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Dist. 33, Art. 1, Q. 3

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 33

Textus Latinus
p. 576

Quaestio III.

Utrum notio de notione praedicetur.

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (La.), then the English rendering (En.).

Tertio quaeritur de comparatione unius notionis ad aliam. Et quaeritur, utrum una notio sive proprietas unius personae praedicetur de alia1. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Syllogismo expositorio. De necessitate enim sequitur, ut dicitur in arte Priorum2, hoc A est B; hoc A est C eodem demonstrato: ergo C est B; et fundatur iste syllogismus super illud principium per

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se notum: quaecumque uni et eidem sunt eadem, inter se sunt eadem. Fiat ergo talis syllogismus: Pater est paternitas; Pater est innascibilitas: ergo paternitas est innascibilitas. Si tu dicas, quod accidens3 peccat contra istam consequentiam et contra illud principium, ut patet hic: Petrus est individuum; Petrus est homo: ergo homo est individuum; contra hoc obiicitur, quia ubi est accidens, ibi est et accidentalis praedicatio; sed cum dicitur: Pater est paternitas, Pater est innascibilitas, non est accidentalis praedicatio, quia est in abstractione: ergo non est ibi accidens. — Item bene sequitur concretive: Pater generat; Pater est innascibilis: ergo innascibilis generat; et tamen magis importatur sic4 praedicatio per modum accidentis: ergo multo fortius sequitur in abstracto: ergo haec est vera: paternitas est innascibilitas.

2. Item, hoc ostenditur a minori sic: maior est unio proprietatum in una persona sive in supposito incommunicabili quam proprietatum5 in una natura communi; sed tanta est unio proprietatum in una natura communi, quod una est alia, ut bonitas est sapientia: ergo multo fortius in persona una proprietas praedicatur de alia.

3. Item, maior est unio proprietatum in una persona quam proprietatis et essentiae in persona — quia ibi unio quantum ad rem est aequalis, et quantum ad modum magis convenit proprietas cum proprietate, quam proprietas cum natura sive essentia — sed tanta est unio essentiae et proprietatis in persona, quod una de alia praedicatur, ut paternitas est deitas: ergo etc.

4. Item, maior est unio proprietatum5 in una persona quam duarum naturarum in eadem persona — sed propter convenientiam naturarum in una persona Christi est communicatio idiomatum, quia Deus est homo, et homo Deus: ergo pari ratione propter convenientiam proprietatum in una hypostasi una de alia praedicatur.

Contra:

1. Sicut se habet persona ad personam, ita notio ad notionem; sed una persona non praedicatur de alia persona: ergo nec una notio de alia notione.

2. Item, quod praedicatur de aliquo in abstractione non facit numerum cum illo6: ergo si notio de notione praedicatur, non sunt plures notiones, sed una.

3. Item, si notio praedicatur de notione, spiratio est generatio, cum haec sit vera: Pater spirat Spiritum sanctum, et spirare est generare: ergo et haec similiter erit vera: Pater generat Spiritum sanctum.

Conclusio.

Duae notiones unius personae in concreto de se invicem praedicari possunt, non vero in abstracto.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod est praedicatio per identitatem et praedicatio per inhaerentiam. Praedicatio per inhaerentiam est in concretione, et hoc est7 ratione suppositi, ut album est musicum. Praedicatio vero per identitatem est in abstractione et ratione formae, non suppositi, ut iustitia est bonitas.

Dico ergo, quod notio ad notionem dupliciter potest comparari: vel in concretione, vel in abstractione. Si in concretione, sic una praedicatur de alia, ut generans est spirans, et Pater est innascibilis, et hoc, quia conveniunt in supposito. Si autem in abstractione, quia tunc notio pure importat ipsum respectum, et in una eademque persona sunt diversi respectus sine sui compositione, et hoc secundum diversas comparationes; sic una de alia non praedicatur.

Ad argumenta:

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur de syllogismo; dicendum, quod contra illum syllogismum peccat accidens, sicut patet in exemplo prius posito; unde non valet forma syllogismi. Similiter illud principium8 intelligendum est secundum idem. Non enim sequitur, quod si aliqua duo sunt similia uni, quod sint similia inter se, nisi sint similia secundum idem. Similiter oportet etiam in relationibus ad hoc, quod sit identitas unius ad aliam, quod non tantum in eodem9 et secundum idem, verum etiam sint ad idem.

