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Dist. 27, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 3

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 27

Textus Latinus
p. 475

QUAESTIO III. Utrum proprietates possint abstrahi a personis divinis.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum contingat proprietates abstrahi. Et quod non, videtur:

1. Quia omnis abstractio supponit concretionem; sed in eis solum proprie est concretio, in quibus est denominativa praedicatio1: ergo si hoc est in accidentibus tantum, videtur, quod ubicumque est ponere proprietatem abstrahibilem, est ponere proprietatem accidentalem. Sed talis nullo modo ponitur in divinis: ergo etc.

2. Item, ubicumque est abstractio, abstractum est simplicius concreto2 — hoc non habet instantiam — sed in divinis non est maior simplicitas et minor, cum omne quod est ibi, sit simplicissimum et in fine totius simplicitatis est: ergo in divinis non cadit abstractio.

3. Item, omnis abstractio aut est universalis a particulari, aut est formae a materia3; sed in divinis nec est universale nec particulare, nec forma nec materia: ergo in divinis non est abstractio.

4. Item, quandocumque abstrahitur aliquid ab aliquo, minus4 est quod remanet, quam ante abstractionem erat, quia utrumque aliquid est — nihil enim non abstrahitur ab aliquo, nec nihil a nihilo, sed aliquid ab aliquo — ergo si paternitas a persona vel hypostasi est abstrahibilis, ergo minus haberet de entitate quam cum paternitate. Sed contra: paternitate abstracta, intelligitur hypostasis esse Deus: ergo si minus haberet de entitate quam cum paternitate, intelligeretur Deus non habere summum esse.

Contra: 1. Magister dicit in littera5: «Paternitas, filiatio, processio ipsas tantum relationes significant»: aut ergo aliquid huic respondet in re, aut nihil. Si nihil: ergo falso et inaniter significant; si aliquid: ergo videtur, quod sint abstrahibiles a parte rei.

2. Item, non intellecto Filio, nihilominus potest intelligi hypostasis Patris esse; sed non intellecto Filio, non potest intelligi paternitas: ergo abstracta6 proprietate, adhuc potest intelligi hypostasis illa esse, cuius erat proprietas. Sed quandocumque aliqua duo sic se habent, quod unum potest intelligi sine altero, unum potest abstrahi ab altero: ergo vere potest intelligi proprietas abstrahi ab hypostasi.

3. Item, cum dico personam, intelligo habentem naturam cum7 proprietate incommunicabili; sed constat, hoc totum non simul intelligi, ergo prius unum, postea alterum: ergo prius intelligo naturam, deinde habentem, et tertio proprietatem incommunicabilem: ergo unumquodque per se est intelligibile, ergo et proprietas sine subiecto: ergo ab ipso est abstrahibilis. Si tu dicas mihi, quod a parte intellectus potest abstrahi, sed non a parte rei; contra: tunc secundum hoc, si abstractio est a parte modi intelligendi, ergo notio et persona non differunt nisi solo modo loquendi; et hoc est supra improbatum8.

4. Item, relatio in divinis est vera relatio, quia, ut dicit Boethius9: «Deus non est sine relatione relatus»; sed ubi est vere quantitas et quantum, ibi est vera abstractio, non tantum a parte intellectus, sed etiam rei: ergo pari ratione, ubi est vera relatio et vere relatus, ibi est vera abstractio.

5. Item, quandocumque aliqua proprietas habet distingui ab alia secundum rem, a qua non distinguitur secundum suppositum, ibi est abstractio non solum a parte intellectus, sed etiam a parte rei; sed paternitas differt ab innascibilitate, non autem differt Pater ab Innascibili10: ergo vere et proprie est abstrahibilis proprietas sive notio a persona non solum a parte nostra, sed etiam a parte rei.

