sentit per tactum, privato sensu, adhuc vivit, sicut in paralytico; cum ergo vivere sit a substantia, videre a potentia, in oculo est anima secundum substantiam; eadem ratione potest probari, et in omnibus partibus esse4.

4. Item, anima operatur in toto corpore, ergo in toto corpore5 est per potentiam; sed potentia animae simplex est: ergo si potentia una est in manu et pede, idem est in diversis partibus; sed non est simplicior potentia quam substantia: ergo etc.

5. Item, anima est in corpore: aut ergo6 est in qualibet parte, aut est in una determinate, aut est in puncto. Si in qualibet parte, habeo propositum. Si in una, cum illa habeat plures partes, et anima sit simplex, erit in pluribus partibus: ergo non est inconveniens, animam esse in pluribus partibus. Sed qua ratione est7 in partibus partis, eadem ratione est in partibus totius. Si est in puncto corporis8, ergo cum punctus non habeat proportionem ad totum corpus, anima est improportionabilis toti corpori: ergo non potest esse perfectio, cum proportio sit perfectionis ad perfectibile9. Similiter, « punctus est substantia posita » sive habens positionem, ergo anima habet situm in corpore; sed nulla forma situalis est motor sufficiens: ergo etc.

Sed contra:

1. Forma, quae est in toto et in partibus una, denominat partes et totum ratione consimili10. Unde quaelibet pars ignis est ignis: ergo si anima est in qualibet parte, tunc quaelibet pars animalis est animal sicut totum11, cum quaelibet pars sit substantia animata sensibilis.

2. Item, existentia animae rationalis non dependet ab aliqua parte corporis, cum sit fixa in se: ergo non est in qualibet12.

3. Item, operatio eius non dependet ab aliqua parte corporis nec alicui communicatur: ergo in nulla parte corporis est, nec in quantum perfectio, nec in quantum motor. Unde Philosophus13 dicit, quod « anima nullius corporis est actus », id est nullius partis corporis, sed in quo est, est sicut actus.

4. Item, corpus organicum14 est diversarum rationum in partibus et toto, ergo habet diversam perfectionem: ergo cum anima perficiat totum quantum ad essentiam, perficit partes quantum ad potentiam: ergo anima rationalis non est in partibus nisi solum

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quantum ad rationem potentiae; et hoc etiam dicit Philosophus15: « Sicut anima ad corpus, sic partes animae ad partes corporis ».

5. Item, si anima est tota in qualibet parte corporis, ergo tota est in manu; sed quando aliquod totum est in aliquo, movetur illo moto16: ergo mota manu, movetur anima, et similiter, manu quiescente, quiescit: ergo cum manus una possit moveri, altera existente in quiete, anima una et eadem numero simul quiescit et movetur secundum idem.

6. Item, si anima est in pluribus partibus17 tota, qua ratione in tribus, eadem ratione in pluribus, et ita in infinitis, et quantumcumque extendatur corpus: ergo anima nata est esse ubique, et ita videtur, quod anima non sit substantia limitata, sed infinita.

7. Item, si tota anima est in manu sicut in aliis partibus: ergo cum vita sit ab18 anima, non magis recipit motum et sensum manus a corde, quam e converso. Hoc autem est contra omnes philosophos19; et sequitur ex hoc tale inconveniens, quod, sicut laeso corde perit vita, ita laesa manu.

Conclusio. Anima rationalis est tota in toto corpore et tota in qualibet parte.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod aliqui dicunt, quod anima secundum essentiam est in aliqua parte determinate, secundum potentiam vero est et influit in toto corpore, sicut aranea est in tela20. Unde dixerunt, quod est in corde, quia cor est domicilium vitae, et eius inhabitator est anima. Et ad hoc ponendum movit eos experimentum cum defectu rationis. Experimentum, quia visibiliter apparet, quod laeso corde separatur anima, et ab ipso fluit21 sensus et motus, et est membrum nobile existens in medio, sicut centrum corporis. Defectus rationis, quia non potuerunt intelligere, quomodo aliquid limitatum sit unum et idem totum in pluribus; et quia fides non cogit credere, et ratio non intelligit, ideo dicunt, non esse ponendum, quod sit in toto ratione cuiuslibet partis.