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Quoniam igitur relationes diversae in eadem persona non sunt ad idem sive ad eundem, ideo non sequitur, quod si conveniant in supposito, quod propter hoc conveniant inter se. Et sic patet, quod nec syllogismus nec principium convenit.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non est ibi accidens; dicendum, quod fallacia accidentis non solum attenditur quantum ad praedicatum accidentale, sed etiam attenditur quantum ad principii variationem, ita quod in una sola acceptione conveniat, in alia sit extraneum; sic est in proposito. Nam Pater secundum aliam comparationem est innascibilitas, secundum aliam est paternitas; ita quod paternitas nullo modo dicit comparationem ad prius10, nec positive, nec privative, quantum est de sua ratione: et ideo patet etc.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur per similitudinem unionis duorum in tertio; dicendum, quod praedicatio per identitatem potest esse tripliciter: aut ita quod essentia comparetur ad essentiam, aut essentia ad proprietatem, aut proprietas ad proprietatem. Quando igitur est praedicatio per identitatem per comparationem essentiae ad essentiam, notatur identitas essentialis, ut cum dicitur, magnitudo est bonitas. Quando iterum per comparationem essentiae ad proprietatem, similiter notatur identitas essentialis. Quando vero est comparatio proprietatis ad proprietatem, quia proprietas non importat nisi rationem et relationem sive respectum, tunc notatur identitas rationis. Et hinc est, quod una proprietas essentialis praedicatur de altera, et proprietas de essentia, quia uniformis modus praedicandi est in his ad se invicem et ad illud in quo conveniunt, quia per identitatem essentiae. Sed non sic est, cum proprietas praedicatur de proprietate. Nam cum proprietas praedicatur de persona, notatur convenientia in substantia et essentia et supposito11. Cum autem praedicatur de alia proprietate, notatur convenientia in ratione et respectu. Et ideo non est simile, immo est ibi accidens: conveniunt in substantia, ergo in respectu.

4. Ad ultimum de convenientia naturarum in una persona patet responsio, quia non est communicatio idiomatum in abstractione, sed in concretione, quia deitas non est humanitas, sed Deus est homo: similiter in proposito est. Ideo patent omnia12.

Scholion

I. Quaestio est de notionibus in eadem persona, v. g. de paternitate et spiratione activa in Patre. Cum enim attributa divina virtualiter inter se distincta praedicentur de se invicem et proprietas de essentia, videtur, quod etiam proprietates eiusdem personae de se praedicari possint (quae ratio solvitur ad 2. 3.). Sed responsio negativa est communis. Schola autem S. Thomae non admittit hic nisi distinctionem virtualem; Scotus adhibet distinctionem suam formalem, S. Bonaventura illam distinctionem attributionis, de qua supra d. 26. q. 1. locuti sumus.

II. De diversis speciebus praedicationis vide supra d. 30. q. 1. Scholion. — De differentia inter praedicationem per identitatem et aliam per inhaerentiam sive denominationem (quae a Scoto vocatur formalis) plura vide d. 5. a. 1. q. 1. ad 2, d. 31. q. 2, et III. Sent. d. 8. a. 1. q. 3. in corp. Praedicatio per identitatem fit inter terminos abstractos, vel saltem cum uno abstracto, non ratione suppositi, sed formae, ut sapientia est bonitas, essentia est Pater. Haec proprie non valet in creatis (d. 5. a. 1. q. 1. ad 2.), sed veraciter adhibetur in divinis (d. 31. q. 2.), sive haec sint idem secundum substantiam, at diversum secundum rationem intelligendi (ut bonitas est sapientia), sive sint idem secundum substantiam, diversum secundum modum se habendi vel non se habendi, ut persona et substantia (ibid. ad 5.). Tamen praedicatio per identitatem minus servat proprietatem praedicationis quam altera (III. Sent. d. 3. dub. 4.). Praedicatio denominativa fit in forma concreta et ratione suppositi. Haec (ut dicitur III. Sent. d. 6. a. 1. q. 3. ad 4.) «potest esse quatuor modis: per modum inhaerentiae sive per modum accidentis, ut cum dicitur: iste est albus; per modum transmutationis, ut cum dicitur: Petrus est dealbatus; per modum possessionis, ut cum dicitur: asinus Socratis; per modum unionis, ut cum dicitur ferrum ignitum, id est igni unitum, et corpus animatum, id est animae unitum». — Vocabulum denominativum sumtum est ex Aristotele (De praedicam. c. 1.), qui distinguit ὁμώνυμα, συνώνυμα, παρώνυμα (denominativa).