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CONCLUSIO. Abstractio proprietatum non est in divinis personis a parte rei, sed a parte intellectus nostri.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod abstrahi aliquid ab aliquo est dupliciter. Uno modo abstractio est11 quae ortum habet a natura rei; et sic abstrahitur universale a particulari, et forma a materia, quoniam utrobique est compositio et diversitas. Alio modo est abstractio, quae ortum habet ab intellectu nostro. Intellectus enim noster cum intelligit aliquid completum, de necessitate dupliciter intelligit sive sub duplici ratione, scilicet per modum ipsius quod est et ipsius quo12. Semper enim cum aliquid intelligit, considerat ipsum intelligibile per aliquam rationem, per quam etiam ipsum capit; et ita intellectus noster est resolubilis in intellectum ipsius quod est et ipsius quo13, quia compositio erat circa ipsum.

Quoniam igitur realis abstractio praesupponit compositionem, quae nullo modo est in Deo, nec quantum ad essentiam nec quantum ad personam; ideo nullo modo est ibi abstractio a parte rei. Rursus, quoniam Deum intelligimus secundum possibilitatem14 intellectus nostri, ideo intellectus noster intelligit Deum per modum ipsius quod et ipsius quo; et intellectus noster est resolubilis, et quia resolubilis, etiam compositus, quamvis res non sit composita. Quantum ad ipsum potest esse abstractio et separatio, ut intelligat ipsum quo est, quod est non intelligendo15. Et quoniam modus significandi consequitur modum intelligendi, ideo contingit significare ipsum quo in abstractione, et hoc ex parte communicabilis, ut cum dicitur deitas16; et ex parte incommunicabilis, ut cum dicitur paternitas.

Concedo ergo, sicut manifestant primae rationes, quod non est ibi realis abstractio.

1. 2. 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur in contrarium de significatione, dicendum, quod aliquid respondet a parte nostri intellectus; nec oportet, quod respondeat abstractio. Sicut enim intellectus noster, licet sit compositus, vere intelligit simplex per modum compositi, quia ponit illam compositionem circa se, non circa rem intellectam; ita est omnino intelligendum de abstractione. Et per hoc patent duo sequentia, quae sunt sumta a ratione intelligendi.

Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod tunc differunt solum modo loquendi; dicendum, quod, sicut tactum fuit in distinctione praecedenti18, relatio secundum comparationem ad subiectum transit, secundum comparationem ad obiectum sive terminum manet; et hoc est17, quia abstractio est formae a subiecto, non a termino, quia paternitas abstrahitur19 a Patre, non a Filio; et quantum ad comparationem ad subiectum est omnino idem, ideo nullo modo est abstrahibilis a parte rei. Nihilominus tamen differre potest aliquo modo per comparationem ad obiectum, quae quidem differentia sumitur a parte rei; sed sicut illa differentia nihil facit ad compositionem, ita nihil facit ad abstractionem.

4. 3. Et sic patent duo sequentia, quia relatio manet et distinguitur ab alia; sed hoc est per comparationem ad obiectum, non ad subiectum20.

Scholion

I. Cum proprietates personarum divinarum, ut paternitas, vocabulo abstracto exprimantur, quaestio oritur, in quo sensu abstractio fieri possit. Abstractio, sicut distinctio, potest esse tum realis (a parte rei), quae importat compositionem in re, a qua abstrahitur, tum secundum modum intelligendi, quae non supponit talem compositionem. Primae speciei abstractionis duplex affertur exemplum, et secundum fundam. 3. et S. Thom., S. I. q. 40. a. 3. haec species iterum dividitur in duas inferiores species, scilicet quatenus abstrahitur vel universale a particulari, vel forma a materia. Haec distinctio est Aristotelis et explicatur a S. Thom. in Comment. ad II. Phys. text. 18. lect. 3. «Considerandum his verbis est, quod multa sunt coniuncta secundum rem, quorum unum non est de intellectu alterius... et ideo potest unum separatim intelligi sine alio. Et hoc est unum intellectum esse abstractum ab alio. Manifestum est autem, quod posteriora non sunt de intellectu priorum, sed e contra. Unde priora possunt intelligi sine posterioribus, et non e contra: sicut patet quod animal est prius homine, et