Sed aliorum opinio est, ut Augustini22, quod anima in qualibet parte corporis sit tota; et ad hoc ponendum movet experimentum, exemplum et rationabile argumentum. Experimentum, quia anima in partibus distantibus a corde ita cito sentit, sicut et in propinquis; item23 simul quasi in ictu oculi sentit laesionem in partibus distantibus, et cum anima separatur, dolor est in singulis partibus et resolutio. Exemplum similiter movet, sicut dicit Augustinus24: « Videmus enim quod uno animali perfecte sano est una sanitas in singulis partibus, nec maior in maiori nec minor in minori ». Si ergo hoc est in forma corporali, quanto magis in spirituali? Rationis argumentum movet, quia anima est forma simplex et motor sufficiens. Quia forma totalis corporis, est in toto; quia vero simplex, non est secundum partem et partem sui; quia motor sufficiens, ideo non habet situm, et ideo nec est in puncto nec in parte determinata. Et quia magis rationalis est opinio, quae fundatur supra25 rationem, quam quae fundatur supra defectus rationis, et quia Augustinus hoc dicit, hanc approbo tanquam meliorem.

Ad argumenta in contrarium:

Ad 1, 2. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium: forma quae est in toto etc.; dicendum, quod triplex est genus formae. Est enim quaedam, quae perficit et extenditur et dependet. Et haec, quia totum perficit, est in toto; quia vero extenditur, perfectionem totius communicat partibus; quia vero dependet nec agit per se, operationem totius communicat partibus, ut patet in forma ignis, quia quaelibet pars ignis est ignis et quaelibet calefacit. Est alia26 forma, quae perficit et dependet, sed non extenditur; et ta-

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lis forma, quia totum perficit, est in toto et qualibet parte: quia vero non extenditur, ideo actum27 totius non attribuit partibus: quia vero dependet, operationem totius communicat partibus; et talis est anima vegetabilis et sensibilis, quia nulla pars animalis est animal, tamen quaelibet pars animalis vivit et sentit. Est iterum28 forma, quae totum perficit, tamen nec extenditur nec dependet quantum ad operationem; et talis, quia perfectio est, est in toto et partibus; quia vero non extenditur, perfectionem totius non communicat partibus: quia non dependet, ideo29 nec operationem communicat: et talis est anima rationalis, quia nulla pars hominis est homo, et nulla pars hominis intelligit. Tamen etsi non communicet30 actum totius ut toti, communicat ut partibus; quia quaelibet pars est pars hominis et vivificatur a perfectione hominis; et ideo perfectio hominis est in qualibet parte.

Ad 3. Et sic patet responsio ad illud, quod nullius corporis est actus; quia nulli parti corporis31 communicat propriam operationem nec perfectionem totius, tamen omnes partes perficit in toto. Similiter ad aliud de forma, quia forma, quae est in partibus, non denominat similiter32 totum et partes, nisi sit forma dependens et extensa; et loquor hic de forma substantiali tantum, non de accidentali.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non sunt eiusdem rationis totum et partes; dicendum, quod in partibus est considerare organizationem et complexionem. Ratione complexionis sunt uniformes toti et sunt dispositae ad idem genus vitae et perficiuntur ab uno; ratione33 organizationis sunt diversae et perficiuntur a potentiis.

Ad 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod34 movetur, mota manu etc.; dicendum, quod perfectio potest super totum perfectibile et quantum ad substantiam et quantum ad potentiam; et cum anima sit perfectio totius corporis, super totum potest, et ideo nullo minori, quam sit totum corpus, definitur eius substantia nec potentia; definitur autem corpore suo, quod perficit, et ideo corpore moto, movetur per consequens; partibus autem non definitur, quia sunt minores toto, et ita est in una, quod est extra illam35. Et ideo, quia in nulla parte est definitive, non movetur ad motum alicuius partis, sicut nec Deus movetur ad motum alicuius creaturae.

Ad 6. Et per hoc patet sequens, quia totum corpus comparatur ipsi animae tanquam unus locus; et ideo in pluribus partibus non est nisi in quantum in uno loco; unde si separentur, non erit in illis. Nec sequitur ex hoc, quod sit infinita, quia « omnium natura constantium terminus est et ratio magnitudinis et augmenti »36, et ita corporis humani. Unde potest cogitari tam magnum corpus, quod non posset vivificari ab anima.