III. Conveniunt auctores in conclusione. Alex. Hal., de hac et seq. q. S. p. 1. q. 68. m. 5. a. 4. 5. et 6. § 6. — Scot., Report. hic q. 3. ad 3. — S. Thom., I. Sent. d. 27. q. 1. a. 1. ad 3; S. I. q. 32. a. 3. ad 3. — B. Albert., hic a. 4. 7. — Petr. a Tar., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 4. a. 1. 2. — Richard. a Med., de hac et seq. q. hic a. 3. q. 1. 2. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 75. q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., d. 26. q. 1. (breviter quaestio tangitur).

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English Translation
p. 576

Question III. Whether one notion is predicated of another notion.

Thirdly, inquiry is made concerning the comparison of one notion to another. And it is asked, whether one notion or property of one person is predicated of another1. And that it is so, it appears:

1. By an expository syllogism. For of necessity it follows, as is said in the Prior [Analytics]2: this A is B; this A is C, the same [middle] being demonstrated: therefore C is B; and this syllogism is founded upon that self-evident principle:

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whatsoever things are the same as one and the same thing are the same as one another. Let, then, such a syllogism be made: the Father is paternity; the Father is unbegottenness: therefore paternity is unbegottenness. If you say that "accident"3 sins against this consequence and against that principle, as appears here: Peter is an individual; Peter is a man: therefore man is an individual; against this it is objected that, where there is an accident, there also is accidental predication; but when it is said: "the Father is paternity, the Father is unbegottenness," there is not accidental predication, since it is in the abstract: therefore there is no accident there. — Likewise, it follows well concretively: the Father generates; the Father is unbegotten: therefore the unbegotten generates; and yet thus4 the predication is more imported by way of an accident: therefore much more strongly does it follow in the abstract: therefore this is true: paternity is unbegottenness.

2. Likewise, this is shown a minori thus: greater is the union of properties in one person or in an incommunicable supposit than [the union] of properties5 in one common nature; but so great is the union of properties in one common nature that one is the other, as goodness is wisdom: therefore much more strongly in [one] person is one property predicated of another.

3. Likewise, greater is the union of properties in one person than [the union] of property and essence in a person — since there the union as to the thing is equal, and as to the mode property agrees more with property than property with nature or essence — but so great is the union of essence and property in a person that the one is predicated of the other, as paternity is deity: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, greater is the union of properties5 in one person than [the union] of two natures in the same person — but on account of the agreement of the natures in the one person of Christ there is the communication of idioms, since God is man and man is God: therefore by parity of reason, on account of the agreement of properties in one hypostasis, the one is predicated of the other.

On the contrary:

1. As person is to person, so is notion to notion; but one person is not predicated of another person: therefore neither is one notion of another notion.

2. Likewise, what is predicated of something in the abstract does not make a number with it6: therefore if notion is predicated of notion, there are not several notions, but one.

3. Likewise, if notion is predicated of notion, [then] spiration is generation, since this is true: "the Father spirates the Holy Spirit," and "to spirate is to generate": therefore this likewise will be true: "the Father generates the Holy Spirit."

Conclusion.

Two notions of one person can be predicated of one another in the concrete, but not in the abstract.

I respond: It must be said that there is predication by identity and predication by inherence. Predication by inherence is in concretion, and this is7 by reason of the supposit, as the white [thing] is musical. But predication by identity is in abstraction and by reason of the form, not of the supposit, as justice is goodness.