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prius est homo hoc homine. Nam homo se habet ex additione ad animal, et hic homo ex additione ad hominem. Et propter hoc homo non est de intellectu animalis, nec Socrates de intellectu hominis: unde animal potest intelligi absque homine, et homo absque Socrate et aliis individuis; et hoc est abstrahere universale a particulari. Deinde explicat abstractionem, quam mathematici faciunt a materia sensibili et naturali. «Similiter autem et inter accidentia omnia, quae adveniunt substantiae, primo advenit ei quantitas, et deinde qualitates sensibiles et actiones et passiones et motus, consequentes sensibiles qualitates. Sic igitur quantitas non claudit in sui intellectu qualitates sensibiles vel passiones vel motus; claudit tamen in sui intellectu substantiam... Et ideo huiusmodi quantitates et quae eis accidunt, sunt secundum intellectum abstracta a motu et a materia sensibili, ut dicitur in VII. Metaph. Quia igitur sic sunt abstracta a motu secundum intellectum, quod non claudunt in suo intellectu materiam sensibilem subiectam motui; ideo mathematicus potest abstrahere a materia sensibili, et nihil differt quantum ad veritatem considerationis, utrum sic vel sic considerentur». Ibidem Angelicus loquitur etiam de errore Platonis, quod docuerit, omnia quae sunt abstracta secundum intellectum, esse abstracta secundum rem. Brulifer (ad hunc locum) intelligit abstractionem formae a materia de separatione animae a corpore, interveniente morte. Aptius intelligitur de abstractione mathematica, «sicut forma circuli abstrahitur per intellectum ab omni materia sensibili» (S. Thom., Sum. loc. cit.). — Plura de speciebus abstractionis vide in S. Bonav., IV. Sent. d. 30. p. II. a. I. q. 1, ubi in fundam. I. et in corp. triplicem gradum abstractionis distinguit secundum actum sentiendi, imaginandi et intelligendi.

II. Licet abstractio realis vel a parte rei non admittatur, tamen minime sequitur, proprietates ab essentia et inter se solo modo loquendi distingui, ut vult Praepositivus. Haec opinio explicite reprobatur in solut. ad 3, et infra d. 33. q. 1. (cfr. etiam supra d. 26. q. 1. Scholion). — S. Thom., S. I. q. 32. a. 2, et q. 40. a. 3. eandem omnino doctrinam ex iisdem principiis docet.

III. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 68. m. 5. a. 6. § 2. — Scot., I. Report. d. 26. q. 3; Quodlib. q. 4. — S. Thom., I. Sent. d. 26. q. 1. a. 2; S. I. q. 40. a. 3. — B. Albert., I. Sent. d. 26. a. 8. — Petr. a Tar., I. Sent. d. 26. q. 1. a. 4. — Richard. a Med., I. Sent. d. 26. a. 2. q. 1. 2. — Aegid. R., I. Sent. d. 26. princ. 1. q. 3. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 56. q. 3. n. 7. seqq. — Dionys. Carth., I. Sent. d. 26. q. 3.

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English Translation

QUESTION III. Whether the properties may be abstracted from the divine persons.

Thirdly it is asked whether the properties may be abstracted. And that they may not, [it is shown] thus:

1. Because every abstraction presupposes concretion; but properly speaking concretion is found only in those things in which there is denominative predication1: therefore if this is [found] in accidents only, it seems that wherever one posits an abstractable property, one posits an accidental property. But no such [accidental property] is in any way posited in divine things: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, wherever there is abstraction, the abstract is simpler than the concrete2 — and this admits no instance against it — but in divine things there is no greater and lesser simplicity, since everything that is there is most simple and is at the limit of all simplicity: therefore in divine things abstraction does not occur.

3. Likewise, every abstraction is either of the universal from the particular, or of form from matter3; but in divine things there is neither universal nor particular, neither form nor matter: therefore in divine things there is no abstraction.