Ad 7. Ad illud quod obiicitur ultimo, quod tunc una pars non recipit ab alia; dicendum, quod sicut Deus in maiore mundo immediate est in omni creatura ipsam continens, tamen per37 ordinem universi influit aliquid una creatura in aliam; sic intelligendum, quod anima per sui praesentiam est in qualibet parte immediate, quam continet et conservat, non tamen omnino, sed influit in omnes partes per unam: et ideo cessante illa parte et eius influentia, perit ordo corporis essentialis, et ita anima separatur.

Scholion

I. Propositio in arg. 1. ad opp., quod forma aliqua denominat partes et totum, vera est, quando agitur de rebus organizatione carentibus, quarum partes sunt proinde omnino homogeneae; sed falsissime applicatur ad corpora organizata, sicut fit in illo sophismate Buridani ad probandum digitum hominis esse hominem. Triplici illa distinctione formarum S. Doctor ad 1. istam difficultatem iam solvit.

II. Pro intelligentia solutionis ad 5. hoc notandum. Anima vocatur perfectio totius corporis et corpus perfectibile, quia secundum Aristotelem anima, ut forma substantialis, est actus corporis, unde « super totum potest », i. e. per substantiam suam potest totum corpus vivificare et per potentiam movere. Hoc tamen non excludit, quod magis influat in organa principaliora, uti explicatur in solut. ad 7. Verba: « Ideo nullo minori, quam sit totum corpus, definitur eius substantia », sensum habent, quod anima sit in toto corpore modo definitivo, ut nunc dicitur, non circumscriptivo. Esse in loco circumscriptive dicitur, quando totum locatum est in toto loco, et pars locati in parte loci; quando vero aliquid determinatur quidem ad aliquem locum, ut naturaliter non possit simul esse in alio, et insuper, ut sit totum in toto et totum in qualibet parte loci, tunc dicitur esse definitive in loco.

III. Circa conclusionem omnibus communem cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 64. — Scot., De rer. princ. q. 12. a. 3. — S. Thom., hic q. 5. a. 3; S. I. q. 76. a. 8; S. c. Gent. II. c. 72. — B. Albert., hic a. 26. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 6. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1. — Ægid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 3. — Durand., hic q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 7. post medium. — Biel, II Sent. d. 16. q. unic. dub. 1.

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English Translation
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Question III. Whether the rational soul is whole in the whole body, and whole in every part of it.

Thirdly it is asked whether the rational soul is in the whole body in such a way that it is in every part. And that it is so, seems to be the case.

1. Augustine1 says that as God is in the greater world, so the soul is in the lesser: but God is in the greater world in such a way that he is whole in every part: therefore the soul is so in the lesser, namely in the body.

2. Likewise, that which gives being to the whole and to the parts is united to the whole and to the parts according to essence, because a form by its essence gives being, and this only to that to which it is essentially united2; but the soul gives being to the whole body and to all its parts: therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, in the eye there is seeing, there is sensing, there is living3. I ask therefore whether these are one act or different acts. Not one; this is clear, because, when sight is removed, it still senses by touch; when sense is removed, it still lives, as in a paralytic; since therefore living is from the substance, seeing from a power, in the eye the soul is according to substance; by the same reasoning it can be proved to be also in all the parts4.

4. Likewise, the soul operates in the whole body; therefore in the whole body5 it is through power; but the power of the soul is simple: therefore if one power is in the hand and the foot, the same [power] is in diverse parts; but a power is not simpler than a substance: therefore, etc.

5. Likewise, the soul is in the body: therefore either6 it is in every part, or it is determinately in one, or it is in a point. If in every part, I have the proposition. If in one, since that has several parts, and the soul is simple, it will be in several parts: therefore it is not unfitting that the soul be in several parts. But for whatever reason it is7 in the parts of a part, by the same reason it is in the parts of the whole. If it is in a point of the body8, then since a point has no proportion to the whole body, the soul is unproportionable to the whole body: therefore it cannot be the perfection [of the body], since proportion belongs to a perfection with respect to the perfectible9. Likewise, « a point is a substance having position », or having a position, therefore the soul has a place in the body; but no situated form is a sufficient mover: therefore, etc.