I say therefore that notion to notion can be compared in two ways: either in concretion, or in abstraction. If in concretion, thus the one is predicated of the other, as the one generating is the one spirating, and the Father is unbegotten, and this, because they agree in the supposit. But if in abstraction — since then the notion purely imports the relation itself, and in one and the same person there are diverse relations without composition of themselves, and this according to diverse comparisons — thus the one is not predicated of the other.

To the arguments:

1. To that, then, which is objected concerning the syllogism; it must be said that against that syllogism the [fallacy of] accident is at play, as is clear in the example previously set down; whence the form of the syllogism does not hold. Likewise that principle8 must be understood according to "the same." For it does not follow that, if any two things are like one [thing], they are like one another, unless they are like according to the same [respect]. Likewise it is also required, in relations, for there to be identity of one to another, that not only [the things] be in the same [supposit]9 and according to the same, but also that they be ordered to the same.

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Since therefore diverse relations in the same person are not [ordered] to the same nor to the same [term], therefore it does not follow that, if they agree in the supposit, on this account they should agree among themselves. And thus it is plain that neither the syllogism nor the principle applies.

2. To that which is objected, that there is no accident there; it must be said that the fallacy of accident is not only attended to as regards an accidental predicate, but is also attended to as regards a variation of the [middle] principle, such that it agrees in one acceptance only, [but] in another is foreign [to the matter]; so it is in the case proposed. For the Father, according to one comparison, is unbegottenness; according to another is paternity; so that paternity in no way expresses comparison to a prior10, neither positively nor privatively, so far as concerns its own nature: and so it is plain etc.

3. To that which is objected through the likeness of the union of two [things] in a third; it must be said that predication by identity can be threefold: either [taking it] thus, that essence is compared to essence, or essence to property, or property to property. When, then, there is predication by identity through the comparison of essence to essence, an essential identity is noted, as when it is said, magnitude is goodness. When again through the comparison of essence to property, likewise an essential identity is noted. But when there is comparison of property to property, since property imports nothing but a relation [ratio] and relation [relatio] or respect, then an identity of ratio is noted. And hence it is that one essential property is predicated of another, and property of essence, since the mode of predicating is uniform in these toward one another and toward that in which they agree, since by identity of essence. But it is not so, when property is predicated of property. For when property is predicated of person, an agreement is noted in substance and essence and supposit11. But when it is predicated of another property, an agreement is noted in ratio and respect. And therefore it is not similar; rather, there is an accident there: they agree in substance, therefore in respect.

4. To the last, concerning the agreement of natures in one person, the response is plain, since the communication of idioms is not in the abstract but in the concrete, since deity is not humanity, but God is man: likewise it is in the case proposed. Thus all things are plain12.

Scholion

I. The question is concerning the notions in the same person, e.g. concerning paternity and active spiration in the Father. For since the divine attributes, virtually distinct among themselves, are predicated of one another, and property [is predicated] of essence, it appears that the properties of the same person also can be predicated of one another (which reasoning is resolved in [the responses] to 2 and 3). But the negative response is the common [one]. Now the school of St. Thomas does not here admit any [distinction] but a virtual one; Scotus employs his formal [distinction]; St. Bonaventure [employs] that distinction of attribution of which we spoke above at d. 26, q. 1.

II. On the diverse species of predication see above d. 30, q. 1, Scholion. — On the difference between predication by identity and the other, by inherence or denomination (which is called formal by Scotus), see further d. 5, a. 1, q. 1, ad 2; d. 31, q. 2; and III Sent. d. 8, a. 1, q. 3 in the body. Predication by identity is made between abstract terms, or at least with one abstract [term], not by reason of the supposit but of the form, as wisdom is goodness, essence is the Father. This properly does not hold in created things (d. 5, a. 1, q. 1, ad 2), but is truly employed in divine matters (d. 31, q. 2), whether these be the same according to substance, but diverse according to the manner of understanding (as goodness is wisdom), or be the same according to substance, [but] diverse according to the mode of comporting itself or not comporting itself, as person and substance (ibid. ad 5). Yet predication by identity preserves the proper character of predication less than the other does (III Sent. d. 3, dub. 4). Denominative predication is made in concrete form and by reason of the supposit. This (as is said in III Sent. d. 6, a. 1, q. 3, ad 4) "can be in four modes: by way of inherence or by way of an accident, as when it is said, this [thing] is white; by way of transmutation, as when it is said, Peter has been whitened; by way of possession, as when it is said, the donkey of Socrates; by way of union, as when it is said iron set on fire, that is, united to fire, and animated body, that is, united to a soul." — The term denominative is taken from Aristotle (Categories c. 1), who distinguishes ὁμώνυμα, συνώνυμα, παρώνυμα (denominativa).