4. Likewise, whenever something is abstracted from something, what remains is less4 than was [there] before the abstraction, since each [item] is something — for nothing is not abstracted from something, nor nothing from nothing, but something from something — therefore if paternity is abstractable from the person or hypostasis, then [the hypostasis] would have less of entity than [it had] with paternity. But on the contrary: with paternity abstracted, the hypostasis is understood to be God: therefore if it had less of entity than [it had] with paternity, God would be understood not to have supreme being.

On the contrary: 1. The Master says in the littera5: «Paternity, filiation, [and] procession signify only the relations themselves»: either therefore something corresponds to this in reality, or nothing. If nothing: therefore they signify falsely and emptily; if something: therefore it seems that they are abstractable on the side of the thing.

2. Likewise, with the Son not being understood, nevertheless the hypostasis of the Father can be understood to be; but with the Son not being understood, paternity cannot be understood: therefore with the property abstracted6, the hypostasis whose property it was can still be understood to be. But whenever any two [items] so stand to one another that one can be understood without the other, the one can be abstracted from the other: therefore the property can truly be understood to be abstracted from the hypostasis.

3. Likewise, when I say person, I understand [one] having a nature with7 an incommunicable property; but it is established that this whole is not understood all at once — therefore [I understand] one [item] first, the other afterward: therefore I understand the nature first, then [the one] having [it], and thirdly the incommunicable property: therefore each [item] is intelligible per se, therefore the property too without a subject: therefore it is abstractable from it. If you say to me that it can be abstracted on the side of the intellect, but not on the side of the thing; on the contrary: then according to this, if the abstraction is on the side of the mode of understanding, then notion and person do not differ except by the mode of speaking alone; and this has been disproved above8.

4. Likewise, relation in divine things is true relation, since, as Boethius says9: «God is not without being related by relation»; but where there is truly quantity and a quantum, there is true abstraction, not only on the side of the intellect, but also of the thing: therefore by parity of reason, where there is true relation and [something] truly related, there is true abstraction.

5. Likewise, whenever some property is distinguished from another according to the thing, from which it is not distinguished according to the supposit, there is abstraction not only on the side of the intellect, but also on the side of the thing; but paternity differs from unbegottenness, while the Father does not differ from the Unbegotten10: therefore truly and properly the property or notion is abstractable from the person not only on our side, but also on the side of the thing.

CONCLUSION. The abstraction of the properties is not in the divine persons on the side of the thing, but on the side of our intellect.

I respond: It must be said that to abstract something from something is twofold. In one mode the abstraction is11 one which has its origin from the nature of the thing; and thus the universal is abstracted from the particular, and form from matter, since in either case there is composition and diversity. In another mode there is abstraction which has its origin from our intellect. For our intellect, when it understands something complete, of necessity understands [it] in two ways or under a twofold account, namely by way of the quod est itself and of the quo12 itself. For always when it understands something, it considers the intelligible itself through some account, by which it also grasps it; and so our intellect is resolvable into the understanding of the quod est itself and of the quo13 itself, since the composition was about [the thing] itself.

Since therefore real abstraction presupposes composition, which is in no way in God, neither as to essence nor as to person; therefore in no way is there in him abstraction on the side of the thing. Again, since we understand God according to the capacity14 of our intellect, therefore our intellect understands God by way of the quod itself and of the quo itself; and our intellect is resolvable, and because resolvable, also composite, although the thing is not composite. As to [the intellect] itself there can be abstraction and separation, so that it understands the quo est itself, which is to understand non-[whole]15. And since the mode of signifying follows the mode of understanding, therefore it happens that the quo itself is signified in abstraction, and this on the side of the communicable, as when one says deity16; and on the side of the incommunicable, as when one says paternity.

I concede therefore, as the first reasons make plain, that there is no real abstraction there.

1. 2. 3. To that which is objected on the contrary about signification, it must be said that something corresponds [to the abstract term] on the side of our intellect; nor is it required that an abstraction [in reality] correspond. For just as our intellect, although it is composite, truly understands the simple by way of the composite, since it places that composition about itself, not about the thing understood; so also is it altogether to be understood concerning abstraction. And through this the two following [arguments] are plain, which are taken from the account of understanding.