On the contrary:

1. A form which is one in the whole and in the parts denominates the parts and the whole by a like account10. Whence every part of fire is fire: therefore if the soul is in every part, then every part of an animal is an animal as the whole is11, since every part is an ensouled sensible substance.

2. Likewise, the existence of the rational soul does not depend on any part of the body, since it is fixed in itself: therefore it is not in every [part]12.

3. Likewise, its operation does not depend on any part of the body, nor is it communicated to any: therefore it is in no part of the body, neither as perfection, nor as mover. Whence the Philosopher13 says that « the soul is the act of no body », that is, of no part of the body, but it is in that in which it is, as an act.

4. Likewise, the organic body14 is of diverse accounts in its parts and in the whole; therefore it has diverse perfection: therefore since the soul perfects the whole as to essence, it perfects the parts as to power: therefore the rational soul is not in the parts except only

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as to the account of power; and this also the Philosopher15 says: « As the soul is to the body, so the parts of the soul are to the parts of the body ».

5. Likewise, if the soul is whole in every part of the body, then it is whole in the hand; but when some whole is in something, it is moved when that is moved16: therefore when the hand is moved, the soul is moved, and likewise, when the hand is at rest, the soul is at rest: therefore since one hand can be moved, while the other is at rest, one and the same soul numerically is at once at rest and moved according to the same.

6. Likewise, if the soul is whole in many parts17, by whatever reason in three, by the same reason in more, and thus in infinite, and however much the body is extended: therefore the soul is by nature to be everywhere, and so it seems that the soul is not a limited substance, but infinite.

7. Likewise, if the whole soul is in the hand as in the other parts: then since life is from18 the soul, the hand does not receive motion and sense from the heart more than conversely. But this is against all philosophers19; and there follows from this such an inconvenience, that, as when the heart is injured life perishes, so [it should perish] when the hand is injured.

Conclusion. The rational soul is whole in the whole body and whole in every part.

I respond: It must be said that some say that the soul according to essence is determinately in some part [of the body], but according to power it is and influences in the whole body, as a spider is in its web20. Whence they said that it is in the heart, because the heart is the dwelling-place of life, and its inhabitant is the soul. And experience together with a defect of reason moved them to posit this. Experience, because it visibly appears that, when the heart is injured, the soul is separated, and from it flows21 sense and motion, and it is the noble member existing in the middle, as the center of the body. Defect of reason, because they could not understand how something limited could be one and the same whole in many; and because faith does not compel us to believe it, and reason does not understand it, therefore they say it must not be posited that it is in the whole by reason of every part.

But the opinion of others is, as of Augustine's22, that the soul is whole in every part of the body; and to posit this, experience, an example, and a reasonable argument move [them]. Experience, because the soul senses as quickly in parts distant from the heart as in parts near; likewise23 it senses, at once as it were in the twinkling of an eye, an injury in distant parts, and when the soul is separated, there is pain in each part and dissolution. Example likewise moves, as Augustine says24: « For we see that in one perfectly healthy animal there is one health in each of the parts, neither greater in the greater nor lesser in the lesser ». If therefore this is so in a corporeal form, how much more in a spiritual one? The argument from reason moves, because the soul is a simple form and a sufficient mover. Because it is the total form of the body, it is in the whole; because it is simple, it is not according to part and part of itself; because a sufficient mover, therefore it has no place, and therefore it is neither in a point nor in a determinate part. And because the more rational opinion is that which is founded upon25 reason, than that which is founded upon defects of reason, and because Augustine says this, I approve this one as the better.

To the arguments to the contrary:

To 1, 2. To that therefore which is objected to the contrary: the form which is in the whole etc.; it must be said that there are three kinds of form. For there is a certain one which perfects and is extended and depends. And this, because it perfects the whole, is in the whole; because it is extended, communicates the perfection of the whole to the parts; because it depends and does not act per se, communicates the operation of the whole to the parts, as is evident in the form of fire, because every part of fire is fire and every [part] heats. There is another26 form, which perfects and depends, but is not extended; and such a

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form, because it perfects the whole, is in the whole and in every part: but because it is not extended, therefore it does not attribute the act27 of the whole to the parts: but because it depends, it communicates the operation of the whole to the parts; and such is the vegetable and sensible soul, because no part of an animal is an animal, yet every part of an animal lives and senses. There is again28 a form which perfects the whole, yet is neither extended nor depends as to operation; and such [a form], because it is a perfection, is in the whole and in the parts; because it is not extended, does not communicate the perfection of the whole to the parts: because it does not depend, therefore29 it does not communicate operation either: and such is the rational soul, because no part of a man is a man, and no part of a man understands. Yet even if it does not communicate30 the act of the whole to the whole [as such], it does communicate [it] to the parts; because every part is a part of a man and is vivified by the perfection of a man; and therefore the perfection of a man is in every part.