III. The authors agree on the conclusion. Alex. Hal., on this and the following question, S. p. 1, q. 68, m. 5, a. 4, 5, and 6, § 6. — Scot., Report. here q. 3, ad 3. — St. Thom., I Sent. d. 27, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3; S. I, q. 32, a. 3, ad 3. — B. Albert., here a. 4, 7. — Petr. a Tar., on this and the following question, here q. 4, a. 1, 2. — Richard a Med., on this and the following question, here a. 3, q. 1, 2. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 75, q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., d. 26, q. 1 (the question is touched on briefly).

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Sive includit in sua formali significatione. Ut enim Alex. Hal., S. I. q. 36. m. 5. in fine ait: «Illud dicitur supponi supposito, quod est in intentione eius in rectitudine, ut supposito homine supponitur animal, et supposito Petro supponitur homo: essentia autem in ratione personae non est secundum rectitudinem, sed oblique. Similiter, supposita notione non supponitur persona. Vel si coarctetur intentio suppositi, illud dicitur supponi altero supposito, quando quod attribuitur uni attribuitur alteri; ideo dixerunt antiqui, quod licet persona essentia esset, quia tamen persona generat, essentia non, supposita persona non supponitur essentia; ergo non sequitur: persona gignit; ergo essentia [non] gignit: et hoc, quia non est: ergo persona non est essentia; sed quod altera ratio intelligentiae [est] in hoc nomine persona et in hoc nomine essentia». — Intellige: notione eiusdem personae, v. g. paternitas de innascibilitate.
    Or it includes [it] in its formal signification. For as Alex. Hal., S. I, q. 36, m. 5, says at the end: «That is said to be supposited under a supposit, which is in [the supposit's] intention in the rectitude [of supposition], as under the supposit man there is supposited animal, and under the supposit Peter there is supposited man; but essence in the formal character of the person is not [supposited] according to the rectitude [of supposition], but obliquely. Similarly, when a notion is supposited, person is not supposited [under it]. Or, if the intention of the supposit is constrained, that is said to be supposited under another supposit when what is attributed to one is attributed to the other; therefore the ancients said that, although a person is essence, since nevertheless the person generates, [but] the essence does not, when person is supposited essence is not supposited [under it]; therefore it does not follow: a person begets; therefore essence [does not] beget: and this, because it is not [the case]: therefore a person is not essence; but [it is] that there is another formal character of intelligibility in this name person and in this name essence». — Understand: of a notion of the same person, e.g. paternity of unbegottenness.
  2. Aristot., I. Prior. c. 6. tertiae syllogisticae figurae modos utiles duplici modo probat: per deductionem ad impossibile, et per expositionem (Ἔκθεσις). Probatio per expositionem est illa, in qua, ut B. Albert. ait in Comment. super hunc locum (tract. 2. c. 11), aliquid sensibile sumitur, de quo utraque extremitas universaliter vel particulariter praedicatur; sive, ut Scotus ait, I. Prior. q. 11: «Syllogismus expositorius est ille, cuius medium est terminus discretus (singularis)». Vocatur expositorius, quia rem, quam concludit, ipsis sensibus exponit sive manifestat. — De principio, in quo iste syllogismus innititur, vide supra pag. 516, nota 2.
    Aristotle, Prior [Analytics] I, c. 6, proves the useful modes of the third syllogistic figure in two ways: by reduction ad impossibile, and by exposition (Ἔκθεσις). Proof by exposition is that in which, as B. Albert says in his Commentary on this place (tract. 2, c. 11), something sensible is taken, of which each extreme is predicated universally or particularly; or, as Scotus says, I Prior. q. 11: «An expository syllogism is one whose middle is a discrete (singular) term». It is called expository because it sets forth or makes manifest, to the senses themselves, the thing which it concludes. — On the principle on which this syllogism is grounded, see above p. 516, note 2.