To that which is objected, that then they differ only by the mode of speaking; it must be said that, as was touched in the preceding distinction18, relation passes over according to the comparison to the subject, [but] according to the comparison to the object or term it remains; and this is17, because abstraction is of the form from the subject, not from the term, since paternity is abstracted19 from the Father, not from the Son; and as to the comparison to the subject it is altogether the same, [and] therefore in no way is it abstractable on the side of the thing. Nevertheless it can in some way differ through the comparison to the object, and this difference is taken on the side of the thing; but just as that difference contributes nothing to composition, so it contributes nothing to abstraction.

4. 3. And so the two following [arguments] are plain, since the relation remains and is distinguished from another; but this is through the comparison to the object, not to the subject20.

Scholion

I. Since the properties of the divine persons, e.g. paternity, are expressed by an abstract vocable, the question arises in what sense abstraction can take place. Abstraction, like distinction, can be either real (on the side of the thing), which imports composition in the thing from which the abstraction is made, or [an abstraction] according to the mode of understanding, which does not presuppose such composition. Of the first species of abstraction a twofold example is brought forward, and according to fundamentum 3 and St. Thomas, Summa I, q. 40, a. 3, this species is again divided into two lower species, namely insofar as the universal is abstracted from the particular, or form from matter. This distinction is from Aristotle and is explained by St. Thomas in Comment. on II Phys. text 18, lect. 3. «It must be considered with these words that there are many [items] joined according to the thing, of which one is not part of the understanding of the other... and therefore the one can be understood separately without the other. And this is one understood [item] being abstracted from another. But it is plain that posterior [items] are not part of the understanding of prior [items], but the contrary. Whence prior [items] can be understood without posterior [ones], and not the contrary: as is plain that animal is prior to man, and man is prior to this man. For man stands by addition to animal, and this man by addition to man. And on this account man is not part of the understanding of animal, nor Socrates of the understanding of man: whence animal can be understood apart from man, and man apart from Socrates and the other individuals; and this is to abstract the universal from the particular». Then [the Angelic Doctor] explains the abstraction which the mathematicians make from sensible and natural matter. «Likewise also among all the accidents which come to substance, first quantity comes to it, and then sensible qualities and actions and passions and motions, [which are] consequent upon the sensible qualities. Thus therefore quantity does not enclose in its understanding sensible qualities or passions or motions; yet it does enclose in its understanding substance... And therefore quantities of this sort and what is accidental to them, are according to the understanding abstracted from motion and from sensible matter, as is said in VII Metaph. Since therefore they are thus abstracted from motion according to the understanding, in such wise that they do not enclose in their understanding the sensible matter that is subjected to motion; therefore the mathematician can abstract from sensible matter, and it makes no difference as to the truth of the consideration, whether [things] be considered thus or thus». In the same place the Angelic [Doctor] also speaks of the error of Plato, that he taught that all things which are abstracted according to the understanding, are abstracted according to the thing. Brulifer (on this place) understands the abstraction of form from matter as concerning the separation of the soul from the body, with death intervening. It is more fittingly understood of mathematical abstraction, «as the form of a circle is abstracted by the intellect from all sensible matter» (St. Thomas, Summa loc. cit.). — On the species of abstraction see further in St. Bonaventure, IV Sent. d. 30, p. II, a. I, q. 1, where in fundamentum I and in the body he distinguishes a threefold grade of abstraction according to the act of sensing, imagining, and understanding.

II. Although real abstraction or [abstraction] on the side of the thing be not admitted, yet it by no means follows that the properties are distinguished from the essence and from one another only by the mode of speaking, as Praepositivus would have it. This opinion is explicitly reproved in the solution to [objection] 3, and below in d. 33, q. 1 (cf. also above d. 26, q. 1, Scholion). — St. Thomas, Summa I, q. 32, a. 2, and q. 40, a. 3, teaches altogether the same doctrine from the same principles.