To 3. And thus the answer is evident to that [objection], that it is the act of no body; because to no part of the body31 does it communicate its proper operation nor the perfection of the whole, yet it perfects all the parts in the whole. Similarly to the other [objection] concerning form: because a form which is in the parts does not denominate the whole and the parts in like manner32, unless it be a dependent and extended form; and I speak here only of substantial form, not of accidental.

To 4. To that which is objected, that the whole and the parts are not of the same account; it must be said that in the parts there is to be considered organization and complexion. By reason of complexion they are uniform with the whole and are disposed to the same kind of life and are perfected by one [thing]; by reason33 of organization they are diverse and are perfected by powers.

To 5. To that which is objected, that34 it is moved, when the hand is moved etc.; it must be said that a perfection has power over the whole perfectible both as to substance and as to power; and since the soul is the perfection of the whole body, it has power over the whole, and therefore its substance and power are bounded by nothing less than the whole body; it is bounded, however, by its own body, which it perfects, and therefore when the body is moved, it is moved consequently; but by the parts it is not bounded, because they are less than the whole, and so it is in one [part] in such a way that it is outside it35. And therefore, because it is in no part definitively, it is not moved by the motion of any part, just as God is not moved by the motion of any creature.

To 6. And by this is evident what follows, because the whole body is compared to the soul itself as one place; and therefore it is not in many parts except inasmuch as in one place; whence if they are separated, it will not be in them. Nor does it follow from this that it is infinite, because « of all things constituted by nature there is a limit and account of magnitude and of growth »36, and so [also] of the human body. Whence so great a body can be conceived that it could not be vivified by the soul.

To 7. To that which is objected last, that then one part does not receive from another; it must be said that, just as God in the greater world is immediately in every creature containing it, yet through37 the order of the universe one creature influences another with something; so it is to be understood that the soul, by its presence, is immediately in every part, which it contains and preserves, yet not entirely, but it influences all the parts through one: and therefore when that part and its influence cease, the essential order of the body perishes, and so the soul is separated.

Scholion

I. The proposition in arg. 1 to the contrary, that some form denominates the parts and the whole, is true when it concerns things lacking organization, whose parts are accordingly altogether homogeneous; but it is most falsely applied to organized bodies, as occurs in that sophism of Buridan for proving that a man's finger is a man. By that threefold distinction of forms the Holy Doctor has already solved this difficulty in [the reply] to 1.

II. For the understanding of the solution to 5, this is to be noted. The soul is called the perfection of the whole body, and the body the perfectible, because according to Aristotle the soul, as substantial form, is the act of the body, whence « it has power over the whole », i.e. by its substance it can vivify the whole body and by its power move it. This, however, does not exclude that it influences more in the more principal organs, as is explained in the solution to 7. The words: « Therefore by nothing less than the whole body is its substance bounded » have the sense that the soul is in the whole body in a definitive mode, as it is now said, not circumscriptive. To be in a place circumscriptively is said when the whole located thing is in the whole place, and a part of the located in a part of the place; but when something is determined indeed to some place, such that it cannot naturally be at the same time in another, and moreover, so as to be whole in the whole and whole in every part of the place, then it is said to be definitively in the place.