  3. Id est fallacia accidentis.
    That is, the fallacy of accident.
  4. Codd. L T hic; multi codd. perperam sicut. Mox pro sequitur codd. I aa bb sequeretur.
    Codices L and T [read] hic ("here"); many codices wrongly [read] sicut ("just as"). Soon, for sequitur ("it follows"), codices I, aa, bb [read] sequeretur ("it would follow").
  5. Cod. W unitas. — Aliqui codd., ut H V Y, cum ed. 1 et pro est. — Vat. cum pluribus codd. et ed. 1 proprietatis; minus recte. Voci unio codd. B E I X aa bb praemittunt unitas vel. Mox post convenientiam in cod. bb repetitur duarum.
    Codex W [reads] unitas ("unity"). — Some codices, as H, V, Y, with edition 1 [read] et in place of est. — The Vatican [edition], with several codices and edition 1, [reads] proprietatis ("of property"); less correctly. To the word unio codices B, E, I, X, aa, bb prefix unitas vel ("unity or"). Soon after convenientiam, in codex bb, duarum ("of two") is repeated.
  6. Quia per abstractionem tollitur ratio compositionis, v. g. subiectum, in quo plura inter se diversa possent uniri.
    Because by abstraction the formal character of composition is removed, e.g. the subject in which several things diverse among themselves could be united.
  7. Multi codd. hic repetunt in, at minus congrue.
    Many codices here repeat in, but less fittingly.
  8. Intellige: identitatis, in obiectione allatum.
    Understand: [the principle] of identity, the one brought forward in the objection.
  9. Vat. cum cod. cc non tantum eadem sint et sint secundum etc.; vetustioribus codd. cum ed. 1 nostram lectionem exhibentibus, eo tamen discrimine interposito, quod non pauci ex illis, ut A C F H K L R S T U V, pro in eodem substituunt in eadem, scil. persona. — Cfr. Scot., I. Prior. q. 11, ubi quaestio: utrum syllogismus expositorius teneat gratia formae, resolvitur hoc modo: quod syllogismus expositorius tenet gratia formae in omnibus terminis, dum tamen praemissae regulentur debite per dici de omni vel de nullo, ita quod terminus discretus distribuatur mediantibus istis dictionibus (i. e. ita quod terminus discretus sive singularis accipiatur secundum idem in praemissis).
    The Vatican [edition], with codex cc, [reads] non tantum eadem sint et sint secundum etc.; the older codices with edition 1 exhibit our reading, with this distinction interposed, however, that not a few of them, as A, C, F, H, K, L, R, S, T, U, V, in place of in eodem substitute in eadem, namely persona. — Cf. Scot., I Prior. q. 11, where the question, whether an expository syllogism holds by virtue of the form, is resolved in this way: that an expository syllogism holds by virtue of the form in all terms, provided that the premises be duly regulated by the dici de omni vel de nullo, so that the discrete term is distributed by means of those expressions (i.e. so that the discrete or singular term is taken according to the same in the premises).
  10. Vat. perperam praedicati contra codd. et alias sex edd. — Codd. L sic prosequuntur: innascibilitas privat comparationem ad prius, paternitas vero nullo modo etc.
    The Vatican [edition] wrongly [reads] praedicati ("of the predicate") against the codices and the other six editions. — Codices L continue thus: unbegottenness denies comparison to a prior, but paternity in no way etc.
  11. Multi codd. cum edd. 2, 3 in supposito; alii, ut C L R U bb, et in supposito. Paulo superius, post notatur, cod. V inserit identitas vel.
    Many codices, with editions 2 and 3, [read] in supposito ("in the supposit"); others, as C, L, R, U, bb, [read] et in supposito ("and in the supposit"). A little earlier, after notatur, codex V inserts identitas vel ("identity or").
  12. Pro omnia aliqui codd. obiecta; codd. B X omnia obiecta.
    In place of omnia ("all things"), some codices [read] obiecta ("the objections"); codices B, X [read] omnia obiecta ("all the objections").
← Dist. 33, Art. 1, Q. 2Dist. 33, Art. 1, Q. 4→