III. Alexander of Hales, Summa p. I, q. 68, m. 5, a. 6, § 2. — Scotus, I Reportata d. 26, q. 3; Quodlib. q. 4. — St. Thomas, I Sent. d. 26, q. 1, a. 2; Summa I, q. 40, a. 3. — Bl. Albert, I Sent. d. 26, a. 8. — Petrus a Tarantasia, I Sent. d. 26, q. 1, a. 4. — Richard of Mediavilla, I Sent. d. 26, a. 2, q. 1, 2. — Aegidius Romanus, I Sent. d. 26, princ. 1, q. 3. — Henry of Ghent, Summa a. 56, q. 3, n. 7 ff. — Dionysius the Carthusian, I Sent. d. 26, q. 3.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Aristot., de Praedicam. c. 1. ait: «Denominativa vero dicuntur quaecumque ab aliquo differentia casu secundum nomen habent appellationem, ut a grammatica grammaticus, et a fortitudine fortis». Duo igitur requiruntur ad hoc, ut aliquid sit denominativum seu denominative de aliquo praedicetur, scil. quod sit concretum adiective (non substantive, ut homo), et quod ab aliquo accidente abstracto derivetur. Hinc et facile intelligitur quod S. Doctor statim adiungit: «ergo si hoc est in accidentibus tantum». Cfr. etiam supra d. 8, a. I. q. 1. ad 2 et 3, ac infra d. 33. q. 3.
    Aristotle, On the Categories c. 1, says: «Denominatives are said to be whatever, differing from something only by case-ending, take their appellation from it according to name, as from grammar a grammarian, and from fortitude a brave man». Two things therefore are required for something to be a denominative or to be predicated denominatively of another, namely that it be concrete adjectivally (not substantively, as man), and that it be derived from some abstracted accident. Hence also is easily understood what the holy Doctor immediately adds: «therefore if this is in accidents only». Cf. also above d. 8, a. I, q. 1, ad 2 and 3, and below d. 33, q. 3.
  2. Abstractum enim dicit formam solam, concretum vero formam cum subiecto.
    For the abstract expresses the form alone, but the concrete the form with its subject.
  3. Cfr. S. Thom., S. I. q. 40. a. 3: Dicendum, quod duplex fit abstractio per intellectum. Una quidem, secundum quod universale abstrahitur a particulari, ut animal ab homine. Alia vero, secundum quod forma abstrahitur a materia, sicut forma circuli abstrahitur per intellectum ab omni materia sensibili. — Cfr. etiam Aristot., II. Phys. text. 18. (c. 2.); III. de Anima, text. 10. seqq. 33. et 39. (c. 4. 6. 8.), et XIII. atque XIV. Metaph. per totum (XII. XIII.); et S. Thom. nec non Averroes in Comment. in hos textus.
    Cf. St. Thomas, Summa I, q. 40, a. 3: It must be said that a twofold abstraction is made by the intellect. One indeed, according as the universal is abstracted from the particular, as animal from man. Another, according as form is abstracted from matter, as the form of a circle is abstracted by the intellect from all sensible matter. — Cf. also Aristotle, II Phys. text 18 (c. 2); III On the Soul, text 10 ff., 33, and 39 (cc. 4, 6, 8), and XIII and XIV Metaph. throughout (XII, XIII); and St. Thomas as well as Averroes in their Commentary on these texts.
  4. Hic, c. 2. — Paulo inferius pro huic, quod in plerisque codd. nec non in ed. 1 exstat, Vat. cum paucis codd. adhuc, codd. A H N X V Mc.
    Here, c. 2. — A little below, in place of huic, which appears in most of the codices and also in ed. 1, the Vatican [edition] [reads otherwise] with [the support of] a few codices still — codd. A H N X V Mc.
  5. Cod. W subiungit hac.
    Cod. W appends hac.
  6. Pro cum, quod etiam Vat. exhibet cum cod. cc, multi codd. cum ed. 1 ex.
    In place of cum, which the Vatican [edition] also exhibits with cod. cc, many codices with ed. 1 [read] ex.
  7. Dist. 26. q. 1.
    Distinction 26, q. 1.