III. Concerning the conclusion common to all, cf. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 64. — Scot., De rer. princ. q. 12. a. 3. — S. Thom., hic q. 5. a. 3; S. I. q. 76. a. 8; S. c. Gent. II. c. 72. — B. Albert., hic a. 26. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 6. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1. — Ægid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 3. — Durand., hic q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 7. post medium. — Biel, II Sent. d. 16. q. unic. dub. 1.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Libr. de Spiritu et anima, c. 13. in fine. — Mox in propos. minore post maiori Vat. repetit mundo.
    Book On the Spirit and the Soul, c. 13, near the end. — Soon, in the minor proposition, after maiori the Vatican edition repeats mundo.
  2. Cfr. Aristot., VIII. Metaph. text. 15. et 16. (VII. c. 6.). — De proxime sequente propositione vide II. de Anima, text. 4. seqq. et 24. (c. 1. et 2.), ac I. de Part. animal. c. 1.
    Cf. Aristotle, VIII Metaphysics text 15 and 16 (VII c. 6). — On the immediately following proposition see II On the Soul, text 4 ff. and 24 (c. 1 and 2), and I On the Parts of Animals c. 1.
  3. Ex plurimis mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus bis est.
    From very many manuscripts and ed. 1 we have supplied est twice.
  4. Supple cum cod. V patet. — In fine argumenti post partibus cod. Y addit corporis.
    Supply with codex V patet. — At the end of the argument, after partibus, codex Y adds corporis.
  5. Vat. absque auctoritate mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 6 minus bene omittit in toto corpore.
    The Vatican edition, without the authority of the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3, 6, less well omits in toto corpore.
  6. Fide plurium mss. ut M T V W X Z etc. et ed. 1 adiecimus ergo, et dein post ergo est.
    On the trust of many manuscripts such as M T V W X Z etc. and ed. 1 we have added ergo, and then after ergo [supplied] est.
  7. Plurimi codd. cum ed. 1 hic et paulo post minus apte omittunt est.
    Very many codices with ed. 1, here and a little later, less aptly omit est.
  8. Codd. aa bb addunt ergo est punctus.
    Codices aa, bb add ergo est punctus.
  9. Colligitur ex dicto Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 24 (c. 2.); Videtur enim actus activorum inesse in patiente et disposito. — Et text. 26. ait, quod non videatur quodlibet (subiectum) recipere quodlibet (quamlibet formam). — Sequens definitio puncti datur ab Aristot., I. de Anima, text. 68. (c. 4.) et V. Metaph. text. 12. (IV. c. 6.)
    It is gathered from what Aristotle says, II On the Soul, text 24 (c. 2): For the act of agents seems to inhere in what is acted upon and disposed. — And at text 26 he says that not just anything (subject) appears to receive just anything (any form). — The following definition of a point is given by Aristotle, I On the Soul, text 68 (c. 4), and V Metaphysics text 12 (IV c. 6).
  10. Aristot., I. de Historia animal. c. 1.
    Aristotle, I History of Animals c. 1.
  11. Ita antiqui codd. cum ed. 1, licet plurimi eorum post pars omittant animalis; Vat. autem cum cod. cc, omissa particula tunc, pro est animal sicut totum ponit dicitur animal.
    So the ancient codices with ed. 1, although very many of them omit animalis after pars; but the Vatican edition with codex cc, omitting the particle tunc, puts dicitur animal for est animal sicut totum.
  12. Codd. W X addunt parte.
    Codices W, X add parte.
  13. Lib. II. de Anima, text. 11. (c. 1.) et III. de Anima, text. 6. (c. 4.).
    Book II On the Soul, text 11 (c. 1) and III On the Soul, text 6 (c. 4).
  14. Aliqui codd. ut A I W Y organizatum.
    Some codices such as A, I, W, Y [read] organizatum.
  15. Libr. II. de Anima, text. 9. (c. 1.).
    Book II On the Soul, text 9 (c. 1).
  16. Vide supra d. 8. a. 2. q. I. ad opp. 3.
    See above, d. 8, a. 2, q. I, to the contrary 3.
  17. Vat. cum cod. cc, aliis autem codd. et ed. 1 refragantibus, hic omittit partibus et in fine argumenti substantia, ac contra plures codd. ut F H T V Y etc. ponit ea ratione loco eadem ratione.