  8. Vide supra pag. 397, nota 2. — Minor argumenti insinuatur ab Aristot., III. de Anima, illis textibus, quos paulo ante citavimus. — In fine argumenti ante abstractio Vat. cum solo cod. cc omittit vera.
    See above p. 397, note 2. — The minor of the argument is intimated by Aristotle, III On the Soul, in those texts which we cited a little before. — At the end of the argument, before abstractio, the Vatican [edition] with only cod. cc omits vera.
  9. Vat., praestantioribus codd. nec non ed. 1 refragantibus, differt ab innascibili Patre.
    The Vatican [edition], with the better codices and ed. 1 contradicting [it], [reads] differt ab innascibili Patre ("differs from the unbegotten Father").
  10. Pro abstractio est Vat. abstractione; lectio corrupta. Immediate post sicut et paulo inferius ex codd. I P Q aa revocavimus ortum, pro quo vocabulo Vat. cum aliis mss. ponit totum.
    In place of abstractio est, the Vatican [edition] [reads] abstractione; a corrupt reading. Immediately after sicut and a little below, from codd. I P Q aa we have restored ortum, in place of which word the Vatican [edition] with the other manuscripts puts totum.
  11. Cod. K, omisso ipsius et addito est, lectionem praebet: et quo est.
    Cod. K, with ipsius omitted and est added, gives the reading: et quo est.
  12. Cod. K P Q X repetunt est.
    Codd. K P Q X repeat est.
  13. Id est potentialitatem sive imperfectionem. — Non multo post auctoritate codd. T Z et ed. 1 restituimus ideo, quod a Vat. abest. Aliquanto inferius pro etiam compositus cod. 1 est compositus, et multi codd. cum ed. 1 et compositus; minus distincte.
    That is, potentiality or imperfection. — Not much after, on the authority of codd. T Z and ed. 1, we have restored ideo, which is missing from the Vatican [edition]. A little below, in place of etiam compositus, cod. 1 has compositus, and many codices with ed. 1 [read] et compositus; less distinctly.
  14. Vat. cum cod. cc intellecto.
    The Vatican [edition] with cod. cc [reads] intellecto.
  15. Codd., uno vel altero excepto, sicut et sex primae edd. voci deitas praemittunt Deus et, quae lectio tamen non convenit cum eo quod dictum est d. 5. a. I. q. 1.
    The codices, with one or another excepted, just as also the first six editions, prefix Deus et to the word deitas; this reading, however, does not agree with what was said in d. 5, a. I, q. 1.
  16. Cod. addit a parte rei.
    A codex adds a parte rei ("on the side of the thing").
  17. Verba et hoc est, a Vat. suppressa, restituimus ex codd. C F L O R S U W, pro quibus verbis codd. W et ratio est, cod. E et ratio huius est, et codd. A G H K T V Z bb ee ff cum ed. 1 et est. — Paulo superius cod. V solo solum pro solum.
    The words et hoc est, suppressed by the Vatican [edition], we restore from codd. C F L O R S U W; in place of which words codd. W [read] et ratio est, cod. E et ratio huius est, and codd. A G H K T V Z bb ee ff with ed. 1 et est. — A little above, cod. V alone [reads] solum in place of solum [variant spacing].
  18. Quaest. 2.
    Question 2.
  19. Sic codd. L T cum ed. 1; Vat. abstrahit. Paulo post cod. R differt pro differre potest.
    Thus codd. L T with ed. 1; the Vatican [edition] [reads] abstrahit ("abstracts"). A little later cod. R [reads] differt in place of differre potest.
  20. Pro subiectum codd. E K V X rem; edd. 2, 4, 6 ad rem et hoc est subiectum.
    In place of subiectum, codd. E K V X [read] rem; edd. 2, 4, 6 [read] ad rem et hoc est subiectum.
← Dist. 27, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 2Dist. 27, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 4→