    The Vatican edition with codex cc — the other codices and ed. 1 opposing — here omits partibus, and at the end of the argument substantia; and against many codices such as F, H, T, V, Y, etc., it puts ea ratione in place of eadem ratione.
  18. Aliqui codd. ut A C G I R S omittunt ab. Cod. T cum una sit anima. Codd. L O sit anima vel ab anima.
    Some codices such as A, C, G, I, R, S omit ab. Codex T [reads] cum una sit anima. Codices L, O [read] sit anima vel ab anima.
  19. Vide Aristot., III. de Partib. animal. c. 3. et 4.
    See Aristotle, III On the Parts of Animals c. 3 and 4.
  20. Chalcidius, qui vixit sub initio IV. saec., in Platonis Timaeum (ed. Lipsiae, 1876, cura Dr. Ioh. Wrobel, pag. 296. n. CCXX.): Sicut aranea in medietate cassis omnia filorum tenet pedibus exordia, ut cum quid ex bestiolis plagas incurrerit ex quacumque parte de proximo sentiat, sic animae principale positum in media sede cordis, sensuum exordia retinere, ut cum quid nuntiabunt, de proximo recognoscat. — Vat. fluit pro influit. Mox post quia cod. K addit sicut dicitur in libro de Motu cordis. Vide Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 87. m. 2. a. 1. § 1. (in aliis edd. q. 94.). — De hac opinione cfr. Greg. Nyssen., de Hominis opificio, c. 12.
    Chalcidius, who lived at the beginning of the IV century, on Plato's Timaeus (Leipzig ed., 1876, by Dr. Joh. Wrobel, p. 296, n. CCXX): Just as a spider in the middle of its net holds with its feet all the beginnings of its threads, so that whenever any of the little creatures runs into the snares from any part, it senses it from close at hand, so the soul's principal [part], placed in the middle seat of the heart, retains the beginnings of the senses, so that whenever they report anything, it recognizes it from close at hand. — The Vatican edition reads fluit for influit. Then after quia codex K adds sicut dicitur in libro de Motu cordis. See Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 87. m. 2. a. 1. § 1 (in other editions q. 94). — On this opinion, cf. Gregory of Nyssa, On the Making of Man, c. 12.
  21. Ex plurimis mss. et ed. 1 substituimus fluit loco influit. — De cordis principatu vide Aristot., III. de Partib. animal. c. 4.
    From very many manuscripts and ed. 1 we have substituted fluit for influit. — On the primacy of the heart, see Aristotle, III On the Parts of Animals c. 4.
  22. Libr. VI. de Trin. c. 6. n. 8; et de Immort. animae c. 16. n. 23; ac de Origine animae hom. (epist. 166.) n. 4; necnon contra Epist. Manichaei c. 16. n. 20. — Mox nonnulli codd. modo inverso ad hoc movendum ponit, codd. h O ad hoc monstrandum vel movendum ponit; sed cum subnexis haec lectio non cohaeret. Dein plures codd. ut A F G I K T etc. cum edd. 1, 2, 3 rationale pro rationabile. De differentia horum cfr. August., II. de Ordine, c. 11. n. 31. seq.
    Book VI On the Trinity c. 6 n. 8; and On the Immortality of the Soul c. 16 n. 23; and On the Origin of the Soul, homily (epist. 166) n. 4; also against the Epistle of Manichaeus c. 16 n. 20. — Then some codices, in inverse manner, [read] ad hoc movendum ponit; codices h, O [read] ad hoc monstrandum vel movendum ponit; but with what follows this reading does not cohere. Then many codices such as A, F, G, I, K, T etc., with editions 1, 2, 3, [read] rationale for rationabile. On the difference of these, cf. Augustine, II On Order, c. 11 n. 31 ff.
  23. Vat., obnitentibus antiquioribus mss. et edd. 1, 6, repetit hic quia. Cod. W et ita, cod. X et loco item, aliqui codd. vero ut F T particulam et addunt non male post simul.
    The Vatican edition, the older manuscripts and editions 1, 6 opposing, here repeats quia. Codex W [reads] et ita, codex X [reads] et in place of item; some codices indeed, such as F, T, not badly add the particle et after simul.
  24. Libr. de Praesentia Dei seu Epistol. 187. c. 4. n. 13: Qualitas vero corporis, quae sanitas dicitur, cum sanum corpus est totum, tanta est in maioribus, quanta in minoribus partibus. Non enim quae minus magnae sunt, ideo minus sanae sunt, aut quae ampliores, ideo saniores. — Ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus uno.
    Book On the Presence of God, or Letter 187 c. 4 n. 13: But the quality of the body which is called health, when the body is sound as a whole, is as great in the larger parts as in the smaller. For those parts which are less large are not for that reason less sound, nor those which are larger therefore more sound. — From the older manuscripts and ed. 1 we have supplied uno.
  25. Ed. 1 hic et paulo post super. Aliqui codd. ut V Y cum ed. 1 defectum loco defectus. Dein fide plurimorum mss. et sex primarum edd. post rationis addidimus et, quod Vat. minus bene omittit.
    Ed. 1 here and a little later [reads] super. Some codices such as V, Y with ed. 1 [read] defectum in place of defectus. Then on the trust of very many manuscripts and the first six editions, we have added after rationis the word et, which the Vatican edition less well omits.
  26. Nonnulli codd. ut A B D E G P T Y W autem pro alia; cod. I autem alia.
    Some codices such as A, B, D, E, G, P, T, Y, W [read] autem for alia; codex I [reads] autem alia.
  27. Aliqui codd. ut D G T ff addunt sive perfectionem.
    Some codices such as D, G, T, ff add sive perfectionem.
  28. Codd. P Q adiiciunt tertia.
    Codices P, Q add tertia.
  29. Multi codd. ut A C E G H I O R S T U V Y Z ff cum ed. 1 omittunt ideo.
    Many codices such as A, C, E, G, H, I, O, R, S, T, U, V, Y, Z, ff, with ed. 1, omit ideo.
  30. Subaudi: parti vel partibus. — Multi codd. ut A C E G L R S U V Y Z cc ff falso post etsi omittunt non; fere omnes tamen codd. contra Vat. habent communicet pro communicat. Mox Vat. cum cod. cc, aliis autem codd. cum ed. 1 refragantibus, omittit est pars ac post hominis particulam et.
    Understand: parti or partibus. — Many codices such as A, C, E, G, L, R, S, U, V, Y, Z, cc, ff falsely omit non after etsi; yet nearly all the codices against the Vatican edition have communicet for communicat. Then the Vatican edition with codex cc — the other codices with ed. 1 opposing — omits est pars and after hominis the particle et.
  31. Ex codd. H Y supplevimus parti corporis, certe saltem subaudiendum. Ed. 1 vero paulo ante post nullius addit parte. Sensus responsionis redditur facilior, si ponatur: quia, etsi nulli parti etc. — Mox fide antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 substituimus tamen loco cum et perficit pro perficiat.
    From codices H, Y we have supplied parti corporis, certainly at least to be understood. But ed. 1, a little before, after nullius adds parte. The sense of the response is rendered easier if one puts: quia, etsi nulli parti etc. — Then on the trust of older manuscripts and ed. 1 we have substituted tamen for cum, and perficit for perficiat.
  32. Vat. praeter fidem plurimorum mss. et ed. 1 simul pro similiter; cod. I similiter et.
    The Vatican edition, against the trust of very many manuscripts and ed. 1, [reads] simul for similiter; codex I [reads] similiter et.
  33. Cod. V addit vero.
    Codex V adds vero.
  34. Supple cum cod. E: anima.
    Supply with codex E: anima.
  35. Antiquam lectionem mss. et ed. 1 restituimus ponendo quod est extra illam loco quod non est extra aliam. Paulo ante cod. W particulae ita praefigit ideo. — De hac solutione cfr. Aristot., I. de Anima, text. 61. (c. 4.).
    We have restored the ancient reading of the manuscripts and ed. 1 by putting quod est extra illam in place of quod non est extra aliam. A little before, codex W prefixes ideo to the particle ita. — On this solution, cf. Aristotle, I On the Soul, text 61 (c. 4).
  36. Libr. II. de Anima, text. 41. (c. 4.). — Immediate post corrupta et falsa lectio Vat. et cod. cc et ita corpus humanum non potest resarcitur ex aliis mss. et ed. 1. Mox multorum codd. ut A F G H K T etc. et ed. 1 auctoritate substituimus posset loco possit.
    Book II On the Soul, text 41 (c. 4). — Immediately after, the corrupt and false reading of the Vatican edition and codex cc, et ita corpus humanum non potest, is repaired from the other manuscripts and ed. 1. Then on the authority of many codices such as A, F, G, H, K, T, etc., and ed. 1 we have substituted posset for possit.
  37. Unus alterve codex ut I cum ed. 1 non male secundum loco per. Mox codd. O Z ab pro aliquid.
    One or two codices such as I, with ed. 1, not badly [read] secundum in place of per. Then codices O, Z [read] ab in place of aliquid.
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